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THE  MAJOR  OPERATIONS 

or  THE  NAVIES  m  THE 

WAR  OF  AMERICAN 

INDEPENDENCE 


BY 

A.  T.   MAHAN,   D.C.L.,  LL.D. 

CAPTAIN,    U.    S.    NAVY 

AUTHOR   OF    '  THE    INFLUENCE    OF   SEA    POWER   UPON   HISTORY, 

1660-1783,'    'the    INFLUENCE    OF  SEA  POWER  UPON  THE 

FRENCH    REVOLUTION    AND    EMPIRE,    1783-1S12,' 

*  THE    RELATIONS    OF    SEA    POWER    TO    THE 

WAR    OF    1812,'    '  NAVAL    STRATEGY ' 

ETC. 


WITH  PORTRAITS,  MAPS,  AND  BATTLE  PLANS 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 
1913 


Copyright,  1913, 
By  A.  T.  Mahan. 


AU  rights  reserved 

Published,  October,  1913 


vM 

e^;.. 


The  University  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

The  contents  of  this  volume  were  first  contributed  as  a 
chapter,  under  the  title  of  "  Major  Operations,  1762-1783," 
to  the  ^^  History  of  the  Royal  Navy,"  in  seven  volumes,  pub- 
lished by  Messrs.  Sampson  Low,  Marston,  and  Company, 
under  the  general  editorship  of  the  late  Sir  William  Laird 
Clowes.  For  permission  to  republish  now  in  this  separate 
form,  the  author  has  to  express  his  thanks  to  the  publishers 
of  that  work. 

In  the  Introduction  following  this  Preface,  the  author  has 
summarized  the  general  lesson  to  be  derived  from  the  course 
of  this  War  of  American  Independence,  as  distinct  from  the 
particular  discussion  and  narration  of  the  several  events 
which  constitute  the  body  of  the  treatment.  These  lessons 
he  conceives  to  carry  admonition  for  the  present  and  future 
based  upon  the  surest  foundations ;  namely,  upon  the  experi- 
ence of  the  past  as  applicable  to  present  conditions.  The 
essential  similarity  between  the  two  is  evident  in  a  common 
dependence  upon  naval  strength. 

There  has  been  a  careful  rereading  and  revision  of  the 
whole  text ;  but  the  changes  found  necessary  to  be  made  are 
much  fewer  than  might  have,  been  anticipated  after  the 
lapse  of  fifteen  years.  Numerous  footnotes  in  the  History, 
specifying  the  names  of  ships  in  fleets,  and  of  their  com- 
manders in  various  battles,  have  been  omitted,  as  not  neces- 
sary to  the  present  purpose,  though  eminently  proper  and 
indeed  indispensable  to  an  extensive  work  of  general  refer- 
ence and  of  encyclopaedic  scope,  such  as  the  History  is. 
Certain  notes  retained  with  the  inititials  W.  L.  C.  are  due  to 

the  editor  of  that  work. 

A.  T.  MAHAN. 
December,  1912. 


281293 


CONTENTS 

PACE 

Preface     ..........         .         .         v 

List  of  Illustrations xix 

List  of  Maps xxi 

List  of  Battle-Plans xxiii 

INTEODUCTION 
THE   TENDENCY   OF   WAIIS   TO   SPREAD 

Macaulay  quoted  on  the  action  of  Frederick  the  Great      ...  1 
Illustration  from  Conditions  of  the  Turkish  Empire  ....  2 
Lesson  from  the  Recent  War  in  the  Balkans,  1912-1913    ...  2 
The  War  of  American  Independence  a  striking  example  of  the  Ten- 
dency of  Wars  to  Spread 3 

Origin  and  Train  of  Events  in  that  War,  Traced        ....  3 
Inference  as  to  possible  Train  of  Future  Events  in  the  History  of  the 

United  States 4 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  Simply  a  Formulated  Precaution  against  the 

Tendency  of  Wars  to  Spread 4 

National  Policy  as  to  Asiatic  Immigration 4 

Necessity  of  an  Adequate  Navy  if  these  two  National  Policies  are  to 

be  sustained 4- 

Dependence  on  Navy  Illustrated  in  the  Two  Great  National  Crises ; 

in  the  War  of  Independence  and  in  the  War  of  Secession  .  4  - 

The  United  States  not  great  in  Population  in  proportion  to  Territory  5 

Nor  Wealthy  in  Proportion  to  exposed  Coast-Line    ....  5 

Special  Fitness  of  a  Navy  to  meet  these  particular  conditions   .         .  5 

The  Pacific  a  great  World  Problem,  dependent  mainly  on  Naval  6 

Power 5  ■ 

CHAPTEK   I 

THE   NAVAL   CAMPAIGN   ON   LAKE   CHAMPLAIN 

1775-177G 

Preponderant  effect  of  Control  of  the  Water  upon  the  Struggle  for 

American  Independence ^ 

Deducible  then  from  Reason  and  from  Experience    ....        6 


viii  CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Consequent  Necessity  to  the  Americans  of  a  Counterpoise  to  British 

Navy 6 

This  obtained  through  Burgoyne's  Surrender 6 

The  Surrender  of  Burgoyne  traceable  directly  to  the  Naval  Cam- 
paigns on  Lake  Champlain,  1775,  1776 7 

The  subsequent  Course  of  the  War  in  all  Quarters  of  the  world  due 

to  that  decisive  Campaign 7 

The  Strategic  Problem  of  Lake  Champlain  familiar  to  Americans 

from  the  Wars  between  France  and  Great  Britain  prior  to  1775  8 

Consequent  prompt  Initiative  by  Ethan  Allen  and  Benedict  Arnold  8 

Energetic  Pursuit  of  first  Successes  by  Arnold 9 

Complete  Control  of  Lake  Champlain  thus  secured    ....  9 

Invasion  of  Canada  by  Montgomery,  1775 9 

Arnold  marches  through  Maine  Wilderness  and  joins  Montgomery 

before  Quebec .10 

Assault  on  Quebec.     Failure,  and  Death  of  Montgomery          .         .  10 

Arnold  maintains  Blockade  of  Quebec,  1776 10 

Relief  of  the  Place  by  British  Navy     .                11 

Arnold  Retreats  to  Crown  Point 12 

Arnold's  Schemes  and  Diligence  to  create  a  Lake  Navy,  1776  .         .  13 

Difficulties  to  be  overcome 13 

Superior  Advantages  of  the  British 13 

The  British  by  building  acquire  Superiority,  but  too  late  for  effect 

in  1776 13 

Ultimate  Consequences  from  this  Retardation 14 

Constitution  of  the  Naval  Force  raised  by  Arnold     ....  14 

He  moves  with  it  to  the  foot  of  Lake  Champlain       ....  15 

Takes  position  for  Defence  at  Valcour  Island 15 

Particular  Difficulties  encountered  by  British    .....  15 

Constitution  of  the  British  Lake  Navy 16 

Land  Forces  of  the  Opponents 17 

Naval  Forces  of  the  Two  at  the  Battle  of  Valcour  Island  ...  17 

Magnitude  of  the  Stake  at  Issue .18 

Arnold's  Purposes  and  Plans 18 

Advance  of  the  British 19 

Arnold's  Disposition  of  his  Flotilla  to  receive  Attack        ...  20 

The  Battle  of  Valcour  Island 21 

The  Americans  Worsted 22 

Arnold  Retreats  by  night  Undetected 23 

Pursuit  by  the  British 24 

Destruction  of  the  American  Vessels 25 

British  Appreciation  of  the  Importance  of  the  Action,  as  shown       .  26 

Criticism  of  the  conduct  of  the  Opposing  Leaders      ....  26 

Arnold's  Merit  and  Gallantry 27 


CONTENTS  ix 


PAGE 

End  of  the  Naval  Story  of  the  Lakes 27 

Effect  of  the  Campaign  upon  the  Decisive  Events  of  1777  .        .      28 


CHAPTER   II 

NAVAL  ACTION  AT  BOSTON,  CHARLESTON,  NEW 
YORK,  AND  NARRAGANSETT  BAY  —  ASSOCI- 
ATED LAND  OPERATIONS,  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF 
TRENTON 

1776 

Necessity  that  Force,  if  resorted  to,  be  from  the  first  Adequate         .  29 

Application  to  National  Policy  in  peace 29 

To  the  Monroe  Doctrine 29 

Failure  of  the  British  Government  of  1775  in  this  respect         •         •  30 

Consequences  of  such  failure 30 

General  Howe  evacuates  Boston  and  retires  to  Halifax.     Extent  of 

his  Command 30 

Dissemination  of  Effort  by  British  Government         .        .         .        .  30 

Expedition  against  South  Carolina 31 

Local  Conditions  about  Charleston 32 

Description  of  Fort  Moultrie 33 

Plan  of  British  Naval  Attack 33 

The  Battle  of  Fort  Moultrie 34 

Failure  of  the  Attack.     British  Losses 36 

Comment  upon  the  Action .         .  37 

The  Expedition  retires  to  New  York 38 

The  Howes,  Admiral  and  General,  arrive  in  New  York  Bay     .         .  39 

Operations  about  the  City 39 

Continuous  and  Decisive,  but  Inconspicuous,  Part  played  by  the 

British  Navy 40 

Description  of  Local  Conditions  about  New  York      ....  40 

American  Preparations  for  Defence 41 

Crucial  Weakness  of  the  Scheme .42 

The  Advance  of  the  British 42 

Washington  withdraws  his  Army  from  the  Brooklyn  side         .         .  43 

Success  of  this  Withdrawal  due  to  British  Negligence        ...  44 

Subsequent  Operations,  and  Retreat  of  Washington  to  New  Jersey  45 

Retreat  continued  to  Pennsylvania,  where  he  receives  reinforcements  46 

Slackness  of  Sir  William  Howe's  actions 47 

The  British  take  possession  of  Narragansett  Bay.     Importance  of 

that  position 48 

Washington  suddenly  takes  the  Offensive.     Battle  of  Trenton          .  48 

He  recovers  most  of  the  State  of  New  Jersey 49 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER    III 

THE  DECISIVE  PERIOD  OF  THE  WAR.  SURREN- 
DER OF  BURGOYNE  AND  CAPTURE  OF  PHILA- 
DELPHIA BY  HOWE.  THE  NAVAL  PART  IN 
EACH   OPERATION 

1777 

PAGE 

British  Object  in  Campaign  of  1777  the  same  as  that  in  1776     .         .  50 

Part  assigned  to  Burgoyne 50 

Slowness  of  his  Progress  at  the  beginning 51 

Sir  William  Howe,  instead  of  cooperating,  takes  his  Army  to  the 

Chesapeake 52 

Criticism  of  this  Course 52 

Howe's  Progress  to  Philadelphia,  and  Capture  of  that  City  .  .  53 
Admiral  Lord  Howe  takes  the  Fleet  from  the  Chesapeake  to  the 

Delaware 53 

Surrender  of  Burgoyne  and  his  Army 53 

British  Naval  Operations  in  Delaware  Bay 54 

Brief  Tenure  —  Nine  Months  —  of  Philadelphia  by  British  .  .  55 
The  general  Failure  of  the  British  Campaign  determined  by  Howe's 

move  to  the  Chesapeake 55 

General  Results  of  the  Campaign 56 

Part  played  by  the  British  Navy.     Analogous  to  that  in  Spain,  1808- 

1812,  and  in  many  other  instances 57 

CHAPTER   IV 

WAR  BEGINS  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND  GREAT 
BRITAIN.  BRITISH  EVACUATE  PHILADELPHIA. 
NAVAL  OPERATIONS  OF  D'ESTAING  AND  HOWE 
ABOUT  NEW  YORK,  NARRAGANSETT  BAY,  AND 
BOSTON.  COMPLETE  SUCCESS  OF  LORD  HOWE. 
AMERICAN  DISAPPOINTMENT  IN  D'ESTAING. 
LORD   HOWE    RETURNS   TO   ENGLAND 

1778 

France  recognizes  the  Independence  of  the  United  States,  and  makes 

with  them  a  defensive  Alliance  ......  58 

A  French  Fleet  sails  for  America  under  Comte  d'Estaing  .         .  59 

Unprepared  condition  of  the  British  Navy 59 

Admiral  Byron  sails  with  a  Reinforcement  for  America    ...  59 
111  effect  of  Naval  Unreadiness  upon  British  Commerce  ;  and  espe- 
cially on  the  West  Indies 60 


CONTENTS  XI 

PAGE 

Admiral  Keppel  puts  to  Sea  with  the  Britisli  Channel  Fleet      .        .61 

First  Guns  of  the  War  with  France 62 

Extreme  Length  of  Byron's  Passage 62 

He  turns  back  to  Halifax 62 

D'Estaing's  slowness  allows  Howe  to  escape  from  Delaware  Bay. 

Howe's  Celerity 62 

Evacuation  of  Philadelphia  by  British  Army,  and  its  precipitate 

Retreat  to  New  York 63 

Escape  of  both  Army  and  Fleet  due  to  d'Estaing's  Delays        .         .  63 

Rapid  Action  of  Lord  Howe 64 

D'Estaing  Arrives  off  New  York 64 

Howe's  elaborate  Dispositions  for  the  Defence  of  New  York  Bay      .  65 

Statement  of  British  and  French  Naval  Force 66 

D'Estaing  decides  not  to  attempt  Passage  of  the  Bar,  and  puts  to  Sea  67 

Anchors  off  Narragansett  Bay 69 

Forces  the  Entrance  to  Newport  and  Anchors  inside  the  Bay  .  .  70 
The  British  garrison  besieged  by  superior  American  and  French 

forces 70 

Howe  appears  with  his  Fleet  and  anchors  off  the  entrance,  at  Point 

Judith 71 

Sustained  Rapidity  of  his  action  at  New  York 71 

D'Estaing  Withdraws  from  Siege  of  Newport  and  puts  to  Sea  .         .  73 

Manoeuvres  of  the  two  Opponents .74 

D'Estaing  quits  the  Field,  and  both  Fleets  are  scattered  by  a  heavy 

Gale 75 

Howe  returns  to  New  York  and  collects  his  Fleet  ....  76 
D'Estaing  calls  off  Newport ;  but  abandons  the  Siege  finally,  taking 

his  Fleet  to  Boston 77 

Critical   Condition   of  British   garrison   in  Newport.     D'Estaing's 

withdrawal  compels  Americans  to  raise  the  siege        ...  77 

Howe  follows  d'Estaing  to  Boston 77 

Discussion  of  the  Conduct  of  the  opposing  Admirals         ...  78 

Howe  gives  up  his  Command  and  returns  to  England        ...  80 

CHAPTEE   V 

THE   NAVAL    WAR   IN    EUROPE.     THE    BATTLE    OF 
USHANT 

1778 

Admirals  Keppel  and  D'Orvilliers  put  to  Sea  from  Portsmouth  and 

Brest 82 

Instructions  given  to  the  French  Admiral 83 

Preliminary  Manoeuvres  after  the  two  Fleets  had  sighted  one  another  83 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGK 

The  Battle  of  Ushant 84 

A  Drawn  Battle.     The  respective  Losses 91 

The  Significance  of  the  Battle  in  the  fighting  Development  of  the 

British  Navy 93 

The  "  Order  of  Battle  " 93 

The  Disputes  and  Courts  Martial  in  Great  Britain  arising  from  the 

Battle  of  Ushant 94 

Keppel  Resigns  his  Command 97 

CHAPTER   yi 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES,  1778-1779.  THE 
BRITISH  INVASION  OF  GEORGIA  AND  SOUTH 
CAROLINA 

Influence  of  Seasonal  Conditions  upon  Naval  Operations  in  America  98 

Commercial  Importance  of  the  West  Indies 98 

The  French  seize  Dominica 99 

D'Estaing  Sails  with  his  Fleet  from  Boston  for  Martinique  .  .  100 
A  British  Squadron  under  Hotham  sails  the  same  day  for  Barbados, 

with  Five  Thousand  Troops 100 

Admiral  Barrington's  Seizure  of  Santa  Lucia 101 

D'Estaing  sails  to  Recapture  it 102 

Rapidity  and  Skill  shown  in  Barrington's  Movements  and  Dispo- 
sitions   102 

D'Estaing's  attacks  Foiled,  both  on  Sea  and  on  Shore      .         .         .  103 

He  Abandons  the  attempt  and  Returns  to  Martinique'       .         .        .  104 

Importance  of  Santa  Lucia  in  Subsequent  Operations        .        .         .  104 

Byron  Reaches  Barbados,  and  takes  over  Command  from  Barrington  105 

D'Estaing  Captures  the  British  Island  Grenada         ....  105 

Byron  goes  to  its  Relief 106 

The  Action   between  the  two  Fleets,    of   Byron   and   d'Estaing, 

July  6,  1779 106 

Criticism  of  the  two  Commanders-in-Chief 110 

D'Estaing  returns  to  Grenada,  which  remains  French  .  .  .  112 
Byron  returns  to  England.     British  North  American  Station  assigned 

to  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  Leeward  Islands  to  Rodney  .  .  .113 
British   Operations  in   Georgia  and   South   Carolina.     Capture  of 

Savannah 113 

Fatal  Strategic  Error  in  these  Operations 114 

D'Estaing's  attempt  to  Retake  Savannah  Foiled  ....  115 
His  appearance  on  the  coast,  however,  causes  the  British  to  abandon 

Narragansett  Bay 115 

D'Estaing  succeeded  by  de  Guichen  in  North  America.  ,   Rodney 

also  arrives 115 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER   VII 

THE  NAVAL  WAR  IN  EUROPEAN  WATERS,  1779. 
ALLIED  FLEETS  INVADE  THE  ENGLISH  CHAN- 
NEL. RODNEY  DESTROYS  TWO  SPANISH  SQUAD- 
RONS  AND   RELIEVES   GIBRALTAR 

PAGE 

Spain  declares  War  against  Great  Britain 116 

Delays  in  Junction  of  French  and  Spanish  Fleets      .         .        .         .116 

They  enter  the  Channel.     Alarm  in  England 117 

Plans  of  the  French  Government ' .  118 

Their  Change  and  Failure.     The  Allied  Fleets  return  to  Brest          .  119 

Criticism  of  the  British  Ministry 120 

Divergent  views  of  France  and  Spain 120 

Prominence  given  to  Gibraltar,  and  the  resulting  Effect  upon  the 

general  War 121 

Exhaustion  of  Supplies  at  Gibraltar 121 

Rodney  with  the  Channel  Fleet  Sails  for  its  Relief,  with  ultimate 

Destination  to  Leeward  Islands  Command  .         .         .         .121 

He  Captures  a  large  Spanish  Convoy 122 

And  Destroys  a  Second  Spanish  Squadron  of  Eleven  Sail-of-the-Line  123 

Distinction  of  this  Engagement 124 

Gibraltar  and  Minorca  Relieved 125 

Rodney  proceeds  to  the  West  Indies 126 

The  Channel  Fleet  returns  to  England 126 


CHAPTER   YIII 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GUICHEN'S  NAVAL  CAMPAIGN 
IN  WEST  INDIES.  DE  GUICHEN  RETURNS  TO 
EUROPE  AND  RODNEY  GOES  TO  NEW  YORK. 
LORD  CORNWALLIS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS.  TWO 
NAVAL  ACTIONS  OF  COMMODORE  CORNWAL- 
LIS.    RODNEY  RETURNS  TO   WEST  INDIES 

1780 

Rodney's  Force  upon  arrival  in  West  Indies 128 

Action  between  British  and  French  Squadrons  prior  to  his  arrival  129 

Rodney  and  de  Guichen  put  to  sea 130 

Action  between  them  of  April  17,  1780      .         .         .         .         .         .131 

Cause  of  Failure  of  Rodney's  Attack 133 

His  Disappointment  in  his  Subordinates 135 

His  Expression  of  his  Feelings •        .  135 

Discussion  of  the  Incidents  and  Principles  involved  .         .         .         .  137 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

The  Losses  of  the  Respective  Fleets 140 

They  Continue  to  Cruise 141 

The  Action  of  May  16,  1780 142 

That  of  May  19,  1780 144 

The  Results  Indecisive 144 

Contrary  Personal  Effect  produced  upon  the  two  Admirals  by  the 

encounters 145 

De  Guichen  asks  to  be  Relieved 145 

Rodney's  Chary  Approval  of  his  Subordinates  in  these  tveo  instances  145 

Suspicion  and  Distrust  rife  in  the  British  Navy  at  this  period  .  .  146 
Twelve  Spanish  Sail-of-the-Line,  with  Ten  Thousand  Troops,  Arrive 

at  Guadeloupe 147 

They  refuse  Cooperation  with  de  Guichen  in  the  Windward  Islands  147 

De  Guichen  Accompanies  them  to  Haiti  with  his  Fleet  .  .  .  147 
He  declines  to  Cooperate  on  the  Continent  with  the  Americans,  and 

sails  for  Europe 148 

Rodney  Arranges  for  the  protection  of  the  Homeward  West  India 

Trade,  and  then  proceeds  to  New  York 149 

Effect  of  his  coming 150 

The  Year  1780  one  of  great  Discouragement  to  Americans  .  .  151 
Summary  of  the  Operations  in  the  Carolinas  and  Virginia,  1780, 

which  led  to  Lord  Cornwallis's  Surrender  in  1781  .  .  .  151 
Two  Naval  Actions  sustained  by  Commodore  Cornwallis  against 

superior  French  forces,  1780 153 

The- Year  1780  Uneventful  in  European  seas 157 

Capture  of  a  great  British  Convoy     .        .         .         .         .         .         .157 

The  Armed  Ne.       Uty  of  the  Baltic  Powers 158 

The  Accession  of  Hollau  1  to  this  followed  by  a  Declaration  of  War 

by  Great  Britain 158 

The  French  Government  withdraws  all  its  Ships  of  War  from  before 

Gibraltar 158 

CHAPTER   IX 

NAVAL  CAMPAIGN  IN  WEST  INDIES  IN  1781.  CAP- 
TURE OF  ST.  EUSTATIUS  BY  RODNEY.  DE 
GRASSE  ARRIVES  IN  PLACE  OF  DE  GUICHEN. 
TOBAGO   SURRENDERS   TO   DE   GRASSE 

Effects  of  the  Great  Hurricanes  of  1780  in  West  Indies     .         .        .  159 
Rodney's  Diminished  Force.     Arrival  of  Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  rein- 
forcements    160 

Rodney  receives  Orders  to  seize  Dutch  Possessions  in  Caribbean      .  160 

Capture  of  St.  Eustatius,  St.  Martin,  and  Saba  ....  101 


CONTENTS 


XV 


The  large  Booty  and  Defenceless  state  of  St.  Eustatius 
Effect  of  these  Conditions  upon  Rodney    . 
Hood  detached  to  cruise  before  Martinique 
De  Grasse  arrives  there  with  Twenty  Ships-of-the-Line 
Indecisive  Action  between  de  Grasse  and  Hood 
Criticism  of  the  two  Commanders      .... 
Junction  of  Rodney  and  Hood   .         .        .         .'       . 
De  Grasse  attempts  Santa  Lucia,  and  Fails 

He  captures  Tobago 

He  decides  to  take  his  Fleet  to  the  American  Continent 


PAGE 

161 
161 
162 
163 
164 
166 
166 
167 
168 
168 


CHAPTER  X 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS  PRECEDING  AND  DETER- 
MINING THE  FALL  OF  YORKTOWN.  CORN- 
WALLIS   SURRENDERS 

1781 

Summary  of  Land  Operations  in  Virginia  early  in  1781     .         .         .  169 

Portsmouth  Occupied 170 

A  French  Squadron  from  Newport,  and  a  British  from  Gardiner's 

Bay,  proceed  to  the  Scene 170 

They  meet  off  the  Chesapeake 171 

Action  between  Arbuthnot  and  des  Touches,  March  16,  1781  .  171 
The  Advantage  rests  with  the  French,  but  they  return  to  Newport. 

Arbuthnot  enters  the  Chesapeake  .  .  '.' '  '  .  .  .174 
Cornwallis  reaches  Petersburg,  Virginia,  May^20  .  .  .  .175 
Under  the  directions  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  he  evacuates  Portsmouth 

and  concentrates  his  fo^^es  at  Yorktown,  August  22  .  .  .  175 
The  French   Fleet  under  de  Grasse  Anchors  in  the  Chesapeake, 

August  30     ...                176 

British  Naval  Movements,  in  July  and  August,  affecting  conditions 

in  the  Chesapeake 176 

Admiral  Graves,  successor  to  Arbuthnot  at  New  York,  joined  there 

by  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  August  28 177 

Washington  and  Rochambeau  move  upon  Cornwallis        .         .        .  178 

The  British  Fleet  under  Graves  arrives  off  the  Chesapeake       .         .  179 

Action  between  de  Grasse  and  Graves,  September  5          ...  179 

Hood's  Criticism  of  Graves's  Conduct 181 

The  British,  worsted,  return  to  New  York,     De  Grasse,  reinforced, 

re-enters  the  Chesapeake,  September  11 184 

Cornwallis  Surrenders,  October  19 184 

De  Grasse  and  Hood  Return  to  West  Indies 185 


xvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   XI 

NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  1781  IN  EUROPE.  DARBY'S 
RELIEF  OF  GIBRALTAR,  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF 
THE  DOGGER  BANK 

PAGE 

Leading  Objects  of  the  Belligerents  in  1781 186 

The  Relief  of  Gibraltar  by  Admiral  Darby 186 

Capture  of  British  Convoy  with  the  spoils  of  St.  Eustatius  .  .  188 
The  French  and  Spanish  Fleet  under  Admiral  de  Cordova  again 

enters  the  English  Channel 188 

Darby  in  inferior  Force  shut  up  in  Tor  Bay 188 

The  Allies  Decide  not  to  attack  him,  but  to  turn  their  Efforts  against 

British  Commerce 189 

Minorca  Lost  by  British 189 

The  Battle  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  between  British  and  Dutch  Fleets  .  190 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  FINAL  NAVAL  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 
INDIES.  HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE.  RODNEY 
AND  DE  GRASSE.  THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF 
APRIL    12,    1782 

Capture  and  Destruction  near  Ushant  of  a  great  French  Convoy  for 

the  West  Indies  opens  the  Naval  Campaign  of  1782    .         .         .  195 

Attack  upon  the  Island  of  St.  Kitts  by  de  Grasse  and  de  Bouill^      .  197 

Hood  sails  for  its  Relief  from  Barbados 197 

His  Plan  of  procedure 198 

Balked  by  an  Accident 199 

He  Succeeds  in  dislodging  de  Grasse  and  taking  the  Anchorage  left 

by  the  French 200 

Unsuccessful  Attempt  by  de  Grasse  to  shake  Hood's  position    .         .  203 
St.  Kitts  nevertheless  compelled  to  Surrender  owing  to  having  insuffi- 
cient Land  Force 205 

Hood  Extricates  himself  from  de  Grasse's  Superior  Force  and  Retires  205 

Rodney  arrives  from  England  and  joins  Hood 205 

Project  of  French  and  Spaniards  against  Jamaica      ....  206 
De  Grasse  sails  from  Martinique  with  his  whole  Fleet  and  a  large 

Convoy 207 

Rodney's  Pursuit 208 

Partial  Actions  of  April  9,  1782 209 

British  Pursuit  continues 211 

It  is  favored  by  the  Lagging  of  two  Ships  in  the  French  Fleet,  April  11  211 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

An  Accident  that  night  induces  de  Grasse  to  bear  down,  and  en- 
ables Rodney  to  force  Action 212 

The  Battle  of  April  12  begins 214 

A  Shift  of  Wind  enables  the  British  to  Break  the  French  Order  in 

three  places 217 

Consequences  of  this  Movement 218 

Resultant  Advantages  to  the  British 219 

Practices  of  the  opposing  Navies  in  regard  to  the  Aims  of  Firing      .  219 

Consequences  Illustrated  in  the  Injuries  received  respectively  .         .  220 
Inadequate  Use  made  by  Rodney  of  the  Advantage  gained  by  his 

Fleet 220 

Hood's  Criticisms 220 

Hood's  Opinion  shared  by  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Rodney's  Chief-of- 

Staff 222 

Rodney's  own  Reasons  for  his  Course  after  the  Battle      .         .         .  222 

His  Assumptions  not  accordant  with  the  Facts          ....  223 

Actual  Prolonged  Dispersion  of  the  French  Fleet      ....  224 

Hood,  Detached  in  Pursuit,  Captures  a  small  French  Squadron        .  224 
Rodney  Superseded  in  Command  before  the  news  of  the  victory 

reached  England 225 

The  general  War  Approaches  its  End 226 


CHAPTER   XIII 

HOWE  AGAIN   GOES  AFLOAT.     THE  FINAL  RELIEF 
OF   GIBRALTAR 

1782 

Howe  appointed  to  Command  Channel  Fleet 227 

Cruises  first  in  North  Sea  and  in  Channel 228 

The  Allied  Fleets  in  much  superior  force  take  Position  in  the  Chops 

of  the  Channel,  but  are  successfully  evaded  by  Howe         .         .  229 

The  British  Jamaica  Convoy  also  escapes  them         ....  229 

Howe  ordered  to  Relieve  Gibraltar 229 

Loss  of  the  Boyal  George^  with  Kempenfelt 229 

Howe  Sails 229 

Slow  but  Successful  Progress 230 

Great  Allied  Fleet  in  Bay  of  Gibraltar 230 

Howe's  Success  in  Introducing  the  Supplies 231 

Negligent  Mismanagement  of  the  Allies 231 

Partial  Engagement  when  Howe  leaves  Gibraltar      ....  232 

Estimate  of  Howe's  Conduct,  and  of  his  Professional  Character       .  232 

French  Eulogies 232 


xviii  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EAST  INDIES, 
1778-1783.  THE  CAREER  OF  THE  BAILLI  DE 
SUFFREN 

PAGE 

Isolation  characteristic  of  Military  and  Naval  Operations  in  India    .  234 

Occurrences  in  1778 234 

Sir  Edward  Hughes  sent  to  India  with  a  Fleet,  1779  .        .         .  235 

The  Years  prior  to  1781  Uneventful 235 

A  British  Squadron  under  Commodore  Johnstone  sent  in  1781  to 

seize  Cape  of  Good  Hope 236 

A  Week  Later,  a  French  Squadron  under  Suffren  sails  for  India      .  236 
Suffren  finds  Johnstone  Anchored  in  Porto  Praya,  and  attacks  at 

once *        .        .         .         .  237 

The  immediate  Result  Indecisive,  but  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  is 

saved  by  Suffren  arriving  first 238 

Suffren  reaches  Mauritius,  and  the  French  Squadron  sails  for  India 

under  Comte  d'Orves 239 

D'Orves  dies,  leaving  Suffren  in  Command 240 

Trincomalee,  in  Ceylon,  captured  by  Hughes 240 

First  Engagement  between  Hughes  and  Suffren,  February  17,  1782  240 

Second  Engagement,  April  12 242 

Third  Engagement,  July  6 244 

Suffren  captures  Trincomalee 247 

Hughes  arrives,  but  too  late  to  save  the  place 247 

Fourth  Engagement  between  Hughes  and  Suffren,  September  3       .  248 
Having  lost  Trincomalee,  Hughes  on  the  change  of  monsoon  is  com- 
pelled to  go  to  Bombay 251 

Reinforced  there  by  Bickerton 251 

Suffren  winters  in  Sumatra,  but  regains  Trincomalee  before  Hughes 

returns.     Also  receives  Reinforcements      .....  251 

The  British  Besiege  Cuddalore 252 

Suffren  Relieves  the  Place 253 

Fifth  Engagement  between  Hughes  and  Suffren,  June  20,  1783        .  253 

Comparison  between  Hughes  and  Suffren  .....  254 

News  of  the  Peace  being  received,  June  29,  Hostilities  in  India  cease  255 

Glossary  of  Nautical  and  Naval  Terms  used  in  this  Book   .  257 

Index 267 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 

Remains  of  the  Revenge,  one  of  Benedict  Arnold's  Schooners  on 

Lake  Champlain  in  1776.   Now  in  Fort  Ticonderoga.   Frontispiece 

FACING   PAGE 

Major-General  Philip  Schuyler 12 

Edward  Pellew,  afterwards  Admiral,  Lord  Exmouth  ...  12 

Benedict  Arnold 27 

Attack  on  Fort  Moultrie  in  1776 33 

Richard,  Earl  Howe 78 

Charles  Henri,  Comte  d'Estaing .  78 

Admiral,  the  Honourable  Samuel  Barrington      ....  104 

Comte  de  Guichen 144 

George  Brydges,  Lord  Rodney 144 

Fran9ois-Joseph-Paul,  Comte  de  Grasse,  Marquis  de  Tilly  .         .  204 

Admiral,  Lord  Hood 204 

Sir  Edward  Hughes,  K.  B 254 

Pierre  Andre  de  Suffren  de  Saint  Tropez 254 


LIST   OF   MAPS 


FACING  PAGE 


Lake  Champlain  and  Connected  Waters 8 

New  York  and  New  Jersey:  to  illustrate  Operations  of  1776, 

1777,  and  1778 40 

Narragansett  Bay 70 

Leeward  Islands  (West  Indies)  Station 99 

Island  of  Santa  Lucia 101 

Island  of  Martinique 164 

Peninsula  of  India,  and  Ceylon 234 

North  Atlantic  Ocean.     General  Map  to  illustrate  Operations  in 

the  War  of  American  Independence 280 


xxi 


LIST   OF  BATTLE-PLANS 

FACING   PAGE 

D'Orvilliers  and  Keppel,  off  Ushant,  July  27,  1778 

Figure  1 ^^ 

Figures  2  and  3 9^ 

D'Estaing  and  Byron,  July  6,  1779 106 

Rodney  and  De  Guichen,  April  17,  1780,  Figures  1  and  2   .         .     132 

Rodney  and  De  Guichen,  May  15,  1780 143 

Cornwallis  and  De  Ternay,  June  20,  1780 156 

Arbuthnot  and  Des  Touches,  March  16,  1781       .         .         .         .172 

Graves  and  De  Grasse,  September  5,  1781 180 

Hood  and  De  Grasse,  January  25,  1782,  Figures  1  and  2  .  .  201 
Hood  and  De  Grasse,  January  26,  1782,  Figure  3  .  .  .203 
Rodney  and  De  Grasse,  April  9  and  12,  1782 

Figures  1  and  2 210 

Figure  3 212 

Figures  4  and  5 215 

Figure  6 •         •         •         -218 

Johnstone  and  Suffren,  Porto  Praya,  April  16,  1781    .        .        .237 

Hughes  and  Suffren,  February  17,  1782 240 

Hughes  and  Suffren,  April  12,  1782 243 

Hughes  and  Sulfren,  July  6,  1782 243 

Hughes  and  Suffren,  September  3,  1782 249 


-nriii 


The    Major    Operations    of 

the  Navies  in  the  War  of 

American  Independence 

INTRODUCTION 

THE  TENDENCY  OF  WARS  TO  SPREAD 

MACAULAY,  in  a  striking  passage  of  his  Essay 
on  Frederick  the  Great,  wrote,  "The  evils 
produced  by  his  wickedness  were  felt  in  lands 
where  the  name  of  Prussia  was  unknown. 
In  order  that  he  might  rob  a  neighbour  whom  he  had  promised 
to  defend,  black  men  fought  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel,  and 
red  men  scalped  each  other  by  the  Great  Lakes  of  North 
America." 

Wars,  like  conflagrations,  tend  to  spread;  more  than 
ever  perhaps  in  these  days  of  close  international  entangle- 
ments and  rapid  communications.  Hence  the  anxiety 
aroused  and  the  care  exercised  by  the  governments  of  Europe, 
the  most  closely  associated  and  the  most  sensitive  on  the 
earth,  to  forestall  the  kindhng  of  even  the  slightest  flame  in 
regions  where  all  alike  are  interested,  though  with  diverse 
objects ;  regions  such  as  the  Balkan  group  of  States  in  their 
exasperating  relations  with  the  Turkish  empire,  under 
which  the  Balkan  peoples  see  constantly  the  bitter  oppres- 


2  '  Major  •operations  of  the  na  vies  in  the 

sion  of  men  of  their  own  blood  and  religious  faith  by  the 
tyranny  of  a  government  which  can  neither  assimilate  nor 
protect.  The  condition  of  Turkish  European  provinces  is 
a  perpetual  lesson  to  those  disposed  to  ignore  or  to  depreciate 
the  immense  difficulties  of  administering  politically,  under 
one  government,  peoples  traditionally  and  racially  distinct, 
yet  living  side  by  side ;  not  that  the  situation  is  much  better 
anywhere  in  the  Turkish  empire.  This  still  survives,  though 
in  an  advanced  state  of  decay,  simply  because  other  States 
are  not  prepared  to  encounter  the  risks  of  a  disturbance 
which  might  end  in  a  general  bonfire,  extending  its  ravages 
to  districts  very  far  remote  from  the  scene  of  the  original 
trouble. 

Since  these  words  were  written,  actual  war  has  broken  out 
in  the  Balkans.  The  Powers,  anxious  each  as  to  the  effect 
upon  its  own  ambitions  of  any  disturbance  in  European 
Turkey,  have  steadily  abstained  from  efficient  interference 
in  behalf  of  the  downtrodden  Christians  of  Macedonia, 
surrounded  by  sympathetic  kinsfolk.  Consequently,  in 
thirty  years  past  this  underbrush  has  grown  drier  and  drier, 
fit  kindling  for  fuel.  In  the  Treaty  of  Berhn,  in  1877,  stipu- 
lation was  made  for  their  betterment  in  governance,  and  we 
are  now  told  that  in  1880  Turkey  framed  a  scheme  for  such, 
—  and  pigeonholed  it.  At  last,  under  unendurable  condi- 
tions, spontaneous  combustion  has  followed.  There  can  be 
no  assured  peace  until  it  is  recognised  practically  that  Chris- 
tianity, by  the  respect  which  it  alone  among  religions  incul- 
cates for  the  welfare  of  the  individual,  is  an  essential  factor 
in  developing  in  nations  the  faculty  of  self-government,  apart 
from  which  fitness  to  govern  others  does  not  exist.  To  keep 
Christian  peoples  under  the  rule  of  a  non-Christian  race,  is, 
therefore,  to  perpetuate  a  state  hopeless  of  reconcilement 
and  pregnant  of  sure  explosion.  Explosions  always  happen 
inconveniently.     Ohsta  principiis  is  the  only  safe  rule ;    the 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  3 

application  of  which  is  not  suppression  of  overt  discontent 
but  rehef  of  grievances. 

The  War  of  American  Independence  was  no  exception  to 
the  general  rule  of  propagation  that  has  been  noted.  When 
our  forefathers  began  to  agitate  against  the  Stamp  Act 
and  the  other  measures  that  succeeded  it,  they  as  little  foresaw 
the  spread  of  their  action  to  the  East  and  West  Indies,  to 
the  English  Channel  and  Gibraltar,  as  did  the  British 
ministry  w^hich  in  framing  the  Stamp  Act  struck  the  match 
from  which  these  consequences  followed.  When  Benedict 
Arnold  on  Lake  Champlain  by  vigorous  use  of  small  means 
obtained  a  year's  delay  for  the  colonists,  he  compassed  the 
surrender  of  Burgoyne  in  1777.  The  surrender  of  Burgoyne, 
justly  estimated  as  the  decisive  event  of  the  war,  was  due  to 
Arnold's  previous  action,  gaining  the  delay  which  is  a  first 
object  for  all  defence,  and  which  to  the  unprepared  colonists 
was  a  vital  necessity.  The  surrender  of  Burgoyne  determined 
the  intervention  of  France,  in  1778;  the  intervention  of 
France  the  accession  of  Spain  thereto,  in  1779.  The  war 
with  these  two  Powers  led  to  the  maritime  occurrences,  the 
interferences  with  neutral  trade,  that  gave  rise  to  the  Armed 
Neutrality ;  the  concurrence  of  Holland  in  which  brought 
war  between  that  country  and  Great  Britain,  in  1780.  This 
extension  of  hostilities  affected  not  only  the  West  Indies  but 
the  East,  through  the  possessions  of  the  Dutch  in  both 
quarters  and  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  If  not  the  occa- 
sion of  Suffren  being  sent  to  India,  the  involvement  of  Holland 
in  the  general  war  had  a  powerful  effect  upon  the  brilliant 
operations  which  he  conducted  there  ;  as  well  as  at,  and  for, 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  then  a  Dutch  possession,  on  his 
outward  voyage. 

In  the  separate  publication  of  these  pages,  my  intention 
and  hope  are  to  bring  home  incidentally  to  American  readers 
this  vast  extent  of  the  struggle  to  which  our  own  Declaration 


4     MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE   NAVIES   IN   THE 

of  Independence  was  but  the  prelude;  with  perchance  the 
further  needed  lesson  for  the  future,  that  questions  the 
most  remote  from  our  own  shores  may  involve  us  in  unfore- 
seen difficulties,  especially  if  we  permit  a  train  of  communica- 
tion to  be  laid  by  which  the  outside  fire  can  leap  step  by  step 
to  the  American  continents.  How  great  a  matter  a  little  fire 
kindleth  !  Our  Monroe  Doctrine  is  in  final  analysis  merely 
the  formulation  of  national  precaution  that,  as  far  as  in  its 
power  to  prevent,  there  shall  not  lie  scattered  about  the 
material  which  foreign  possessions  in  these  continents 
might  supply  for  the  extension  of  combustion  originating 
elsewhere ;  and  the  objection  to  Asiatic  immigration,  however 
debased  by  less  worthy  feelings  or  motives,  is  on  the  part 
of  thinking  men  simply  a  recognition  of  the  same  danger 
arising  from  the  presence  of  an  inassimilable  mass  of  popu- 
lation, racially  and  traditionally  distinct  in  characteristics, 
behind  which  would  lie  the  sympathies  and  energy  of  a  power- 
ful military  and  naval  Asiatic  empire. 

Conducive  as  each  of  these  policies  is  to  national  safety 
and  peace  amid  international  conflagration,  neither  the  one 
nor  the  other  can  be  sustained  without  the  creation  and 
maintenance  of  a  preponderant  navy.  In  the  struggle 
with  which  this  book  deals,  Washington  at  the  time  said  that 
the  navies  had  the  casting  vote.  To  Arnold  on  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  to  DeGrasse  at  Yorktown,  fell  the  privilege  of  exercis- 
ing that  prerogative  at  the  two  great  decisive  moments  of 
the  War.  To  the  Navy  also,  beyond  any  other  single  instru- 
mentality, was  due  eighty  years  later  the  successful  suppres- 
sion of  the  movement  of  Secession.  The  effect  of  the  block- 
ade of  the  Southern  coasts  upon  the  financial  and  military 
efficiency  of  the  Confederate  Government  has  never  been 
closely  calculated,  and  probably  is  incalculable.  At  these 
two  principal  national  epochs  control  of  the  water  was  the 
most  determinative  factor.     In  the  future,  upon  the  Navy  will 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  5 

depend  the  successful  maintenance  of  the  two  leading  national 
policies  mentioned ;  the  two  most  essential  to  the  part  this 
country  is  to  play  in  the  progress  of  the  world. 

For,  while  numerically  great  in  population,  the  United 
States  is  not  so  in  proportion  to  territory;  nor,  though 
wealthy,  is  she  so  in  proportion  to  her  exposure.  That 
Japan  at  four  thousand  miles  distance  has  a  population  of 
over  three  hundred  to  the  square  mile,  while  our  three  great 
Pacific  States  average  less  than  twenty,  is  a  portentous  fact. 
The  immense  aggregate  numbers  resident  elsewhere  in  the 
United  States  cannot  be  transfered  thither  to  meet  an  emer- 
gency, nor  contribute  effectively  to  remedy  this  insufficiency ; 
neither  can  a  land  force  on  the  defensive  protect,  if  the  way 
of  the  sea  is  open.  In  such  opposition  of  smaller  numbers 
against  larger,  nowhere  do  organisation  and  development 
count  as  much  as  in  navies.  Nowhere  so  well  as  on  the  sea 
can  a  general  numerical  inferiority  be  compensated  by 
specific  numerical  superiority,  resulting  from  the  correspond- 
ence between  the  force  employed  and  the  nature  of  the  ground. 
It  follows  strictly,  by  logic  and  by  inference,  that  by  no  other 
means  can  safety  be  insured  as  economically  and  as  effi- 
ciently. Indeed,  in  matters  of  national  security,  economy 
and  efficiency  are  equivalent  terms.  The  question  of  the 
Pacific  is  probably  the  greatest  world  problem  of  the  twentieth 
century,  in  which  no  great  country  is  so  largely  and  directly 
interested  as  is  the  United  States.  For  the  reason  given  it  is 
essentially  a  naval  question,  the  third  in  which  the  United 
States  finds  its  well-being  staked  upon  naval  adequacy. 


6     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  NAVAL  CAMPAIGN   ON   LAKE    CHAMPLAIN 

1775-1776 

AT  the  time  when  hostiUties  began  between  Great 
Britain  and  her  American  Colonies,  the  fact  was 
realised  generally,  being  evident  to  reason  and 
taught  by  experience,  that  control  of  the  water, 
both  ocean  and  inland,  would  have  a  preponderant  effect 
upon  the  contest.  It  was  clear  to  reason,  for  there  was  a 
long  seaboard  with  numerous  interior  navigable  watercourses, 
and  at  the  same  time  scanty  and  indifferent  communications 
by  land.  Critical  portions  of  the  territory  involved  were 
yet  an  unimproved  wilderness.  Experience,  the  rude  but 
efficient  schoolmaster  of  that  large  portion  of  mankind  which 
gains  knowledge  only  by  hard  knocks,  had  confirmed  through 
the  preceding  French  wars  the  inferences  of  the  thoughtful. 
Therefore,  conscious  of  the  great  superiority  of  the  British 
Navy,  which,  however,  had  not  then  attained  the  unchal- 
lenged supremacy  of  a  later  day,  the  American  leaders  early 
sought  the  alliance  of  the  Bourbon  kingdoms,  France  and 
Spain,  the  hereditary  enemies  of  Great  Britain.  There 
alone  could  be  found  the  counterpoise  to  a  power  which,  if 
unchecked,  must  ultimately  prevail. 

Nearly  three  years  elapsed  before  the  Colonists  accom- 
plished this  object,  by  giving  a  demonstration  of  their  strength 
in  the  enforced  surrender  of  Burgoyne's  army  at  Saratoga. 
This  event  has  merited  the  epithet  "decisive,"  because,  and 
only  because,  it  decided  the  intervention  of  France.  It  may 
be  affirmed,  with  little  hesitation,  that  this  victory  of  the 
colonists  was  directly  the  result  of  naval  force,  —  that  of 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  7 

the  colonists  themselves.  It  was  the  cause  that  naval  force 
from  abroad,  entering  into  the  contest,  transformed  it  from 
a  local  to  a  universal  war,  and  assured  the  independence  of  the 
Colonies.  That  the  Americans  were  strong  enough  to  im- 
pose the  capitulation  of  Saratoga,  was  due  to  the  invaluable 
year  of  delay  secured  to  them  by  their  little  navy  on  Lake 
Champlain,  created  by  the  indomitable  energy,  and  handled 
with  the  indomitable  courage,  of  the  traitor,  Benedict 
Arnold.  That  the  war  spread  from  America  to  Europe, 
from  the  English  Channel  to  the  Baltic,  from  the  Bay  of 
Biscay  to  the  Mediterranean,  from  the  West  Indies  to  the 
Mississippi,  and  ultimately  involved  the  waters  of  the  remote 
peninsula  of  Hindustan,  is  traceable,  through  Saratoga,  to 
the  rude  flotilla  which  in  1776  anticipated  its  enemy  in  the 
possession  of  Lake  Champlain.  The  events  which  thus  cul- 
minated merit  therefore  a  clearer  understanding,  and  a  fuller 
treatment,  than  their  intrinsic  importance  and  petty  scale 
would  justify  otherwise. 

In  1775,  only  fifteen  years  had  elapsed  since  the  expulsion 
of  the  French  from  the  North  American  continent.  The 
concentration  of  their  power,  during  its  continuance,  in  the 
valley  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  had  given  direction  to  the  local 
conflict,  and  had  impressed  upon  men's  minds  the  importance 
of  Lake  Champlain,  of  its  tributary  Lake  George,  and  of  the 
Hudson  River,  as  forming  a  consecutive,  though  not  con- 
tinuous, water  line  of  communications  from  the  St.  Lawrence 
to  New  York.  The  strength  of  Canada  against  attack 
by  land  lay  in  its  remoteness,  in  the  wilderness  to  be  traversed 
before  it  was  reached,  and  in  the  strength  of  the  line  of  the 
St.  Lawrence,  with  the  fortified  posts  of  Montreal  and 
Quebec  on  its  northern  bank.  The  wilderness,  it  is  true, 
interposed  its  passive  resistance  to  attacks  from  Canada 
as  well  as  to  attacks  upon  it ;  but  when  it  had  been  traversed, 
there  were  to  the  southward  no  such  strong  natural  positions 


8       MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

confronting  the  assailant.  Attacks  from  the  south  fell  upon 
the  front,  or  at  best  upon  the  flank,  of  the  line  of  the  St. 
Lawrence.  Attacks  from  Canada  took  New  York  and  its 
dependencies  in  the  rear. 

These  elements  of  natural  strength,  in  the  military  con- 
ditions of  the  North,  were  impressed  upon  the  minds  of  the 
Americans  by  the  prolonged  resistance  of  Canada  to  the  greatly 
superior  numbers  of  the  British  Colonists  in  the  previous 
wars.  Regarded,  therefore,  as  a  base  for  attacks,  of  a  kind 
with  which  they  were  painfully  familiar,  but  to  be  undergone 
now  under  disadvantages  of  numbers  and  power  never 
before  experienced,  it  was  desirable  to  gain  possession  of 
the  St.  Lawrence  and  its  posts  before  they  were  strengthened 
and  garrisoned.  At  this  outset  of  hostilities,  the  American 
insurgents,  knowing  clearly  their  own  minds,  possessed 
the  advantage  of  the  initiative  over  the  British  government, 
which  still  hesitated  to  use  against  those  whom  it  styled 
rebels  the  preventive  measures  it  would  have  taken  at  once 
against  a  recognised  enemy. 

Under  these  circumstances,  in  May,  1775,  a  body  of  two 
hundred  and  seventy  Americans,  led  by  Ethan  Allen  and 
Benedict  Arnold,  seized  the  posts  of  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point,  which  were  inadequately  garrisoned.  These  are  on 
the  upper  waters  of  Lake  Champlain,  where  it  is  less  than  a 
third  01  a  mile  wide;  Ticonderoga  being  on  a  peninsula 
formed  by  the  lake  and  the  inlet  from  Lake  George,  Crown 
Point  on  a  promontory  twelve  miles  lower  down.^  They 
were  positions  of  recognised  importance,  and  had  been  ad- 
vanced posts  of  the  British  in  previous  wars.  A  schooner 
being  found  there,  Arnold,  who  had  been  a  seaman,  em- 

1  In  customary  representation  of  maps,  North  is  upper,  and  move- 
ment northward  is  commonly  spoken  of  as  up.  It  is  necessary  there- 
fore to  bear  in  mind  that  the  flow  of  water  from  Lake  George  to  the 
St.  Lawrence,  though  northward,  is  down. 


L.AKK  CHAMPLAIN 

AND 
CONINECTED    WATERS 


4    Fort  George, 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  9 

barked  in  her  and  hurried  to  the  foot  of  the  lake.  The 
wind  failed  him  when  still  thirty  miles  from  St.  John's, 
another  fortified  post  on  the  lower  narrows,  where  the  lake 
gradually  tapers  down  to  the  Richelieu  River,  its  outlet 
to  the  St.  Lawrence.  Unable  to  advance  otherwise,  Arnold 
took  to  his  boats  with  thirty  men,  pulled  through  the  night, 
and  at  six  o'clock  on  the  following  morning  surprised  the 
post,  in  which  were  only  a  sergeant  and  a  dozen  men.  He 
reaped  the  rewards  of  celerity.  The  prisoners  informed 
him  that  a  considerable  body  of  troops  was  expected  from 
Canada,  on  its  way  to  Ticonderoga;  and  this  force  in  fact 
reached  St.  John's  on  the  next  day.  When  it  arrived,  Arnold 
was  gone,  having  carried  off  a  sloop  which  he  found  there  and 
destroyed  everything  else  that  could  float.  By  such  trifling 
means  two  active  oflicers  had  secured  the  temporary  control 
of  the  lake  itself  and  of  the  approaches  to  it  from  the  south. 
There  being  no  roads,  the  British,  debarred  from  the  water 
line,  were  unable  to  advance.  Sir  Guy  Carleton,  Governor 
and  Commander-in-Chief  in  Canada,  strengthened  the  works 
at  St.  John's,  and  built  a  schooner ;  but  his  force  was  inade- 
quate to  meet  that  of  the  Americans. 

The  seizure  of  the  two  posts,  being  an  act  of  offensive  war, 
was  not  at  once  pleasing  to  the  American  Congress,  which 
still  clung  to  the  hope  of  reconciliation;  but  events  were 
marching  rapidly,  and  ere  summer  was  over  the  invasion  of 
Canada  was  ordered.  General  Montgomery,  appointed  to 
that  enterprise,  embarked  at  Crown  Point  with  two  thou- 
sand men  on  September  4th,  and  soon  afterwards  appeared 
before  St.  John's,  which  after  prolonged  operations  capitu- 
lated on  the  3d  of  November.  On  the  13th  Montgomery 
entered  Montreal,  and  thence  pressed  down  the  St.  Lawrence 
to  Pointe  aux  Trembles,  twenty  miles  above  Quebec.  There 
he  joined  Arnold,  who  in  the  month  of  October  had  crossed 
the  northern  wilderness,  between  the  head  waters  of  the 


10       MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN    THE 

Kennebec  River  and  St.  Lawrence.  On  the  way  he  had 
endured  immense  privations,  losing  five  hundred  men  of  the 
twelve  hundred  with  whom  he  started;  and  upon  arriving 
opposite  Quebec,  on  the  10th  of  November,  three  days  had 
been  unavoidably  spent  in  collecting  boats  to  pass  the  river. 
Crossing  on  the  night  of  the  13th,  this  adventurous  soldier 
and  his  little  command  climbed  the  Heights  of  Abraham  by 
the  same  path  that  had  served  Wolfe  so  well  sixteen  years 
before.  With  characteristic  audacity  he  summoned  the 
place.  The  demand  of  course  was  refused ;  but  that  Carleton 
did  not  fall  at  once  upon  the  little  band  of  seven  hundred  that 
bearded  him  shows  by  how  feeble  a  tenure  Great  Britain 
then  held  Canada.  Immediately  after  the  junction  Mont- 
gomery advanced  on  Quebec,  where  he  appeared  on  the  5th 
of  December.  Winter  having  already  begun,  and  neither 
his  numbers  nor  his  equipments  being  adequate  to  regular 
siege  operations,  he  very  properly  decided  to  try  the  des- 
perate chance  of  an  assault  upon  the  strongest  fortress  in 
America.  This  was  made  on  the  night  of  December  31st, 
1775.  Whatever  possibility  of  success  there  may  have  been 
vanished  with  the  death  of  Montgomery,  who  fell  at  the  head 
of  his  men. 

The  American  army  retired  three  miles  up  the  river,  went 
into  winter-quarters,  and  established  a  land  blockade  of 
Quebec,  which  was  cut  off  from  the  sea  by  the  ice.  "For 
five  months,"  wrote  Carleton  to  the  Secretary  for  War,  on 
the  14th  of  May,  1776,  "this  town  has  been  closely  invested 
by  the  rebels."  From  this  unpleasant  position  it  was  re- 
lieved on  the  6th  of  May,  when  signals  were  exchanged 
between  it  and  the  Surprise,  the  advance  ship  of  a  squadron 
under  Captain   Charles  Douglas,^  which  had   sailed   from 

1  Afterwards  Captain  of  the  Fleet  (Chief  of  Staff)  to  Rodney  in 
his  great  campaign  of  1782.  Post,  p.  222.  He  died  a  Rear-Admiral 
and  Baronet  in  1789. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  11 

England  on  the  1 1th  of  March.  Arriving  off  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  Lawrence,  on  the  morning  of  April  12th,  Douglas  found 
ice  extending  nearly  twenty  miles  to  sea,  and  packed  too 
closely  to  admit  of  working  through  it  by  dexterous  steering. 
The  urgency  of  the  case  not  admitting  delay,  he  ran  his  ship, 
the  Isis,  50,  with  a  speed  of  five  knots,  against  a  large  piece 
of  ice  about  ten  or  twelve  feet  thick,  to  test  the  effect.  The 
ice,  probably  softened  by  salt  water  and  salt  air,  went  to 
pieces.  "Encouraged  by  this  experiment,"  continues  Doug- 
las, somewhat  magnificently,  "we  thought  it  an  enterprise 
worthy  an  English  ship  of  the  line  in  our  King  and  country's 
sacred  cause,  and  an  effort  due  to  the  gallant  defenders  of  Que- 
bec, to  make  the  attempt  of  pressing  her  by  force  of  sail, 
through  the  thick,  broad,  and  closely  connected  fields  of  ice, 
to  which  we  saw  no  bounds  towards  the  western  part  of  our 
horizon.  Before  night  (when  blowing  a  snow-storm,  we 
brought-to,  or  rather  stopped),  we  had  penetrated  about 
eight  leagues  into  it,  describing  our  path  all  the  way  with 
bits  of  the  sheathing  of  the  ship's  bottom,  and  sometimes 
pieces  of  the  cutwater,  but  none  of  the  oak  plank ;  and  it  was 
pleasant  enough  at  times,  when  we  stuck  fast,  to  see  Lord 
Petersham  exercising  his  troops  on  the  crusted  surface  of  that 
fluid  through  which  the  ship  had  so  recently  sailed."  It 
took  nine  days  of  this  work  to  reach  Anticosti  Island,  after 
which  the  ice  seems  to  have  given  no  more  trouble;  but 
further  delay  was  occasioned  by  fogs,  calms,  and  head  winds. 
Upon  the  arrival  of  the  ships  of  war,  the  Americans  at 
once  retreated.  During  the  winter,  though  reinforcements 
must  have  been  received  from  time  to  time,  they  had  wasted 
from  exposure,  and  from  small-pox,  which  ravaged  the  camp. 
On  the  1st  of  May  the  returns  showed  nineteen  hundred 
men  present,  of  whom  only  a  thousand  were  fit  for  duty. 
There  were  then  on  hand  but  three  days'  provisions,  and  none 
other  nearer  than  St.  John's.   The  inhabitants  would  of  course 


12       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

render  no  further  assistance  to  the  Americans  after  the  ships 
arrived.  The  Navy  had  again  decided  the  fate  of  Canada, 
and  was  soon  also  to  determine  that  of  Lake  Champlain. 

When  two  hundred  troops  had  landed  from  the  ships, 
Carleton  marched  out,  "to  see,"  he  said,  "what  these  mighty 
boasters  were  about."  The  sneer  was  unworthy  a  man  of 
his  generous  character,  for  the  boasters  had  endured  much  for 
faint  chances  of  success ;  and  the  smallness  of  the  reinforce- 
ment which  encouraged  him  to  act  shows  either  an  extreme 
prudence  on  his  part,  or  the  narrow  margin  by  which  Quebec 
escaped.  He  found  the  enemy  busy  with  preparations  for 
retreat,  and  upon  his  appearance  they  abandoned  their  camp. 
Their  forces  on  the  two  sides  of  the  river  being  now  separated 
by  the  enemy's  shipping,  the  Americans  retired  first  to  Sorel, 
where  the  Richeheu  enters  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  thence 
continued  to  fall  back  by  gradual  stages.  It  was  not  until 
June  15th  that  Arnold  quitted  Montreal ;  and  at  the  end  of 
June  the  united  force  was  still  on  the  Canadian  side  of  the 
present  border  line.  On  the  3d  of  July  it  reached  Crown 
Point,  in  a  pitiable  state  from  small-pox  and  destitution. 

Both  parties  began  at  once  to  prepare  for  a  contest  upon 
Lake  Champlain.  The  Americans,  small  as  their  flotilla 
was,  still  kept  the  superiority  obtained  for  them  by  Arnold's 
promptitude  a  year  before.  On  the  25th  of  June  the  Ameri- 
can General  Schuyler,  commanding  the  Northern  Department, 
wrote  :  "  We  have  happily  such  a  naval  superiority  on  Lake 
Champlain,  that  I  have  a  confident  hope  the  enemy  will  not 
appear  upon  it  this  campaign,  especially  as  our  force  is 
increasing  by  the  addition  of  gondolas,  two  nearly  finished. 
Arnold,  however,"  —  whose  technical  knowledge  caused 
him  to  be  intrusted  with  the  naval  preparations,  —  "says 
that  300  carpenters  should  be  employed  and  a  large  number 
of  gondolas,  row-galleys,  etc.,  be  built,  twenty  or  thirty  at 
least.    There  is  great  difficulty  in  getting  the  carpenters 


K     O 


'%  ■  ■  :• 

ii^sl' 

«5«w-*.«».  .""^     \j^^^^a^^^^^BB| 

'^':« 

IfH 

WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  13 

needed.'^  Arnold's  ideas  were  indeed  on  a  scale  worthy 
of  the  momentous  issues  at  stake.  "To  augment  our  navy 
on  the  lake  appears  to  me  of  the  utmost  importance.  There 
is  water  between  Crown  Point  and  Pointe  au  Fer  for  vessels 
of  the  largest  size.  I  am  of  opinion  that  row-galleys  are  the 
best  construction  and  cheapest  for  this  lake.  Perhaps  it 
may  be  well  to  have  one  frigate  of  36  guns.  She  may  carry 
18-pounders  on  the  Lake,  and  be  superior  to  any  vessel 
that  can  be  built  or  floated  from  St.  John's. '^ 

Unfortunately  for  the  Americans,  their  resources  in  men 
and  means  were  far  inferior  to  those  of  their  opponents, 
who  were  able  eventually  to  carry  out,  though  on  a  somewhat 
smaller  scale,  Arnold's  idea  of  a  sailing  ship,  strictly  so  called, 
of  force  as  yet  unknown  in  inland  waters.  Such  a  ship,  aided 
as  she  was  by  two  consorts  of  somewhat  similar  character, 
dominated  the  Lake  as  soon  as  she  was  afloat,  reversing 
all  the  conditions.  To  place  and  equip  her,  however,  required 
time,  invaluable  time,  during  which  Arnold's  two  schooners 
exercised  control.  Baron  Riedesel,  the  commander  of  the 
German  contingent  with  Carleton,  after  examining  the  Ameri- 
can position  at  Ticonderoga,  wrote,  "  If  we  could  have  begun 
our  expedition  four  weeks  earlier,  I  am  satisfied  that  every- 
thing would  have  been  ended  this  year  (1776) ;  but,  not 
having  shelter  nor  other  necessary  things,  we  were  unable 
to  remain  at  the  other  [southern]  end  of  Champlain."  So 
delay  favors  the  defence,  and  changes  issues.  What  would 
have  been  the  effect  upon  the  American  cause  if,  simultane- 
ously with  the  loss  of  New  York,  August  20th-September 
15th,  had  come  news  of  the  fall  of  Ticonderoga,  the  repute 
of  which  for  strength  stood  high  ?  Nor  was  this  all ;  for  in 
that  event,  the  plan  which  was  wrecked  in  1777  by  Sir 
William  Howe's  ill-conceived  expedition  to  the  Chesapeake 
would  doubtless  have  been  carried  out  in  1776.  In  a  con- 
temporary English  paper  occurs  the  following  significant 


14     MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

item:  "London,  September  26th,  1776.  Advices  have  been 
received  here  from  Canada,  dated  August  12th,  that  General 
Burgoyne's  army  has  found  it  impracticable  to  get  across 
the  lakes  this  season.  The  naval  force  of  the  Provincials 
is  too  great  for  them  to  contend  with  at  present.  They 
must  build  larger  vessels  for  this  purpose,  and  these  cannot 
be  ready  before  next  summer.  The  design  was'^  that  the  two 
armies  commanded  by  Generals  Howe  and  Burgoyne  should 
cooperate ;  that  they  should  both  be  on  the  Hudson  River 
at  the  same  time ;  that  they  should  join  about  Albany,  and 
thereby  cut  off  all  communication  between  the  northern  and 
southern  Colonies."  ^ 

As  Arnold's  more  ambitious  scheme  could  not  be  realised, 
he  had  to  content  himself  with  gondolas  and  galleys,  for  the 
force  he  was  to  command  as  well  as  to  build.  The  precise 
difference  between  the  two  kinds  of  rowing  vessels  thus  distin- 
guished by  name,  the  writer  has  not  been  able  to  ascertain. 
The  gondola  was  a  flat-bottomed  boat,  and  inferior  in  nautical 
qualities  —  speed,  handiness,  and  seaworthiness  —  to  the 
galleys,  which  probably  were  keeled.  The  latter  certainly 
carried  sails,  and  may  have  been  capable  of  beating  to  wind- 
ward. Arnold  preferred  them,  and  stopped  the  building  of 
gondolas.  "The  galleys,"  he  wrote,  "are  quick  moving, 
which  will  give  us  a  great  advantage  in  the  open  lake."  The 
complements  of  the  galleys  were  eighty  men,  of  the  gondolas 
forty-five ;  from  which,  and  from  their  batteries,  it  may  be 
inferred  that  the  latter  were  between  one  third  and  one  half 
the  size  of  the  former.  The  armaments  of  the  two  were  alike 
in  character,  but  those  of  the  gondolas  much  lighter.  Ameri- 
can accounts  agree  with  Captain  Douglas's  report  of  one 
galley  captured  by  the  British.  In  the  bows,  an  18  and  a 
12-pounder ;  in  the  stern,  two  9's ;  in  broadside,  from  four  to 
'  six  6's.     There  is  in  this  a  somewhat  droll  reminder  of  the  dis- 

^  Author's  italics.  ^  Remembrancer,  iv.  291. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  15 

puted  merits  of  bow,  stern,  and  broadside  fire,  in  a  modern 
iron-clad ;  and  the  practical  conclusion  is  much  the  same. 
The  gondolas  had  one  12-pounder  and  two  6's.  All  the 
vessels  of  both  parties  carried  a  number  of  swivel  guns. 

Amid  the  many  difficulties  which  lack  of  resources  imposed 
upon  all  American  undertakings,  Arnold  succeeded  in  getting 
afloat  with  three  schooners,  a  sloop,  and  five  gondolas,  on 
the  20th  of  August.  He  cruised  at  the  upper  end  of  Cham- 
plain  till  the  1st  of  September,  when  he  moved  rapidly  north, 
and  on  the  3d  anchored  in  the  lower  narrows,  twenty-five 
miles  above  St.  John's,  stretching  his  line  from  shore  to  shore. 
Scouts  had  kept  him  informed  of  the  progress  of  the  British 
naval  preparations,  so  that  he  knew  that  there  was  no  immedi- 
ate danger;  while  an  advanced  position,  maintained  with  a 
bold  front,  would  certainly  prevent  reconnoissances  by 
water,  and  possibly  might  impose  somewhat  upon  the 
enemy.  The  latter,  however,  erected  batteries  on  each 
side  of  the  anchorage,  compelling  Arnold  to  fall  back  to  the 
broader  lake.  He  then  had  soundings  taken  about  Valcour 
Island,  and  between  it  and  the  western  shore ;  that  being 
the  position  in  which  he  intended  to  make  a  stand.  He 
retired  thither  on  the  23rd  of  September. 

The  British  on  their  side  had  contended  with  no  less 
obstacles  than  their  adversaries,  though  of  a  somewhat 
different  character.  To  get  carpenters  and  materials  to 
build,  and  seamen  to  man,  were  the  chief  difficulties  of  the 
Americans;  the  necessities  of  the  seaboard  conceding  but 
partially  the  demands  made  upon  it ;  but  their  vessels  were 
built  upon  the  shores  of  the  Lake,  and  launched  into  navigable 
w^aters.  A  large  fleet  of  transports  and  ships  of  war  in  the  St. 
Lawrence  supplied  the  British  with  adequate  resources,  which 
were  utilized  judiciously  and  energetically  by  Captain 
Douglas ;  but  to  get  these  to  the  Lake  was  a  long  and  arduous 
task.     A  great  part  of  the  Richelieu  River  was  shoal,  and  ob- 


16       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

structed  by  rapids.  The  point  where  lake  navigation  began 
was  at  St.  John's,  to  which  the  nearest  approach,  by  a 
hundred-ton  schooner,  from  the  St.  Lawrence,  was  Chambly, 
ten  miles  below.  Flat-boats  and  long-boats  could  be  dragged 
up  stream,  but  vessels  of  any  size  had  to  be  transported  by 
land ;  and  the  engineers  found  the  roadbed  too  soft  in  places 
to  bear  the  weight  of  a  hundred  tons.  Under  Douglas's 
directions,  the  planking  and  frames  of  two  schooners  were 
taken  down  at  Chambly,  and  carried  round  by  road  to  St. 
John's,  where  they  were  again  put  together.  At  Quebec  he 
found  building  a  new  hull,  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  tons. 
This  he  took  apart  nearly  to  the  keel,  shipping  the  frames 
in  thirty  long-boats,  which  the  transport  captains  consented 
to  surrender,  together  with  their  carpenters,  for  service  on 
the  Lake.  Drafts  from  the  ships  of  war,  and  volunteers  from 
the  transports,  furnished  a  body  of  seven  hundred  seamen 
for  the  same  employment,  —  a  force  to  which  the  Americans 
could  oppose  nothing  equal,  commanded  as  it  was  by  regular 
naval  officers.  The  largest  vessel  was  ship-rigged,  and  had  a 
battery  of  eighteen  12-pounders ;  she  was  called  the  Inflexible, 
and  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant  John  Schanck.  The 
two  schooners,  Maria,  Lieutenant  Starke,  and  Carleton, 
Lieutenant  James  Richard  Dacres,  carried  respectively  four- 
teen and  twelve  6-pounders.  These  were  the  backbone 
of  the  British  flotilla.  There  were  also  a  radeau,  the  Thun- 
derer, and  a  large  gondola,  the  Loyal  Convert,  both  heavily 
armed ;  but,  being  equally  heavy  of  movement,  they  do  not 
appear  to  have  played  any  important  part.  Besides  these, 
when  the  expedition  started,  there  were  twenty  gunboats, 
each  carrying  one  fieldpiece,  from  24's  to  9-pounders ;  or,  in 
some  cases,  how^itzers.^ 

^  The  radeau  had  six  24-pounders,  six  12's,  and  two  howitzers ; 
the  gondola,  seven  9-pounders.  The  particulars  of  armament  are 
from  Douglas's  letters. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  17 

"By  all  these  means,"  wrote  Douglas  on  July  21st,  "our 
acquiring  an  absolute  dominion  over  Lake  Champlain  is  not 
doubted  of."  The  expectation  was  perfectly  sound.  With 
a  working  breeze,  the  Inflexible  alone  could  sweep  the  Lake 
clear  of  all  that  floated  on  it.  But  the  element  of  time  re- 
mained. From  the  day  of  this  writing  till  that  on  which 
he  saw  the  Inflexible  leave  St.  John's,  October  4th,  was  over 
ten  weeks;  and  it  was  not  until  the  9th  that  Carleton  was 
ready  to  advance  with  the  squadron.  By  that  time  the 
American  troops  at  the  head  of  the  Lake  had  increased  to 
eight  or  ten  thousand.  The  British  land  force  is  reported  ^ 
as  thirteen  thousand,  of  which  six  thousand  were  in  garrison 
at  St.  John's  and  elsewhere. 

Arnold's  last  reinforcements  reached  him  at  Valcour  on 
the  6th  of  October.  On  that  day,  and  in  the  action  of  the 
11th,  he  had  with  him  all  the  American  vessels  on  the  Lake, 
except  one  schooner  and  one  galley.  His  force,  thus,  was  two 
schooners  and  a  sloop,  broadside  vessels,  besides  four  galleys 
and  eight  gondolas,  which  may  be  assumed  reasonably  to 
have  depended  on  their  bow  guns ;  there,  at  least,  was  their 
heaviest  fire.  Thus  reckoned,  his  flotilla,  disposed  to  the 
best  advantage,  could  bring  into  action  at  one  time,  two  18's, 
thirteen  12's,  one  9,  two  6's,  twelve  4's,  and  two  2-pounders, 
independent  of  swivels ;  total  thirty-two  guns,  out  of  eighty- 
four  that  were  mounted  in  fifteen  vessels.  To  this  the  British 
had  to  oppose,  in  three  broadside  vessels,  nine  12's  and  thir- 
teen 6's,  and  in  twenty  gunboats,  tw^enty  other  brass  guns, 
"from  twenty-four  to  nines,  some  with  howitzers;"^  total 
forty-two  guns.  In  this  statement  the  radeau  and  gondola 
have  not  been  included,  because  of  their  unmanageableness. 
Included  as  broadside  vessels,  they  would  raise  the  British 

1  By  American  reports.  Beatson  gives  the  force  sent  out,  in  the 
spring  of  1776,  as  13,357.     ("  Mil.  and  Nav.  Memoirs,"  vi.  44.) 

2  Douglas's  letters. 


18      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

armament — by  three  24's,  three  12'3,  four  9's,  and  a 
howitzer  —  to  a  total  of  fifty-three  guns.  Actually,  they 
could  be  brought  into  action  only  under  exceptional  cir- 
cumstances, and  are  more  properly  omitted. 

These  minutiae  are  necessary  for  the  proper  appreciation 
of  what  Captain  Douglas  justly  called  ''a  momentous  event." 
It  was  a  strife  of  pigmies  for  the  prize  of  a  continent,  and 
the  leaders  are  entitled  to  full  credit  both  for  their  antecedent 
energy  and  for  their  dispositions  in  the  contest ;  not  least  the 
unhappy  man  who,  having  done  so  much  to  save  his  country, 
afterwards  blasted  his  name  by  a  treason  unsurpassed  in 
modern  war.  Energy  and  audacity  had  so  far  preserved 
the  Lake  to  the  Americans;  Arnold  determined  to  have 
one  more  try  of  the  chances.  He  did  not  know  the  full 
force  of  the  enemy,  but  he  expected  that  "it  would  be  very 
formidable,  if  not  equal  to  ours."  ^  The  season,  however, 
was  so  near  its  end  that  a  severe  check  would  equal  a  defeat, 
and  would  postpone  Carleton's  further  advance  to  the  next 
spring.  Besides,  what  was  the  worth  of  such  a  force  as  the 
American,  such  a  flotilla,  under  the  guns  of  Ticonderoga,  the 
Lake  being  lost  ?  It  was  eminently  a  case  for  taking  chances, 
even  if  the  detachment  should  be  sacrificed,  as  it  was. 

Arnold's  original  purpose  had  been  to  fight  under  way ; 
and  it  was  from  this  point  of  view  that  he  valued  the  galleys, 
because  of  their  mobility.  It  is  uncertain  when  he  first 
learned  of  the  rig  and  battery  of  the  Inflexible;  but  a  good 
look-out  was  kept,  and  the  British  squadron  was  sighted 
from  Valcour  when  it  quitted  the  narrows.  It  may  have 
been  seen  even  earlier;    for  Carleton  had  been  informed. 


1  Douglas  thought  that  the  appearance  of  the  Inflexible  was  a  com- 
plete surprise ;  but  Arnold  had  been  informed  that  a  third  vessel, 
larger  than  the  schooners,  was  being  set  up.  With  a  man  of  his 
character,  it  is  impossible  to  be  sure,  from  his  letters  to  his  superior, 
how  much  he  knew,  or  what  he  withheld. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  19 

erroneously,  that  the  Americans  were  near  Grand  Island, 
which  led  him  to  incline  to  that  side,  and  so  open  out  Val- 
cour  sooner.  The  British  anchored  for  the  night  of  October 
10th,  between  Grand  and  Long  ^  Islands.  Getting  under  way 
next  morning,  they  stood  up  the  Lake  with  a  strong  north-east 
wind,  keeping  along  Grand  Island,  upon  which  their  attention 
doubtless  was  fastened  by  the  intelligence  which  they  had 
received  ;  but  it  was  a  singular  negligence  thus  to  run  to  lee- 
ward with  a  fair  wind,  without  thorough  scouting  on  both 
hands.  The  consequence  was  that  the  American  flotilla 
was  not  discovered  until  Valcour  Island,  which  is  from  one 
hundred  and  twenty  to  one  hundred  and  eighty  feet  high 
throughout  its  two  miles  of  length,  was  so  far  passed  that  the 
attack  had  to  be  made  from  the  south,  —  from  leeward. 

When  the  British  were  first  made  out,  Arnold's  sec- 
ond in  command,  Waterbury,  urged  that  in  view  of  the 
enemy's  superiority  the  flotilla  should  get  under  way  at 
once,  and  fight  them  "  on  a  retreat  in  the  main  lake ; " 
the  harbour  being  disadvantageous  "to  fight  a  number 
so  much  superior,  and  the  enemy  being  able  to  surround 
us  on  every  side,  we  lying  between  an  island  and  the 
main."  Waterbury 's  advice  evidently  found  its  origin  in 
that  fruitful  source  of  military  errors  of  design,  which  reckons 
the  preservation  of  a  force  first  of  objects,  making  the  re- 
sults of  its  action  secondary.  With  sounder  judgment, 
Arnold  decided  to  hold  on.  A  retreat  before  square-rigged 
sailing  vessels  having  a  fair  wind,  by  a  heterogeneous  force 
like  his  own,  of  unequal  speeds  and  batteries,  could  result 
only  in  disaster.  Concerted  fire  and  successful  escape  were 
alike  improbable;  and  besides,  escape,  if  feasible,  was  but 
throwing  up  the  game.  Better  trust  to  a  steady,  well- 
ordered  position,  developing  the  utmost  fire.  If  the  enemy 
discovered  him,  and  came  in  by  the  northern  entrance,  there 
1  Now  called  North  Hero. 


20     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

was  a  five-foot  knoll  in  mid-channel  which  might  fetch  the 
biggest  of  them  up ;  if,  as  proved  to  be  the  case,  the  island 
should  be  passed,  and  the  attack  should  be  made  from  leeward, 
it  probably  would  be  partial  and  in  disorder,  as  also  happened. 
The  correctness  of  Arnold's  decision  not  to  chance  a  retreat 
was  shown  in  the  retreat  of  two  days  later. 

Valcour  is  on  the  west  side  of  the  Lake,  about  three  quarters 
of  a  mile  from  the  main ;  but  a  peninsula  projecting  from  the 
island  at  mid-length  narrows  this  interval  to  a  half-mile. 
From  the  accounts,  it  is  clear  that  the  American  flotilla  lay 
south  of  this  peninsula.  Arnold  therefore  had  a  reasonable 
hope  that  it  might  be  passed  undetected.  Writing  to  Gates, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  at  Ticonderoga,  he  said  :  "  There  is 
a  good  harbour,  and  if  the  enemy  venture  up  the  Lake  it  will 
be  impossible  for  them  to  take  advantage  of  our  situation.  If 
we  succeed  in  our  attack  upon  them,  it  will  be  impossible  for 
any  to  escape.  If  we  are  worsted,  our  retreat  is  open  and 
free.  In  case  of  wind,  which  generally  blows  fresh  at  this 
season,  our  craft  will  make  good  weather,  while  theirs  cannot 
keep  the  Lake."  It  is  apparent  from  this,  written  three 
weeks  before  the  battle,  that  he  then  was  not  expecting 
a  force  materially  different  from  his  own.  Later,  he  de- 
scribes his  position  as  being  "  in  a  small  bay  on  the  west 
side  of  the  island,  as  near  together  as  possible,  and  in  such  a 
form  that  few  vessels  can  attack  us  at  the  same  time,  and 
those  will  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  whole  fleet." 
Though  he  unfortunately  gives  no  details,  he  evidently  had 
sound  tactical  ideas.  The  formation  of  the  anchored  vessels 
is  described  by  the  British  officers  as  a  half-moon. 

When  the  British  discovered  the  enemy,  they  hauled  up 
for  them.  Arnold  ordered  one  of  his  schooners,  the  Royal 
Savage,  and  the  four  galleys,  to  get  under  way;  the  two 
other  schooners  and  the  eight  gondolas  remaining  at  their 
anchors.     The  Royal  Savage,  dropping  to  leeward,  —  by  bad 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  21 

mangement,  Arnold  says,  —  came,  apparently  unsupported, 
under  the  distant  fire  of  the  Inflexible,  as  she  drew  under  the 
lee  of  Valcour  at  11  a.m.,  followed  by  the  Carleton,  and  at 
greater  distance  by  the  Maria  and  the  gunboats.  Three 
shots  from  the  ship's  12-pounders  struck  the  Royal  Samge, 
which  then  ran  ashore  on  the  southern  point  of  the  island. 
The  Inflexible,  followed  closely  by  the  Carleton,  continued 
on,  but  fired  only  occasionally;  showing  that  Arnold 
was  keeping  his  galleys  in  hand,  at  long  bowls,  —  as 
small  vessels  with  one  eighteen  should  be  kept,  when  con- 
fronted with  a  broadside  of  nine  guns.  Between  the  island 
and  the  main  the  north-east  wind  doubtless  drew  more 
northerly,  adverse  to  the  ship's  approach;  but,  a  flaw  off 
the  cliffs  taking  the  fore  and  aft  sails  of  the  Carleton,  she 
fetched  "  nearly  into  the  middle  of  the  rebel  half-moon,  where 
Lieutenant  J.  R.  Dacres  intrepidly  anchored  with  a  spring 
on  her  cable."  The  Maria,  on  board  which  was  Carleton, 
together  with  Commander  Thomas  Pringle,  commanding 
the  flotilla,  was  to  leeward  when  the  chase  began,  and  could 
not  get  into  close  action  that  day.  By  this  time,  seventeen 
of  the  twenty  gunboats  had  come  up,  and,  after  silencing 
the  Royal  Savage,  pulled  up  to  within  point-blank  range 
of  the  American  flotilla.  "The  cannonade  was  tremendous," 
wrote  Baron  Riedesel.  Lieutenant  Edward  Longcroft, 
of  the  radeau  Thunderer,  not  being  able  to  get  his  raft 
into  action,  went  with  a  boat's  crew  on  board  the  Royal 
Savage,  and  for  a  time  turned  her  guns  upon  her  former 
friends;  but  the  fire  of  the  latter  forced  him  again  to 
abandon  her,  and  it  seemed  so  likely  that  she  might  be  re- 
taken that  she  was  set  on  fire  by  Lieutenant  Starke  of  the 
Maria,  when  already  "two  rebel  boats  were  very  near  her. 
She  soon  after  blew  up."  The  American  guns  converging  on 
the  Carleton  in  her  central  position,  she  suffered  severely. 
Her  commander.  Lieutenant  Dacres,  was  knocked  senseless ; 


22     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES   IN  THE 

another  officer  lost  an  arm ;  only  Mr.  Edward  Pellew,  after- 
wards Lord  Exmouth,  remained  fit  for  duty.  The  spring 
being  shot  away,  she  swung  bows  on  to  the  enemy,  and  her 
fire  was  thus  silenced.  Captain  Pringle  signalled  to  her  to 
withdraw ;  but  she  was  unable  to  obey.  To  pay  her  head 
off  the  right  way,  Pellew  himself  had  to  get  out  on  the  bow- 
sprit under  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry,  to  bear  the  jib  over  to 
windward ;  but  to  make  sail  seems  to  have  been  impossible. 
Two  artillery  boats  were  sent  to  her  assistance,  "  which  towed 
her  off  through  a  very  thick  fire,  until  out  of  farther  reach, 
much  to  the  honour  of  Mr.  John  Curling  and  Mr.  Patrick 
Carnegy,  master's  mate  and  midshipman  of  the  Isis,  who 
conducted  them;  and  of  Mr.  Edward  Pellew,  mate  of  the 
Blonde,  who  threw  the  tow-rope  from  the  Carleton's  bow- 
sprit." ^  This  service  on  board  the  Carleton  started  Pellew  on 
his  road  to  fortune;  but,  singularly  enough,  the  lieutenancy 
promised  him  in  consequence,  by  both  the  First  Lord  and 
Lord  Howe,  was  delayed  by  the  fact  that  he  stayed  at  the 
front,  instead  of  going  to  the  rear,  where  he  would  have  been 
"within  their  jurisdiction."^  The  Carleton  had  two  feet  of 
water  in  the  hold,  and  had  lost  eight  killed  and  six  wounded, 
—  about  half  her  crew, — when  she  anchored  out  of  fire. 
In  this  small  but  stirring  business,  the  Americans,  in  addition 
to  the  Royal  Savage,  had  lost  one  gondola.  Besides  the  inju- 
ries to  the  Carleton,  a  British  artillery  boat,  commanded  by  a 
German  lieutenant,  was  sunk.  Towards  evening  the  In- 
flexible got  within  point-blank  shot  of  the  Americans,  "when 
five  broadsides,"  wrote  Douglas,  "silenced  their  whole  line." 
One  fresh  ship,  with  scantling  for  sea-going,  and  a  con- 
centrated battery,  has  an  unquestioned  advantage  over  a 

1  Douglas's  letter.  The  Isis  and  the  Blonde  were  vessels  of  the 
British  squadron  under  Douglas,  then  lying  in  the  St.  Lawrence. 
The  officers  named  were  temporarily  on  the  lake  service. 

2  Sandwich,  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  to  Pellew. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  23 

dozen  light-built  craft,  carrying  one  or  two  guns  each,  and 
already  several  hours  engaged. 

At  nightfall  the  Inflexible  dropped  out  of  range,  and  the 
British  squadron  anchored  in  line  of  battle  across  the  southern 
end  of  the  passage  between  the  island  and  the  main;  some 
vessels  were  extended  also  to  the  eastward,  into  the  open 
Lake.  "The  best  part  of  my  intelligence,"  wrote  Burgoyne 
next  day  from  St.  John's,  to  Douglas  at  Quebec,  "is  that  our 
whole  fleet  was  formed  in  line  above  the  enemy,  and  conse- 
quently they  must  have  surrendered  this  morning,  or  given 
us  battle  on  our  own  terms.  The  Indians  and  light  troops 
are  abreast  with  the  fleet;  they  cannot,  therefore,  escape 
by  land."  The  British  squadron  sharing  this  confidence,  a 
proper  look-out  was  not  kept.  The  American  leader  im- 
mediately held  a  conference  with  his  officers,  and  decided  to 
attempt  a  retreat,  "which  was  done  with  such  secrecy," 
writes  Waterbury,  "that  we  went  through  them  entirely 
undiscovered."  The  movement  began  at  7  p.m.,  a  galley 
leading,  the  gondolas  and  schooners  following,  and  Arnold 
and  his  second  bringing  up  the  rear  in  the  two  heaviest 
galleys.  This  delicate  operation  was  favoured  by  a  heavy  fog, 
which  did  not  clear  till  next  morning  at  eight.  As  the 
Americans  stole  by,  they  could  not  see  any  of  the  hostile 
ships.  By  daylight  they  were  out  of  sight  of  the  British. 
Riedesel,  speaking  of  this  event,  says,  "The  ships  anchored, 
secure  of  the  enemy,  who  stole  off  during  the  night,  and 
sailing  round  the  left  wing,  aided  by  a  favourable  wind,  es- 
caped under  darkness."  The  astonishment  next  morning, 
he  continues,  was  great,  as  was  Carleton's  rage.  The  latter 
started  to  pursue  in  such  a  hurry  that  he  forgot  to  leave  orders 
for  the  troops  which  had  been  landed  ;  but,  failing  to  discover 
the  fugitives,  he  returned  and  remained  at  Valcour  till  night- 
fall, when  scouts  brought  word  that  the  enemy  were  at 
Schuyler's  Island,  eight  miles  above. 


24     MAJOR    OPERA  TIONS   OF   THE  NA  VIES  IN   THE 

The  retreat  of  the  Americans  had  been  embarrassed  by 
their  injuries,  and  by  the  wind  coming  out  ahead.  They 
were  obHged  to  anchor  on  the  12th  to  repair  damages,  both 
hulls  and  sails  having  suffered  severely.  Arnold  took  the 
precaution  to  write  to  Crown  Point  for  bateaux,  to  tow  in 
case  of  a  southerly  wind ;  but  time  did  not  allow  these  to 
arrive.  Two  gondolas  had  to  be  sunk  on  account  of  their 
injuries,  making  three  of  that  class  so  far  lost.  The  retreat 
was  resumed  at  2  p.m.,  but  the  breeze  was  fresh  from  the 
southward,  and  the  gondolas  made  very  little  way.  At 
evening  the  British  chased  again.  That  night  the  wind 
moderated,  and  at  daybreak  the  American  flotilla  was  twenty- 
eight  miles  from  Crown  Point,  —  fourteen  from  Valcour,  — 
having  still  five  miles'  start.  Later,  however,  by  Arnold's  re- 
port, "  the  wind  again  breezed  up  to  the  southward,  so  that  we 
gained  very  little  either  by  beating  or  rowing.  At  the  same 
time  the  enemy  took  a  fresh  breeze  from  northeast,  and,  by 
the  time  we  had  reached  Split  Rock,  were  alongside  of  us." 
The  galleys  of  Arnold  and  Waterbury,  the  Congress  and  the 
Washington,  had  throughout  kept  in  the  rear,  and  now 
received  the  brunt  of  the  attack,  made  by  the  Inflexible  and 
the  two  schooners,  which  had  entirely  distanced  their  sluggish 
consorts.  This  fight  was  in  the  upper  narrows,  where  the 
Lake  is  from  one  to  three  miles  wide ;  and  it  lasted,  by  Ar- 
nold's report,  for  five  glasses  (two  hours  and  a  half),^  the 
Americans  continually  retreating,  until  about  ten  miles  from 
Crown  Point.  There,  the  Washington  having  struck  some 
time  before,  and  final  escape  being  impossible,  Arnold  ran 
the  Congress  and  four  gondolas  ashore  in  a  small  creek  on 
the  east  side ;  pulling  to  windward,  with  the  cool  judgment 
that  had  marked  all  his  conduct,  so  that  the  enemy  could 
not  follow  him  —  except  in  small  boats  with  which  he  could 
deal.  There  he  set  his  vessels  on  fire,  and  stood  by  them 
^  Beatson,  "Nav.  and  Mil.  Memoirs,"  says  two  hours. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  25 

until  assured  that  they  would  blow  up  with  their  flags  flying. 
He  then  retreated  to  Crown  Point  through  the  woods, 
"despite  the  savages ;"  a  phrase  which  concludes  this  singular 
aquatic  contest  with  a  quaint  touch  of  local  colour. 

In  three  days  of  fighting  and  retreating  the  Americans  had 
lost  one  schooner,  two  galleys,  and  seven  gondolas,  —  in  all, 
ten  vessels  out  of  fifteen.  The  killed  and  wounded  amounted 
to  over  eighty,  twenty  odd  of  whom  were  in  Arnold's  galley. 
The  original  force,  numbering  seven  hundred,  had  been 
decimated.  Considering  its  raw  material  and  the  recency  of 
its  organisation,  words  can  scarcely  exaggerate  the  heroism 
of  the  resistance,  which  undoubtedly  depended  chiefly 
upon  the  personal  military  qualities  of  the  leader.  The 
British  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  did  not  exceed  forty. 

The  little  American  navy  on  Champlain  was  wiped  out; 
but  never  had  any  force,  big  or  small,  lived  to  better  purpose 
or  died  more  gloriously,  for  it  had  saved  the  Lake  for  that 
year.  Whatever  deductions  may  be  made  for  blunders,  and 
for  circumstances  of  every  character  which  made  the  British 
campaign  of  1777  abortive  and  disastrous,  thus  leading 
directly  to  the  American  alliance  with  France  in  1778,  the 
delay,  with  all  that  it  involved,  was  obtained  by  the  Lake 
campaign  of  1776.  On  October  15th,  two  days  after  Arnold's 
final  defeat,  Carleton  dated  a  letter  to  Douglas  from  before 
Crown  Point,  whence  the  American  garrison  was  withdrawn. 
A  week  later  Riedesel  arrived,  and  wrote  that,  "were  our 
whole  army  here  it  would  be  an  easy  matter  to  drive  the 
enemy  from  their  entrenchments,"  at  Ticonderoga,  and  —  as 
has  been  quoted  already  —  four  weeks  sooner  would  have 
insured  its  fall.  It  is  but  a  coincidence  that  just  four  weeks 
had  been  required  to  set  up  the  Inflexible  at  St.  John's; 
but  it  typifies  the  whole  story.  Save  for  Arnold's  flotilla, 
the  two  British  schooners  would  have  settled  the  business. 
"Upon  the  whole.  Sir,"  wrote  Douglas  in  his  final  letter  from 


26     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

Quebec  before  sailing  for  England,  "I  scruple  not  to  say, 
that  had  not  General  Carleton  authorized  me  to  take  the 
extraordinary  measure  of  sending  up  the  Inflexible  from  Que- 
bec, things  could  not  this  year  have  been  brought  to  so  glo- 
rious a  conclusion  on  Lake  Champlain."  Douglas  further 
showed  the  importance  attached  to  this  success  by  men  of 
that  day,  by  sending  a  special  message  to  the  British 
ambassador  at  Madrid,  "presuming  that  the  early 
knowledge  of  this  great  event  in  the  southern  parts 
of  Europe  may  be  of  advantage  to  His  Majesty's  service/' 
That  the  opinion  of  the  government  was  similar  may  be 
inferred  from  the  numerous  rewards  bestowed.  Carleton 
was  made  a  Knight  of  the  Bath,  and  Douglas  a  baronet. 

The  gallantry  shown  by  both  sides  upon  Lake  Champlain 
in  1776  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  narrative.  With 
regard  to  the  direction  of  movements,  —  the  skill  of  the  two 
leaders,  —  the  same  equal  credit  cannot  be  assigned.  It  was 
a  very  serious  blunder,  on  October  11th,  to  run  to  leeward, 
passing  a  concealed  enemy,  undetected,  upon  waters  so  per- 
fectly well  known  as  those  of  Champlain  were ;  it  having  been 
the  scene  of  frequent  British  operations  in  previous  wars. 
Owing  to  this,  "the  Maria,  because  of  her  distant  situation 
(from  which  the  Inflexible  and  Carleton  had  chased  by  signal) 
when  the  rebels  were  first  discovered,  and  baffling  winds, 
could  not  get  into  close  action."  ^  For  the  same  reason  the 
Inflexible  could  not  support  the  Carleton.  The  Americans, 
in  the  aggregate  distinctly  inferior,  were  thus  permitted  a 
concentration  of  superior  force  upon  part  of  their  enemies. 
It  is  needless  to  enlarge  upon  the  mortifying  incident  of 
Arnold's  escape  that  evening.     To  liken  small  things  to  great, 

^  Douglas's  letters.  The  sentence  is  awlovard,  but  carefully  com- 
pared with  the  copy  in  the  author's  hands.  Douglas  says,  of  the 
details  he  gives,  that  "they  have  been  collected  with  the  most 
scrupulous  circumspection." 


BENEDICT  ARNOLD. 


WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  27 

—  always  profitable  in  military  analysis,  —  it  resembled 
Hood's  slipping  away  from  de  Grasse  at  St.  Kitts.^ 

In  conduct  and  courage,  Arnold's  behavior  was  excellent 
throughout.  Without  enlarging  upon  the  energy  which 
created  the  flotilla,  and  the  breadth  of  view  which  suggested 
preparations  that  he  could  not  enforce,  admiration  is  due  to 
his  recognition  of  the  fact  —  implicit  in  deed,  if  unexpressed 
in  word  —  that  the  one  use  of  the  Navy  was  to  contest  the 
control  of  the  water;  to  impose  delay,  even  if  it  could  not 
secure  ultimate  victory.  No  words  could  say  more  clearly 
than  do  his  actions  that,  under  the  existing  conditions,  the 
navy  was  useless,  except  as  it  contributed  to  that  end; 
valueless,  if  buried  in  port.  Upon  this  rests  the  merit  of  his 
bold  advance  into  the  lower  narrows ;  upon  this  his  choice  of 
the  strong  defensive  position  of  Valcour;  upon  this  his  re- 
fusal to  retreat,  as  urged  by  Waterbury,  when  the  full  force 
of  the  enemy  was  disclosed,  —  a  decision  justified,  or  rather, 
illustrated,  by  the  advantages  which  the  accidents  of  the  day 
threw  into  his  hands.  His  personal  gallantry  was  conspicu- 
ous there  as  at  all  times  of  his  Hfe.  "His  countrymen,"  said 
a  generous  enemy  of  that  day,  "  chiefly  gloried  in  the  danger- 
ous attention  which  he  paid  to  a  nice  point  of  honour,  in  keep- 
ing his  flag  flying,  and  not  quitting  his  galley  till  she  w^as  in 
flames,  lest  the  enemy  should  have  boarded,  and  struck  it." 
It  is  not  the  least  of  the  injuries  done  to  his  nation  in  after 
years,  that  he  should  have  silenced  this  boast  and  effaced  this 
glorious  record  by  so  black  an  infamy. 

With  the  destruction  of  the  flotilla  ends  the  naval  story 
of  the  Lakes  during  the  War  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Satisfied  that  it  was  too  late  to  proceed  against  Ticonderoga 
that  year,  Carleton  withdrew  to  St.  John's  and  went  into 
winter-quarters.  The  following  year  the  enterprise  was  re- 
sumed under  General  Burgoyne;  but  Sir  William  Howe, 
1  Post,  p.  205. 


/ 


28      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

instead  of  cooperating  by  an  advance  up  the  Hudson,  which 
was  the  plan  of  1776,  carried  his  army  to  Chesapeake  Bay, 
to  act  thence  against  Philadelphia.  Burgoyne  took  Ticon- 
deroga  and  forced  his  way  as  far  as  Saratoga,  sixty  miles  from 
Ticonderoga  and  thirty  from  Albany,  where  Howe  should 
have  met  him.  There  he  was  brought  to  a  stand  by  the 
army  which  the  Americans  had  collected,  found  himself 
unable  to  advance  or  to  retreat,  and  was  forced  to  lay  down 
his  arms  on  October  17th,  1777.  The  garrisons  left  by  him 
at  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point  retired  to  Canada,  and  the 
posts  were  re-occupied  by  the  Americans.  No  further 
contest  took  place  on  the  Lake,  though  the  British  vessels 
remained  in  control  of  it,  and  showed  themselves  from  time 
to  time  up  to  1781.  With  the  outbreak  of  war  between 
Great  Britain  and  France,  in  1778,  the  scene  of  maritime 
interest  shifted  to  salt  water,  and  there  remained  till  the 
end. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  29 


CHAPTER  II 

NAVAL  ACTION  AT  BOSTON,  CHARLESTON,  NEW 
YORK,  AND  NARRAGANSETT  BAY  — ASSO- 
CIATED LAND  OPERATIONS  UP  TO  THE  BAT- 
TLE OF  TRENTON 


1776 


THE  opening  conflict  between  Great  Britain  and 
her  North  American  Colonies  teaches  clearly 
the  necessity,  too  rarely  recognised  in  practice, 
that  when  a  State  has  decided  to  use  force, 
the  force  provided  should  be  adequate  from  the  first. 
This  applies  with  equal  weight  to  national  policies  when 
it  is  the  intention  of  the  nation  to  maintain  them  at  all 
costs.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  for  instance  is  such  a 
policy;  but  unless  constant  adequate  preparation  is 
maintained  also,  the  policy  itself  is  but  a  vain  form 
of  words.  It  is  in  preparation  beforehand,  chiefly  if 
not  uniformly,  that  the  United  States  has  failed.  It  is 
better  to  be  much  too  strong  than  a  little  too  weak.  Seeing 
the  evident  temper  of  the  Massachusetts  Colonists,  force 
would  be  needed  to  execute  the  Boston  Port  Bill  and  its 
companion  measures  of  1774;  for  the  Port  Bill  especially, 
naval  force.  The  supplies  for  1775  granted  only  18,000 
seamen,  —  2000  less  than  for  the  previous  year.  For  1776, 
28,000  seamen  were  voted,  and  the  total  appropriations  rose 
from  £5,556,000  to  £10,154,000;  but  it  was  then  too  late. 
Boston  was  evacuated  by  the  British  army,  8000  strong 
on  the  17th  of  March,  1776 ;  but  already,  for  more  than  half 
a  year,  the  spreading  spirit  of  revolt  in  the  thirteen  Colonies 


30      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

had  been  encouraged  by  the  sight  of  the  British  army  cooped 
up  in  the  town,  suffering  from  want  of  necessaries,  while  the 
colonial  army  blockading  it  was  able  to  maintain  its  position, 
because  ships  laden  with  stores  for  the  one  were  captured, 
and  the  cargoes  diverted  to  the  use  of  the  other.  To  secure 
free  and  ample  communications  for  one's  self,  and  to  inter- 
rupt those  of  the  opponent,  are  among  the  first  requirements 
of  war.  To  carry  out  the  measures  of  the  British  government 
a  naval  force  was  needed,  which  not  only  should  protect  the 
approach  of  its  own  transports  to  Boston  Bay,  but  should 
prevent  access  to  all  coast  ports  whence  supplies  could  be 
carried  to  the  blockading  army.  So  far  from  this,  the 
squadron  was  not  equal,  in  either  number  or  quality,  to  the 
work  to  be  done  about  Boston ;  and  it  was  not  until  October, 
1775,  that  the  Admiral  was  authorized  to  capture  colonial 
merchant  vessels,  which  therefore  went  and  came  unmolested, 
outside  of  Boston,  carrying  often  provisions  which  found  their 
way  to  Washington's  army. 

After  evacuating  Boston,  General  Howe  retired  to  Halifax, 
there  to  await  the  coming  of  reinforcements,  both  military 
and  naval,  and  of  his  brother,  Vice-Admiral  Lord  Howe, 
appointed  to  command  the  North  American  Station.  General 
Howe  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  forces  throughout  the 
territory  extending  from  Nova  Scotia  to  West  Florida; 
from  Halifax  to  Pensacola.  The  first  operation  of  the 
campaign  was  to  be  the  reduction  of  New  York. 

The  British  government,  however,  had  several  objects  in 
view,  and  permitted  itself  to  be  distracted  from  the  single- 
minded  prosecution  of  one  great  undertaking  to  other  subsidi- 
ary operations,  not  always  concentric.  Whether  the 
control  of  the  line  of  the  Hudson  and  Lake  Champlain  ought 
to  have  been  sought  through  operations  beginning  at  both 
ends,  is  open  to  argument ;  the  facts  that  the  Americans  were 
back  in  Crown  Point  in  the  beginning  of  July,  1776,  and  that 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  31 

Carleton's  13,000  men  got  no  farther  than  St.  John's  that 
year,  suggest  that  the  greater  part  of  the  latter  force  would 
have  been  better  employed  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey 
than  about  Champlain.  However  that  may  be,  the  diver- 
sion to  the  Carolina s  of  a  third  body,  respectable  in  point 
of  numbers,  is  scarcely  to  be  defended  on  military  grounds. 
The  government  was  induced  to  it  by  the  expectation  of  local 
support  from  royalists.  That  there  were  many  of  these  in 
both  Carolinas  is  certain ;  but  while  military  operations  must 
take  account  of  political  conditions,  the  latter  should  not  be 
allowed  to  overbalance  elementary  principles  of  the  military 
art.  It  is  said  that  General  Howe  disapproved  of  this 
ex-centric  movement. 

The  force  destined  for  the  Southern  coasts  assembled  at 
Cork  towards  the  end  of  1775,  and  sailed  thence  in  January, 
1776.  The  troops  were  commanded  by  Lord  Cornwallis, 
the  squadron  by  Nelson's  early  patron,  Commodore  Sir 
Peter  Parker,  whose  broad  pennant  was  hoisted  on  board  the 
Bristol,  50.  After  a  boisterous  passage,  the  expedition  arrived 
in  May  off  Cape  Fear  in  North  Carolina,  where  it  was  joined 
by  two  thousand  men  under  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  Cornwallis's 
senior,  whom  Howe  by  the  government's  orders  had  detached 
to  the  southward  in  January.  Upon  Clinton's  appearance, 
the  royalists  in  North  Carolina  had  risen,  headed  by  the 
husband  of  Flora  Macdonald,  whose  name  thirty  years  be- 
fore had  been  associated  romantically  with  the  escape  of  the 
young  Pretender  from  Scotland.  She  had  afterwards  emi- 
grated to  America.  The  rising,  however,  had  been  put  down, 
and  Clinton  had  not  thought  it  expedient  to  try  a  serious 
invasion,  in  face  of  the  large  force  assembled  to  resist  him. 
Upon  Parker's  coming,  it  was  decided  to  make  an  attempt 
upon  Charleston,  South  Carolina.  The  fleet  therefore  sailed 
from  Cape  Fear  on  the  1st  of  June,  and  on  the  4th  anchored 
off  Charleston  Bar. 


32      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

Charleston  Harbour  opens  between  two  of  the  sea-islands 
which  fringe  the  coasts  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.  On 
the  north  is  Sullivan's  Island,  on  the  south  James  Island. 
The  bar  of  the  main  entrance  was  not  abreast  the  mouth  of 
the  port,  but  some  distance  south  of  it.  Inside  the  bar,  the 
channel  turned  to  the  northward,  and  thence  led  near  Sulli- 
van's Island,  the  southern  end  of  which  was  therefore  chosen 
as  the  site  of  the  rude  fort  hastily  thrown  up  to  meet  this 
attack,  and  afterwards  called  Fort  Moultrie,  from  the 
name  of  the  commander.  From  these  conditions,  a  southerly 
wind  was  needed  to  bring  ships  into  action.  After  sounding 
and  buoying  the  bar,  the  transports  and  frigates  crossed  on 
the  7th  and  anchored  inside ;  but  as  it  was  necessary  to  re- 
move some  of  the  Bristol's  guns,  she  could  not  follow  until 
the  10th.  On  the  9th  Clinton  had  landed  in  person  with 
five  hundred  men,  and  by  the  15th  all  the  troops  had  disem- 
barked upon  Long  Island,  next  north  of  Sullivan's.  It  w^as 
understood  that  the  inlet  between  the  two  w^as  fordable, 
allowing  the  troops  to  cooperate  with  the  naval  attack,  by 
diversion  or  otherwise;  but  this  proved  to  be  a  mistake. 
The  passage  was  seven  feet  deep  at  low  water,  and  there 
were  no  means  for  crossing ;  consequently  a  small  American 
detachment  in  the  scrub  wood  of  the  island  sufficed  to 
check  any  movement  in  that  quarter.  The  fighting  there- 
fore was  confined  to  the  cannonading  of  the  fort  by  the  ships. 

Circumstances  not  fully  explained  caused  the  attack  to  be 
fixed  for  the  23d;  an  inopportune  delay,  during  which 
Americans  were  strengthening  their  still  very  imperfect 
defences.  On  the  23d  the  wind  was  unfavourable.  On  the 
25th  the  Experiment,  50,  arrived,  crossed  the  bar,  and,  after 
taking  in  her  guns  again,  w^as  ready  to  join  in  the  assault. 
On  the  27th,  at  10  a.m.,  the  ships  got  under  way  with  a  south- 
east breeze,  but  this  shifted  soon  afterwards  to  north-west, 
and  they  had  to  anchor  again,  about  a  mile  nearer  to  Sulli- 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  33 

van's  Island.  On  the  following  day  the  wind  served,  and 
the  attack  was  made. 

In  plan,  Fort  Moultrie  was  square,  with  a  bastion  at  each 
angle.  In  construction,  the  sides  were  palmetto  logs,  dove- 
tailed and  bolted  together,  laid  in  parallel  rows,  sixteen 
feet  apart;  the  interspace  being  filled  with  sand.  At  the 
time  of  the  engagement,  the  south  and  west  fronts  were 
finished ;  the  other  fronts  were  only  seven  feet  high,  but  sur- 
mounted by  thick  planks,  to  be  tenable  against  escalade. 
Thirty-one  guns  were  in  place,  18  and  9-pounders,  of 
which  twenty-one  were  on  the  south  face,  commanding  the 
channel.  Within  was  a  traverse  running  east  and  west,  pro- 
tecting the  gunners  from  shots  from  the  rear ;  but  there  was 
no  such  cover  against  enfilading  fire,  in  case  an  enemy's 
ship  passed  the  fort  and  anchored  above  it.  "The  general 
opinion  before  the  action,"  Moultrie  says,  "and  especially 
among  sailors,  was  that  two  frigates  would  be  sufficient  to 
knock  the  town  about  our  ears,  notwithstanding  our  batter- 
ies." Parker  may  have  shared  this  impression,  and  it  may 
account  for  his  leisureliness.  When  the  action  began,  the 
garrison  had  but  twenty-eight  rounds  for  each  of  twenty- 
six  cannon,  but  this  deficiency  was  unknown  to  the  British. 

Parker's  plan  w^as  that  the  two  50's,  Bristol  and  Experi- 
ment, and  two  28-gun  frigates,  the  Active  and  the  Solebay, 
should  engage  the  main  front ;  while  two  frigates  of  the  same 
class,  the  Actceon  and  the  Syren,  with  a  20-gun  corvette,  the 
Sphinx,  should  pass  the  fort,  anchoring  to  the  westward,  up- 
channel,  to  protect  the  heavy  vessels  against  fire-ships,  as 
well  as  to  enfilade  the  principal  American  battery.  The 
main  attack  was  to  be  further  supported  by  a  bomb-vessel, 
the  Thunder,  accompanied  by  the  armed  transport  Friendship, 
which  were  to  take  station  to  the  southeast  of  the  east  bastion 
of  the  engaged  front  of  the  fort.  The  order  to  weigh  was 
given  at  10.30  a.m.,  when  the  flood-tide  had  fairly  made; 


34     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

and  at  11.15  the  Active,  Bristol,  Experiment,  and  Solebay, 
anchored  in  hne  ahead,  in  the  order  named,  the  Active  to 
the  eastward.  These  ships  seem  to  have  taken  their  places 
skilfully  without  confusion,  and  their  fire,  which  opened  at 
once,  was  rapid,  well-sustained,  and  well-directed;  but 
their  position  suffered  under  the  radical  defect  that,  whether 
from  actual  lack  of  water,  or  only  from  fear  of  grounding, 
they  were  too  far  from  the  works  to  use  grape  effectively. 
The  sides  of  ships  being  much  weaker  than  those  of  shore 
works,  while  their  guns  were  much  more  numerous,  the 
secret  of  success  was  to  get  near  enough  to  beat  down  the 
hostile  fire  by  a  multitude  of  projectiles.  The  bomb- vessel 
Thunder  anchored  in  the  situation  assigned  her;  but  her 
shells,  though  well  aimed,  were  ineffective.  "Most  of  them 
fell  within  the  fort,"  Moultrie  reported,  "  but  we  had  a  morass 
in  the  middle,  which  swallowed  them  instantly,  and  those 
that  fell  in  the  sand  were  immediately  buried."  During 
the  action  the  mortar  bed  broke,  disabling  the  piece. 

Owing  to  the  scarcity  of  ammunition  in  the  fort,  the 
garrison  had  positive  orders  not  to  engage  at  ranges  exceed- 
ing four  hundred  yards.  Four  or  five  shots  were  thrown  at 
the  Active,  while  still  under  sail,  but  with  this  exception  the 
fort  kept  silence  until  the  ships  anchored,  at  a  distance 
estimated  by  the  Americans  to  be  three  hundred  and  fifty 
yards.  The  word  was  then  passed  along  the  platform,  "  Mind 
the  Commodore ;  mind  the  two  50-gun  ships,"  —  an  order 
which  was  strictly  obeyed,  as  the  losses  show.  The  protec- 
tion of  the  work  proved  to  be  almost  perfect,  —  a  fact  which 
doubtless  contributed  to  the  coolness  and  precision  of  fire 
vitally  essential  with  such  deficient  resources.  The  texture  of 
the  palmetto  wood  suffered  the  balls  to  sink  smoothly  into 
it  without  splintering,  so  that  the  facing  of  the  work  held  well. 
At  times,  when  three  or  four  broadsides  struck  together,  the 
merlons  shook  so  that  Moultrie  feared  they  would  come 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  35 

bodily  in;  but  they  withstood,  and  the  small  loss  inflicted 
was  chiefly  through  the  embrasures.  The  flagstaff  being 
shot  away,  falling  outside  into  the  ditch,  a  young  sergeant, 
named  Jasper,  distinguished  himself  by  jumping  after 
it,  fetching  back  and  rehoisting  the  colours  under  a  heavy 
fire. 

In  the  squadron  an  equal  gallantry  was  shown  under 
circumstances  which  made  severe  demands  upon  endurance. 
Whatever  Parker's  estimate  of  the  worth  of  the  defences, 
no  trace  of  vain-confidence  appears  in  his  dispositions,  which 
were  thorough  and  careful,  as  the  execution  of  the  main 
attack  was  skilful  and  vigorous;  but  the  ships'  companies, 
expecting  an  easy  victory,  had  found  themselves  confronted 
with  a  resistance  and  a  punishment  as  severe  as  were  endured 
by  the  leading  ships  at  Trafalgar,  and  far  more  prolonged. 
Such  conditions  impose  upon  men's  tenacity  the  additional 
test  of  surprise  and  discomfiture.  The  Experiment,  though 
very  small  for  a  ship  of  the  line,  lost  23  killed  and  56  wounded, 
out  of  a  total  probably  not  much  exceeding  300 ;  w^hile  the 
Bristol,  having  the  spring  shot  away,  swung  with  her  head 
to  the  southward  and  her  stern  to  the  fort,  undergoing  for 
a  long  time  a  raking  fire  to  which  she  could  make  little  reply. 
Three  several  attempts  to  replace  the  spring  were  made  by 
Mr.  James  Saumarez,  —  afterwards  the  distinguished  ad- 
miral. Lord  de  Saumarez,  then  a  midshipman,  —  before  the 
ship  was  relieved  from  this  grave  disadvantage.  Her  loss 
was  40  killed  and  71  wounded ;  not  a  man  escaping  of  those 
stationed  on  the  quarter-deck  at  the  beginning  of  the  action. 
Among  the  injured  was  the  Commodore  himself,  whose  cool 
heroism  must  have  been  singularly  conspicuous,  from  the 
notice  it  attracted  in  a  service  where  such  bearing  was  not 
rare.  At  one  time  when  the  quarter-deck  was  cleared  and  he 
stood  alone  upon  the  poop-ladder,  Saumarez  suggested  to  him 
to  come  down;   but  he  replied,  smiling,  "You  want  to  get 


36  MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

rid  of  me,  do  you?'*  and  refused  to  move.  The  captain  of 
the  ship,  John  Morris,  was  mortally  wounded.  With  com- 
mendable modesty  Parker  only  reported  himself  as  slightly 
bruised ;  but  deserters  stated  that  for  some  days  he  needed 
the  assistance  of  two  men  to  walk,  and  that  his  trousers  had 
been  torn  off  him  by  shot  or  splinters.  The  loss  in  the  other 
ships  was  only  one  killed,  14  wounded.     The  Americans  had 

37  killed  and  wounded. 

The  three  vessels  assigned  to  enfilade  the  main  front 
of  the  fort  did  not  get  into  position.  They  ran  on  the 
middle  ground,  owing,  Parker  reported,  to  the  ignorance  of  the 
pilots.  Two  had  fouled  each  other  before  striking.  Having 
taken  the  bottom  on  a  rising  tide,  two  floated  in  a  few  hours, 
and  retreated ;  but  the  third,  the  Actceon,  28,  sticking  fast,  was 
set  on  fire  and  abandoned  by  her  officers.  Before  she  blew 
up,  the  Americans  boarded  her,  securing  her  colours,  bell, 
and  some  other  trophies.  "Had  these  ships  effected  their 
purpose,"  Moultrie  reported,  "they  would  have  driven  us 
from  our  guns." 

The  main  division  held  its  ground  until  long  after  nightfall, 
firing  much  of  the  time,  but  stopping  at  intervals.  After 
two  hours  it  had  been  noted  that  the  fort  replied  very  slowly, 
which  was  attributed  to  its  being  overborne,  instead  of  to  the 
real  cause,  the  necessity  for  sparing  ammunition.  For  the 
same  reason  it  was  entirely  silent  from  3.30  p.m.  to  6,  when 
fire  was  resumed  from  only  two  or  three  guns,  whence  Parker 
surmised  that  the  rest  had  been  dismounted.  The  Americans 
were  restrained  throughout  the  engagement  by  the  fear  of 
exhausting  entirely  their  scanty  store. 

"About  9  P.M.,"  Parker  reported,  "being  very  dark,  great 
part  of  our  ammunition  expended,  the  people  fatigued,  the 
tide  of  ebb  almost  done,  no  prospect  from  the  eastward  (that 
is,  from  the  army),  and  no  possibility  of  our  being  of  any 
further  service,  I  ordered  the  ships  to  withdraw  to  their 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  37 

former  moorings."  Besides  the  casualties  among  the  crew, 
and  severe  damage  to  the  hull,  the  BristoVs  mainmast,  with 
nine  cannon-balls  in  it,  had  to  be  shortened,  while  the  mizzen- 
mast  was  condemned.  The  injury  to  the  frigates  was  im- 
material, owing  to  the  garrison's  neglecting  them. 

The  fight  in  Charleston  Harbour,  the  first  serious  contest 
in  which  ships  took  part  in  this  war,  resembles  generically 
the  battle  of  Bunker's  Hill,  with  which  the  regular  land  war- 
fare had  opened  a  year  before.  Both  illustrate  the  difficulty 
and  danger  of  a  front  attack,  without  cover,  upon  a  fortified 
position,  and  the  advantage  conferred  even  upon  untrained 
men,  if  naturally  cool,  resolute,  and  intelligent,  not  only  by 
the  protection  of  a  work,  but  also,  it  may  be  urged,  by  the 
recognition  of  a  tangible  line  up  to  which  to  hold,  and  to 
abandon  which  means  defeat,  dishonour,  and  disaster.  It 
is  much  for  untried  men  to  recognise  in  their  surroundings 
something  which  gives  the  unity  of  a  common  purpose,  and 
thus  the  coherence  which  discipline  imparts.  Although 
there  was  in  Parker's  dispositions  nothing  open  to  serious 
criticism,  —  nothing  that  can  be  ascribed  to  undervaluing 
his  opponent,  —  and  although,  also,  he  had  good  reason  to 
expect  from  the  army  active  cooperation  which  he  did  not 
get,  it  is  probable  that  he  was  very  much  surprised,  not  only 
at  the  tenacity  of  the  Americans'  resistance,  but  at  the  efiicacy 
of  their  fire.  He  felt,  doubtless,  the  traditional  and  natural 
distrust  —  and,  for  the  most  part,  the  justified  distrust  — 
with  which  experience  and  practice  regard  inexperience. 
Some  seamen  of  American  birth,  who  had  been  serving  in 
the  Bristol,  deserted  after  the  fight.  They  reported  that  her 
crew  said,  "We  were  told  the  Yankees  would  not  stand 
two  fires,  but  we  never  saw  better  fellows ; "  and  when  the  fire 
of  the  fort  slackened  and  some  cried,  "They  have  done  fight- 
ing," others  replied,  "By  God,  we  are  glad  of  it,  for  we  never 
had  such  a  drubbing  in  our  lives."     "All  the  common  men 


38       MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

of  the  fleet  spoke  loudly  in  praise  of  the  garrison/'  —  a 
note  of  admiration  so  frequent  in  generous  enemies  that  we 
may  be  assured  that  it  was  echoed  on  the  quarter-deck  also. 
They  could  afford  it  well,  for  there  was  no  stain  upon  their 
own  record  beyond  the  natural  mortification  of  defeat; 
no  flinching  under  the  severity  of  their  losses,  although  a 
number  of  their  men  were  comparatively  raw,  volunteers 
from  the  transports,  whose  crews  had  come  forward  almost 
as  one  man  when  they  knew  that  the  complements  of  the 
ships  were  short  through  sickness.  Edmund  Burke,  a 
friend  to  both  sides,  was  justified  in  saying  that  "never  did 
British  valour  shine  more  conspicuously,  nor  did  our  ships 
in  an  engagement  of  the  same  nature  experience  so  serious 
an  encounter."  There  were  several  death-vacancies  for 
lieutenants;  and,  as  the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain  gave 
Pellew  his  first  commission,  so  did  that  of  Charleston  Harbour 
give  his  to  Saumarez,  who  was  made  lieutenant  of  the  Bristol 
by  Parker.  Two  years  later,  when  the  ship  had  gone  to 
Jamaica,  he  was  followed  on  her  quarter-deck  by  Nelson 
and  Collingwood,  who  also  received  promotion  in  her  from  the 
same  hand. 

The  attack  on  Fort  Moultrie  was  not  resumed.  After 
necessary  repairs,  the  ships  of  war  with  the  troops  went  to 
New  York,  where  they  arrived  on  the  4th  of  August,  and  took 
part  in  the  operations  for  the  reduction  of  that  place  under  the 
direction  of  the  two  Howes. 

The  occupation  of  New  York  Harbour,  and  the  capture  of 
the  city  were  the  most  conspicuous  British  successes  of  the 
summer  and  fall  of  1776.  While  Parker  and  Clinton  were 
meeting  with  defeat  at  Charleston,  and  Arnold  was  hurrying 
the  preparation  of  his  flotilla  on  Champlain,  the  two  brothers, 
General  Sir  William  Howe  and  the  Admiral,  Lord  Howe, 
were  arriving  in  New  York  Bay,  invested  not  only  with  the 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  39 

powers  proper  to  the  commanders  of  great  fleets  and  armies, 
but  also  with  authority  as  peace  commissioners,  to  negotiate 
an  amicable  arrangement  with  the  revolted  Colonies. 

Sir  William  Howe  had  awaited  for  some  time  at  Halifax 
the  arrival  of  the  expected  reinforcements,  but  wearying 
at  last  he  sailed  thence  on  the  10th  of  June,  1776,  with  the 
army  then  in  hand.  On  the  25th  he  himself  reached  Sandy 
Hook,  the  entrance  to  New  York  Bay,  having  preceded  the 
transports  in  a  frigate.  On  the  29th,  the  day  after  Parker's 
repulse  at  Fort  Moultrie,  the  troops  arrived;  and  on  July 
3d,  the  date  on  which  Arnold,  retreating  from  Canada, 
reached  Crown  Point,  the  British  landed  on  Staten  Island, 
which  is  on  the  west  side  of  the  lower  Bay.  On  the  12th  came 
in  the  Eagle,  64,  carrying  the  flag  of  Lord  Howe.  This 
officer  was  much  esteemed  by  the  Americans  for  his  own 
personal  qualities,  and  for  his  attitude  towards  them  in  the 
present  dispute,  as  well  as  for  the  memory  of  his  brother,  w^ho 
had  endeared  himself  greatly  to  them  in  the  campaign  of 
1758,  when  he  had  fallen  near  Lake  Champlain ;  but  the  de- 
cisive step  of  declaring  their  independence  had  been  taken 
already,  on  July  4th,  eight  days  before  the  Admiral's  arrival. 
A  month  was  spent  in  fruitless  attempts  to  negotiate  with 
the  new  government,  without  recognising  any  official  charac- 
ter in  its  representatives.  During  that  time,  however, 
while  abstaining  from  decisive  operations,  cruisers  were  kept 
at  sea  to  intercept  American  traders,  and  the  Admiral, 
immediately  upon  arriving,  sent  four  vessels  of  war  twenty- 
five  miles  up  the  Hudson  River,  as  far  as  Tarrytown.  This 
squadron  was  commanded  by  Hyde  Parker,  afterwards,  in 
1801,  Nelson's  commander-in-chief  at  Copenhagen.  The 
service  was  performed  under  a  tremendous  cannonade  from 
all  the  batteries  on  both  shores,  but  the  ships  could  not  be 
stopped.  Towards  the  middle  of  August  it  was  evident 
that  the  Americans  would  not  accept  any  terms  in  the  power 


40     MAJOR  OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

of  the  Howes  to  offer,  and  it  became  necessary  to  attempt 
coercion  by  arms. 

In  the  reduction  of  New  York  in  1776,  the  part  played 
by  the  British  Navy,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  campaign  in 
general  and  of  the  enemy's  force  in  particular,  was  of  that  in- 
conspicuous character  which  obscures  the  fact  that  without 
the  Navy  the  operations  could  not  have  been  undertaken  at 
all,  and  that  the  Navy  played  to  them  the  part  of  the  base 
of  operations  and  line  of  communications.  Like  the  founda- 
tions of  a  building,  these  lie  outside  the  range  of  superficial 
attention,  and  therefore  are  less  generally  appreciated  than 
the  brilliant  fighting  going  on  at  the  front,  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  which  they  are  all  the  time  indispensable.  Conse- 
quently, whatever  of  interest  may  attach  to  any,  or  to  all,  of 
the  minor  affairs,  which  in  the  aggregate  constitute  the  action 
of  the  naval  force  in  such  circumstances,  the  historian  of 
the  major  operations  is  confined  perforce  to  indicating  the 
broad  general  effect  of  naval  power  upon  the  issue.  This 
will  be  best  done  by  tracing  in  outline  I  the  scene  of 
action,  the  combined  movements,  and  the  Navy's  influence 
in  both. 

The  harbour  of  New  York  divides  into  two  parts  —  the 
upper  and  lower  Bays  —  connected  by  a  passage  called  the 
Narrows,  between  Long  and  Staten  Islands,  upon  the  latter 
of  which  the  British  troops  were  encamped.  Long  Island, 
which  forms  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Narrows,  extends 
to  the  east-north-east  a  hundred  and  ten  miles,  enclosing 
between  itself  and  the  continent  a  broad  sheet  of  water 
called  Long  Island  Sound,  that  reaches  nearly  to  Narragan- 
sett  Bay.  The  latter,  being  a  fine  anchorage,  entered  also  into 
the  British  scheme  of  operations,  as  an  essential  feature  in  a 
coastwise  maritime  campaign.  Long  Island  Sound  and  the 
upper  Bay  of  New  York  are  connected  by  a  crooked  and 
difficult  passage,  known  as  the  East  River,  eight  or  ten  miles 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  41 

in  length,  and  at  that  time  nearly  a  mile  wide  ^  abreast  the 
city  of  New  York.  At  the  point  where  the  East  River  joins 
New  York  Bay,  the  Hudson  River,  an  estuary  there  nearly 
two  miles  wide,  also  enters  from  the  north,  —  a  circumstance 
which  has  procured  for  it  the  alternative  name  of  the  North 
River.  Near  their  confluence  is  Governor's  Island,  half  a 
mile  below  the  town,  centrally  situated  to  command  the 
entrances  to  both.  Between  the  East  and  North  rivers, 
with  their  general  directions  from  north  and  east-north-east, 
is  embraced  a  long  strip  of  land  gradually  narrowing  to  the 
southward.  The  end  of  this  peninsula,  as  it  would  otherwise 
be,  is  converted  into  an  island,  of  a  mean  length  of  about 
eight  miles,  by  the  Harlem  River,  —  a  narrow  and  partially 
navigable  stream  connecting  the  East  and  North  rivers.  To 
the  southern  extreme  of  this  island,  called  Manhattan,  the 
city  of  New  York  was  then  confined. 

As  both  the  East  and  North  rivers  were  navigable  for  large 
ships,  the  former  throughout,  the  latter  for  over  a  hundred 
miles  above  its  mouth,  it  was  evident  that  control  of  the  water 
must  play  a  large  part  in  warlike  operations  throughout 
the  district  described.  With  the  limited  force  at  Washing- 
ton's disposal,  he  had  been  unable  to  push  the  defences  of 
the  city  as  far  to  the  front  as  was  desirable.  The  lower  Bay 
was  held  by  the  British  Navy,  and  Staten  Island  had  been 
abandoned,  necessarily,  without  resistance,  thereby  giving  up 
the  strong  defensive  position  of  the  Narrows.  The  lines 
were  contracted  thus  to  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  New 
York  itself.  Small  detached  works  skirted  the  shores  of  Man- 
hattan Island,  and  a  line  of  redoubts  extended  across  it,  fol- 
lowing the  course  of  a  small  stream  which  then  partly  divided 
it,  a  mile  from  the  southern  end.  Governor's  Island  was  also 
occupied  as  an  outpost.  Of  more  intrinsic  strength,  but  not 
at  first  concerned,  strong  works  had  been  thrown  up  on  either 
1  At  the  present  day  reduced  by  reclaimed  land. 


42      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

side  of  the  North  River,  upon  commanding  heights  eight 
miles  above  New  York,  to  dispute  the  passage  of  ships. 

The  crucial  weakness  in  this  scheme  of  defence  w^as  that 
the  shore  of  Long  Island  opposite  the  city  was  much  higher 
than  that  of  Manhattan.  If  this  height  were  seized,  the 
city,  and  all  below  it,  became  untenable.  Here,  therefore, 
was  the  key  of  the  position  and  the  chief  station  for  the  Ameri- 
can troops.  For  its  protection  a  line  of  works  was  thrown  up, 
the  flanks  of  which  rested  upon  Wallabout  Bay  and  Gowanus 
Cove,  two  indentations  in  the  shores  of  Long  Island.  These 
Washington  manned  with  nine  thousand  of  the  eighteen 
thousand  men  under  his  command.  By  the  arrival  of  three 
divisions  of  Hessian  troops,  Howe's  army  now  numbered 
over  thirty-four  thousand  men,  to  which  Clinton  brought 
three  thousand  more  from  before  Charleston.^ 

On  the  22d  of  August  the  British  crossed  from  Staten 
Island  to  Gravesend  Bay,  on  the  Long  Island  shore  of  the 
Narrows.  The  Navy  covered  the  landing,  and  the  trans- 
portation of  the  troops  was  under  the  charge  of  Commodore 
William  Hotham,  who,  nineteen  years  later,  was  Nelson's 
commander-in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean.  By  noon  fifteen 
thousand  men  and  forty  field-guns  had  been  carried  over  and 
placed  on  shore.  The  force  of  the  Americans  permitted  little 
opposition  to  the  British  advance ;  but  General  Howe  was 
cautious  and  easy-going,  and  it  was  not  till  the  27th  that  the 
army,  now  increased  to  twenty-five  thousand,  was  fairly  in 
front  of  the  American  lines,  having  killed,  w^ounded,  and  taken 
about  1,500  men.  Hoping  that  Howe  would  be  tempted  to 
storm  the  position,  Washington  replaced  these  with  two 
thousand  drawn  from  his  meagre  numbers  ;  but  his  opponent, 
who  had  borne  a  distinguished  part  at  Bunker's  Hill,  held 

^  Beatson's  "Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,"  vi.  44,  give  34,614  as 
the  strength  of  Howe's  army.  Clinton's  division  is  not  included  in 
this.     vi.  45. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  43 

back  his  troops,  who  were  eager  for  the  assault.  The 
Americans  now  stood  with  their  backs  to  a  swift  tidal  stream, 
nearly  a  mile  wide,  with  only  a  feeble  line  of  works  between 
them  and  an  enemy  more  than  double  their  number. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  Sir  Peter  Parker,  with  a  64- 
gun  ship,  two  50's,  and  two  frigates,  attempted  to  work  up  to 
New  York,  with  a  view  of  supporting  the  left  flank  of  the 
army;  but  the  wind  came  out  from  the  north,  and,  the 
ebb-tide  making,  the  ships  got  no  nearer  than  three  miles 
from  the  city.  Fortunately  for  the  Americans,  they  either 
could  not  or  would  not  go  farther  on  the  following  two  days. 
After  dark  of  the  28th,  Howe  broke  ground  for  regular 
approaches.  Washington,  seeing  this,  and  knowing  that  there 
could  be  but  one  result  to  a  siege  under  his  condition  of 
inferiority,  resolved  to  withdraw.  During  the  night  of  the 
29th  ten  thousand  men  silently  quitted  their  positions,  em- 
barked, and  crossed  to  Manhattan  Island,  carrying  with 
them  all  their  belongings,  arms,  and  ammunition.  The 
enemy's  trenches  were  but  six  hundred  yards  distant,  yet  no 
suspicion  was  aroused,  nor  did  a  single  deserter  give  treach- 
erous warning.  The  night  was  clear  and  moonlit,  although 
a  heavy  fog  towards  daybreak  prolonged  the  period  of  se- 
crecy which  shrouded  the  retreat.  When  the  fog  rose,  the 
last  detachment  was  discovered  crossing,  but  a  few  ineffectual 
cannon-shot  were  the  only  harassment  experienced  by  the 
Americans  in  the  course  of  this  rapid  and  dexterous  retirement. 
The  garrison  of  Governor's  Island  was  withdrawn  at  the 
same  time. 

The  unmolested  use  of  the  water,  and  the  nautical  skill 
of  the  fishermen  who  composed  one  of  the  American  regi- 
ments, were  essential  to  this  escape;  for  admirable  as  the 
movement  was  in  arrangement  and  execution,  no  word 
less  strong  than  escape  applies  to  it.  By  it  Washington 
rescued  over  half  his  army  from  sure  destruction,  and,  not 


44      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

improbably,  the  cause  of  his  people  from  immediate  collapse. 
An  opportunity  thus  seized  implies  necessarily  an  opportunity 
lost  on  the  other  side.  For  that  failure  both  army  and  navy 
must  bear  their  share  of  the  blame.  It  is  obvious  that  when  an 
enemy  is  greatly  outnumbered  his  line  of  retreat  should  be 
watched .  This  was  the  business  of  both  commanders-in-chief, 
the  execution  of  it  being  primarily  the  duty  of  the  navy,  as 
withdrawal  from  the  American  position  could  be  only  by  water. 
It  was  a  simple  question  of  look-out,  of  detection,  of  pre- 
vention by  that  means.  To  arrest  the  retreat  sailing  ships 
were  inadequate,  for  they  could  not  have  remained  at 
anchor  under  the  guns  of  Manhattan  Island,  either  by  day  or 
night ;  but  a  f ew^  boats  with  muffled  oars  could  have  watched, 
could  have  given  the  alarm,  precipitating  an  attack  by  the 
army,  and  such  a  movement  interrupted  in  mid-course  brings 
irretrievable  disaster. 

Washington  now  withdrew  the  bulk  of  his  force  to  the  line 
of  the  Harlem.  On  his  right,  south  of  that  river  and  com- 
manding the  Hudson,  was  a  fort  called  by  his  name ;  oppo- 
site to  it  on  the  Jersey  shore  was  Fort  Lee.  A  garrison  of 
four  thousand  men  occupied  New  York.  After  amusing  him- 
self with  some  further  peace  negotiations,  Howe  determined 
to  possess  the  city.  As  a  diversion  from  the  main  effort, 
and  to  cover  the  crossing  of  the  troops,  two  detachments  of 
ships  were  ordered  to  pass  the  batteries  on  the  Hudson  and 
East  rivers.  This  was  done  on  the  13th  and  the  15th  of 
September.  The  East  River  division  suffered  severely, 
especially  in  spars  and  rigging ;  ^  but  the  success  of  both, 
following  upon  that  of  Hyde  Parker  a  few  weeks  earlier,  in 
his  expedition  to  Tarrytown,  confirmed  Washington  in  the 
opinion  which  he  expressed  five  years  later  to  de  Grasse, 
that  batteries  alone  could  not  stop  ships  having  a  fair  wind. 
This  is  now  a  commonplace  of  naval  warfare ;  steam  giving 
1  Admiral  James's  Journal,  p.  30.     (Navy  Records  Society.) 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  45 

always  a  fair  wind.  On  the  15th  Howe's  army  crossed  under 
cover  of  Parker's  ships,  Hotham  again  superintending  the 
boat  w^ork.  The  garrison  of  New  York  sUpped  along  the 
west  shore  of  the  island  and  joined  the  main  body  on  the  Har- 
lem ;  favored  again,  apparently,  in  this  flank  movement  a 
mile  from  the  enemy's  front,  by  Howe's  inertness,  and  fond- 
ness for  a  good  meal,  to  which  a  shrewd  American  woman 
invited  him  at  the  critical  moment. 

Despite  these  various  losses  of  position,  important  as  they 
were,  the  iVmerican  army  continued  to  elude  the  British 
general,  who  apparently  did  not  hold  very  strongly  the 
opinion  that  the  most  decisive  factor  in  war  is  the  enemy's 
organised  force.  As  control  of  the  valley  of  the  Hudson, 
in  connection  with  Lake  Champlain,  was,  very  properly, 
the  chief  object  of  the  British  government,  Howe's  next  aim 
was  to  loosen  Washington's  grip  on  the  peninsula  north  of 
the  Harlem.  The  position  seeming  to  him  too  strong  for  a 
front  attack,  he  decided  to  strike  for  its  left  flank  and  rear 
by  way  of  Long  Island  Sound.  In  this,  which  involved  the 
passage  of  the  tortuous  and  dangerous  channel  called  Hell 
Gate,  with  its  swift  conflicting  currents,  the  Navy  again 
bore  an  essential  part.  The  movement  began  on  October 
12th,  the  day  after  Arnold  was  defeated  at  Valcour.  So  far 
as  its  leading  object  went  it  was  successful,  Washington 
feeling  obliged  to  let  go  the  line  of  the  Harlem,  and  change 
front  to  the  left.  As  the  result  of  the  various  movements 
and  encounters  of  the  two  armies,  he  fell  back  across  the  Hud- 
son into  New  Jersey,  ordering  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Wash- 
ington, and  deciding  to  rest  his  control  of  the  Hudson  Valley 
upon  West  Point,  fifty  miles  above  New  York,  a  position  of 
peculiar  natural  strength,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river.  To 
these  decisions  he  was  compelled  by  his  inferiority  in  numbers, 
and  also  by  the  very  isolated  and  hazardous  situation  in 
which   he  was   operating,   between  two   navigable  waters. 


46       MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

absolutely  controlled  by  the  enemy's  shipping.  This  con- 
clusion was  further  forced  upon  him  by  another  successful 
passage  before  the  guns  of  Forts  Washington  and  Lee  by 
Hyde  Parker,  with  three  ships,  on  the  9th  of  October.  On 
this  occasion  the  vessels,  two  of  which  were  frigates  of  the 
heaviest  class,  suffered  very  severely,  losing  nine  killed  and 
eighteen  w^ounded;  but  the  menace  to  the  communications 
of  the  Americans  could  not  be  disregarded,  for  their  supplies 
came  mostly  from  the  west  of  the  Hudson. 

It  was  early  in  November  that  Washington  crossed  into 
New  Jersey  with  five  thousand  men;  and  soon  afterwards 
he  directed  the  remainder  of  his  force  to  follow.  At  that 
moment  the  blunder  of  one  subordinate,  and  the  disobedience 
of  another,  brought  upon  him  two  serious  blows.  Fort 
Washington  not  being  evacuated  when  ordered,  Howe 
carried  it  by  storm,  capturing  not  only  it  but  its  garrison 
of  twenty-seven  hundred  men;  a  very  heavy  loss  to  the 
Americans.  On  the  other  hand,  the  most  explicit  orders 
failed  to  bring  the  officer  left  in  command  on  the  east  of  the 
Hudson,  General  Charles  Lee,  to  rejoin  the  commander-in- 
chief.  This  criminal  perverseness  left  Washington  with 
only  six  thousand  men  in  New  Jersey,  seven  thousand  being 
in  New  York.  Under  these  conditions  nothing  remained  but 
to  put  the  Delaware  also  between  himself  and  the  enemy.  He 
therefore  retreated  rapidly  through  New  Jersey,  and  on  the 
8th  of  December  crossed  into  Pennsylvania  with  an  army  re- 
duced to  three  thousand  by  expiry  of  enlistments.  The 
detachment  beyond  the  Hudson,  diminishing  daily  by  the 
same  cause,  gradually  worked  its  way  to  him ;  its  commander 
luckily  being  captured  on  the  road.  At  the  time  it  joined,  a 
few  battalions  also  arrived  from  Ticonderoga,  released  by 
Carleton's  retirement  to  the  foot  of  Champlain.  W^ashing- 
ton's  force  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Delaware  was  thus  in- 
creased to  six  thousand  men. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  47 

In  this  series  of  operations,  extending  from  August  22d 
to  December  14th,  when  Howe  went  into  winter-quarters  in 
New  Jersey,  the  British  had  met  with  no  serious  mishaps, 
beyond  the  inevitable  losses  undergone  by  the  assailants 
of  well-chosen  positions.  Nevertheless,  having  in  view  the 
superiority  of  numbers,  of  equipment,  and  of  discipline,  and 
the  command  of  the  water,  the  mere  existence  of  the  enemy's 
army  as  an  organised  body,  its  mere  escape,  deprives  the  cam- 
paign of  the  claim  to  be  considered  successful.  The  red 
ribbon  of  the  Bath  probably  never  was  earned  more  cheaply 
than  by  Sir  William  Howe  that  year.  Had  he  displayed  any- 
thing like  the  energy  of  his  two  elder  brothers,  Washington, 
with  all  his  vigilance,  firmness,  and  enterprise,  could  scarcely 
have  brought  off  the  force,  vastly  diminished  but  still  a  living 
organism,  around  which  American  resistance  again  crystal- 
lised and  hardened.  As  it  was,  within  a  month  he  took  the 
offensive,  and  recovered  a  great  part  of  New  Jersey. 

Whatever  verdict  may  be  passed  upon  the  merit  of  the 
military  conduct  of  affairs,  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  value,  or 
of  the  unflagging  energy,  of  the  naval  support  given.  Sir 
William  Howe  alludes  to  it  frequently,  both  in  general  and 
specifically ;  while  the  Admiral  sums  up  his  always  guarded 
and  often  cumbrous  expressions  of  opinion  in  these  words : 
"It  is  incumbent  upon  me  to  represent  to  your  Lordships, 
and  I  cannot  too  pointedly  express,  the  unabating  per- 
severance and  alacrity  with  which  the  several  classes  of 
officers  and  seamen  have  supported  a  long  attendance  and 
unusual  degree  of  fatigue,  consequent  of  these  different  move- 
ments of  the  army." 

The  final  achievement  of  the  campaign,  and  a  very  im- 
portant one,  was  the  occupation  of  Rhode  Island  and  Narra- 
gansett  Bay  by  a  combined  expedition,  which  left  New  York 
on  the  1st  of  December,  and  on  the  8th  landed  at  Newport 
without   opposition.     The   naval   force,   consisting   of   five 


48       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

50-gun  ships  and  eight  smaller  vessels,  was  commanded  by 
Sir  Peter  Parker;  the  troops,  seven  thousand  in  number, 
by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Henry  Clinton.  The  immediate 
effect  was  to  close  a  haven  of  privateers,  who  centred  in  great 
numbers  around  an  anchorage  which  flanked  the  route  of 
all  vessels  bound  from  Europe  to  New  York.  The  posses- 
sion of  the  bay  facilitated  the  control  of  the  neighbouring 
waters  by  British  ships  of  war,  besides  giving  them  a  base 
central  for  coastwise  operations  and  independent  of  tidal 
considerations  for  entrance  or  exit.  The  position  was 
abandoned  somewhat  precipitately  three  years  later.  Rodney 
then  deplored  its  loss  in  the  following  terms  :  "  The  evacuat- 
ing Rhode  Island  was  the  most  fatal  measure  that  could 
possibly  have  been  adopted.  It  gave  up  the  best  and  noblest 
harbor  in  America,  capable  of  containing  the  whole  Navy 
of  Britain,  and  where  they  could  in  all  seasons  lie  in  perfect 
security;  and  from  w^hence  squadrons,  in  forty-eight  hours, 
could  blockade  the  three  capital  cities  of  America ;  namely, 
Boston,  New  York,  and  Philadelphia." 

At  the  end  of  1776  began  the  series  of  British  reverses 
which  characterised  the  year  1777,  making  this  the  decisive 
period  of  the  war,  because  of  the  effect  thus  produced  upon 
general  public  opinion  abroad;  especially  upon  the  govern- 
ments of  France  and  Spain.  On  the  20th  of  December, 
Howe,  announcing  to  the  Ministry  that  he  had  gone  into 
winter-quarters,  WTote :  "The  chain,  I  own,  is  rather  too 
extensive,  but  I  was  induced  to  occupy  Burlington  to  cover 
the  county  of  Monmouth;  and  trusting  to  the  loyalty  of 
the  inhabitants,  and  the  strength  of  the  corps  placed  in  the 
advanced  posts,  I  conclude  the  troops  will  be  in  perfect  se- 
curity." Of  this  unwarranted  security  Washington  took 
prompt  advantage.  On  Christmas  night  a  sudden  descent, 
in  a  blinding  snow-storm,  upon  a  British  outpost  at  Trenton, 
swept  off  a  thousand  prisoners ;  and  although  for  the  moment 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  49 

.  ^ 
the  American  leader  again  retired  behind  the  DelWare,  it 
was  but  to  resume  the  offensive  four  days  latere  Cornwalhs, 
who  was  in  New  York  on  the  point  of  saih'ng  for  England, 
hurried  back  to  the  front,  but  in  vain.  A  series  of  quick  and 
well-directed  movements  recovered  the  gfat^  of  New  Jersey ; 
and  by  the  5th  of  January  the  Americ^trT  Ifedquarters,  and 
main  body  of  the  army,  were  established  at  Morristown 
in  the  Jersey  hills,  the  left  resting' upon  the  Hudson,  thus 
recovering  touch  with  the  strategic  centre  of  interest.  This 
menacing  position  of  the  Americans,  upon  the  flank  of  the 
line  of  communications  from^'ew  York  to  the  Delaware, 
compelled  Howe  to  contract  abruptly  the  lines  he  had  ex- 
tended so  lightly ;  and  th^  cd;mpaign  he  was  forced  thus  re- 
luctantly to  reopen  closed  under  a  gloom  of  retreat  and  disas- 
ter, which  profoundly ^  and  justly  impressed  not  only  the 
generality  of  men  but  military  critics  as  well.  "Of  all  the 
great  conquests  which  his  Majesty's  troops  had  made  in 
the  Jersies,"  writes  Beatson,  "  Brunswick  and  Amboy  were  the 
only  two  places  Gffany  note  which  they  retained ;  and  however 
brilliant  their/successes  had  been  in  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign,  tfiey  reaped  little  advantage  from  them  when  the 
winter  adyanced,  and  the  contiguity  of  so  vigilant  an 
enemy  forced  them  to  perform  the  severest  duty."  With 
deliberate  or  unconscious  humour  he  then  immediately  con- 
cludes the  chronicle  of  the  year  with  this  announcement : 
"  His  Majesty  was  so  well  pleased  with  the  abilities  and  activ- 
ity which  General  Howe  had  displayed  this  campaign,  that 
on  the  25th  of  October  he  conferred  upon  him  the  Most 
Honourable  Order  of  the  Bath." 


50     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  DECISIVE  PERIOD  OF  THE  WAR.  SURREN- 
DER OF  BURGOYNE  AND  CAPTURE  OF 
PHILADELPHIA  BY  HOWE.  THE  NAVAL 
PART    IN    EACH   OPERATION 

1777 

THE  leading  purpose  of  the  British  government  in 
the  campaign  of  1777  was  the  same  as  that  with 
which  it  had  begun  in  1776,  —  the  control 
of  the  line  of  the  Hudson  and  Lake  Champlain, 
to  be  mastered  by  two  expeditions,  one  starting  from  each 
end,  and  both  working  towards  a  common  centre  at  Albany, 
near  the  head  of  navigation  of  the  River.  Preliminary  diffi- 
culties had  been  cleared  away  in  the  previous  year,  by  the 
destruction  of  the  American  flotilla  on  the  Lake,  and  by  the 
reduction  of  New  York.  To  both  these  objects  the  Navy 
had  contributed  conspicuously.  It  remained  to  complete 
the  work  by  resuming  the  advance  from  the  two  bases  of 
operations  secured.  In  1777  the  fortifications  on  the  Hudson 
were  inadequate  to  stop  the  progress  of  a  combined  naval 
and  military  expedition,  as  was  shown  in  the  course  of 
the  campaign. 

The  northern  enterprise  was  intrusted  to  General  Burgoyne. 
The  impossibility  of  creating  a  new  naval  force,  able  to  con- 
tend with  that  put  afloat  by  Carleton,  had  prevented 
the  Americans  from  further  building.  Burgoyne  therefore 
moved  by  the  Lake  without  opposition  to  Ticonderoga, 
before  which  he  appeared  on  the  2d  of  July.     A  position 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  51 

commanding  the  works  was  discovered,  which  the  Americans 
had  neglected  to  occupy.  It  being  seized,  and  a  battery 
estabhshed,  the  fort  had  to  be  evacuated.  The  retreat 
being  made  by  water,  the  British  Lake  Navy,  under  Captain 
Skeffington  Lutwidge,  with  whom  Nelson  had  served  a  few 
years  before  in  the  Arctic  seas,  had  a  conspicuous  part  in  the 
pursuit ;  severing  the  boom  blockading  the  narrow  upper 
lake  and  joining  impetuously  in  an  attack  upon  the  floating 
material,  the  flat-boat  transports,  and  the  few  relics  of 
Arnold's  flotilla  which  had  escaped  the  destruction  of  the 
previous  year.  This  affair  took  place  on  the  6th  of  July. 
From  that  time  forward  the  progress  of  the  army  was  mainly 
by  land.  The  Navy,  however,  found  occupation  upon 
Lake  George,  where  Burgoyne  established  a  depot  of  sup- 
plies, although  he  did  not  utilise  its  waterway  for  the  march 
of  the  army.  A  party  of  seamen  under  Edward  Pellew,  still  a 
midshipman,  accompanied  the  advance,  and  shared  the  mis- 
fortunes of  the  expedition.  It  is  told  that  Burgoyne  used 
afterwards  to  chaff  the  young  naval  officer  with  being  the 
cause  of  their  disaster,  because  he  and  his  men,  by  rebuilding 
a  bridge  at  a  critical  moment,  had  made  it  possible  to  cross 
the  upper  Hudson.  Impeded  in  its  progress  by  immense 
difficulties,  both  natural  and  imposed  by  the  enemy,  the  army 
took  twenty  days  to  make  twenty  miles.  On  the  30th  of 
July  it  reached  Fort  Edward,  forty  miles  from  Albany,  and 
there  was  compelled  to  stay  till  the  middle  of  September. 
Owing  to  neglect  at  the  War  Office,  the  peremptory  orders  to 
Sir  William  Howe,  to  move  up  the  Hudson  and  make  a  junc- 
tion with  Burgoyne,  were  not  sent  forward.  Consequently, 
Howe,  acting  upon  the  discretionary  powers  which  he  pos- 
sessed already,  and  swayed  by  political  reasons  into  which  it 
is  not  necessary  to  enter,  determined  to  renew  his  attempt 
upon  Philadelphia.  A  tentative  advance  into  New  Jersey, 
and  the  consequent   manoeuvres   of  Washington,   satisfied 


52     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

him  that  the  enterprise  by  this  route  was  too  hazardous. 
He  therefore  embarked  fourteen  thousand  men,  leaving 
eight  thousand  with  Sir  Henry  CHnton  to  hold  New  York  and 
make  diversions  in  favor  of  Burgoyne;  and  on  the  23d  of 
July  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook,  escorted  by  five  64-gun  ships, 
a  50,  and  ten  smaller  vessels,  under  Lord  Howe's  immediate 
command.  The  entire  expedition  numbered  about  280  sail. 
Elaborate  pains  were  taken  to  deceive  Washington  as  to  the 
destination  of  the  armament ;  but  little  craft  was  needed  to 
prevent  a  competent  opponent  from  imagining  a  design  so 
contrary  to  sound  military  principle,  having  regard  to  Bur- 
goyne's  movements  and  to  the  well-understood  general 
purpose  of  the  British  ministry.  Accordingly  Washington 
wrote,  "Howe's  in  a  manner  abandoning  Burgoyne  is  so 
unaccountable  a  matter,  that  till  I  am  fully  assured  of  it,  I 
cannot  help  casting  my  eyes  continually  behind  me."  He 
suspected  an  intention  to  return  upon  New  York. 

On  the  31st  of  July,  just  as  Burgoyne  reached  Fort  Ed- 
ward, where  he  stuck  fast  for  six  weeks,  Howe's  armament 
was  off  the  Capes  of  the  Delaware.  The  prevailing  summer 
wind  on  the  American  coast  is  south-south-west,  fair  for 
ascending  the  river ;  but  information  was  received  that  the 
enemy  had  obstructed  the  channel,  which  lends  itself  to  such 
defences  for  some  distance  below  Philadelphia.  Therefore, 
although  after  occupying  the  city  the  free  navigation  of  the 
river  to  the  sea  would  be  essential  to  maintaining  the  position, 

—  for  trial  had  shown  that  the  whole  army  could  not  assure 
communications  by  land  with  New  York,  the  other  sea  base, 

—  Howe  decided  to  prosecute  his  enterprise  by  way  of  the 
Chesapeake,  the  ascent  of  which,  under  all  the  conditions, 
could  not  be  seriously  impeded.  A  fortnight  more  was  con- 
sumed in  contending  against  the  south-west  winds  and  calms, 
before  the  fleet  anchored  on  the  15th  of  August  within  the 
Capes  of  the  Chesapeake;    and  yet  another  week  passed 


WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  53 

before  the  head  of  the  Bay  was  reached.  On  the  25th  the 
troops  landed.  Washington,  though  so  long  in  doubt,  was 
on  hand  to  dispute  the  road,  but  in  inferior  force ;  and  Howe 
had  no  great  difficulty  in  fighting  his  way  to  Philadelphia, 
which  was  occupied  on  the  26th  of  September.  A  week 
earlier  Burgoyne  had  reached  Stillwater,  on  the  west  bank  of 
the  Hudson,  the  utmost  point  of  his  progress,  where  he  was 
still  twenty  miles  from  Albany.  Three  weeks  later,  con- 
fronted by  overwhelming  numbers,  he  was  forced  to  capitu- 
late at  Saratoga,  whither  he  had  retreated. 

Lord  Howe  held  on  at  the  head  of  the  Chesapeake  until 
satisfied  that  his  brother  no  longer  needed  him.  On  the  14th 
of  September  he  started  down  the  Bay  with  the  squadron 
and  convoy,  sending  ahead  to  the  Delaware  a  small  division, 
to  aid  the  army,  if  necessary.  The  winds  holding  southerly, 
ten  days  were  required  to  get  to  sea;  and  outside  further 
delay  was  caused  by  very  hea\y  weather.  The  Admiral 
there  quitted  the  convoy  and  hastened  up  river.  On  the 
6th  of  October  he  was  off  Chester,  ten  miles  below  Phila- 
delphia. The  navy  had  already  been  at  work  for  a  week, 
clearing  away  obstructions,  of  which  there  were  two  lines; 
both  commanded  by  batteries  on  the  farther,  or  Jersey,  shore 
of  the  Delaware.  The  lower  battery  had  been  carried  by 
troops;  and  when  Howe  arrived,  the  ships,  though  meeting 
lively  opposition  from  the  American  galleys  and  fire-rafts, 
had  freed  the  channel  for  large  vessels  to  approach  the  upper 
obstructions.  These  were  defended  not  only  by  a  work  at 
Red  Bank  on  the  Jersey  shore,  but  also,  on  the  other  side 
of  the  stream,  by  a  fort  called  Fort  Mifflin,  on  Mud  Island.^ 
As  the  channel  at  this  point,  for  a  distance  of  half  a  mile,  was 
only  two  hundred  yards  wide,  and  troops  could  not  reach  the 
island,  the  position  was  very  strong,  and  it  detained  the  Brit- 

^  This  was  just  below  the  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill,  a  short  dis- 
tance below  the  present  League  Island  navy  yard. 


54       MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

ish  for  six  weeks.  Fort  Mifflin  was  supported  by  two  float- 
ing batteries  and  a  number  of  galleys.  The  latter  not  only 
fought,  offensively  and  defensively,  but  maintained  the 
supplies  and  ammunition  of  the  garrison. 

On  the  22d  of  October,  a  concerted  attack,  by  the  army 
on  the  works  at  Red  Bank,  and  by  the  Navy  on  Fort  Mifflin, 
resulted  disastrously.  The  former  was  repulsed  with  con- 
siderable loss,  the  officer  commanding  being  killed.  The 
squadron,  consisting  of  a  64,  three  frigates,  and  a  sloop, 
went  into  action  with  Mud  Island  at  the  same  time ;  but,  the 
channel  having  shifted,  owing  possibly  to  the  obstructions, 
the  sixty-four  and  the  sloop  grounded,  and  could  not  be 
floated  that  day.  On  the  23d  the  Americans  concentrated 
their  batteries,  galleys,  and  fire-rafts  upon  the  two ;  and  the 
larger  ship  took  fire  and  blew  up  in  the  midst  of  the  prepara- 
tions for  lightening  her.  The  sloop  was  then  set  on  fire  and 
abandoned. 

So  long  as  this  obstacle  remained,  all  supplies  for  the 
British  army  in  Philadelphia  had  to  be  carried  by  boats  to 
the  shore,  and  transported  considerable  distances  by  land. 
As  direct  attacks  had  proved  unavailing,  more  deliber- 
ate measures  were  adopted.  The  army  built  batteries,  and 
the  navy  sent  ashore  guns  to  mount  in  them;  but  the 
decisive  blow  to  Mud  Island  was  given  by  a  small  armed 
ship,  the  Vigilant,  20,  which  was  successfully  piloted  through 
a  channel  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  and  reached  the  rear 
of  the  work,  towing  with  her  a  floating  battery  with  three 
24-pounders.  This  was  on  the  15th  of  November.  That 
night  the  Americans  abandoned  Fort  Mifflin.  Their  loss, 
Beatson  says,  amounted  to  near  400  killed  and  wounded; 
that  of  the  British  to  43.  If  this  be  correct,  it  should  have 
established  the  invincibility  of  men  who  under  such  prodi- 
gious disparity  of  suffering  could  maintain  their  position 
so  tenaciously.     After  the  loss  of  Mud  Island,  Red  Bank 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  55 

could  not  be  held  to  advantage,  and  it  was  evacuated  on  the 
21st,  when  an  attack  was  imminent.  The  American  vessels 
retreated  up  the  river ;  but  they  were  cornered,  and  of  course 
ultimately  were  destroyed.  The  obstructions  being  now 
removed,  the  British  water  communications  by  the  line  of 
the  Delaware  were  established,  —  eight  weeks  after  the 
occupation  of  the  city,  which  was  to  be  evacuated  necessarily 
six  months  later. 

While  these  things  were  passing,  Howe's  triumph  was 
marred  by  the  news  of  Burgoyne's  surrender  on  the  17th  of 
October.  For  this  he  could  not  but  feel  that  the  home 
government  must  consider  him  largely  responsible;  for 
in  the  Chesapeake,  too  late  to  retrieve  his  false  step,  he  had 
received  a  letter  from  the  minister  of  war  saying  that, 
whatever  else  he  undertook,  support  to  Burgoyne  was  the 
great  object  to  be  kept  in  view. 

During  the  operations  round  Philadelphia,  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  in  New  York  had  done  enough  to  show  what  strong 
probabilities  of  success  would  have  attended  an  advance  up 
the  Hudson,  by  the  twenty  thousand  men  whom  Howe  could 
have  taken  with  him.  Starting  on  the  3d  of  October  with 
three  thousand  troops,  accompanied  by  a  small  naval  division 
of  frigates,  Clinton  in  a  week  had  reached  West  Point,  fifty 
miles  up  the  river.  The  American  fortifications  along  the 
way  were  captured,  defences  levelled,  stores  and  shipping 
burned ;  while  an  insignificant  detachment,  with  the  light 
vessels,  went  fifty  miles  further  up,  and  there  destroyed  more 
military  stores  without  encountering  any  resistance  worth 
mentioning.  Certainly,  had  Howe  taken  the  same  line  of 
operations,  he  would  have  had  to  reckon  with  Washington's 
ten  thousand  men  which  confronted  him  on  the  march  from 
the  Chesapeake  to  Philadelphia;  but  his  flank  would  have 
been  covered,  up  to  Albany,  by  a  navigable  stream  on  either 
side  of  which  he  could  operate  by  that  flying  bridge  which  the 


56     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

presence  and  control  of  the  navy  continually  constituted. 
Save  the  fortifications,  which  Clinton  easily  carried,  there 
was  no  threat  to  his  communications  or  to  his  flank,  such  as 
the  hill  country  of  New  Jersey  had  offered  and  Washington 
had  skilfully  utiHsed. 

The  campaign  of  1777  thus  ended  for  the  British  with  a 
conspicuous  disaster,  and  with  an  apparent  success  which 
was  as  disastrous  as  a  failure.  At  its  close  they  held  Nar- 
ragansett  Bay,  the  city  and  harbour  of  New  York,  and  the 
city  of  Philadelphia.  The  first  was  an  admirable  naval 
base,  especially  for  sailing  ships,  for  the  reasons  given  by 
Rodney.  The  second  was  then,  as  it  is  now,  the  greatest 
military  position  on  the  Atlantic  coast  of  the  United  States ; 
and  although  the  two  could  not  communicate  by  land,  they 
did  support  each  other  as  naval  stations  in  a  war  essentially 
dependent  upon  maritime  power.  Philadelphia  served  no 
purpose  but  to  divide  and  distract  British  enterprise.  Ab- 
solutely dependent  for  maintenance  upon  the  sea,  the  forces 
in  it  and  in  New  York  could  not  cooperate ;  they  could  not 
even  unite  except  by  sea.  When  Clinton  relieved  Howe 
as  commander-in-chief,  though  less  than  a  hundred  miles 
away  by  land,  he  had  to  take  a  voyage  of  over  two  hundred 
miles,  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia,  half  of  it  up  a  difficult 
river,  to  reach  his  station;  and  troops  were  transferred  by 
the  same  tedious  process.  In  consequence  of  these  condi- 
tions, the  place  had  to  be  abandoned  the  instant  that  war 
with  France  made  control  of  the  sea  even  doubtful.  The 
British  held  it  for  less  than  nine  months  in  all. 

During  1777  a  number  of  raids  were  made  by  British 
combined  land  and  sea  forces,  for  the  purpose  of  destroying 
American  depots  and  other  resources.  Taken  together,  such 
operations  are  subsidiary  to,  and  aid,  the  great  object  of  inter- 
rupting or  harassing  the  communications  of  an  enemy.  In 
so  far,  they  have  a  standing  place  among  the  major  opera- 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  57 

tions  of  war ;  but  taken  singly  they  cannot  be  so  reckoned, 
and  the  fact,  therefore,  is  simply  noted,  without  going  into 
details.  It  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  in  them,  al- 
though the  scale  was  smaller,  the  Navy  played  the  same 
part  that  it  now  does  in  the  many  expeditions  and  small 
wars  undertaken  by  Great  Britain  in  various  parts  of  the 
world;  the  same  that  it  did  in  Wellington's  campaigns  in 
the  Spanish  peninsula,  1808-1812.  The  land  force  depended 
upon  the  water,  and  the  water  was  controlled  by  the  Navy. 


68      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 


CHAPTER  IV 

WAR  BEGINS  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND  GREAT 
BRITAIN.  BRITISH  EVACUATE  PHILADEL- 
PHIA. NAVAL  OPERATIONS  OF  D'ESTAING 
AND  HOWE  ABOUT  NEW  YORK,  NARRAGAN- 
SETT  BAY,  AND  BOSTON.  COMPLETE  SUC- 
CESS OF  LORD  HOWE.  AMERICAN  DISAP- 
POINTMENT IN  D'ESTAING.  LORD  HOWE 
RETURNS  TO  ENGLAND. 

1778 

THE  events  of  1777  satisfied  the  French  govern- 
ment that  the  Americans  had  strength  and  skill 
sufficient  to  embarrass  Great  Britain  seriously, 
and  that  the  moment,  therefore,  was  opportune 
for  taking  steps  which  scarcely  could  fail  to  cause  war.  On 
the  6th  of  February,  1778,  France  concluded  with  the  United 
States  an  open  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce;  and  at  the 
same  time  a  second  secret  treaty,  acknowledging  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  late  Colonies,  and  contracting  with  them  a 
defensive  alliance.  On  the  13th  of  March,  the  French  Am- 
bassador in  London  communicated  the  open  treaty  to  the 
British  government,  with  the  remark  that  "  the  L^nited  States 
were  in  full  possession  of  the  independence  proclaimed  by 
their  declaration  of  July  4th,  1776."  Great  Britain  at  once 
recalled  her  Ambassador,  and  both  countries  prepared  for 
war,  although  no  declaration  was  issued.  On  the  13th  of 
April,  a  French  fleet  of  twelve  ships  of  the  line  and  five  frig- 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  59 

ates,  under  the  command  of  the  Count  d'Estaing,  ^  sailed 
from  Toulon  for  the  American  coast.  It  was  destined  to 
Delaware  Bay,  hoping  to  intercept  Howe's  squadron.  D'Es- 
taing was  directed  to  begin  hostilities  when  forty  leagues 
west  of  Gibraltar. 

The  British  ministry  was  not  insensible  of  the  danger, 
the  imminence  of  which  had  been  felt  during  the  previous 
year;  but  it  had  not  got  ready  betimes,  owing  possibly  to 
confident  expectations  of  success  from  the  campaign  of 
1777.  The  ships,  in  point  of  numbers  and  equipment,  were 
not  as  far  forward  as  the  Admiralty  had  represented;  and 
difficulty,  amounting  for  the  moment  to  impossibility,  was 
experienced  in  manning  them.  The  vessels  of  the  Channel 
fleet  had  to  be  robbed  of  both  crews  and  stores  to  compose 
a  proper  reinforcement  for  America.  Moreover,  the  destina- 
tion of  the  Toulon  squadron  was  unknown,  the  French  govern- 
ment having  given  out  that  it  was  bound  to  Brest,  where  over 
twenty  other  ships  of  the  line  were  in  an  advanced  state  of 
preparation.  Not  until  the  5th  of  June,  when  d'Estaing 
was  already  eight  weeks  out,  was  certain  news  brought  by  a 
frigate,  which  had  watched  his  fleet  after  it  had  passed 
Gibraltar,  and  which  had  accompanied  it  into  the  Atlantic 
ninety  leagues  west  of  the  Straits.  The  reinforcement 
for  America  was  then  permitted  to  depart.  On  the  9th  of 
June,  thirteen  ships  of  the  line  sailed  for  New  York  under 
the  command  of  Vice- Admiral  John  Byron.^ 

These  delays  occasioned  a  singular  and  striking  illustration 
of  the  ill  effects  upon  commerce  of  inadequate  preparation 
for  manning   the   fleet.     A   considerable   number  of  West 

1  Charles  H.,  Comte  d'Estaing.  Born,  1729.  Served  in  India 
under  Lally  Tollendal,  1758.  After  having  been  taken  prisoner  at 
Madras  in  1759,  exchanged  into  the  navy.  Commanded  in  North 
America,  1778-80.     Guillotined,  1794.     W.  L.  C. 

2  Grandfather  of  the  poet. 


60     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

India  ships,  with  stores  absolutely  necessary  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  islands,  waited  at  Portsmouth  for  convoy  for  up- 
wards of  three  months,  while  the  whole  fleet,  of  eighty  sail, 
was  detained  for  five  weeks  after  it  had  assembled ;  "  and, 
although  the  wind  came  fair  on  the  19th  of  May,  it  did  not 
sail  till  the  26th,  owing  to  the  convoying  ships,  the  Boyne 
and  the  Ruhy,  not  being  ready."  Forty-five  owners  and 
masters  signed  a  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  stating  these 
facts.  "The  convoy/'  they  said,  "was  appointed  to  sail 
April  10th."  Many  ships  had  been  ready  as  early  as  Febru- 
ary. "  Is  not  this  shameful  usage,  my  Lords,  thus  to  deceive 
the  public  in  general  ?  There  are  two  hundred  ships  loaded 
with  provisions,  etc.,  waiting  at  Spithead  these  three  months. 
The  average  expense  of  each  ship  amounts  to  £150  monthly, 
so  that  the  expense  of  the  w^hole  West  India  fleet  since  Febru- 
ary amounts  to  £90,000." 

The  West  Indies  before  the  war  had  depended  chiefly 
upon  their  fellow  colonies  on  the  American  continent  for 
provisions,  as  well  as  for  other  prime  necessaries.  Not  only 
were  these  cut  off  as  an  incident  of  the  war,  entailing  great 
embarrassment  and  suffering,  which  elicited  vehement  ap- 
peals from  the  planter  community  to  the  home  government, 
but  the  American  privateers  preyed  heavily  upon  the  com- 
merce of  the  islands,  whose  industries  were  thus  smitten 
root  and  branch,  import  and  export.  In  1776,  salt  food  for 
whites  and  negroes  had  risen  from  50  to  100  per  cent,  and 
corn,  the  chief  support  of  the  slaves,  —  the  laboring  class,  — 
by  400  per  cent.  At  the  same  time  sugar  had  fallen  from 
25  to  40  per  cent  in  price,  rum  over  37  per  cent.  The  words 
"starvation"  and  "famine"  were  freely  used  in  these  repre- 
sentations, which  were  repeated  in  1778.  Insurance  rose  to 
23  per  cent ;  and  this,  with  actual  losses  by  capture,^  and  by 

^  The  Secretary  of  Lloyd's,  for  the  purposes  of  this  work,  has  been 
so  good  as  to  cause  to  be  specially  compiled  a  summary  of  the  losses 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE 


61 


cessation  of  American  trade,  with  consequent  fall  of  prices, 
was  estimated  to  give  a  total  loss  of  £66  upon  every  £100 
earned  before  the  war.  Yet,  with  all  this,  the  outward  West 
India  fleet  in  1778  waited  six  weeks,  April  lOth-May  26th, 
for  convoy.  Immediately  after  it  got  away,  a  rigorous  em- 
bargo was  laid  upon  all  shipping  in  British  ports,  that  their 
crews  might  be  impressed  to  man  the  Channel  fleet.  Market- 
boats,  even,  were  not  allowed  to  pass  between  Portsmouth 
and  the  Isle  of  Wight. 

Three  days  after  Byron  had  sailed.  Admiral  Augustus 
Keppel  also  put  to  sea  with  twenty-one  ships  of  the  line,  to 
cruise  off  Brest.  His  instructions  were  to  prevent  the 
junction  of  the  Toulon  and  Brest  divisions,  attacking  either 
that  he  might  meet.  On  the  17th  of  June,  two  French  frig- 
ates were  sighted.  In  order  that  they  might  not  report 
his  force  or  his  movements,  the  British  Admiral  sent  two 
of  his  own  frigates,  with  the  request  that  they  would  speak 
him.     One,  the  Belle  Poule,  36,  refused ;    and  an  engage- 

and  captures  during  the  period  1775-1783.  This,  so  far  as  it  deals 
with  merchantmen  and  privateers,  gives  the  following  results. 


British 

Vessels 

Enemy's 

Vessels 

Merchantmen 

Privateers 

Merchantmen 

Privateers 

Re- taken 

Re-taken 

Re-taken 

Re-taken 

Taken  1 

or  Ran- 
somed 

Taken  1 

or  Ran- 
somed 

Taken  1 

or  Ran- 
somed 

Taken  1 

or  Ran- 
somed 

1775 

_ 

_ 

1776 

229 

51 

— 

— 

19 

— 

6 

— 

1777 

331 

52 

— 

— 

51 

1 

18 

— 

1778 

359 

87 

5 

— 

232 

5 

16 

— 

1779 

487 

106 

29 

5 

238 

5 

31 

1780 

581 

260 

15 

2 

203 

3 

34 

1 

1781 

587 

211 

38 

6 

277 

10 

40 

1782 

415 

99 

1 

— 

104 

1 

68 

— 

1783 

98 

13 

1 

1 

11 

2 

3 

— 

Including  those  re-taken  or  ransomed. 


W.  L.  C. 


62       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN    THE 

ment  followed  between  her  and  the  British  ship,  the  Arethusa, 
32.  The  King  of  France  subsequently  declared  that  this 
occurrence  fixed  the  date  of  the  war's  beginning.  Although 
both  Keppel's  and  d'Estaing's  orders  prescribed  acts  of 
hostility,  no  formal  war  yet  existed. 

Byron  had  a  very  tempestuous  passage,  with  adverse  winds, 
by  which  his  vessels  were  scattered  and  damaged.  On  the 
18th  of  August,  sixty-seven  days  from  Plymouth,  the  flag- 
ship arrived  off  the  south  coast  of  Long  Island,  ninety  miles 
east  of  New  York,  without  one  of  the  fleet  in  company. 
There  twelve  ships  were  seen  at  anchor  to  leeward  (north), 
nine  or  ten  miles  distant,  having  jury  masts,  and  showing 
other  signs  of  disability.  The  British  vessel  approached 
near  enough  to  recognise  them  as  French.  They  were 
d'Estaing's  squadron,  crippled  by  a  very  heavy  gale,  in 
which  Howe's  force  had  also  suffered,  though  to  a  less  ex- 
tent. Being  alone,  and  ignorant  of  existing  conditions, 
Byron  thought  it  inexpedient  to  continue  on  for  either 
New  York  or  Narragansett  Bay.  The  wind  being  southerly, 
he  steered  for  Halifax,  which  he  reached  August  26th.  Some 
of  his  ships  also  entered  there.  A  very  few  had  already 
succeeded  in  joining  Howe  in  New  York,  being  fortunate 
enough  to  escape  the  enemy. 

So  far  as  help  from  England  went.  Lord  Howe  would  have 
been  crushed  long  before  this.  He  owed  his  safety  partly 
to  his  own  celerity,  partly  to  the  delays  of  his  opponent. 
Early  in  May  he  received  advices  from  home,  which  con- 
vinced him  that  a  sudden  and  rapid  abandonment  of  Phila- 
delphia and  of  Delaware  Bay  might  become  necessary.  He 
therefore  withdrew  his  ships  of  the  line  from  New  York 
and  Narragansett,  concentrating  them  at  the  mouth  of 
Delaware  Bay,  while  the  transports  embarked  all  stores, 
except  those  needed  for  a  fortnight's  supply  of  the  army  in  a 
hostile  country.     The  threatening  contingency  of  a  superior 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  63 

enemy's  appearing  off  the  coast  might,  and  did,  make  it 
imperative  not  to  risk  the  troops  at  sea,  but  to  choose  instead 
the  alternative  of  a  ninety-mile  march  through  New  Jersey, 
which  a  year  before  had  been  rejected  as  too  hazardous  for 
an  even  larger  force.  Thus  prepared,  no  time  was  lost 
when  the  evacuation  became  necessary.  Sir  William  Howe, 
who  had  been  relieved  on  the  24th  of  May  by  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  and  had  returned  to  England,  escaped  the  humilia- 
tion of  giving  up  his  dearly  bought  conquest.  On  the  18th 
of  June  the  British  troops,  twelve  thousand  in  number,  were 
ferried  across  the  Delaware,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Navy,  and  began  their  hazardous  march  to  New  York.  The 
next  day  the  transports  began  to  move  down  the  river ;  but, 
owing  to  the  intricate  navigation,  head  winds,  and  calms, 
they  did  not  get  to  sea  until  the  28th  of  June.  On  the  8th  of 
July,  ten  days  too  late,  d'Estaing  anchored  in  the  mouth  of 
the  Delaware.  "Had  a  passage  of  even  ordinary  length 
taken  place,"  wrote  Washington,  "Lord  Howe  with  the  Brit- 
ish ships  of  war  and  all  the  transports  in  the  river  Delaware 
must  inevitably  have  fallen ;  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton  must 
have  had  better  luck  than  is  commonly  dispensed  to  men  of 
his  profession  under  such  circumstances,  if  he  and  his  troops 
had  not  shared  at  least  the  fate  of  Burgoyne." 

Had  Howe's  fleet  been  intercepted,  there  would  have  been 
no  naval  defence  for  New  York ;  the  French  fleet  would  have 
surmounted  the  difficulties  of  the  harbour  bar  at  its  ease; 
and  Clinton,  caught  between  it  and  the  American  army, 
must  have  surrendered.  Howe's  arrival  obviated  this 
immediate  danger ;  but  much  still  needed  to  be  done,  or  the 
end  would  be  postponed  only,  not  averted.  A  fair  wind 
carried  the  fleet  and  the  whole  convoy  from  the  Delaware 
to  Sandy  Hook  in  forty-eight  hours.  On  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  as  Howe  was  approaching  his  port,  he  spoke  a 
packet  from  England,  which  not  only  brought  definite  news 


64      MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

of  d'Estaing's  sailing,  but  also  reported  that  she  herself  had 
fallen  in  with  him  to  the  southward,  not  very  far  from  the 
American  coast,  and  had  been  chased  by  his  ships.  His 
appearance  off  New  York,  therefore,  was  imminent. 

Howe's  measures  were  prompt  and  thorough,  as  became 
his  great  reputation.  To  watch  for  d'Estaing's  approach,  a 
body  of  cruisers  was  despatched,  numerous  enough  for  some 
to  bring  frequent  word  of  his  movements,  while  others 
kept  touch  with  him.  The  ships  at  New  York  were  ordered 
down  to  Sandy  Hook,  where  the  defence  of  the  entrance  was 
to  be  made.  Clinton,  who  had  been  hard  pressed  by  Wash- 
ington throughout  his  march,  arrived  on  the  30th  of  June  — 
the  day  after  Howe  himself  —  on  the  heights  of  Navesink,  on 
the  seacoast,  just  south  of  Sandy  Hook.  During  the  pre- 
vious winter  the  sea  had  made  a  breach  between  the  heights 
and  the  Hook,  converting  the  latter  into  an  island.  Across 
this  inlet  the  Navy  threw  a  bridge  of  boats,  by  which  the 
army  on  the  5th  of  July  passed  to  the  Hook,  and  thence  was 
conveyed  to  the  city. 

On  the  same  day  the  French  fleet  was  sighted  off  the  coast  of 
Virginia  by  a  cruiser,  which  reached  Howe  on  the  7th ;  and 
two  days  later  another  brought  word  that  the  enemy  had 
anchored  on  the  8th  off  the  Delaware.  There  d'Estaing 
again  tarried  for  two  days,  which  were  diligently  improved 
by  the  British  Admiral,  who  at  the  same  time  sent  off  des- 
patches to  warn  Byron,  of  whose  coming  he  now  had  heard. 
Despite  all  his  energy,  his  preparations  still  w^ere  far  from 
complete,  w^hen  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  a  third  vessel 
arrived,  announcing  that  the  French  were  approaching. 
That  evening  they  anchored  outside,  four  miles  south  of 
Sandy  Hook.  Howe,  who  during  all  these  days  was  indefati- 
gable, not  only  in  planning  but  also  in  personal  supervision 
of  details,  hastened  at  once  to  place  his  vessels  according 
to  the  disposition  which  he  had  determined,  and  which  he 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  Gb 

had  carefully  explained  to  his  captains,  thus  insuring  an  intel- 
ligent cooperation  on  their  part. 

The  narrow  arm  of  land  called  Sandy  Hook  projects  in  a 
northerly  direction  from  the  New  Jersey  coast,  and  covers 
the  lower  bay  of  New  York  on  the  south  side.  The  main 
ship-channel,  then  as  now,  ran  nearly  east  and  west,  at  right 
angles  to  the  Hook  and  close  to  its  northern  end.  Beyond 
the  channel,  to  the  north,  there  was  no  solid  ground  for 
fortification  within  the  cannon  range  of  that  day.  There- 
fore such  guns  as  could  be  mounted  on  shore,  five  in  number, 
were  placed  in  battery  at  the  end  of  the  Hook.  These  formed 
the  right  flank  of  the  defence,  which  was  continued  thence 
to  the  westward  by  a  line  of  seven  ships,  skirting  the  southern 
edge  of  the  channel.  As  the  approach  of  the  French,  if  they 
attacked,  must  be  with  an  easterly  wind  and  a  rising  tide, 
the  ships  were  placed  with  that  expectation;  and  in  such 
wise  that,  riding  with  their  heads  to  the  eastward,  each  suc- 
cessive one,  from  van  to  rear,  lay  a  little  outside  —  north  — 
of  her  next  ahead.  The  object  of  this  indented  formation 
was  that  each  ship  might  bring  her  broadside  to  bear  east, 
and  yet  fire  clear  of  those  to  the  east  of  her.  In  order  to 
effect  this  concentration  of  all  the  batteries  in  an  easterly 
direction,  which  would  rake  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
a  spring^  was  run  from  the  outer,  or  port  quarter  of  every 
ship,  except  the  leader.^    These  springs  were  not  taken  to 

1  A  spring  is  a  rope  taken  usually  from  the  quarter  (one  side  of  the 
stern)  of  a  ship,  to  the  anchor.  By  hauling  upon  it  the  battery  is 
turned  in  the  direction  desired. 

2  The  leader,  the  Leviathan,  was  excepted,  evidently  because  she 
lay  under  the  Hook,  and  her  guns  could  not  bear  down  channel. 
She  was  not  a  fighting  ship  of  the  squadron,  but  an  armed  storeship, 
although  originally  a  ship  of  war,  and  therefore  by  her  thickness  of 
side  better  fitted  for  defence  than  an  ordinary  merchant  vessel. 
Placing  her  seems  to  have  been  an  afterthought,  to  close  the  gap 
in  the  line,  and  prevent  even  the  possibility  of  the  enemy's  ships 
turning  in  there  and  doubling  on  the  van.     Thus  Howe  avoided 


66     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

the  bow  cable  or  anchor,  as  was  often  done,  but  to  anchors  of 
their  own,  placed  broad  off  the  port  bows.  If,  then,  the 
enemy  attacked,  the  ships,  by  simply  keeping  fast  the  springs 
and  veering  the  cables,  would  swing  with  their  broadsides 
facing  east.  If  the  enemy,  which  had  no  bow  fire,  survived 
his  punishment,  and  succeeded  in  advancing  till  abreast  the 
British  line,  it  was  necessary  only  to  keep  fast  the  cables  and 
let  go  the  springs ;  the  ships  would  swing  head  to  the  east  wind, 
and  the  broadsides  would  once  more  bear  north,  across  the 
channel  instead  of  along  it.  These  careful  arrangements  were 
subject,  of  course,  to  the  mischance  of  shot  cutting  away 
cables  or  springs ;  but  this  was  more  than  offset  by  the  prob- 
able injury  to  the  enemy's  spars  and  rigging,  as  well  as  hulls, 
before  he  could  use  his  batteries  at  all. 

Such  was  the  main  defence  arranged  by  Howe ;  with  which 
New  York  stood  or  fell.  In  the  line  were  five  64's,  one 
50,  and  an  armed  storeship.  An  advanced  line,  of  one 
fifty  with  two  smaller  vessels,  was  placed  just  inside  the  bar 
—  two  or  three  miles  outside  the  Hook  —  to  rake  the  enemy 
as  he  crossed,  retiring  as  he  approached ;  and  four  galleys, 
forming  a  second  line,  were  also  stationed  for  the  same 
purpose,  across  the  channel,  abreast  of  the  Hook.^  The  re- 
treat of  these  was  secure  into  the  shoal  water,  where  they 
could  not  be  followed.  One  64  and  some  frigates  were 
held  as  a  reserve,  inside  the  main  line,  to  act  as  occasion 
might  require.  The  total  available  force  was,  six  64's, 
three  50's,  and   six  frigates.     D'Estaing's  fleet,  in   detail, 

the  fatal  oversight  made  by  Brueys  twenty  years  later,  in  Aboukir 
Bay. 

^  It  may  be  recalled  that  a  similar  disposition  was  made  by  the 
Confederates  at  Mobile  against  Farragut's  attack  in  1864,  and  that 
it  was  from  these  small  vessels  that  his  flagship  Hartford  underwent 
her  severest  loss.  To  sailing  ships  the  odds  were  greater,  as  injury 
to  spars  might  involve  stoppage.  Moreover,  Howe's  arrangements 
brought  into  such  fire  all  his  heavier  ships. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  67 

consisted  of  one  90-gun  ship,  one  80,  six  74's  and  one 
50.  Great  as  was  this  discrepancy  between  the  opponents, 
it  was  counterbalanced  largely  by  Howe's  skilful  dis- 
positions, which  his  enemy  could  not  circumvent.  If 
the  latter  once  got  alongside,  there  was  little  hope  for 
the  British ;  but  it  was  impossible  for  the  French  to  evade 
the  primary  necessity  of  undergoing  a  raking  fire,  without 
reply,  from  the  extreme  range  of  their  enemies'  cannon  up 
to  the  moment  of  closing.  The  stake,  however,  was  great, 
and  the  apparent  odds  stirred  to  the  bottom  the  fighting 
blood  of  the  British  seamen.  The  ships  of  war  being  short- 
handed,  Howe  called  for  volunteers  from  the  transports. 
Such  numbers  came  forward  that  the  agents  of  the  vessels 
scarcely  could  keep  a  watch  on  board;  and  many  whose 
names  were  not  on  the  lists  concealed  themselves  in  the 
boats  which  carried  their  companions  to  the  fighting  ships. 
The  masters  and  mates  of  merchantmen  in  the  harbour 
in  like  manner  offered  their  services,  taking  their  stations 
at  the  guns.  Others  cruised  off  the  coast  in  small  boats,  to 
warn  off  approaching  vessels;  many  of  which  nevertheless 
fell  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

Meanwhile  d'Estaing  was  in  communication  with  Wash- 
ington, one  of  whose  aides-de-camp  visited  his  flagship.  A 
number  of  New  York  pilots  also  were  sent.  When  these 
learned  the  draught  of  the  heavier  French  ships,  they  de- 
clared that  it  was  impossible  to  take  them  in ;  that  there  was 
on  the  bar  only  twenty-three  feet  at  high  water.  Had  that 
been  really  the  case,  Howe  would  not  have  needed  to  make 
the  preparations  for  defence  that  were  visible  to  thousands 
of  eyes  on  sea  and  on  shore ;  but  d'Estaing,  though  personally 
brave  as  a  lion,  was  timid  in  his  profession,  which  he  had 
entered  at  the  age  of  thirty,  without  serving  in  the  lower 
grades.  The  assurances  of  the  pilots  were  accepted  after 
an  examination  by  a  lieutenant  of  the  flagship,  who  could 


68     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

find  nothing  deeper  than  twenty-two  feet.  Fortune's  favors 
are  thrown  away,  as  though  in  mockery,  on  the  incompetent 
or  the  irresohite.  On  the  22d  of  July  a  fresh  north-east 
wind  concurred  with  a  spring  tide  to  give  the  highest  possible 
water  on  the  bar.^ 

"At  eight  o'clock,"  wrote  an  eye-witness  in  the  British  fleet, 
"d'Estaing  with  all  his  squadron  appeared  under  way.  He  kept 
working  to  windward,  as  if  to  gain  a  proper  position  for  crossing  the 
bar  by  the  time  the  tide  should  serve.  The  wind  could  not  be  more 
favourable  for  such  a  design;  it  blew  from  the  exact  point  from 
which  he  could  attack  us  to  the  greatest  advantage.  The  spring 
tides  were  at  the  highest,  and  that  afternoon  thirty  feet  on  the  bar. 
We  consequently  expected  the  hottest  day  that  had  ever  been  fought 
between  the  two  nations.  On  our  side  all  was  at  stake.  Had  the 
men-of-war  been  defeated,  the  fleet  of  transports  and  victuallers 
must  have  been  destroyed,  and  the  army,  of  course,  have  fallen  with 
us.  D'Estaing,  however,  had  not  spirit  equal  to  the  risk ;  at  three 
o'clock  we  saw  him  bear  off  to  the  southward,  and  in  a  few  hours 
he  was  out  of  sight." 

Four  days  later,  Howe,  reporting  these  occurrences,  wrote  : 
"The  weather  having  been  favourable  the  last  three  days 
for  forcing  entrance  to  this  port,  I  conclude  the  French 
commander  has  desisted."  It  is  clear  that  the  experienced 
British  admiral  did  not  recognise  the  impossibility  of 
success  for  the  enemy. 

After  the  demonstration  of  the  22d,  d'Estaing  stood  to  the 
southward,  with  the  wind  at  east.  The  British  advice- 
boats  brought  back  word  that  they  had  kept  company  with 
him  as  far  south  as  the  Capes  of  the  Delaware,  and  there 
had  left  him  ninety  miles  from  land.     When  their  leaving 

1  A  letter  to  the  Admiralty,  dated  October  Sth,  1779,  from  Vice- 
Admiral  Marriot  Arbuthnot,  then  commander-in-chief  at  New  York, 
states  that  "at  spring  tides  there  is  generally  thirty  feet  of  water 
on  the  bar  at  high  water." 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  69 

freed  him  from  observation,  he  turned,  and  made  for  Narra- 
gansett  Bay,  an  attack  on  which,  in  support  of  an  American 
land  force,  had  been  concerted  between  him  and  Washing- 
ton. On  the  29th  he  anchored  three  miles  south  of  Rhode 
Island,  and  there  awaited  a  suitable  moment  for  forcing  the 
entrance. 

Narragansett  Bay  contains  several  islands.  The  two 
largest,  near  the  sea,  are  Rhode  Island  and  Conanicut, 
the  latter  being  the  more  westerly.  Their  general  direction, 
as  that  of  the  Bay  itself,  is  north  and  south ;  and  by  them 
the  entrance  is  divided  into  three  passages.  Of  these,  the 
eastern,  called  Seakonnet,  is  not  navigable  above  Rhode 
Island.  The  central,  which  is  the  main  channel,  is  joined 
by  the  western  above  ^onanicut,  and  thus  the  two  lead  to  the 
upper  Bay.  The  town  of  Newport  is  on  the  west  side  of 
Rhode  Island,  four  miles  from  the  main  entrance. 

On  the  30th  of  July,  the  day  after  the  French  fleet  had 
arrived,  two  of  its  ships  of  the  line,  under  command  of  the 
afterwards  celebrated  Suffren,  went  up  the  western  channel, 
anchoring  within  it  near  the  south  end  of  Conanicut.  One 
of  them,  as  she  passed,  was  hulled  twice  by  the  British  batter- 
ies. At  the  same  time,  two  frigates  and  a  corvette  entered 
Seakonnet ;  whereupon  the  British  abandoned  and  burned  a 
sloop  of  war,  the  Kingfisher,  16,  and  some  galleys  there 
stationed.  The  British  general.  Sir  Robert  Pigot,  now 
withdrew  his  detachments  from  Conanicut,  after  disabling  the 
guns,  and  concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  force  in  the  southern 
part  of  Rhode  Island  and  about  Newport.  Goat  Island, 
which  covers  the  inner  harbour  of  the  town,  was  still  occupied, 
the  main  channel  being  commanded  by  its  batteries,  as  well 
as  by  those  to  the  north  and  south  of  it  upon  Rhode  Island. 
On  the  5th  of  August,  Suffren's  two  ships  again  got  under 
way,  sailed  through  the  western  passage,  and  anchored  in  the 
main  channel,  north  of  Conanicut;    their  former  positions 


70       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

being  taken  by  two  other  ships  of  the  Hne.^  The  senior 
British  naval  officer,  seeing  retreat  cut  off  both  north  and 
south,  now  destroyed  those  ships  of  war^  which  could  not 
enter  the  inner  harbour,  sinking  two  between  Goat  and  Rhode 
Islands,  to  prevent  any  enemy  passing  there.  Five  transports 
also  were  sunk  north  of  Goat  Island,  between  it  and  Coaster's 
Harbour,  to  protect  the  inside  anchorage  in  that  direction. 
These  preliminary  operations  cost  the  British  five  frigates 
and  two  sloops,  besides  some  galleys.  Guns  and  ammuni- 
tion taken  from  them  went  to  increase  the  defences ;  and  their 
officers  and  crews,  over  a  thousand  in  number,  served  in  the 
fortifications. 

On  the  8th  of  August  the  eight  remaining  French  ships  of 
the  line  ran  the  batteries  on  Rhode  and  Goat  Islands,  an- 
choring above  the  latter,  between  it  and  Conanicut,  and 
were  rejoined  there  by  the  four  previously  detached  to  the 
western  passage.  Ten  thousand  American  troops  having  by 
this  time  crossed  from  the  mainland  to  the  northern  part  of 
Rhode  Island,  d'Estaing  immediately  landed  four  thousand 
soldiers  and  seamen  from  the  fleet  upon  Conanicut,  for  a 
preliminary  organisation;  after  which  they  also  were  to 
pass  to  Rhode  Island  and  join  in  the  operations.  For  the 
moment,  therefore,  the  British  garrison,  numbering  probably 
six  thousand  men,^  was  hemmed  in  by  vastly  superior  forces, 
by  land  and  by  water.  Its  embarrassment,  however,  did 
not  last  long.  On  the  following  morning  Lord  Howe  appeared 
and  anchored  off  Point  Judith,  seven  miles  from  the  entrance 
to  the  Bay,  and  twelve  from  the  position  then  occupied  by  the 

1  These  four  ships  were  among  the  smallest  of  the  fleet,  being  one 
74,  two  64's,  and  a  50.  D'Estaing  very  properly  reserved  his 
heaviest  ships  to  force  the  main  channel. 

2  Flora,  32  ;   Juno,  32  ;   Lark,  32  ;   Orpheus,  32  ;   Falcon,  16. 

^  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  an  exact  statement  of  the  number  ; 
Beatson  gives  eight  regiments,  with  a  reinforcement  of  five  bat- 
taUons. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  71 

French  fleet.  He  brought  a  stronger  force  than  he  had  been 
able  to  gather  for  the  defence  of  New  York,  having  now  one 
74,  seven  64's,  and  five  50 's,  in  all  thirteen  of  the  line,  besides 
several  smaller  vessels ;  but  he  still  was  greatly  inferior  to 
opponent,  by  any  rational  mode  of  naval  reckoning. 

Howe's  energies  in  New  York  had  not  been  confined  to 
preparations  for  resisting  the  entrance  of  the  enemy,  nor 
did  they  cease  with  the  latter's  departure.  When  he  first 
arrived  there  from  Philadelphia,  he  had  hastened  to  get 
his  ships  ready  for  sea,  a  pre-occupation  which  somewhat, 
but  not  unduly,  delayed  their  taking  their  positions  at  Sandy 
Hook.  Two,  for  instance,  had  been  at  the  watering-place 
when  the  approach  of  the  French  was  signalled.  Owing  to 
this  diligence,  no  time  was  lost  by  his  fault  when  the  new 
destination  of  the  enemy  was  made  known  to  him,  on  the 
28th  or  29th  of  July,  by  the  arrival  of  the  Raisonnahle,  64,^ 
from  Halifax.  This  ship  narrowly  escaped  the  French  fleet, 
having  passed  it  on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  steering  for  Rhode 
Island.  The  Renown,  50,  which  on  the  26th  had  reached  New 
York  from  the  West  Indies,  had  a  similar  close  shave, 
having  sailed  unnoticed  through  the  rear  of  the  enemy 
the  night  before.  Besides  these  two,  Howe  was  joined  also 
by  the  Centurion,  50,  from  Halifax,  and  by  the  Cornwall,  74 ; 
the  latter,  which  crossed  the  bar  on  the  30th,  being  the  first 
of  Byron's  fleet  to  reach  New  York.  The  three  others 
belonged  to  Howe's  own  squadron.  For  the  two  Halifax 
ships  which  helped  to  make  this  most  w^elcome  reinforce- 
ment, the  Admiral  was  indebted  to  the  diligence  of  the 
officer  there  commanding,  who  hurried  them  aw^ay  as  soon 
as  he  learned  of  d'Estaing's  appearance  on  the  coast.  The 
opportuneness  of  their  arrival  attracted  notice.  "  Had  they 
appeared  a  few  days  sooner,"  says  a  contemporary  narra- 

1  It  may  be  interesting  to  recall  that  this  was  the  ship  on  the  books 
of  which  Nelson's  name  was  first  borne  in  the  navy,  in  1771. 


72     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

tive,  "  either  they  must  have  been  prevented  from  forming  a 
junction  with  our  squadron,  and  forced  again  to  sea,  or  we 
should  have  had  the  mortification  to  see  them  increase  th-e 
triumph  of  our  enemy." 

On  the  1st  of  August,  forty-eight  hours  after  the  Cornwall 
had  come  in  from  a  stormy  passage  of  fifty-two  days,  the 
squadron  was  ready  for  sea,  and  Howe  attempted  to  sail; 
but  the  wind  hauled  foul  immediately  after  the  signal  to 
weigh  had  been  made.  It  did  not  become  fair  at  the  hour 
of  high  water,  when  alone  heavy  ships  could  cross  the  bar, 
until  the  morning  of  the  6th.  "Rhode  Island  was  of  such 
importance,"  says  the  narrator  already  quoted,  ^' and  the 
fate  of  so  large  a  portion  of  the  British  army  as  formed  the 
garrison  was  of  such  infinite  consequence  to  the  general  cause, 
that  it  was  imagined  the  Admiral  would  not  lose  a  moment  in 
making  some  attempt  for  their  relief."  He  had  learned  of 
the  detachments  made  from  the  French  fleet,  and  hoped  that 
some  advantage  might  be  taken  of  this  division.  In  short, 
he  went,  as  was  proper  and  incumbent  on  him  in  such  critical 
circumstances,  to  take  a  great  risk,  in  hope  of  a  favourable 
chance  offering.  On  the  9th,  as  before  stated,  he  anchored  off 
Point  Judith,  and  opened  communications  with  the  garrison, 
from  which  he  learned  the  events  that  had  so  far  occurred, 
and  also  that  the  enemy  was  well  provided  with  craft  of  all 
kinds  to  make  a  descent  upon  any  part  of  the  Island. 

As  deGrasse  at  Yorktown,  when  rumour  announced  the 
approach  of  a  British  fleet,  was  deterred  only  by  the  most 
urgent  appeals  of  Washington  from  abandoning  his  control 
of  the  Chesapeake,  essential  to  the  capture  of  Cornwallis, 
so  now  d'Estaing,  in  Narragansett  Bay,  was  unwilling  to 
keep  his  place,  in  face  of  Howe's  greatly  inferior  squadron.^ 

^  Troude  attributes  d'Estaing's  sortie  to  a  sense  of  the  insecurity 
of  his  position  ;  Lapeyrouse  Bonfils,  to  a  desire  for  contest.  Che- 
vaHer  dwells  upon  the  exposure  of  the  situation. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  73 

The  influence  exerted  upon  these  two  admirals  by  the  mere 
approach  of  a  hostile  fleet,  when  decisive  advantages  depended 
upon  their  holding  their  ground,  may  be  cited  plausibly  in 
support  of  the  most  extreme  view  of  the  effect  of  a  "fleet 
in  being;"  but  the  instances  also,  when  the  conditions 
are  analysed,  will  suggest  the  question  :  Is  such  effect  always 
legitimate,  inherent  in  the  existence  of  the  fleet  itself,  or  does 
it  not  depend  often  upon  the  characteristics  of  the  man 
affected  ?  The  contemporary  British  narrative  of  these 
events  in  Narragansett  Bay,  after  reciting  the  various  ob- 
stacles and  the  inferiority  of  the  British  squadron,  says : 
"The  most  skilful  officers  w^ere  therefore  of  opinion  that  the 
Vice- Admiral  could  not  risk  an  attack ;  and  it  appears  by  his 
Lordship's  public  letter  that  this  was  also  his  own  opinion : 
under  such  circumstances,  he  judged  it  was  impracticable  to 
afford  the  General  any  essential  relief."  In  both  these 
instances,  the  admirals  concerned  were  impelled  to  sacrifice 
the  almost  certain  capture,  not  of  a  mere  position,  but  of  a 
decisive  part  of  the  enemy's  organised  forces,  by  the  mere 
possibility  of  action;  by  the  moral  effect  produced  by  a 
fleet  greatly  inferior  to  their  own,  w^hich  in  neither  case  would 
have  attacked,  as  things  stood.     What  does  this  prove  ? 

Immediately  upon  Howe's  appearance,  the  French  seamen 
who  had  landed  the  day  before  on  Conanicut  were  recalled 
to  their  ships.  The  next  morning,  August  10,  at  7  a.m.,  the 
wind  came  out  strong  at  north-east,  which  is  exceptional  at 
that  season.  D'Estaing  at  once  put  to  sea,  cutting  the 
cables  in  his  haste.  In  two  hours  he  w^as  outside,  steering 
for  the  enemy.  Howe,  of  course,  retired  at  once ;  his  in- 
feriority^ did  not  permit  an  engagement  except  on  his  own 
terms.  To  insure  these,  he  needed  the  weather-gage,  the 
offensive  position  of  that  day,  which  by  keeping  south  he 
expected  to  gain,  when  the  usual  wind  from  that  quarter 

1  For  the  respective  force  of  the  two  fleets  see  pp.  66,  67,  71. 


74     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

should  set  in.  The  French  Admiral  had  the  same  object, 
hoping  to  crush  his  agile  opponent ;  and,  as  the  sea  breeze 
from  south-west  did  not  make  that  day,  he  succeeded  in 
keeping  the  advantage  with  which  he  had  started,  despite 
Howe's  skill.  At  nightfall  both  fleets  were  still  steering  to 
the  southward,  on  the  port  tack,  the  French  five  or  six 
miles  in  the  rear  of  the  British,  with  the  wind  variable  at  east. 
The  same  course  was  maintained  throughout  the  night,  the 
French  gradually  overhauling  the  British,  and  becoming 
visible  at  3  a.m.  of  the  11th.  By  Howe's  dispatch,  they 
bore  in  the  morning,  at  an  hour  not  specified,  east-north- 
east, which  would  be  nearly  abeam,  but  somewhat  more 
distant  than  the  night  before,  having  apparently  kept  closer 
to  the  wind,  which  by  this  had  steadied  at  east-north-east. 
In  the  course  of  the  day  Howe  shifted  his  flag  from  the 
Eagle,  64,  to  the  Apollo,  32,  and  placed  himself  between  the 
two  fleets,  the  better  to  decide  the  movements  of  his  own. 
Finding  it  impossible  to  gain  the  weather-gage,  and  unwilling, 
probably,  to  be  drawn  too  far  from  Rhode  Island,  he  now 
made  a  wide  circle  with  the  fleet  by  a  succession  of  changes 
of  course :  at  8  a.m.  to  south,  then  to  south-west  and  west, 
until  finally,  at  1.30  p.m.,  the  ships  were  steering  north-west; 
always  in  line  of  battle.  The  French  Admiral  seems  to  have 
followed  this  movement  cautiously,  on  an  outer  circle  but 
with  a  higher  speed,  so  that  from  east-north-east  in  the 
morning,  which,  as  the  fleets  were  then  heading,  would  be 
on  the  starboard  side  of  the  British,  abreast  and  to  windward, 
at  4  p.m.  the  French  bore  south-south-east,  which  would  be 
somewhat  on  the  port  quarter,  or  nearly  astern  but  to 
leeward.  At  this  time  their  van  was  estimated  by  Howe  to 
be  two  or  three  miles  from  the  British  rear,  and,  according 
to  his  reading  of  their  manoeuvres,  d'Estaing  was  forming  his 
line  for  the  same  tack  as  the  British,  with  a  view  of  "en- 
gaging the  British  squadron  to  leeward,"  whereby  he  would 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  75 

obtain  over  it  the  advantage  of  using  the  lower-deck  guns,  the 
wind  and  sea  having  become  much  heavier.  As  the  French 
Admiral,  in  this  new  disposition,  had  put  his  heaviest  ships 
in  the  van,  and  his  line  was  nearly  in  the  wake  of  the 
British,  Howe  inferred  an  attack  upon  his  rear.  He 
therefore  ordered  his  heaviest  ship,  the  Cornwall,  74,  to  go 
there  from  the  centre,  exchanging  places  with  the  Centurion, 
50,  and  at  the  same  time  signalled  the  fleet  to  close  to  the 
centre,  —  a  detail  worth  remembering  in  view  of  Rodney's 
frustrated  manoevure  of  April  17th,  1780.  It  now  re- 
mained simply  to  await  firmly  the  moment  when  the  French 
should  have  covered  the  intervening  ground,  and  brought 
to  action  so  much  of  his  rear  as  d'Estaing  saw  fit  to  engage ; 
the  conditions  of  the  sea  favoring  the  speed  of  the  bulkier 
ships  that  composed  the  hostile  fleet.  The  latter,  however, 
soon  abandoned  the  attempt,  and  "bore  away  to  the  south- 
ward, apparently  from  the  state  of  the  weather,  which,  by 
the  wind  freshening  much,  with  frequent  rain,  was  now 
rendered  very  unfavorable  for  engaging."  It  may  be 
added  that  the  hour  was  very  late  for  beginning  an  action. 
At  sundown  the  British  were  under  close-reefed  topsails, 
and  the  sea  such  that  Howe  was  unable  to  return  to  the 
Eagle}  >) 

The  wind  now  increased  to  great  violence,  and  a  severe 
storm  raged  on  the  coast  until  the  evening  of  the  13th, 
throwing  the  two  fleets  into  confusion,  scattering  the  ships, 
and  causing  numerous  disasters.  The  Apollo  lost  her  fore- 
mast, and  sprung  the  mainmast,  on  the  night  of  the  12th. 
The  next  day  only  two  British  ships  of  the  line  and  three 
smafler  vessels  were  in  sight  of  their  Admiral.     When  the 

^  This  account  of  the  manoeuvres  of  the  two  fleets  is  based  upon 
Lord  Howe's  dispatch,  and  ampHfied  from  the  journal  of  Captain 
Henry  Duncan  of  the  flagship  Eagle  which  has  been  published  (1902) 
since  the  first  publication  of  this  work.  See  "  Navy  Records  Society, 
Naval  Miscellany."     Vol.  i,  p.  161. 


76      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

weather  moderated,  Howe  went  on  board  the  Phoenix,  44, 
and  thence  to  the  Centurion,  50,  with  which  he  "proceeded  to 
the  southward,  and  on  the  15th  discovered  ten  sail  of  the 
French  squadron,  some  at  anchor  in  the  sea,  about  twenty- 
five  leagues  east  from  Cape  May."^  Leaving  there  the 
Centurion,  to  direct  to  New  York  any  of  Byron's  ships 
that  might  come  on  the  coast,  he  departed  thither  himself 
also,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  17th  rejoined  the  squadron 
off  Sandy  Hook,  the  appointed  rendezvous.  Many  injuries 
had  been  received  by  the  various  ships,  but  they  were  mostly 
of  a  minor  character ;  and  on  the  22d  the  fleet  again  put  to 
sea  in  search  of  the  enemy. 

The  French  had  suffered  much  more  severely.  The  flag- 
ship Languedoc,  90,  had  carried  away  her  bowsprit,  all  her 
lower  masts  followed  it  overboard,  and  her  tiller  also  was 
broken,  rendering  the  rudder  unserviceable.  The  Marseillais, 
74,  lost  her  foremast  and  bowsprit.  In  the  dispersal  of  the 
two  fleets  that  followed  the  gale,  each  of  these  crippled  vessels, 
on  the  evening  of  the  13th,  encountered  singly  a  British  50- 
gun  ship ;  the  Languedoc  being  attacked  by  the  Renoivn,  and 
the  Marseillais  by  the  Preston.  The  conditions  in  each  in- 
stance were  distinctly  favourable  to  the  smaller  combatant ; 
but  both  unfortunately  withdrew  at  nightfall,  making  the 
mistake  of  postponing  to  to-morrow  a  chance  which  they  had 
no  certainty  would  exist  after  to-day.  When  morning 
dawned,  other  French  ships  appeared,  and  the  opportunity 
passed  away.  The  British  Isis,  50,  also  was  chased  and 
overtaken  by  the  Cesar,  74.  In  the  action  which  ensued,  the 
French  ship's  wheel  was  shot  away,  and  she  retired  ;  —  two 
other  British  vessels,  one  of  the  line,  being  in  sight.  The  latter 
are  not  mentioned  in  the  British  accounts,  and  both  sides 
claimed  the  advantage  in  this  drawn  action.  The  French 
captain  lost  an  arm. 

•  1  At  the  mouth  of  Delaware  Bay. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  77 

After  making  temporary  repairs,  at  the  anchorage  where 
Howe  saw  them  on  the  15th  of  August,  the  French  fleet  had 
proceeded  again  towards  Newport.  It  was  in  the  course  of 
this  passage  that  they  were  seen  by  Byron's  flagship  ^  on  the 
18th,  to  the  southward  of  Long  Island.  The  Experiment y 
50,  which  Howe  had  sent  to  reconnoitre  Narragansett  Bay, 
was  chased  by  them  into  Long  Island  Sound,  and  only  reached 
New  York  by  the  East  River ;  being  the  first  ship  of  the  line 
or  50-gun  ship  that  ever  passed  through  Hell  Gate.  On  the 
20th  d'Estaing  communicated  with  General  Sullivan,  the 
commander  of  the  American  land  forces  on  Rhode  Island ; 
but  it  was  only  to  tell  him  that  in  his  own  opinion,  and  in 
that  of  a  council  of  war,  the  condition  of  the  squadron  neces- 
sitated going  to  Boston  to  refit.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of 
the  propriety  of  this  decision,  its  seriousness  can  be  best 
understood  from  the  report  sent  by  Pigot  to  Howe.  "The 
rebels  had  advanced  their  batteries  within  fifteen  hundred 
yards  of  the  British  works.  He  was  under  no  apprehensions 
from  any  of  their  attempts  in  front ;  but,  should  the  French 
fleet  come  in,  it  would  make  an  alarming  change.  Troops 
might  be  landed  and  advanced  in  his  rear ;  and  in  that  case 
he  could  not  answer  for  the  consequences."  Disregarding 
Sullivan's  entreaties  that  he  would  remain,  d'Estaing  sailed 
next  day  for  Boston,  which  he  reached  on  August  28th.  On 
the  31st  the  indefatigable  Howe  came  in  sight ;  but  the  French 
had  w^orked  actively  in  the  three  days.  Forty-nine  guns, 
18  and  24-pounders,  with  six  mortars,  were  already  in  posi- 
tion covering  the  anchorage;  and  "the  French  squadron,  far 
from  fearing  an  attack,  desired  it  eagerly."  ^  The  withdrawal 
of  the  French  fleet  from  Rhode  Island  was  followed  by  that 
of  the  American  troops  from  before  Newport. 

Howe  had  quitted  New  York  the  instant  he  heard  of 
d'Estaing's  reappearance  off  Rhode  Island.     He  took  with 

1  Ante,  p.  62.  2  Chevalier:  "Marine  Francaise,"  1778. 


78     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

him  the  same  number  of  vessels  as  before,  —  thirteen  of  the 
Hne,  —  the  Monmouth,  64,  of  Byron's  squadron,  having 
arrived  and  taken  the  place  of  the  Isis,  crippled  in  her  late 
action.  Before  reaching  Newport,  he  learned  that  the 
French  had  started  for  Boston.  He  hoped  that  they  would 
find  it  necessary  to  go  outside  George's  Bank,  and  that  he 
might  intercept  them  by  follow^ing  the  shorter  road  inside. 
In  this  he  was  disappointed,  as  has  been  seen,  and  the 
enemy's  position  was  now  too  strong  for  attack.  The 
French  retreat  to  Boston  closed  the  naval  campaign  of  1778 
in  North  American  waters. 

The  inability  or  unwillingness  of  d'Estaing  to  renew  the 
enterprise  against  Rhode  Island  accords  the  indisputable 
triumph  in  this  campaign  to  Howe,  —  an  honour  he  must 
share,  and  doubtless  would  have  shared  gladly,  w^th  his  sup- 
porters in  general.  That  his  fleet,  for  the  most  part  two  years 
from  home,  in  a  country  w^ithout  dockyards,  should  have  been 
able  to  take  the  sea  within  ten  days  after  the  gale,  while 
their  opponents,  just  from  France,  yet  with  three  months'  sea 
practice,  were  so  damaged  that  they  had  to  abandon  the  field 
and  all  the  splendid  prospects  of  Rhode  Island,  —  as  they 
already  had  allowed  to  slip  the  chance  at  New  York,  — 
shows  a  decisive  superiority  in  the  British  officers  and  crews. 
The  incontestable  merits  of  the  rank  and  file,  however,  must 
not  be  permitted  to  divert  attention  from  the  great  qualities 
of  the  leader,  but  for  which  the  best  material  would  have 
been  unavailing.  The  conditions  were  such  as  to  elicit  to  the 
utmost  Howe's  strongest  qualities,  —  firmness,  endurance, 
uninterrupted  persistence  rather  than  celerity,  great  pro- 
fessional skill,  ripened  by  constant  reflection  and  ready  at 
an  instant's  call.  Not  brilliant  in  intellect,  perhaps,  but 
absolutely  clear,  and  replete  with  expedients  to  meet  every 
probable  contingency,  Howe  exhibited  an  equable,  unflagging 
energy,  which   was  his  greatest  characteristic,  and   which 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  79 

eminently  fitted  him  for  the  task  of  checkmating  an  enemy's 
every  move  —  for  a  purely  defensive  campaign.  He  was 
always  on  hand  and  always  ready ;  for  he  never  wearied,  and 
he  knew  his  business.  To  great  combinations  he  was  perhaps 
unequal.  At  all  events,  such  are  not  associated  with  his 
name.  The  distant  scene  he  did  not  see;  but  step  by  step 
he  saw  his  way  with  absolute  precision,  and  followed  it  with 
unhesitating  resolution.  With  a  force  inferior  throughout, 
to  have  saved,  in  one  campaign,  the  British  fleet.  New 
York,  and  Rhode  Island,  with  the  entire  British  army, 
which  was  divided  between  those  two  stations  and  dependent 
upon  the  sea,  is  an  achievement  unsurpassed  in  the  annals 
of  naval  defensive  warfare.  It  may  be  added  that  his 
accomplishment  is  the  measure  of  his  adversary's  deficiencies. 
Howe's  squadron  had  been  constituted  in  1776  with  ref- 
erence to  the  colonial  struggle  only,  and  to  shallow  water, 
and  therefore  was  composed,  very  properly,  of  cruisers,  and 
of  ships  of  the  line  of  the  smaller  classes ;  there  being  several 
fifties,  and  nothing  larger  than  a  sixty-four.  When  war  with 
France  threatened,  the  Ministry,  having  long  warning,  com- 
mitted an  unpardonable  fault  in  allowing  such  a  force  to  be 
confronted  by  one  so  superior  as  that  which  sailed  from 
Toulon,  in  April,  1778.  This  should  have  been  stopped  on 
its  way,  or,  failing  that,  its  arrival  in  America  should  have 
been  preceded  by  a  British  reinforcement.  As  it  was,  the 
government  was  saved  from  a  tremendous  disaster  only  by 
the  efficiency  of  its  Admiral  and  the  inefficiency  of  his  antag- 
onist. As  is  not  too  uncommon,  gratitude  was  swamped 
by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  from  the  national  wrath, 
excited  by  this,  and  by  other  simultaneous  evidences  of 
neglect.  An  attempt  was  made  to  disparage  Howe's  con- 
duct, and  to  prove  that  his  force  was  even  superior  to  that  of 
the  French,  by  adding  together  the  guns  in  all  his  ships,  dis- 
regarding their  classes,  or  by  combining  groups  of  his  small 


80     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

vessels  against  d'Estaing's  larger  units.  The  instrument 
of  the  attack  was  a  naval  officer,  of  some  rank  but  slender 
professional  credit,  who  at  this  most  opportune  moment 
underwent  a  political  conversion,  which  earned  him  em- 
ployment on  the  one  hand,  and  the  charge  of  apostasy  on 
the  other.  For  this  kind  of  professional  arithmetic,  Howe 
felt  and  expressed  just  and  utter  contempt.  Two  and  two 
make  four  in  a  primer,  but  in  the  field  they  may  make  three, 
or  they  may  make  five.  Not  to  speak  of  the  greater  de- 
fensive power  of  heavy  ships,  nor  of  the  concentration  of 
their  fire,  the  unity  of  direction  under  one  captain  possesses 
here  also  that  importance  which  has  caused  unity  of  com- 
mand and  of  effort  to  be  recognised  as  the  prime  element  in 
military  efficiency,  from  the  greatest  things  to  the  smallest. 
Taken  together,  the  three  elements — greater  defensive  power, 
concentration  of  fire,  and  unity  of  direction  —  constitute  a 
decisive  and  permanent  argument  in  favor  of  big  ships,  in 
Howe's  days  as  in  our  own.  Doubtless,  now,  as  then,  there 
is  a  limit ;  most  arguments  can  be  pushed  to  an  absurdum, 
intellectual  or  practical.  To  draw  a  line  is  always  hard; 
but,  if  we  cannot  tell  just  where  the  line  has  been  passed  we 
can  recognise  that  one  ship  is  much  too  big,  while  another 
certainly  is  not.  Between  the  two  an  approximation  to  an 
exact  result  can  be  made. 

On  his  return  to  New  York  on  September  11th,  Howe 
found  there  Rear- Admiral  Hyde  Parker  ^  with  six  ships  of  the 
line  of  Byron's  squadron.  Considering  his  task  now  ac- 
complished, Howe  decided  to  return  to  England,  in  virtue  of 
a  permission  granted  some  time  before  at  his  own  request. 
The  duty  against  the  Americans,  lately  his  fellow-country- 

^  Later  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  Bart.,  who  perished  in  the 
Cato  in  1783.  He  was  father  of  that  Admiral  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  who 
in  1801  was  Nelson's  commander-in-chief  at  Copenhagen,  and  who  in 
1778  commanded  the  Phoenix,  44,  in  Howe's  fleet.    {Ante,  pp.  39, 46.) 


WAH   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  81 

men,  had  been  always  distasteful  to  him,  although  he  did 
not  absolutely  refuse  to  undertake  it,  as  did  Admiral  Keppel. 
The  entrance  of  France  into  the  quarrel,  and  the  coming  of 
d'Estaing,  refreshed  the  spirits  of  the  veteran,  who  moreover 
scorned  to  abandon  his  command  in  the  face  of  such  odds. 
Now,  with  the  British  positions  secure,  and  superiority  of 
force  insured  for  the  time  being,  he  gladly  turned  over  his 
charge  and  sailed  for  home ;  burning  against  the  Admiralty 
with  a  wrath  common  to  most  of  the  distinguished  seamen 
of  that  war.  He  was  not  employed  afloat  again  until  a 
change  of  Ministry  took  place,  in  1782. 


82     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  NAVAL  WAR  IN  EUROPE.  THE  BATTLE  OF 

USHANT 

1778 

DURING  the  same  two  months  that  saw  the 
contest  between  d'Estaing  and  Howe  in  America 
the  only  encounter  between  nearly  equal  fleets 
in  1778  took  place  in  European  waters.  Ad- 
miral Keppel,  having  returned  to  Spithead  after  the  affair 
between  the  Belle  Poule  and  the  Areihusa,^  again  put  to  sea 
on  the  9th  of  July,  with  a  force  increased  to  thirty  ships 
of  the  line.  He  had  been  mortified  by  the  necessity  of  avoid- 
ing action,  and  of  even  retiring  into  port,  with  the  inade- 
quate numbers  before  under  his  command,  and  his  mind  was 
fixed  now  to  compel  an  engagement,  if  he  met  the  French. 

The  Brest  fleet  also  put  to  sea,  the  day  before  Keppel, 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  the  Comte  d'Orvilliers.  It 
contained  thirty-two  ships  of  the  line.  Of  these,  three  — 
a  64,  a  60,  and  a  50  —  w^ere  not  considered  fit  for  the 
line  of  battle,  which  was  thus  reduced  to  twenty-nine  sail, 
carrying  2098  guns.  To  these  the  British  opposed  an  aggre- 
gate of  2278;  but  comparison  by  this  means  only  is  very 
rough.  Not  only  the  sizes  of  the  guns,  but  the  classes  and 
weight  of  the  vessels  need  to  be  considered.  In  the  particu- 
lar instance  the  matter  is  of  little  importance;  the  action 
being  indecisive,  and  credit  depending  upon  manoeuvres 
rather  than  upon  fighting. 

1  Ante,  pp.  61,  62. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  83 

The  French  admiral  was  hampered  by  vacillating  instruc- 
tions, reflections  of  the  unstable  impulses  which  swayed  the 
Ministry.  Whatever  his  personal  wishes,  he  felt  that  he 
was  expected  to  avoid  action,  unless  under  very  favourable 
circumstances.  At  the  moment  of  sailing  he  wrote  :  "  Since 
you  leave  me  free  to  continue  my  cruise,  I  will  not  bring  the 
fleet  back  to  Brest,  unless  by  positive  orders,  until  I  have 
fulfilled  the  month  at  sea  mentioned  in  my  instructions,  and 
known  to  all  the  captains.  Till  then  I  will  not  fly  before 
Admiral  Keppel,  whatever  his  strength ;  only,  if  I  know  him 
to  be  too  superior,  I  will  avoid  a  disproportionate  action  as 
well  as  I  can ;  but  if  the  enemy  really  seeks  to  force  it,  it  will 
be  very  hard  to  shun."  These  words  explain  his  conduct 
through  the  next  few  days. 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  23d  the  two  fleets  sighted  each 
other,  about  a  hundred  miles  west  of  Ushant,  the  French 
being  then  to  leeward.  Towards  sunset,  they  were  stand- 
ing south-west,  with  the  wind  at  west-north-west,  and  bore 
north-east  from  the  enemy,  who  were  lying-to,  heads  to  the 
northward.  The  British  remaining  nearly  motionless 
throughout  the  night,  and  the  wind  shifting,  d'Orvilliers 
availed  himself  of  the  conditions  to  press  to  windward,  and 
in  the  morning  was  found  to  bear  north-west  from  his  oppo- 
nent.^ Their  relative  positions  satisfied  both  admirals  for 
the  moment;  for  Keppel  found  himself  interposed  between 
Brest  and  the  French,  while  d'Orvilliers,  though  surrender- 
ing the  advantage  of  open  retreat  to  his  port,  had  made  it 
possible,  by  getting  the  weather-gage,  to  fulfil  his  promise  to 
keep  the  sea  and  yet  to  avoid  action.  Two  of  his  ships, 
how^ever,  the  Due  de  Bourgogne,  80,  and  a  74,  were  still 
to  leeward,  not  only  of  their  own  main  body,  but  also  of 
the  British.     Keppel  sent  chasers  after  them,  for  the  ex- 

1  Testimony  of  Captains  Hood,  Robinson,  and  Macbride,  and  of 
Rear-Admiral  Campbell ,  captain  of  the  fleet  to  Keppel. 


84     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

pressed  purpose  of  compelling  d'Orvilliers  to  action  in  their 
support/  and  it  was  believed  by  the  British  that  they  were 
forced  to  return  to  Brest,  to  avoid  being  cut  off.  They 
certainly  quitted  their  fleet,  which  was  thus  reduced  to 
twenty-seven  effective  sail.  From  this  time  until  July  27th 
the  wind  continued  to  the  westward,  and  the  wariness  of  the 
French  admiral  baffled  all  his  antagonist's  efforts  to  get 
within  range.  Keppel,  having  no  doubts  as  to  what  was 
expected  of  him,  pursued  vigorously,  watching  his  chance. 
On  the  morning  of  July  27th  the  two  fleets  (Fig  1,  AA, 
AA),  were  from  six  to  ten  miles  apart,  wind  south-west,  both 
on  the  port  tack,^  steering  north-west;  the  French  dead  to 
windward,  in  line  ahead.  The  British  were  in  bow-and- 
quarter  line.  In  this  formation,  when  exact,  the  ships  of 
a  fleet  were  nearly  abreast  each  other ;  so  ranged,  however, 
that  if  they  tacked  all  at  the  same  time  they  would  be  at 
once  in  line  of  battle  ahead  close  to  the  wind,  —  the  fight- 
ing order.^  Both  fleets  were  irregularly  formed,  the 
British  especially  so ;  for  Keppel  rightly  considered  that  he 
would  not  accomplish  his  purpose,  if  he  were  pedantic  con- 
cerning the  order  of  his  going.  He  had  therefore  signalled  a 
"General  Chase,"  which,  by  permitting  much  individual 
freedom  of  movement,  facilitated  the  progress  of  the  whole 
body.  At  daylight,  the  division  commanded  by  Sir  Hugh 
Palliser  —  the  right  wing,  as  then  heading  —  had  dropped 
astern  (R) ;  and  at  5.30  a.m.  the  signal  was  made  to  seven  of 
its  fastest  sailers  to  chase  to  windward,  to  get  farther  to  wind- 
ward by  pressing  sail,  the  object  being  so  to  place  them 


1  See  note  on  preceding  page. 

2  A  vessel  is  said  to  be  on  the  port  tack  when  she  has  the  wind 
blowing  on  her  port,  or  left  side ;  on  the  starboard  tack,  when  the 
wind  is  on  the  right  side.  Thus  with  an  east  wind,  if  she  head  north, 
she  is  on  the  starboard  tack ;  if  south,  on  the  port. 

^  See  also  note  ;  post,  p.  200. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  85 

relatively  to  the  main  body,  as  to  support  the  latter,  if  an 
opportunity  for  action  should  offer. 

At  9  A.M.  the  French  admiral,  wishing  to  approach  the 
enemy  and  to  see  more  clearly,  ordered  his  fleet  to  wear  in 
succession,  —  to  countermarch.  As  the  van  ships  went 
round  (b)  under  this  signal,  they  had  to  steer  off  the  wind 
(be),  parallel  to  their  former  line,  on  which  those  following 
them  still  were,  until  they  reached  the  point  to  which  the 
rear  ship  meantime  had  advanced  (c),  when  they  could  again 
haul  to  the  wind.  This  caused  a  loss  of  ground  to  leeward, 
but  not  more  than  d'Orvilliers  could  afford,  as  things  stood. 
Just  after  he  had  fairly  committed  himself  to  the  manoeuvre, 
the  wind  hauled  to  the  southward  two  points,^  from  south-west 
to  south-south-west,  which  favoured  the  British,  allowing 
them  to  head  more  nearly  towards  the  enemy  (BB ) .  The  shift 
also  threw  the  bows  of  the  French  off  the  line  they  were 
following,  deranging  their  order.  Keppel  therefore  continued 
on  the  port  tack,  until  all  the  French  (BB),  were  on  the  star- 
board, and  at  10.15,  being  nearly  in  their  wake,  he  ordered 
his  own  ships  to  tack  together  (dd) ,  which  would  bring  them 
into  line  ahead  on  the  same  tack  as  the  French;  that  is, 
having  the  wind  on  the  same  side.  This  put  the  British  in 
column,^  still  to  leeward,  but  nearly  astern  of  the  enemy 
and  following  (CC).  At  this  moment  a  thick  rain-squall 
came  up,  concealing  the  fleets  one  from  another  for  three 
quarters  of  an  hour.  With  the  squall  the  wind  shifted  back 
to  southwest,  favouring  the  British  on  this  tack,  as  it  had  on 
the  other,  and  enabling  them  to  lay  up  for  the  enemy's  rear 
after  which  (French  BB)  they  were  standing  and  could  now 
bring  to  action.  When  the  weather  cleared,  at  1 1,  the  French 
were  seen  to  have  gone  about  again,  all  the  ships  together,  and 

1  Twenty-two  degrees. 

2  Column  and  line  ahead  are  equivalent  terms,  each  ship  steering 
in  the  wake  of  its  next  ahead. 


86     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

were  still  in  the  confusion  of  a  partly  executed  manoeuvre  (CC) . 
Their  admiral  had  doubtless  recognised,  from  the  change  of 
wind,  and  from  the  direction  of  the  enemy  when  last  visible, 
that  an  encounter  could  not  be  avoided.  If  he  continued 
on  the  starboard  tack,  the  van  of  the  pursuing  enemy, 
whose  resolve  to  force  battle  could  not  be  misunderstood, 
would  overtake  his  rear  ships,  engaging  as  many  of  them  as 
he  might  choose.  By  resuming  the  port  tack,  the  heads  of  the 
columns  would  meet,  and  the  fleets  pass  in  opposite  direc- 
tions, on  equal  terms  as  regarded  position;  because  all  the 
French  would  engage,  and  not  only  a  part  of  their  rear. 
Therefore  he  had  ordered  his  ships  to  go  about,  all  at  the 
same  time ;  thus  forming  column  again  rapidly,  but  reversing 
the  order  so  that  the  rear  became  the  van. 

Keppel  so  far  had  made  no  signal  for  the  line  of  battle,  nor 
did  he  now.  Recognising  from  the  four  days'  chase  that 
his  enemy  was  avoiding  action,  he  judged  correctly  that  he 
should  force  it,  even  at  some  risk.  It  was  not  the  time  for 
a  drill-master,  nor  a  parade.  Besides,  thanks  to  the  morning 
signal  for  the  leewardly  ships  to  chase,  these,  forming  the 
rear  of  the  disorderly  column  in  which  he  was  advancing, 
were  now  well  to  windward,  able  therefore  to  support  their 
comrades,  if  needful,  as  well  as  to  attack  the  enemy.  In 
short,  practically  the  whole  force  was  coming  into  action, 
although  much  less  regularly  than  might  have  been  desired. 
What  was  to  follow  was  a  rough-and-ready  fight,  but  it  was 
all  that  could  be  had,  and  better  than  nothing.  Keppel 
therefore  simply  made  the  signal  for  battle,  and  that  just 
as  the  firing  began.  The  collision  was  so  sudden  that  the 
ships  at  first  had  not  their  colours  flying. 

The  French  also,  although  their  manoeuvres  had  been  more 
methodical,  were  in  some  confusion.  It  is  not  given  to  a 
body  of  thirty  ships,  of  varying  qualities,  to  attain  per- 
fection of  movement  in  a  fortnight  of  sea  practice.     The 


x^ 

^;^' 

f\ 

/\ 

k/ 

\J 

^A^ 

^i>. 

aintja  aqi 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  87 

change  of  wind  had  precipitated  an  action,  which  one  admiral 
had  been  seeking,  and  the  other  shunning ;  but  each  had  to 
meet  it  with  such  shift  as  he  could.  The  British  (CC)  being 
close-hauled,  the  French  (CC),  advancing  on  a  parallel  line, 
were  four  points ^  off  the  wind.  Most  of  their  ships,  therefore, 
could  have  gone  clear  to  windward  of  their  opponents, 
but  the  fact  that  the  latter  could  reach  some  of  the  leaders 
compelled  the  others  to  support  them.  As  d'Orvilliers  had 
said,  it  was  hard  to  avoid  an  enemy  resolute  to  fight.  The 
leading  three  French  vessels  ^  (e)  hauled  their  wind,  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  admiral's  signal  to  form  the  line  of  battle,  which 
means  a  close-hauled  line.  The  effect  of  this  was  to  draw 
them  gradually  away  from  the  hostile  line,  taking  them  out 
of  range  of  the  British  centre  and  rear.  This,  if  imitated 
by  their  followers,  would  render  the  affair  even  more  partial 
and  indecisive  than  such  passing  by  usually  was.  The 
fourth  French  ship  began  the  action,  opening  fire  soon  after 
eleven.  The  vessels  of  the  opposing  fleets  surged  by  under 
short  canvas,  (D), firing  as  opportunity  offered,  but  necessarily 
much  handicapped  by  smoke,  which  prevented  the  clear 
sight  of  an  enemy,  and  caused  anxiety  lest  an  unseen  friend 
might  receive  a  broadside.  "The  distance  between  the 
Formidable,  90,  (Pallis.er's  flagship)  and  the  Egmont,  74,  was 
so  short,"  testified  Captain  John  Laforey,  whose  three-decker, 
the  Ocean,  90,  was  abreast  and  outside  this  interval,  "that 
it  w^as  with  difficulty  I  could  keep  betwixt  them  to  engage, 
without  firing  upon  them,  and  I  was  once  very  near  on  board 
the  Egmont,"  —  next  ahead  of  the  Ocean.  The  Formidable 
kept  her  mizzen  topsail  aback  much  of  the  time,  to  deaden 

1  Forty-five  degrees. 

2  Chevalier  says,  p.  89,  "The  English  passed  out  of  range"  of 
these  ships.  As  these  ships  had  the  wind,  they  had  the  choice  of 
range,  barring  signals  from  their  own  admiral.  In  truth,  they  were 
obeying  his  order. 


88       MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

her  way,  to  make  the  needed  room  ahead  for  the  Ocean,  and 
also  to  allow  the  rear  ships  to  close.  "  At  a  quarter  past  one," 
testified  Captain  Maitland  of  the  Elizabeth,  74,  "we  were 
very  close  behind  the  Formidable,  and  a  midshipman  upon 
the  poop  called  out  that  there  was  a  ship  coming  on  board 
on  the  weatherbow.  I  put  the  helm  up,  .  .  .  and  found, 
when  the  smoke  cleared  away,  I  was  shot  up  under  the  For- 
midable's  lee.  She  was  then  engaged  with  the  tw^o  last  ships 
in  the  French  fleet,  and,  as  I  could  not  fire  at  them  without 
firing  through  the  Formidable,  I  was  obliged  to  shoot  on."  ^ 
Captain  Bazely,  of  the  Formidable,  says  of  the  same  incident, 
"The  Formidable  did  at  the  time  of  action  bear  up  to  one  of 
the  enemy's  ships,  to  avoid  being  aboard  of  her,  whose  jib 
boom  nearly  touched  the  main  topsail  weather  leech  of  the 
Formidable.  I  thought  we  could  not  avoid  being  on  board." 
Contrary  to  the  usual  result,  the  loss  of  the  rear  division, 
in  killed  and  wounded,  was  heaviest,  nearly  equalling  the 
aggregate  of  the  two  others.^  This  was  due  to  the  morning 
signal  to  chase  to  windward,  which  brought  these  ships 
closer  than  their  leaders.  As  soon  as  the  British  van,  ten 
ships,  had  passed  the  French  rear,  its  commander,  Vice- 
Admiral  Sir  Robert  Harland,  anticipating  Keppel's  wishes, 
signalled  it  to  go  about  and  follow  the  enemy  (Fig.  2,  V). 
As  the  French  column  w^as  running  free,  these  ships,  when 
about,  fetched  to  windward  of  its  wake.  When  the  Victory 
drew  out  of  the  fire,  at  1  p.m.,  Keppel  also  made  a  similar 
signal,  and  attempted  to  wear  (c),  the  injuries  to  his  rigging 
not  permitting  tacking ;  but  caution  was  needed  in  manoeu- 
vring across  the  bows  of  the  following  ships,  and  it  was  not 

1  This  evidence  of  the  captains  of  the  Ocean  and  the  Elizabeth 
contradicts  Palliser's  charge  that  his  ship  was  not  adequately- 
supported. 

2  It  was  actually  quite  equal,  but  this  was  due  to  an  accidental 
explosion  on  board  the  Formidable. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  89 

till  2  P.M.,  that  the  Victory  was  about  on  the  other  tack 
(Fig.  2,  C),  heading  after  the  French.  At  this  time,  2  p.m., 
just  before  or  just  after  wearing,  the  signal  for  battle  was 
hauled  down,  and  that  for  the  line  of  battle  was  hoisted. 
The  object  of  the  latter  was  to  re-form  the  order,  and  the 
first  was  discontinued,  partly  because  no  longer  needed, 
chiefly  that  it  might  not  seem  to  contradict  the  urgent  call 
for  a  re-formation. 

At  this  time  six  or  seven  of  Harland's  division  were  on  the 
weather  bow  of  the  Victory,  to  windward  (westward),  but 
a  little  ahead,  and  standing  like  her  after  the  French;  all 
on  the  port  tack  (Fig.  2).  None  of  the  centre  division  suc- 
ceeded in  joining  the  flagship  at  once.  At  2.30  Palliser's 
ship,  the  Formidable  (R),  on  the  starboard  tack,  passed  the 
Victory  to  leeward,  apparently  the  last  of  the  fleet  out  of 
action.  A  half-hour  after  this  the  Victory  had  been  joined 
by  three  of  the  centre,  which  were  following  her  in  close 
order,  the  van  remaining  in  the  same  relative  position. 
Astern  of  these  two  groups  from  van  and  centre  were  a 
number  of  other  ships  in  various  degrees  of  confusion,  — 
some  going  about,  some  trying  to  come  up,  others  completely 
disabled.  Especially,  there  was  in  the  south-south-east, 
therefore  well  to  leeward,  a  cluster  of  four  or  five  British 
vessels,  evidently  temporarily  incapable  of  manoeuvring. 

This  was  the  situation  which  met  the  eye  of  the  French 
admiral,  scanning  the  field  as  the  smoke  drove  away.  The 
disorder  of  the  British,  which  originated  in  the  general  chase, 
had  increased  through  the  hurry  of  the  manoeuvres  succeeding 
the  squall,  and  culminated  in  the  conditions  just  described. 
It  was  an  inevitable  result  of  a  military  exigency  confronted 
by  a  fleet  only  recently  equipped.  The  French,  starting  from 
a  better  formation,  had  come  out  in  better  shape.  But,  after 
all,  it  seems  difficult  wholly  to  remedy  the  disadvantage  of 
a  poHcy  essentially  defensive ;  and  d'OrvilHers'  next  order, 


90     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

though  well  conceived,  was  resultless.  At  1  p.m.^  he  signalled 
his  fleet  to  wear  in  succession,  and  form  the  line  of  battle  on 
the  starboard  tack  (Fig.  2,  F).  This  signal  was  not  seen  by 
the  leading  ship,  which  should  have  begun  the  movement. 
The  junior  French  admiral,  in  the  fourth  ship  from  the  van, 
at  length  went  about,  and  spoke  the  flagship,  to  know  what 
was  the  Commander-in-Chief's  desire.  D'Orvilliers  explained 
that  he  wished  to  pass  along  the  enemy's  fleet  from  end  to 
end,  to  leeward,  because  in  its  disordered  state  there  was  a 
fair  promise  of  advantage,  and  by  going  to  leeward  —  pre- 
senting his  weather  side  to  the  enemy  —  he  could  use  the 
w^eather  lower-deck  guns,  whereas,  in  the  then  state  of  the 
sea,  the  lee  lower  ports  could  not  be  opened.  Thus  explained, 
the  movement  was  executed,  but  the  favourable  moment 
had  passed.  It  was  not  till  2.30  that  the  manoeuvre  was 
evident  to  the  British. 

As  soon  as  Keppel  recognised  his  opponent's  intention,  he 
wore  the  Victory  again,  (d) ,  a  few  minutes  after  3  p.m.,  and  stood 
slowly  down,  on  the  starboard  tack  off  the  wind,  towards  his 
crippled  ships  in  the  south-south-east,  keeping  aloft  the  signal 
for  the  line  of  battle,  which  commanded  every  manageable 
ship  to  get  to  her  station  (Fig.  3,  C).  As  this  deliberate 
movement  was  away  from  the  enemy,  (F) ,  Palliser  tried  after- 
wards to  fix  upon  it  the  stigma  of  flight,  —  a  preposterous 
extravagancy.  Harland  put  his  division  about  at  once  and 
joined  the  Admiral.  On  this  tack  his  station  was  ahead  of 
the  Victory,  but  in  consequence  of  a  message  from  Keppel 
he  fell  in  behind  her,  to  cover  the  rear  until  Palliser' s  division 
could  repair  damage  and  take  their  places.  At  4  p.m.  Har- 
land's  division  was  in  the  line.  Palliser's  ships,  as  they  com- 
pleted refitting,  ranged  themselves  before  or  behind  his  flag- 
ship ;  their  captains  considering,  as  they  testified,  that  they  took 

1  Chevalier.  Probably  later  by  the  other  times  used  in  this 
account. 


Battle  of  Ushant 

4 

27th  July,  1778.  2.30  P.M. 

•A. 

Fk;.2. 

■4% 

French  o  wearing  in  succession                        '^)^                           <p^       ^ 
after  the  Action.                                        r^X                            0           0 
British  ••  forming  for  pursuit.                              -^^                   <7<^           Oy 
V   Harland's  Flagship  and  Division                                                ^          « 

(Van.  in  Action)                                                    <?    C 
C  Keppel's  Flagship  with  track  before                      ^        a   ^          ^ 

and  after          ^              ^       "^         ^       a                 0 
R   PalUser's  Flagship            ^                   "^   «=>     o       c^                   n 

'  0,- 

-'^'     / 

'^^ 

^         Disabled 
«#'   British 
X,     Ships 

Battle  of  Ushant 

27th  July,  1778.  6.0  P.M. 

-r- 

c 

0 

Fig. 3. 

0 

French  o  forming  line  of  Battle  to 

Leeward  of  British. 
British  m.  forming  line  to  Windward 
V    Harland's  Division  passing  froui 

Rear  to  its  Station  in  the  Vaji. 
C    Centre  formed  or  forming 
R   Rear  to  Windward  Inactive 

0 
0^ 

0 

p 
o 

0 

0 

%     .--'''■ 

y 
,,---''' 

^^ 

«      0  Disabled            'y%^^ 
-m  _      British                        '       "-' 
0  f       Ships 

WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  91 

station  from  their  divisional  commander,  and  not  from  the 
ship  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  There  was  formed  thus, 
on  the  weather  quarter  of  the  Victory,  and  a  mile  or  two  dis- 
tant, a  separate  line  of  ships,  constituting  on  this  tack  the 
proper  rear  of  the  fleet,  and  dependent  for  initiative  on 
PalHser's  flagship  (Fig.  3,  R).  At  5  p.m.  Keppel  sent  word 
by  a  frigate  to  Palliser  to  hasten  into  the  line,  as  he  was  only 
waiting  for  him  to  renew  the  action,  the  French  now  having 
completed  their  manoeuvre.  They  had  not  attacked,  as 
they  might  have  done,  but  had  drawn  up  under  the  lee  of 
the  British,  their  van  abreast  the  latter's  centre.  At  the 
same  time  Harland  was  directed  to  move  to  his  proper  posi- 
tion in  the  van,  which  he  at  once  did  (Fig.  3,  V).  Palliser 
made  no  movement,  and  Keppel  with  extraordinary  —  if 
not  culpable  —  forbearance  refrained  from  summoning  the 
rear  ships  into  line  by  their  individual  pennants.  This  he 
at  last  did  about  7  p.m.,  signalling  specifically  to  each  of  the 
vessels  then  grouped  with  Palliser,  (except  his  own  flagship), 
to  leave  the  latter  and  take  their  posts  in  the  line.  This 
was  accordingly  done,  but  it  was  thought  then  to  be  too  late 
to  renew  the  action.  At  daylight  the  next  morning,  only 
three  French  ships  were  in  sight  from  the  decks;  but  the 
main  body  could  be  seen  in  the  south-east  from  some  of  the 
mastheads,  and  was  thought  to  be  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
miles  distant. 

Though  absolutely  indecisive,  this  was  a  pretty  smart 
skirmish ;  the  British  loss  being  133  killed  and  373  wounded, 
that  of  the  French  161  killed  and  513  wounded.  The  general 
result  would  appear  to  indicate  that  the  French,  in  accord- 
ance with  their  usual  policy,  had  fired  to  cripple  their  enemy's 
spars  and  rigging,  the  motive-power.  This  would  be  con- 
sistent with  d'Orvilliers'  avowed  purpose  of  avoiding  action 
except  under  favourable  circumstances.  As  the  smoke 
thickened  and  confusion  increased,  the  fleets  had  got  closer 


92      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

together,  and,  whatever  the  intention,  many  shot  found  their 
way  to  the  British  hulls.  Nevertheless,  as  the  returns  show, 
the  number  of  men  hit  among  the  French  was  to  the  British 
nearly  as  7  to  5.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that  the 
manoeuvring  power  of  the  French  after  the  action  was  greater 
than  that  of  the  British. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  advantage.  This  was  simply  a 
point  of  honour,  or  of  credit,  for  material  advantage  accrued 
to  neither.  Keppel  had  succeeded  in  forcing  d'Orvilliers 
to  action  against  his  will;  d'Orvilliers,  by  a  well-judged 
evolution,  had  retained  a  superiority  of  manoeuvring  power 
after  the  engagement.  Had  his  next  signal  been  promptly 
obeyed,  he  might  have  passed  again  by  the  British  fleet,  in 
fairly  good  order,  before  it  re-formed,  and  concentrated  his 
fire  on  the  more  leewardly  of  its  vessels.  Even  under  the 
delay,  it  was  distinctly  in  his  power  to  renew  the  fight; 
and  that  he  did  not  do  so  forfeits  all  claim  to  victory.  Not 
to  speak  of  the  better  condition  of  the  French  ships,  Keppel, 
by  running  off  the  wind,  had  given  his  opponent  full  oppor- 
tunity to  reach  his  fleet  and  to  attack.  Instead  of  so  doing, 
d'Orvilliers  drew  up  under  the  British  lee,  out  of  range,  and 
offered  battle ;  a  gallant  defiance,  but  to  a  crippled  foe. 

Time  was  thus  given  to  the  British  to  refit  their  ships 
sufficiently  to  bear  down  again.  This  the  French  admiral 
should  not  have  permitted.  He  should  have  attacked 
promptly,  or  else  have  retreated;  to  windward,  or  to  lee- 
ward, as  seemed  most  expedient.  Under  the  conditions,  it 
was  not  good  generalship  to  give  the  enemy  time,  and  to 
await  his  pleasure.  Keppel,  on  the  other  hand,  being  granted 
this  chance,  should  have  renewed  the  fight ;  and  here  arose 
the  controversy  which  set  all  England  by  the  ears,  and  may 
be  said  to  have  immortalised  this  otherwise  trivial  incident. 
Palliser's  division  was  to  windward  from  4  to  7  p.m.,  while 
the  signals  w^ere  flying  to  form  line  of  battle,  and  to  bear 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  93 

down  in  the  Admiral's  wake ;  and  Keppel  alleged  that,  had 
these  been  obeyed  by  6  p.m.,  he  would  have  renewed  the  battle, 
having  still  over  two  hours  of  daylight.  It  has  been  stated 
already  that,  besides  the  signals,  a  frigate  brought  Palliser 
word  that  the  Admiral  was  waiting  only  for  him. 

The  immediate  dispute  is  of  slight  present  interest,  except 
as  an  historical  link  in  the  fighting  development  of  the  British 
Navy;  and  only  this  historical  significance  justifies  more 
than  a  passing  mention.  In  1778  men's  minds  were  still 
full  of  Byng's  execution  in  1757,  and  of  the  Mathews  and 
Lestock  affair  in  1744,  which  had  materially  influenced 
Byng  in  his  action  off  Minorca.  Keppel  repeatedly  spoke 
of  himself  as  on  trial  for  his  life ;  and  he  had  been  a  member 
of  Byng's  court-martial.  The  gist  of  the  charges  against 
him,  preferred  by  Palliser,  was  that  he  attacked  in  the  first 
instance  without  properly  forming  his  line,  for  which  Mathews 
had  been  censured ;  and,  secondly,  that  by  not  renewing 
the  action  after  the  first  pass-by,  and  by  wearing  away  from 
the  French  fleet,  he  had  not  done  his  utmost  to  "take,  sink, 
burn,  and  destroy."  This  had  been  the  charge  on  which 
Byng  was  shot.  Keppel,  besides  his  justifying  reasons  for 
his  course  in  general,  alleged  and  proved  his  full  intention  to 
attack  again,  had  not  Palliser  failed  to  come  into  line,  a 
delinquency  the  same  as  that  of  Lestock,  which  contributed 
to  Mathew's  ruin. 

In  other  words,  men's  minds  were  breaking  away  from, 
but  had  not  thrown  off  completely,  the  tyranny  of  the  Order 
of  Battle,  —  one  of  the  worst  of  tyrannies,  because  founded 
on  truth.  Absolute  error,  like  a  whole  lie,  is  open  to  speedy 
detection ;  half-truths  are  troublesome.  The  Order  of  Bat- 
tle ^  was  an  admirable  servant  and  a  most  objectionable 

1  The  Order  of  Battle  was  constituted  by  the  ships  "of  the  line" 
ranging  themselves  one  behind  the  other  in  a  prescribed  succession ; 
the  position  of  each  and  the  intervals  between  being  taken  from  the 


94      MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

despot.  Mathews,  in  despair  over  a  recalcitrant  second, 
cast  off  the  yoke,  engaged  with  part  of  his  force,  was  ill  sup- 
ported and  censured ;  Lestock  escaping.  Byng,  considering 
this,  and  being  a  pedant  by  nature,  would  not  break  his 
line ;  the  enemy  slipped  away,  Minorca  surrendered,  and  he 
was  shot.  In  Keppel's  court-martial,  twenty-eight  out  of 
the  thirty  captains  who  had  been  in  the  line  were  summoned 
as  witnesses.  Most  of  them  swore  that  if  Keppel  had  chased 
in  line  of  battle  that  day,  there  could  have  been  no  action, 
and  the  majority  of  them  cordially  approved  his  course ; 
but  there  was  evidently  an  undercurrent  still  of  dissent,  and 
especially  in  the  rear  ships,  where  there  had  been  some  of  the 
straggling  inevitable  in  such  movements.  Their  commanders 
therefore  had  uncomfortable  experience  of  the  lack  of  mutual 
support,  which  the  line  of  battle  was  meant  to  insure. 

Another  indication  of  still  surviving  pedantry  was  the  obli- 
gation felt  in  the  rear  ships  to  take  post  about  their  own 
admiral,  and  to  remain  there  when  the  signals  for  the  line 
of  battle,  and  to  bear  down  in  the  admiral's  wake,  were 
flying.  Thus  Palliser's  own  inaction,  to  whatever  cause  due, 
paralysed  the  six  or  eight  sail  with  him;  but  it  appears  to 
the  writer  that  Keppel  was  seriously  remiss  in  not  summoning 
those  ships  by  their  own  pennants,  as  soon  as  he  began  to 
distrust  the  purposes  of  the  Vice-Admiral,  instead  of  delaying 
doing  so  till  7  p.m.,  as  he  did.  It  is  a  curious  picture  presented 
to  us  by  the  evidence.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  with  his 
staff  and  the  captain  of  the  ship,  fretting  and  fuming  on  the 

ship  next  ahead.  This  made  the  leading  vessel  the  pivot  of  the  order 
and  of  manoeuvring,  unless  specially  otherwise  directed ;  which  in 
an  emergency  could  not  always  be  easily  done.  Strictly,  if  cir- 
cumstances favoured,  the  line  on  which  the  ships  thus  formed  was  one 
of  the  two  close-hauled  lines;  "close-hauled"  meaning  to  bring 
the  vessel's  head  as  "near"  the  direction  of  the  wind  as  possible, 
usually  to  about  70  degrees.  The  advantage  of  the  close-hauled 
line  was  that  the  vessels  were  more  manageable  than  when  "off" 
the  wind. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  95 

Victory's  quarter-deck;  the  signals  flying  which  have  been 
mentioned ;  Harland's  division  getting  into  line  ahead ;  and 
four  points  on  the  weather  quarter,  only  two  miles  distant, 
so  that  "every  gun  and  port  could  be  counted,"  a  group  of 
seven  or  eight  sail,  among  them  the  flag  of  the  third  in  com- 
mand, apparently  indifferent  spectators.  The  Formidable' s 
only  sign  of  disability  was  the  foretopsail  unbent  for  four 
hours,  —  a  delay  which,  being  unexplained,  rather  increased 
than  relieved  suspicion,  rife  then  throughout  the  Navy. 
Palliser  was  a  Tory,  and  had  left  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
to  take  his  command.  Keppel  was  so  strong  a  Whig  that 
he  would  not  serve  against  the  Americans ;  and  he  evidently 
feared  that  he  was  to  be  betrayed  to  his  ruin. 

PalHser's  defence  rested  upon  three  principal  points:  (1), 
that  the  signal  for  the  line  of  battle  was  not  seen  on  board 
the  Formidable ;  (2),  that  the  signal  to  get  into  the  Admiral's 
wake  was  repeated  by  himself;  (3),  that  his  foremast  was 
wounded,  and,  moreover,  found  to  be  in  such  bad  condition 
that  he  feared  to  carry  sail  on  it.  As  regards  the  first,  the 
signal  was  seen  on  board  the  Ocean,  next  astern  of  and  "  not 
far  from"^  the  Formidable;  for  the  second,  the  Admiral 
should  have  been  informed  of  a  disability  by  which  a  single 
ship  was  neutralizing  a  division.  The  frigate  that  brought 
Keppel's  message  could  have  carried  back  this.  Thirdly,  the 
most  damaging  feature  to  Palliser's  case  was  that  he  asserted 
that,  after  coming  out  from  under  fire,  he  wore  at  once 
towards  the  enemy ;  afterwards  he  wore  back  again.  A  ship 
that  thus  wore  twice  before  three  o'clock,  might  have  displayed 
zeal  and  efficiency  enough  to  run  two  miles,  off  the  wind,^ 
at  five,  to  support  a  fight.     Deliberate  treachery  is  impossible. 

1  Evidence  of  Captain  John  Laforey,  of  the  Ocean. 

2  "I  do  not  recollect  how  many  points  I  went  from  the  wind; 
I  must  have  bore  down  a  pretty  large  course."  Testimony  of 
Captain  J.  Laforey,  of  the  Ocean,  on  this  point. 


96     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

To  this  writer  the  Vice-Admirars  behaviour  seems  that  of  a 
man  in  a  sulk,  who  will  do  only  that  which  he  can  find  no 
excuses  for  neglecting.  In  such  cases  of  sailing  close,  men 
generall}^  slip  over  the  line  into  grievous  wrong. 

Keppel  was  cleared  of  all  the  charges  preferred  against 
him;  the  accuser  had  not  thought  best  to  embody  among 
them  the  delay  to  recall  the  ships  which  his  own  example  was 
detaining.  Against  Palliser  no  specific  charge  was  preferred, 
but  the  Admiralty  directed  a  general  inquiry  into  his  course 
on  the  27th  of  July.  The  court  found  his  conduct  "  in  many 
instances  highly  exemplary  and  meritorious,"  —  he  had 
fought  well,  —  "  but  reprehensible  in  not  having  acquainted 
the  Commander-in-Chief  of  his  distress,  which  he  might  have 
done  either  by  the  Fox,  or  other  means  which  he  had  in  his 
power."  Public  opinion  running  strongly  for  Keppel,  his 
acquittal  was  celebrated  with  bonfires  and  illuminations  in 
London ;  the  mob  got  drunk,  smashed  the  windows  of  Palli- 
ser's  friends,  wrecked  Palliser's  own  house,  and  came  near 
to  killing  Palliser  himself.  The  Admiralty,  in  1780,  made  him 
Governor  of  Greenwich  Hospital. 

On  the  28th  of  July,  the  British  and  French  being  no  longer 
in  sight  of  each  other,  Keppel,  considering  his  fleet  too  in- 
jured aloft  to  cruise  near  the  French  coast,  kept  away  for 
Plymouth,  where  he  arrived  on  the  31st.  Before  putting  to 
sea  again,  he  provided  against  a  recurrence  of  the  misde- 
meanor of  the  27th  by  a  general  order,  that  "in  future  the 
Line  is  always  to  be  taken  from  the  Centre."  Had  this  been 
in  force  before,  Palliser's  captains  would  have  taken  station  by 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the  Formidable  would  have  been 
left  to  windward  by  herself.  At  the  same  time  Howe  was 
closing  his  squadron  upon  the  centre  in  America ;  and  Rod- 
ney, two  years  later,  experienced  the  ill-effects  of  distance 
taken  from  the  next  ahead,  when  the  leading  ship  of  a 
fleet  disregarded  an  order. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  97 

Although  privately  censuring  Palliser's  conduct,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief made  no  official  complaint,  and  it  was  not 
until  the  matter  got  into  the  papers,  through  the  talk  of  the 
fleet,  that  the  difficulty  began  which  resulted  in  the  trial  of 
both  officers,  early  in  the  following  year.  After  this,  Keppel, 
being  dissatisfied  with  the  Admiralty's  treatment,  intimated 
his  wish  to  give  up  the  command.  The  order  to  strike  his 
flag  was  dated  March  18th,  1779.  He  was  not  employed 
afloat  again,  but  upon  the  change  of  administration  in  1782 
he  became  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  and  so  remained,  with 
a  brief  intermission,  until  December,  1783. 

It  is  perhaps  necessary  to  mention  that  both  British  and 
French  asserted,  and  assert  to  this  day,  that  the  other  party 
abandoned  the  field. ^  The  point  is  too  trivial,  in  the  author's 
opinion,  to  warrant  further  discussion  of  an  episode  the  his- 
torical interest  of  which  is  very  slight,  though  its  professional 
lessons  are  valuable.  The  British  case  had  the  advantage 
—  through  the  courts-martial  —  of  the  sworn  testimony  of 
twenty  to  thirty  captains,  who  agreed  that  the  British  kept 
on  the  same  tack  under  short  sail  throughout  the  night,  and 
that  in  the  morning  only  three  French  ships  were  visible. 
As  far  as  known  to  the  author,  the  French  contention  rests 
only  on  the  usual  reports. 

1  "During  the  night  (of  the  27th)  Admiral  Keppel  kept  away  (fit 
route)  for  Portsmouth."  Chevalier,  "Marine  Fran§aise,"  p.  90. 
Paris,  1877.  Oddly  enough,  he  adds  that  "on  the  evening  of  the  28th 
the  French  squadron,  carried  eastward  by  the  currents,  sighted 
Ushant." 


98       MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  VI 

OPERATIONS  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES,  1778-1779. 
THE  BRITISH  INVASION  OF  GEORGIA  AND 
SOUTH   CAROLINA 

CONDITIONS  of  season  exerted  great  influence 
upon  the  time  and  place  of  hostilities  during 
the  maritime  war  of  1778;  the  opening  scenes 
of  which,  in  Europe  and  in  North  America, 
have  just  been  narrated.  In  European  seas  it  was  realised 
that  naval  enterprises  by  fleets,  requiring  evolutions  by  masses 
of  large  vessels,  were  possible  only  in  summer.  Winter  gales 
scattered  ships,  impeded  manoeuvres,  and  made  gun-fire 
ineffective.  The  same  consideration  prevailed  to  limit  ac- 
tivity in  North  American  waters  to  the  summer ;  and  comple- 
mentary to  this  was  the  fact  that  in  the  West  Indies  hurri- 
canes of  excessive  violence  occurred  from  July  to  October. 
The  practice  therefore  was  to  transfer  effort  from  one  quarter 
to  the  other  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  according  to  the 
season. 

In  the  recent  treaty  with  the  United  States,  the  King  of 
France  had  formally  renounced  all  claim  to  acquire  for  him- 
self any  part  of  the  American  continent  then  in  possession 
of  Great  Britain.  On  the  other  hand,  he  had  reserved  the 
express  right  to  conquer  any  of  her  islands  south  of  Bermuda. 
The  West  Indies  were  then  the  richest  commercial  region  on 
the  globe  in  the  value  of  their  products ;  and  France  wished 
not  only  to  increase  her  already  large  possessions  there,  but 
also  to  establish  more  solidly  her  political  and  military  tenure. 


ST. THOMAS 


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WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  99 

In  September,  1778,  the  British  Island  of  Dominica  was 
seized  by  an  expedition  from  the  adjacent  French  colony  of 
Martinique.  The  affair  was  a  surprise,  and  possesses  no 
special  military  interest ;  but  it  is  instructive  to  observe  that 
Great  Britain  was  unprepared,  in  the  West  Indies  as  else- 
where, when  the  war  began.  A  change  had  been  made 
shortly  before  in  the  command  of  the  Leeward  Islands  Station, 
as  it  was  called,  which  extended  from  Antigua  southward 
over  the  Lesser  Antilles  with  headquarters  at  Barbados. 
Rear-Admiral  the  Hon.  Samuel  Barrington,  the  new-comer, 
leaving  home  before  war  had  been  declared,  had  orders  not 
to  quit  Barbados  till  further  instructions  should  arrive. 
These  had  not  reached  him  when  he  learned  of  the  loss  of 
Dominica.  The  French  had  received  their  orders  on  the 
17th  of  August.  The  blow  was  intrinsically  somewhat  se- 
rious, so  far  as  the  mere  capture  of  a  position  can  be,  because 
the  fortifications  were  strong,  though  they  had  been  inade- 
quately garrisoned.  It  is  a  mistake  to  build  works  and  not 
man  them,  for  their  fall  transfers  to  the  enemy  strength 
which  he  otherwise  would  need  time  to  create.  To  the 
French  the  conquest  was  useful  beyond  its  commercial  value, 
because  it  closed  a  gap  in  their  possessions.  They  now  held 
four  consecutive  islands,  from  north  to  south,  Guadeloupe, 
Dominica,  Martinique,  and  Santa  Lucia. 

Barrington  had  two  ships  of  the  line :  his  flagship,  the 
Prince  of  Wales,  74,  and  the  Boyne,  70.  If  he  had  been 
cruising,  these  would  probably  have  deterred  the  French. 
Upon  receiving  the  news  he  put  to  sea,  going  as  far  as  Anti- 
gua ;  but  he  did  not  venture  to  stay  away  because  his  expected 
instructions  had  not  come  yet,  and,  like  Keppel,  he  feared  an 
ungenerous  construction  of  his  actions.  He  therefore  re- 
mained in  Barbados,  patiently  watching  for  an  opportunity 
to  act. 

The  departure  of  Howe  and  the  approach  of  winter  de- 


100    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

termined  the  transference  of  British  troops  and  ships  from 
the  continent  to  the  Leeward  Islands.  Reinforcements  had 
given  the  British  fleet  in  America  a  numerical  superiority, 
which  for  the  time  imposed  a  check  upon  d'Estaing;  but 
Byron,  proverbially  unlucky  in  weather,  was  driven  crippled 
to  Newport,  leaving  the  French  free  to  quit  Boston.  The 
difficulty  of  provisioning  so  large  a  force  as  twelve  ships  of 
the  line  at  first  threatened  to  prevent  the  withdrawal,  sup- 
plies being  then  extremely  scarce  in  the  port;  but  at  the 
critical  moment  American  privateers  brought  in  large  num- 
bers of  prizes,  laden  with  provisions  from  Europe  for  the 
British  army.  Thus  d'Estaing  was  enabled  to  sail  for  Mar- 
tinique on  the  4th  of  November.  On  the  same  day  there 
left  New  York  for  Barbados  a  British  squadron,  —  two  64's, 
three  50's,  and  three  smaller  craft,  —  under  the  command 
of  Commodore  William  Hotham,  convoying  five  thousand 
troops  for  service  in  the  West  Indies. 

Being  bound  for  nearly  the  same  point,  the  two  hostile 
bodies  steered  parallel  courses,  each  ignorant  of  the  other's 
nearness.  In  the  latitude  of  Bermuda  both  suffered  from  a 
violent  gale,  but  the  French  most;  the  flagship  Languedoc 
losing  her  main  and  mizzen  topmasts.  On  the  25th  of  No- 
vember one  ^  of  Hotham's  convoy  fell  into  the  hands  of  d'Es- 
taing, who  then  first  learned  of  the  British  sailing.  Doubt- 
ful whether  their  destination  was  Barbados  or  Antigua,  — 
their  two  chief  stations,  —  he  decided  for  the  latter.  Arriv- 
ing off  it  on  the  6th  of  December,  he  cruised  for  forty-eight 
hours,  and  then  bore  away  for  Fort  Royal,  Martinique,  the 
principal  French  depot  in  the  West  Indies,  where  he  anchored 
on  the  9th.  On  the  10th  Hotham  joined  Barrington  at 
Barbados. 

Barrington  knew  already  what  he  wanted  to  do,  and 
therefore  lost  not  a  moment  in  deliberation.     The  troops 

1  The  French  accounts  say  three. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPEND^B'Nvd  5'  '    lOl 

were  kept  on  board,  Hotham's  convoy  arrangements  being 
left  as  they  were.  On  the  morning  of  December  12th  the 
entire  force  sailed  again,  the  main  changes  in  it  being  in  the 
chief  command,  and  in  the  addition  of  Barrington's  two  ships 
of  the  line.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  13th  the  shipping 
anchored  in  the  Grand  Cul  de  Sac,  an  inlet  on  the  west  side 
of  Santa  Lucia,  which  is  seventy  miles  east-north-east  from 
Barbados.  Part  of  the  troops  landed  at  once,  and  seized 
the  batteries  and  heights  on  the  north  side  of  the  bay.  The 
remainder  were  put  on  shore  the  next  morning.  The  French 
forces  were  inadequate  to  defend  their  works;  but  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  they  were  driven  with  unremitting  energy, 
and  that  to  this  promptness  the  British  owed  their  ability 
to  hold  the  position. 

Three  miles  north  of  the  Cul  de  Sac  is  a  bay  then  called 
the  Carenage ;  now  Port  Castries.  At  its  northern  ex- 
tremity is  a  precipitous  promontory.  La  Vigie,  then  fortified, 
upon  the  tenure  of  which  depended  not  only  control  of  that 
anchorage,  but  also  access  to  the  rear  of  the  works  which 
commanded  the  Cul  de  Sac.  If  those  works  fell,  the  British 
squadron  must  abandon  its  position  and  put  to  sea,  where 
d'Estaing's  much  superior  fleet  would  be  in  waiting.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  squadron  were  crushed  at  its  anchors, 
the  troops  were  isolated  and  must  ultimately  capitulate. 
Therefore  La  Vigie  and  the  squadron  were  the  two  keys  to 
the  situation,  and  the  loss  of  either  would  be  decisive. 

By  the  evening  of  the  14th  the  British  held  the  shore  line 
from  La  Vigie  to  the  southern  point  of  the  Cul  de  Sac,  as 
well  as  Morne  Fortune  (Fort  Charlotte),  the  capital  of  the 
island.  The  feeble  French  garrison  retired  to  the  interior, 
leaving  its  guns  unspiked,  and  its  ammunition  and  stores 
untouched,  —  another  instance  of  the  danger  of  works  turn- 
ing to  one's  own  disadvantage.  It  was  Barrington's  purpose 
now  to  remove  the  transports  to  the  Carenage,  as  a  more  com- 


'f{^i''MA^Ok^^'&PERATI0NS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

modious  harbour,  probably  also  better  defended ;  but  he  was 
prevented  by  the  arrival  of  d'Estaing  that  afternoon.  "  Just 
as  all  the  important  stations  were  secured,  the  French  colours 
struck,  and  General  Grant's  headquarters  established  at 
the  Governor's  house,  the  Ariadne  frigate  came  in  sight  with 
the  signal  abroad  for  the  approach  of  an  enemy."  ^  The 
French  fleet  was  seen  soon  afterwards  from  the  heights  above 
the  squadron. 

The  British  had  gained  much  so  far  by  celerity,  but  they 
still  spared  no  time  to  take  breath.  The  night  was  passed 
by  the  soldiers  in  strengthening  their  positions,  and  by  the 
Rear-Admiral  in  rectifying  his  order  to  meet  the  expected 
attack.  The  transports,  between  fifty  and  sixty  in  number, 
were  moved  inside  the  ships  of  war,  and  the  latter  were  most 
carefully  disposed  across  the  mouth  of  the  Cul  de  Sac  bay. 
At  the  northern  (windward)  ^  end  was  placed  the  Isis,  50, 
well  under  the  point  to  prevent  anything  from  passing  round 
her;  but  for  further  security  she  was  supported  by  three 
frigates,  anchored  abreast  of  the  interval  between  her  and 
the  shore.  From  the  I  sis  the  line  extended  to  the  south- 
ward, inclining  slightly  outward;  the  Prince  of  Wales,  74, 
Barrington's  flagship,  taking  the  southern  flank,  as  the  most 
exposed  position.  Between  her  and  the  Isis  were  five  other 
ships,  —  the  Boyne,  70,  Nonsuch,  64,  St.  Albans,  64,  Preston, 
50,  and  Centurion,  50.  The  works  left  by  the  French  at  the 
north  and  south  points  of  the  bay  may  have  been  used  to 
support  the  flanks,  but  Barrington  does  not  say  so  in  his 
report. 

D'Estaing  had  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  and  two  days  after 
this  was  able  to  land  seven  thousand  troops.  With  such  a 
superiority  it  is  evident  that  the  British  would  have  been 

1  Beatson,  *'  Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,"  iv,  390. 

2  Santa  Lucia  being  in  the  region  of  the  north-east  trade  winds, 
north  and  east  are  always  windwardly  relatively  to  south  and  west. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE        103 

stopped  in  the  midst  of  their  operations,  if  he  had  arrived 
twenty-four  hours  sooner.  To  gain  time,  Barrington  had 
sought  to  prevent  intelHgence  reaching  Fort  Royal,  less 
than  fifty  miles  distant,  by  sending  cruisers  in  advance  of  his 
squadron,  to  cover  the  approaches  to  Santa  Lucia ;  but,  de- 
spite his  care,  d'Estaing  had  the  news  on  the  14th.  He 
sailed  at  once,  and,  as  has  been  said,  was  off  Santa  Lucia 
that  evening.  At  daybreak  of  the  15th  he  stood  in  for  the 
Carenage ;  but  when  he  came  within  range,  a  lively  cannon- 
ade told  him  that  the  enemy  was  already  in  possession. 
He  decided  therefore  to  attack  the  squadron  in  the  Cul  de 
Sac,  and  at  1 1 .30  the  French  passed  along  it  from  north  to 
south,  firing,  but  without  effect.  A  second  attempt  was 
made  in  the  afternoon,  directed  upon  the  lee  flank,  but  it 
was  equally  unavailing.  The  British  had  three  men  killed ; 
the  French  loss  is  not  given,  but  is  said  to  have  been  slight. 
It  is  stated  that  that  day  the  sea  breeze  did  not  penetrate 
far  enough  into  the  bay  to  admit  closing.  This  frequently 
happens,  but  it  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  squadron 
was  the  proper  point  of  attack,  and  that,  especially  in  the 
winter  season,  an  opportunity  to  close  must  offer  soon. 
D'Estaing,  governed  probably  by  the  soldierly  bias  he  more 
than  once  betrayed,  decided  now  to  assault  the  works  on 
shore.  Anchoring  in  a  small  bay  north  of  the  Carenage,  he 
landed  seven  thousand  men,  and  on  the  18th  attempted  to 
storm  the  British  lines  at  La  Vigie.  The  neck  of  land  con- 
necting the  promontory  with  the  island  is  very  flat,  and 
the  French  therefore  labored  under  great  disadvantage 
through  the  commanding  position  of  their  enemy.  It  was 
a  repetition  of  Bunker  Hill,  and  of  many  other  ill-judged 
and  precipitate  frontal  attacks.  After  three  gallant  but  in- 
effectual charges,  led  by  d'Estaing  in  person,  the  assail- 
ants retired,  with  the  loss  of  forty-one  officers  and  eight 
hundred  rank  and  file,  killed  and  wounded. 


104     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

D'Estaing  reembarked  his  men,  and  stood  ready  again 
to  attack  Barrington ;  a  frigate  being  stationed  off  the  Cul 
de  Sac,  to  give  notice  when  the  wind  should  serve.  On  the 
24th  she  signalled,  and  the  fleet  weighed;  but  Barrington, 
who  had  taken  a  very  great  risk  for  an  adequate  object, 
took  no  unnecessary  chances  through  presumption.  He  had 
employed  his  respite  to  warp  the  ships  of  war  farther  in,  where 
the  breeze  reached  less  certainly,  and  where  narrower  waters 
gave  better  support  to  the  flanks.  He  had  strengthened  the 
latter  also  by  new  works,  in  which  he  had  placed  heavy  guns 
from  the  ships,  manned  by  seamen.  For  these  or  other 
reasons  d'Estaing  did  not  attack.  On  the  29th  he  quitted 
the  island,  and  on  the  30th  the  French  governor,  the  Cheva- 
lier de  Micoud,  formally  capitulated. 

This  achievement  of  Barrington  and  of  Major-General 
James  Grant,  who  was  associated  with  him,  was  greeted 
at  the  time  with  an  applause  which  will  be  echoed  by  the 
military  judgment  of  a  later  age.  There  is  a  particular 
pleasure  in  finding  the  willingness  to  incur  a  great  risk,  con- 
joined with  a  care  that  chances  nothing  against  which  the 
utmost  diligence  and  skill  can  provide.  The  celerity, 
forethought,  wariness,  and  daring  of  Admiral  Barrington 
have  inscribed  upon  the  records  of  the  British  Navy  a 
success  the  distinction  of  which  should  be  measured,  not 
by  the  largeness  of  the  scale,  but  by  the  perfection  of  the 
workmanship,  and  by  the  energy  of  the  execution  in  face  of 
great  odds. 

Santa  Lucia  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  British  through- 
out the  war.  It  was  an  important  acquisition,  because  at 
its  north-west  extremity  was  a  good  and  defensible  anchor- 
age, Gros  Ilet  Bay,  only  thirty  miles  from  Fort  Royal  in 
Martinique.  In  it  the  British  fleet  could  lie,  when  desirable 
to  close-watch  the  enemy,  yet  not  be  worried  for  the  safety 
of  the  port  when  away ;  for  it  was  but  an  outpost,  not  a 


ADMIRAL,   THE   HONOURABLE   SAMUEL   BARRINGTON. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  105 

base  of  operations,  as  Fort  Royal  was.  It  was  thus  used 
continually,  and  from  it  Rodney  issued  for  his  great  vic- 
tory in  April,  1782. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  1779  no  important  incident 
occurred  in  the  West  Indies.  On  the  6th  of  January,  Vice- 
Admiral  Byron,  with  ten  ships  of  the  line  from  Narragansett 
Bay,  reached  Santa  Lucia,  and  relieved  Barringtonof  the  chief 
command.  Both  the  British  and  the  French  fleets  were 
reinforced  in  the  course  of  the  spring,  but  the  relative  strength 
remained  nearly  as  before,  until  the  27th  of  June,  when  the 
arrival  of  a  division  from  Brest  made  the  French  numbers 
somewhat  superior. 

Shortly  before  this,  Byron  had  been  constrained  by  one  of 
the  commercial  exigencies  which  constantly  embarrassed  the 
military  action  of  British  admirals.  A  large  convoy  of  trad- 
ing ships,  bound  to  England,  was  collecting  at  St.  Kitts,  and 
he  thought  necessary  to  accompany  it  part  of  the  homeward 
way,  until  well  clear  of  the  French  West  India  cruisers. 
For  this  purpose  he  left  Santa  Lucia  early  in  June.  As  soon 
as  the  coast  was  clear,  d'Estaing,  informed  of  Byron's  object, 
sent  a  small  combined  expedition  against  St.  Vincent,  which 
was  surrendered  on  the  18th  of  the  month.  On  the  30th 
the  French  admiral  himself  quitted  Fort  Royal  with  his 
whole  fleet,  —  twenty-five  ships  of  the  line  and  several 
frigates,  —  directing  his  course  for  the  British  Island  of 
Grenada,  before  which  he  anchored  on  the  2d  of  July. 
With  commendable  promptitude,  he  landed  his  troops  that 
evening,  and  on  the  4th  the  island  capitulated.  Except  as 
represented  by  one  small  armed  sloop,  which  was  taken,  the 
British  Navy  had  no  part  in  this  transaction.  Thirty  richly 
laden  merchant  ships  were  captured  in  the  port. 

At  daybreak  of  July  6th,  Byron  appeared  with  twenty-one 
sail  of  the  line,  one  frigate,  and  a  convoy  of  twenty-eight 
vessels,  carrying  troops  and  equipments.     He  had  returned 


106     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES   IN   THE 

to  Santa  Lucia  on  the  1st,  and  there  had  heard  of  the  loss 
of  St.  Vincent,  with  a  rumor  that  the  French  had  gone 
against  Grenada.  He  consequently  had  put  to  sea  on  the 
3d,  with  the  force  mentioned. 

The  British  approach  was  reported  to  d'Estaing  during 
the  night  of  July  5th.  Most  of  his  fleet  was  then  lying  at 
anchor  off  Georgetown,  at  the  south-west  of  the  island; 
some  vessels,  which  had  been  under  way  on  look-out  duty, 
had  fallen  to  leew^ard.^  At  4  a.m.  the  French  began  to  lift 
their  anchors,  with  orders  to  form  line  of  battle  on  the  star- 
board tack,  in  order  of  speed ;  that  is,  as  rapidly  as  possible 
without  regard  to  usual  stations.  When  daylight  had  fully 
made,  the  British  fleet  (A)  was  seen  standing  down  from  the 
northward,  close  inshore,  on  the  port  tack,  with  the  wind 
free  at  north-east  by  east.  It  was  not  in  order,  as  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  the  ships  nearest  the  enemy,  and  therefore 
first  to  close,  ought  to  have  been  in  the  rear  on  the  then  tack. 
For  this  condition  there  is  no  evident  excuse;  for  a  fleet 
having  a  convoy  necessarily  proceeds  so  slowly  that  the  war- 
ships can  keep  reasonable  order  for  mutual  support.  More- 
over, irregularities  that  are  permissible  in  case  of  emergency, 
or  when  no  enemy  can  be  encountered  suddenly,  cease  to  be 
so  when  the  imminent  probability  of  a  meeting  exists.  The 
worst  results  of  the  day  are  to  be  attributed  to  this  fault. 
Being  short  of  frigates,  BjTon  had  assigned  three  ships  of 
the  line  (a),  under  Rear- Admiral  Rowley,  to  the  convoy, 
which  of  course  was  on  the  off  hand  from  the  enemy,  and 
somewhat  in  the  rear.  It  was  understood,  however,  that 
these  would  be  called  into  the  line,  if  needed. 

When  the  French  (AA)  were  first  perceived  by  Byron, 
their  line  was  forming;  the  long  thin  column  lengthening 
out  gradually  to  the  north-north-west,  from  the  confused 

^  To  the  westward.  These  islands  lie  in  the  trade-winds,  which 
are  constant  in  general  direction  from  north-east. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  107 

cluster  ^  still  to  be  seen  at  the  anchorage.  Hoping  to  profit 
by  their  disorder,  he  signalled  "a  general  chase  in  that 
quarter,^  as  well  as  for  Rear-Admiral  Rowley  to  leave  the 
convoy ;  and  as  not  more  than  fourteen  or  fifteen  of  the 
enemy's  ships  appeared  to  be  in  line,  the  signal  was  made 
for  the  ships  to  engage,  and  form  as  they  could  get  up.''  ^ 
It  is  clear  from  this  not  only  that  the  ships  were  not  in  order, 
but  also  that  they  were  to  form  under  fire.  Three  ships, 
the  Sultan,  74,  the  Prince  of  Wales,  74,  and  the  Boyne,  70, 
in  the  order  named,  —  the  second  carrying  Harrington's 
flag,  — were  well  ahead  of  the  fleet  (b).  The  direction  pre- 
scribed for  the  attack,  that  of  the  clustered  ships  in  the 
French  rear,  carried  the  British  down  on  a  south-south-west, 
or  south  by  west,  course ;  and  as  the  enemy's  van  and  centre 
were  drawing  out  to  the  north-north-west,  the  two  lines  at 
that  time  resembled  the  legs  of  a  "V,"  the  point  of  which 
was  the  anchorage  off  Georgetown.  Barrington's  three  ships 
therefore  neared  the  French  order  gradually,  and  had  to 
receive  its  fire  for  some  time  before  they  could  reply,  unless, 
by  hauling  to  the  wind,  they  diverged  from  the  set  course. 
This,  and  their  isolation,  made  their  loss  very  heavy.  When 
th^y  reached  the  rear  of  the  French,  the  latter's  column  was 
tolerably  formed,  and  Barrington's  ships  wore  (w)  in  succes- 
sion,—  just  as  Harland's  had  done  in  Keppel's  action, — to 

^  Admiral  Keppel,  in  his  evidence  before  the  Palliser  Court,  gave 
an  interesting  description  of  a  similar  scene,  although  the  present 
writer  is  persuaded  that  he  was  narrating  things  as  they  seemed, 
rather  than  as  they  were  —  as  at  Grenada.  "The  French  were 
forming  their  line  exactly  in  the  manner  M.  Conflans  did  when 
attacked  by  Admiral  Hawke."  (Keppel  had  been  in  that  action.) 
"It  is  a  manner  peculiar  to  themselves  ;  and  to  those  who  do  not 
understand  it,  it  appears  like  confusion.  They  draw  out  ship  by 
ship  from  a  cluster." 

2  That  is,  towards  the  ships  at  anchor,  —  the  enemy's  rear  as 
matters  then  were. 

3  Byron's  Report.     The  italics  are  the  author's. 


108     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

follow  on  the  other  tack.  In  doing  this,  the  Sultan  kept  away 
under  the  stern  of  the  enemy's  rearmost  ship,  to  rake  her; 
to  avoid  which  the  latter  bore  up.  The  Sultan  thus  lost 
time  and  ground,  and  Barrington  took  the  lead,  standing 
along  the  French  line,  from  rear  to  van,  and  to  windward. 

Meanwhile,  the  forming  of  the  enemy  had  revealed  to 
Byron  for  the  first  time,  and  to  his  dismay,  that  he  had  been 
deceived  in  thinking  the  French  force  inferior  to  his  own. 
"However,  the  general  chase  was  continued,  and  the  signal 
made  for  close  engagement."  ^  The  remainder  of  the  ships 
stood  down  on  the  port  tack,  as  the  first  three  had  done,  and 
wore  in  the  wake  of  the  latter,  whom  they  followed;  but 
before  reaching  the  point  of  wearing,  three  ships,  "  the  Graf- 
ton, 74,  the  Cornwall,  74,  and  the  Lion,  64  (c),  happening 
to  he  to  leeward,^  sustained  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  whole  line, 
as  it  passed  on  the  starboard  tack."  It  seems  clear  that, 
having  had  the  wind,  during  the  night  and  now,  and  being 
in  search  of  an  enemy,  it  should  not  have  "happened ''  that 
any  ships  should  have  been  so  far  to  leeward  as  to  be  unsup- 
ported. Captain  Thomas  White,  R.N.,  writing  as  an  ad- 
vocate of  Byron,  says,^  "  while  the  van  was  wearing  .  .  .  the 
sternmost  ships  were  coming  up  under  Rear-Admiral  Hyde 
Parker.  .  .  .  Among  these  ships,  the  Cornwall  and  Lion, 
from  being  nearer  the  enemy  than  those  about  them  (for  the 
rear  division  had  not  then  formed  into  line),  drew  upon  them- 
selves almost  the  whole  of  the  enemy's  fire."  No  words  can 
show  more  clearly  the  disastrous,  precipitate  disorder  in 
which  this  attack  was  conducted.  The  Grafton,  White  says, 
was  similarly  situated.  In  consequence,  these  three  were  so 
crippled,  besides  a  heavy  loss  in  men,  that  they  dropped  far 
to  leeward  and  astern  (c,'  c'^),  when  on  the  other  tack. 

When  the  British  ships  in  general  had  got  round,  and  were 

1  Byron's  Report.  ^  j})id.    Author's  italics. 

3  "Naval  Researches."     London,  1830,  p.  22. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  109 

in  line  ahead  on  the  starboard  tack, — the  same  as  the  French, 

—  ranging  from  rear  to  van  of  the  enemy  (Positions  B,  B,  B), 
Byron  signalled  for  the  eight  leading  ships  to  close  together, 
for  mutual  support,  and  to  engage  close.  This,  which  should 
have  been  done  —  not  with  finikin  precision,  but  with  mili- 
tary adequacy  —  before  engaging,  was  less  easy  now,  in 
the  din  of  battle  and  with  crippled  ships.  A  quick-eyed 
subordinate,  however,  did  something  to  remedy  the  error 
of  his  chief.  Rear-Admiral  Rowley  was  still  considerably 
astern,  having  to  make  up  the  distance  between  the  convoy 
and  the  fleet.  As  he  followed  the  latter,  he  saw  Barrington's 
three  ships  unduly  separated  and  doubtless  visibly  much 
mauled.  Instead,  therefore,  of  blindly  following  his  leader, 
he  cut  straight  across  (aa)  to  the  head  of  the  column  to 
support  the  van,  —  an  act  almost  absolutely  identical  with 
that  which  won  Nelson  renown  at  Cape  St.  Vincent.  In 
this  he  was  followed  by  the  Monmouth,  64,  the  brilliancy  of 
whose  bearing  was  so  conspicuous  to  the  two  fleets  that  it  is 
said  the  French  officers  after  the  battle  toasted  "the  little 
black  ship."  She  and  the  Suffolk,  74,  Rowley's  flagship,  also 
suffered  severely  in  this  gallant  feat. 

It  was  imperative  with  Byron  now  to  keep  his  van  well  up 
with  the  enemy,  lest  he  should  uncover  the  convoy,  broad 
on  the  weather  bow  of  the  two  fleets.  '^They  seemed  much 
inclined  to  cut  off  the  convoy,  and  had  it  much  in  their  power 
by  means  of  their  large  frigates,  independent  of  ships  of 
the  line."  ^  On  the  other  hand,  the  Cornwall,  Grafton,  and 
Lion,  though  they  got  their  heads  round,  could  not  keep  up 
with  the  fleet  (c^  c'O,  and  were  dropping  also  to  leeward 

—  towards  the  enemy.  At  noon,  or  soon  after,  d'Estaing 
bore  up  with  the  body  of  his  force  to  join  some  of  his  vessels 
that  had  fallen  to  leeward.  Byron  very  properly  —  under 
his  conditions  of  inferiority — kept  his  wind ;  and  the  separa- 

1  Byron's  Report. 


110      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

tion  of  the  two  fleets,  thus  produced,  caused  firing  to  cease 
at  1  P.M. 

The  enemies  were  now  ranged  on  parallel  lines,  some  dis~ 
tance  apart ;  still  on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  north-nerth 
west.  Between  the  two,  but  far  astern,  the  Cormvall,  Grafton, 
Lion,  and  a  fourth  British  ship,  the  Fame,  were  toiling  along, 
greatly  crippled.  At  3  p.m.,  the  French,  now  in  good  order, 
tacked  together  (t,  t,  t),  which  caused  them  to  head  towards 
these  disabled  vessels.  Byron  at  once  imitated  the  move- 
ment, and  the  eyes  of  all  in  the  two  fleets  anxiously  watched 
the  result.  Captain  Cornwallis  of  the  Lion,  measuring  the 
situation  accurately,  saw  that,  if  he  continued  ahead,  he 
would  be  in  the  midst  of  the  French  by  the  time  he  got 
abreast  of  them.  Having  only  his  foremast  standing,  he 
put  his  helm  up,  and  stood  broad  off  before  the  wind  (c'Oj 
across  the  enemy's  bow^s,  for  Jamaica.  He  was  not  pursued. 
The  other  three,  unable  to  tack  and  afraid  to  wear,  which 
would  put  them  also  in  the  enemy's  power,  stood  on,  passed 
to  windward  of  the  latter,  receiving  several  broadsides,  and 
so  escaped  to  the  northward.  The  Monmouth  was  equally 
maltreated;  in  fact,  she  had  not  been  able  to  tack  to  the 
southward  with  the  fleet.  Continuing  north  (aO,  she  be- 
came now  much  separated.  D'Estaing  afterwards  reestab- 
lished his  order  of  battle  on  the  port  tack,  forming  upon  the 
then  leewardmost  ship,  on  the  line  BC. 

Byron's  action  off  Grenada,  viewed  as  an  isolated  event, 
was  the  most  disastrous  in  results  that  the  British  Navy  had 
fought  since  Beachy  Head,  in  1690.  That  the  Cornwall, 
Grafton,  and  Lion  were  not  captured  was  due  simply  to  the 
strained  and  inept  caution  of  the  French  admiral.  This  Byron 
virtually  admitted.  "To  my  great  surprise  no  ship  of  the 
enemy  was  detached  after  the  Lion.  The  Grafton  and  Corn- 
wall might  have  been  weathered  by  the  French,  if  they  had 
kept  their  wind,  .  .  .  but  they  persevered  so  strictly  in  de- 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  111 

dining  every  chance  of  close  action  that  they  contented 
themselves  with  firing  upon  these  ships  when  passing  barely 
within  gunshot,  and  suffered  them  to  rejoin  the  squadron, 
without  one  effort  to  cut  them  off."  Suffren,^  who  led  the 
French  on  the  starboard  tack,  and  whose  ship,  the  Fantasque, 
64,  lost  22  killed  and  43  wounded,  wrote  :  "  Had  our  admiral's 
seamanship  equalled  his  courage,  we  would  not  have  allowed 
four  dismasted  ships  to  escape."  That  the  Monmouth  and 
Fame  could  also  have  been  secured  is  extremely  probable; 
and  if  Byron,  in  order  to  save  them,  had  borne  down  to  re- 
new the  action,  the  disaster  might  have  become  a  catastrophe. 
That  nothing  resulted  to  the  French  from  their  great  ad- 
vantage is  therefore  to  be  ascribed  to  the  incapacity  of  their 
Commander-in-Chief.  It  is  instructive  to  note  also  the 
causes  of  the  grave  calamity  which  befell  the  British,  when 
twenty-one  ships  met  twenty-four,^  —  a  sensible  but  not 
overwhelming  superiority.  These  facts  have  been  shown 
sufficiently.  Byron's  disaster  was  due  to  attacking  with 
needless  precipitation,  and  in  needless  disorder.  He  had  the 
weather-gage,  it  was  early  morning,  and  the  northeast  trade- 
wind,  already  a  working  breeze,  must  freshen  as  the  day  ad- 
vanced. The  French  were  tied  to  their  new  conquest,  which 
they  could  not  abandon  without  humiliation;  not  to  speak 
of  their  troops  ashore.  Even  had  they  wished  to  retreat, 
they  could  not  have  done  so  before  a  general  chase,  unless 
prepared  to  sacrifice  their  slower  ships.     If  twenty-four  ships 

1  Pierre  A.  de  Suffren  de  Saint  Tropez,  a  Bailli  of  the  Order  of 
Knights  of  Malta.  Born,  1726.  Present  at  two  naval  actions  before 
he  was  twenty.  Participated  in  1756  in  the  attack  on  Port  Mahon, 
and  in  1759  in  the  action  off  Lagos.  Chef  d'escadre  in  1779.  Dis- 
patched to  the  East  Indies  in  1781.  Fought  a  British  squadron  in 
the  Bay  of  Praya,  and  a  succession  of  brilliant  actions  with  Sir 
Edward  Hughes,  1782-83.  Vice- Admiral,  1783.  Killed  in  a  duel, 
1788.     One  of  the  greatest  of  French  naval  officers.  —  W.  L.  C. 

2  Troude  says  that  one  French  seventy-four,  having  touched  in 
leaving  port,  was  not  in  the  engagement. 


112    MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

could  reconcile  themselves  to  running  from  twenty-one,  it  was 
scarcely  possible  but  that  the  fastest  of  these  would  overtake 
the  slowest  of  those.  There  was  time  for  fighting,  an  op- 
portunity for  forcing  action  which  could  not  be  evaded,  and 
time  also  for  the  British  to  form  in  reasonably  good  order. 

It  is  important  to  consider  this,  because,  while  Keppel  must 
be  approved  for  attacking  in  partial  disorder,  Byron  must  be 
blamed  for  attacking  in  utter  disorder.  Keppel  had  to  snatch 
opportunity  from  an  unwilling  foe.  Having  himself  the  lee- 
gage,  he  could  not  pick  and  choose,  nor  yet  manoeuvre ;  yet 
he  brought  his  fleet  into  action,  giving  mutual  support 
throughout  nearly,  if  not  quite,  the  whole  line.  What  Byron 
did  has  been  set  forth ;  the  sting  is  that  his  bungling  tactics 
can  find  no  extenuation  in  any  urgency  of  the  case. 

The  loss  of  the  two  fleets,  as  given  by  the  authorities  of 
either  nation,  were  :  British,  183  killed,  346  wounded ;  French, 
190  killed,  759  wounded.  Of  the  British  total,  126  killed 
and  235  wounded,  or  two  thirds,  fell  to  the  two  groups  of 
three  ships  each,  w^hich  by  Byron's  mismanagement  were 
successively  exposed  to  be  cut  up  in  detail  by  the  concen- 
trated fire  of  the  enemy.  The  British  loss  in  spars  and  sails 
— in  motive-power — also  exceeded  greatly  that  of  the  French. 

After  the  action  d'Estaing  returned  quietly  to  Grenada. 
Byron  went  to  St.  Kitts  to  refit ;  but  repairs  were  most  diffi- 
cult, owing  to  the  dearth  of  stores  in  which  the  Admiralty 
had  left  the  West  Indies.  With  all  the  skill  of  the  seamen 
of  that  day  in  making  good  damages,  the  ships  remained 
long  unserviceable,  causing  great  apprehension  for  the  other 
islands.  This  state  of  things  d'Estaing  left  unimproved,  as 
he  had  his  advantage  in  the  battle.  He  did,  indeed,  parade 
his  superior  force  before  Byron's  fleet  as  it  lay  at  anchor; 
but,  beyond  the  humiliation  naturally  felt  by  a  Navy  which 
prided  itself  on  ruling  the  sea,  no  further  injury  was  done. 

In  August  Byron  sailed  for  England.     Barrington  had 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  113 

already  gone  home,  wounded.  The  station  therefore  was 
left  in  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Hyde  Parker,^  and  so  re- 
mained until  March,  1780,  when  the  celebrated  Rodney 
arrived  as  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  Leeward  Islands 
Station.  The  North  American  Station  was  given  to  Vice- 
Admiral  Harriot  Arbuthnot,  who  had  under  him  a  half- 
dozen  ships  of  the  line,  with  headquarters  at  New  York. 
His  command  was  ordinarily  independent  of  Rodney's,  but 
the  latter  had  no  hesitation  in  going  to  New  York  on  emer- 
gency and  taking  charge  there;  in  doing  which  he  had  the 
approval  of  the  Admiralty. 

The  approach  of  winter  in  1778  had  determined  the  ces- 
sation of  operations,  both  naval  and  military,  in  the  northern 
part  of  the  American  continent,  and  had  led  to  the  transfer 
of  five  thousand  troops  to  the  West  Indies,  already  noted. 
At  the  same  time,  an  unjustifiable  extension  of  British  effort, 
having  regard  to  the  disposable  means,  was  undertaken  in 
the  southern  States  of  Georgia  and  South  Carolina.  On 
the  27th  of  November  a  small  detachment  of  troops  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Archibald  Campbell,  sailed  from  Sandy 
Hook,  convoyed  by  a  division  of  frigates  commanded  by 
Captain  Hyde  Parker.^  The  expedition  entered  the  Savannah 
River  four  weeks  later,  and  soon  afterwards  occupied  the 
city  of  the  same  name.  Simultaneously  with  this,  by  Clin- 
ton's orders.  General  Prevost  moved  from  Florida,  then  a 
British  colony,  with  all  the  men  he  could  spare  from  the  de- 

1  First  of  the  name.  Born  1714.  In  1780,  he  fell  under  Rodney's 
censure,  and  went  home.  In  1781,  he  commanded  in  the  general 
action  with  the  Dutch,  known  as  the  Dogger  Bank.  In  1782,  he 
sailed  for  the  East  Indies  in  the  Cato,  64 ;  which  ship  was  never 
again  heard  from. 

2  Sir  Hyde  Parker,  Kt.  Second  of  the  name,  son  of  the  first. 
Born,  1739.  Captain,  1763.  Rear-Admiral,  1793.  Vice-Admiral, 
1794.  Admiral,  1799.  Died,  1807.  Nelson's  chief  at  Copen- 
hagen, in  1801. 


114    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

fence  of  St.  Augustine.  Upon  his  arrival  in  Savannah  he 
took  command  of  the  whole   force  thus  assembled. 

These  operations,  which  during  1779  extended  as  far  as 
the  neighbourhood  of  Charleston,  depended  upon  the  con- 
trol of  the  water,  and  are  a  conspicuous  example  of  misap- 
plication of  power  to  the  point  of  ultimate  self-destruction. 
They  were  in  1778-79  essentially  of  a  minor  character,  es- 
pecially the  maritime  part,  and  will  therefore  be  dismissed 
with  the  remark  that  the  Navy,  by  small  vessels,  accompanied 
every  movement  in  a  country  cut  up  in  all  directions  by  water- 
courses, big  and  little.  "The  defence  of  this  province," 
wrote  Parker,  "must  greatly  depend  on  the  naval  force  upon 
the  different  inland  creeks.  I  am  therefore  forming  some 
galleys  covered  from  musketry,  which  I  believe  will  have  a 
good  effect."  These  were  precursors  of  the  "tin-clads"  of 
the  American  War  of  Secession,  a  century  later.  Not  even 
an  armored  ship  is  a  new  thing  under  the  sun. 

In  the  southern  States,  from  Georgia  to  Virginia,  the  part 
of  the  Navy  from  first  to  last  was  subsidiary,  though  im- 
portant. It  is  therefore  unnecessary  to  go  into  details,  but 
most  necessary  to  note  that  here,  by  misdirection  of  effort 
and  abuse  of  means,  was  initiated  the  fatal  movement  which 
henceforth  divided  the  small  British  army  in  North  America 
into  two  sections,  wholly  out  of  mutual  support.  Here  Sir 
William  Howe's  error  of  1777  was  reproduced  on  a  larger  scale 
and  was  therefore  more  fatal.  This  led  directly,  by  the  in- 
evitable logic  of  a  false  position,  to  Cornwallis's  march 
through  North  Carolina  into  Virginia,  to  Yorktown  in  1781, 
and  to  the  signal  demonstration  of  sea  power  off  Chesapeake 
Bay,  which  at  a  blow  accomplished  the  independence  of 
the  United  States.  No  hostile  strategist  could  have  severed 
the  British  army  more  hopelessly  than  did  the  British  govern- 
ment ;  no  fate  could  have  been  more  inexorable  than  was  its 
own   perverse   will.     The   personal    ahenation    and    official 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  115 

quarrel  between  Sir  Henry  Clinton  and  Lord  Cornwallis, 
their  divided  counsels  and  divergent  action,  were  but  the 
natural  result,  and  the  reflection,  of  a  situation  essentially 
self-contradictory  and  exasperating. 

As  the  hurricane  season  of  1779  advanced,  d'Estaing,  who 
had  orders  to  bring  back  to  France  the  ships  of  the  line  with 
which  he  had  sailed  from  Toulon  in  1778,  resolved  to  go  first 
upon  the  American  coast,  off  South  Carolina  or  Georgia. 
Arriving  with  his  whole  fleet  at  the  mouth  of  the  Savannah, 
August  31st,  he  decided  to  attempt  to  wrest  the  city  of 
Savannah  from  the  British.  This  would  have  been  of  real 
service  to  the  latter,  had  it  nipped  in  the  bud  their  ex-centric 
undertaking ;  but,  after  three  weeks  of  opening  trenches,  an 
assault  upon  the  place  failed.  D'Estaing  then  sailed  for 
Europe  with  the  ships  designated  to  accompany  him,  the  others 
returning  to  the  West  Indies  in  two  squadrons,  under  de 
Grasse  and  La  Motte-Picquet.  Though  fruitless  in  its  main 
object,  this  enterprise  of  d'Estaing  had  the  important  in- 
direct effect  of  causing  the  British  to  abandon  Narragansett 
Bay.  Upon  the  news  of  his  appearance.  Sir  Henry  Clinton 
had  felt  that,  with  his  greatly  diminished  army,  he  could  not 
hold  both  Rhode  Island  and  New  York.  He  therefore 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  former,  thus  surrendering,  to 
use  again  Rodney's  words,  "  the  best  and  noblest  harbour  in 
America."  The  following  summer  it  was  occupied  in  force 
by  the  French. 

D'Estaing  was  succeeded  in  the  chief  command,  in  the 
West  Indies  and  North  America,  by  Rear-Admiral  de  Gui- 
chen,^  who  arrived  on  the  station  in  March,  1780,  almost 
at  the  same  moment  as  Rodney. 

^  Louis  Urbain  de  Bouenic,  Comte  de  Guichen.  Born,  1712. 
Entered  the  navy,  1730.  Commanded  the  Illustre  with  success  in 
North  America  in  1756.  Second  in  command  in  the  action  off 
Ushant  in  1778.  Thrice  fought  Rodney  in  the  West  Indies  in  1780. 
Fought  Kempenfelt  off  the  Azores  in  1781.     Died,  1790.  —  W.  L.  C. 


116  MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF    THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  NAVAL  WAR  IN  EUROPEAN  WATERS,  1779. 
ALLIED  FLEETS  INVADE  THE  ENGLISH  CHAN- 
NEL. RODNEY  DESTROYS  TWO  SPANISH 
SQUADRONS  AND  RELIEVES  GIBRALTAR 

IN  June,  1779,  the  maritime  situation  of  Great  Britain 
had  become  much  more  serious  by  Spain's  declaring 
war.  At  the  same  moment  that  d'Estaing  with 
twenty-five  ships  of  the  hne  had  confronted  Byron's 
twenty-one,  the  Channel  fleet  of  forty  sail  had  seen  gather- 
ing against  it  a  host  of  sixty-six.  Of  this  great  number 
thirty-six  were  Spanish. 

The  open  declaration  of  Spain  had  been  preceded  by  a 
secret  alliance  with  France,  signed  on  the  12th  of  April. 
Fearing  that  the  British  government  would  take  betimes  the 
reasonable  and  proper  step  of  blockading  the  Brest  fleet  of 
thirty  with  the  Channel  forty,  thus  assuming  a  central  posi- 
tion with  reference  to  its  enemies  and  anticipating  the  policy 
of  Lord  St.  Vincent,  the  French  Ministry  hurried  its  ships 
to  sea  on  the  4th  of  June;  Admiral  d'Orvilhers,  Keppel's 
opponent,  still  in  command.  His  orders  were  to  cruise  near 
the  island  of  Cizarga,  off  the  north-west  coast  of  Spain, 
where  the  Spaniards  w^ere  to  join  him.  On  the  11th  of  June 
he  was  at  the  rendezvous,  but  not  till  the  23d  of  July  did 
the  bulk  of  the  Spanish  force  appear.  During  this  time,  the 
French,  insufficiently  equipped  from  the  first,  owing  to  the 
haste  of  their  departure,  were  consuming  provisions  and 
w^ater,  not  to  speak  of  wasting  pleasant  summer  weather. 
Their  ships  also  were  ravaged  by  an  epidemic  fever.     Upon 


WAR   OF   AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  117 

the  junction,  d'Orvilliers  found  that  the  Spaniards  had  not 
been  furnished  with  the  French  system  of  signals,  although 
by  the  treaty  the  French  admiral  was  to  be  in  chief  command. 
The  rectification  of  this  oversight  caused  further  delay,  but 
on  the  11th  of  August  the  combined  fleet  sighted  Ushant, 
and  on  the  14th  was  off  the  Lizard.  On  the  16th  it  appeared 
before  Plymouth,  and  there  on  the  17th  captured  the  British 
64-gun  ship  Ardent. 

Thirty-five  ships  of  the  Channel  fleet  had  gone  to  sea  on 
the  16th  of  June,  and  now  were  cruising  outside,  under  the 
command  of  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Hardy.  His  station  w^as 
from  ten  to  twenty  leagues  south-west  of  Scilly ;  consequently 
he  had  not  been  seen  by  the  enemy,  who  from  Ushant  had 
stood  up  the  Channel.  The  allies,  now  nearly  double  the 
numbers  of  the  British,  were  between  them  and  their  ports, 
—  a  serious  situation  doubtless,  but  by  no  means  desperate ; 
not  so  dangerous  for  sailing  ships  as  it  probably  will  be  for 
steamers  to  have  an  enemy  between  them  and  their  coal. 

The  alarm  in  England  was  very  great,  especially  in  the 
south.  On  the  9th  of  July  a  royal  proclamation  had  com- 
manded all  horses  and  cattle  to  be  driven  from  the  coasts,  in 
case  of  invasion.  Booms  had  been  placed  across  the  en- 
trance to  Plymouth  Harbor,  and  orders  wxre  sent  from  the 
Admiralty  to  sink  vessels  across  the  harbour's  mouth.  Many 
who  had  the  means  withdrew  into  the  interior,  which  in- 
creased the  panic.  Great  merchant  fleets  were  then  on  the 
sea,  homeward  bound.  If  d'Orvilliers  were  gone  to  cruise 
in  the  approaches  to  the  Channel,  instead  of  to  the  Spanish 
coast,  these  might  be  taken;  and  for  some  time  his  where- 
abouts were  unknown.  As  it  w^as,  the  Jamaica  convoy,  over 
two  hundred  sail,  got  in  a  few  days  before  the  allies  appeared, 
and  the  Leeward  Islands  fleet  had  similar  good  fortune. 
Eight  homeward  bound  East  Indiamen  were  less  lucky,  but, 
being  warned  of  their  danger,  took  refuge  in  the  Shannon, 


118     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES   IN   THE 

and  there  remained  till  the  trouble  blew  over.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  stock  market  stood  firm.  Nevertheless,  it  was 
justly  felt  that  such  a  state  of  things  as  a  vastly  superior 
hostile  fleet  in  the  Channel  should  not  have  been.  Sir  John 
Jervis,  afterward  Earl  St.  Vincent,  who  commanded  a  ship 
in  the  fleet,  wrote  to  his  sister :  "  What  a  humiliating  state 
is  our  country  reduced  to  !"  but  he  added  that  he  laughed  at 
the  idea  of  invasion. 

The  French  had  placed  a  force  of  fifty  thousand  men  at 
Le  Havre  and  St.  Malo,  and  collected  four  hundred  vessels 
for  their  transport.  Their  plans  were  not  certainly  known, 
but  enough  had  transpired  to  cause  reasonable  anxiety; 
and  the  crisis,  on  its  face,  was  very  serious.  Not  their  own 
preparations,  but  the  inefficiency  of  their  enemies,  in  counsel 
and  in  preparation,  saved  the  British  Islands  from  invasion. 
What  the  results  of  this  would  have  been  is  another  question, 
—  a  question  of  land  warfare.  The  original  scheme  of  the 
French  Ministry  was  to  seize  the  Isle  of  Wight,  securing 
Spithead  as  an  anchorage  for  the  fleet,  and  to  prosecute  their 
enterprise  from  this  near  and  reasonably  secure  base.  Re- 
ferring to  this  first  project,  d'Orvilhers  wrote:  "We  will 
seek  the  enemy  at  St.  Helen's,^  and  then,  if  I  find  that  road- 
stead unoccupied,  or  make  myself  master  of  it,  I  will  send 
w^ord  to  Marshal  De  Vaux,  at  Le  Havre,  and  inform  him  of 
the  measures  I  will  take  to  insure  his  passage,  which  [meas- 
ures] will  depend  upon  the  position  of  the  English  main 
fleet  [dependront  des  forces  superieures  des  Anglais].  That 
is  to  say,  I  myself  will  lead  the  combined  fleet  on  that  side 
[against  their  main  body],  to  contain  the  enemy,  and  I  will 
send,  on  the  other  side  [to  convoy],  a  light  squadron,  with  a 
sufficient  number  of  ships  of  the  line  and  frigates ;  or  I  will 
propose  to  M.  de  Cordova  to  take  this  latter  station,  in  order 
that  the  passage  of  the  army  may  be  free  and  sure.     I  assume 

1  An  anchorage  three  miles  to  seaward  of  Spithead. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  119 

that  then,  either  by  the  engagement  I  shall  have  fought 
with  the  enemy,  or  by  their  retreat  into  their  ports,  I  shall  be 
certain  of  their  situation  and  of  the  success  of  the  operation."  ^ 
It  will  be  observed  that  d'Orvilliers,  accounted  then  and  now 
one  of  the  best  officers  of  his  day  in  the  French  navy,  takes 
here  into  full  account  the  British  "fleet  in  being."  The 
main  body  of  the  allies,  fifty  ships,  was  to  hold  this  in  check, 
while  a  smaller  force  —  Cordova  had  command  of  a  special 
"squadron  of  observation,"  of  sixteen  ships  of  the  line  — 
was  to  convoy  the  crossing. 

These  projects  all  fell  to  pieces  before  a  strong  east  wind, 
and  a  change  of  mind  in  the  French  government.  On  the 
16th  of  August,  before  Plymouth,  d'Orvilliers  was  notified 
that  not  the  Isle  of  Wight,  but  the  coast  of  Cornwall,  near 
Falmouth,  was  to  be  the  scene  of  landing.  The  effect  of 
this  was  to  deprive  the  huge  fleet  of  any  anchorage,  —  a 
resource  necessary  even  to  steamers,  and  far  more  to  sailing 
vessels  aiming  to  remain  in  a  position.  As  a  point  to  begin 
shore  operations,  too,  as  well  as  to  sustain  them,  such  a 
remote  corner  of  the  country  to  be  invaded  was  absurd. 
D'Orvilliers  duly  represented  all  this,  but  could  not  stay 
w^here  he  was  long  enough  to  get  a  reply.  An  easterly  gale 
came  on,  which  blew  hard  for  several  days  and  drove  the 
allies  out  of  the  Channel.  On  the  25th  of  August  word  was 
received  that  the  British  fleet  was  near  Scilly.  A  council 
of  war  was  then  held,  which  decided  that,  in  view  of  the 
terrible  increase  of  disease  in  the  shipping,  and  of  the  short- 
ness of  provisions,  it  was  expedient  not  to  reenter  the  Chan- 
nel, but  to  seek  the  enemy,  and  bring  him  to  battle.  This 
was  done.  On  the  29th  Hardy  was  sighted,  being  then  on 
his  return  up  Channel.  With  the  disparity  of  force  he  could 
not  but  decline  action,  and  the  allies  were  unable  to  compel  it. 
On  the  3d  of  September  he  reached  Spithead.     D'Orvilliers 

1  Chevalier,  "Marine  Frangaise,"  1778,  p.  165.     Author's  italics. 


120  MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

soon  afterwards  received  orders  to  return  to  Brest,  and  on 
the  14th  the  combined  fleet  anchored  there. 

The  criticism  to  be  passed  on  the  conduct  of  this  summer 
campaign  by  the  British  Ministry  is  twofold.  In  the  first 
place,  it  was  not  ready  according  to  the  reasonable  standard 
of  the  day,  which  recognised  in  the  probable  cooperation 
of  the  two  Bourbon  kingdoms,  France  and  Spain,  the  meas- 
ure of  the  minimum  naval  force  permissible  to  Great  Britain. 
Secondly,  the  entrance  of  Spain  into  the  war  had  been  fore- 
seen months  before.  For  the  inferior  force,  therefore,  it 
was  essential  to  prevent  a  junction,  —  to  take  an  interior 
position.  The  Channel  fleet  ought  to  have  been  off  Brest 
before  the  French  sailed.  After  they  were  gone,  there  was 
still  fair  ground  for  the  contention  of  the  Opposition,  that 
they  should  have  been  followed,  and  attacked,  off  the  coast 
of  Spain.  During  the  six  weeks  they  waited  there,  they  were 
inferior  to  Hardy's  force.  Allowance  here  must  be  made, 
however,  for  the  inability  of  a  representative  government 
to  disregard  popular  outcry,  and  to  uncover  the  main  ap- 
proach to  its  own  ports.  This,  indeed,  does  but  magnify 
the  error  made  in  not  watching  Brest  betimes;  for  in 
such  case  a  fleet  before  Brest  covered  also  the  Channel. 

With  regard  to  the  objects  of  the  war  in  which  they  had 
become  partners,  the  views  of  France  and  Spain  accorded  in 
but  one  point,  —  the  desirability  of  injuring  Great  Britain. 
Each  had  its  own  special  aim  for  its  own  advantage.  This 
necessarily  introduced  divergence  of  effort;  but,  France 
having  first  embarked  alone  in  the  contest  and  then  sought 
the  aid  of  Spain,  the  particular  objects  of  her  ally  naturally 
obtained  from  the  beginning  a  certain  precedence.  Until 
near  the  close  of  the  war,  it  may  be  said  that  the  chief  am- 
bitions of  France  were  in  the  West  Indies;  those  of  Spain, 
in  Europe,  —  to  regain  Minorca  and  Gibraltar. 

In  this  way  Gibraltar  became  a  leading  factor  in  the  con- 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE         121 

test,  and  affected,  directly  or  indirectly,  the  major  opera- 
tions throughout  the  world,  by  the  amount  of  force  absorbed 
in  attacking  and  preserving  it.  After  the  futile  effort  in  the 
Channel,  in  1779,  Spain  recalled  her  vessels  from  Brest. 
"The  project  of  a  descent  upon  England  was  abandoned 
provisionally.  To  blockade  Gibraltar,  to  have  in  America 
and  Asia  force  sufficient  to  hold  the  British  in  check,  and  to 
take  the  offensive  in  the  West  Indies,  —  such,"  wrote  the 
French  government  to  its  ambassador  in  Madrid,  "  was 
the  plan  of  campaign  adopted  for  1780."  Immediately  upon 
the  declaration  of  war,  intercourse  between  Gibraltar  and  the 
Spanish  mainland  was  stopped.  Soon  afterwards  a  blockade 
by  sea  was  instituted ;  fifteen  cruisers  being  stationed  at 
the  entrance  of  the  Bay,  where  they  seized  and  sent  into 
Spanish  ports  all  vessels,  neutral  or  British,  bound  to  the 
Rock.  This  blockade  was  effectively  supported  from  Cadiz, 
but  a  Spanish  force  of  some  ships  of  the  line  and  many  small 
vessels  also  maintained  it  more  directly  from  Algeciras,  on 
the  Spanish  side  of  the  Bay  of  Gibraltar.  The  British  Medi- 
terranean squadron,  then  consisting  only  of  one  60-gun  ship, 
three  frigates,  and  a  sloop,  was  wholly  unable  to  afford  re- 
lief. At  the  close  of  the  year  1779,  flour  in  Gibraltar  was 
fourteen  guineas  the  barrel,  and  other  provisions  in  propor- 
tion. It  became  therefore  imminently  necessary  to  throw  in 
supplies  of  all  kinds,  as  well  as  to  reinforce  the  garrison. 
To  this  service  Rodney  was  assigned ;  and  with  it  he  began 
the  brilliant  career,  the  chief  scene  of  which  was  to  be  in  the 
West  Indies. 

Rodney  was  appointed  to  command  the  Leeward  Islands 
Station  on  the  1st  of  October,  1779.  He  was  to  be  accom- 
panied there  immediately  by  only  four  or  five  ships  of  the 
line ;  but  advantage  w^as  taken  of  his  sailing,  to  place  under 
the  charge  of  an  officer  of  his  approved  reputation  a  great 
force,  composed  of  his  small  division  and  a  large  fraction  of 


122     MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

the  Channel  fleet,  to  convey  supplies  and  reinforcements  to 
Gibraltar  and  Minorca.  On  the  29th  of  December  the  whole 
body,  after  many  delays  in  getting  down  Channel,  put  to 
sea  from  Plymouth :  twenty-two  ships  of  the  line,  fourteen 
frigates  and  smaller  vessels,  besides  a  huge  collection  of 
storeships,  victuallers,  ordnance  vessels,  troop-ships,  and 
merchantmen,  —  the  last  named  being  the  "trade"  for  the 
West  Indies  and  Portugal. 

On  the  7th  of  January,  1780,  a  hundred  leagues  west  of 
Cape  Finisterre,  the  West  India  ships  parted  for  their  des- 
tination, under  convoy  of  a  ship  of  the  line  and  three  frigates. 
At  daylight  on  the  8th,  twenty-two  sail  were  seen  to  the 
north-east,  the  squadron  apparently  having  passed  them  in 
the  night.  Chase  was  at  once  given,  and  the  whole  were 
taken  in  a  few  hours.  Seven  were  ships  of  war,  one 
64  and  six  frigates;  the  remainder  merchant  vessels, 
laden  with  naval  stores  and  provisions  for  the  Spanish  fleet 
at  Cadiz.  The  provision  ships,  twelve  in  number,  were 
diverted  at  once  to  the  relief  of  Gibraltar,  under  charge  of 
the  Spanish  sixty-four,  which  had  been  one  of  their  convoy 
before  capture,  and  was  now  manned  by  a  British  crew.  Con- 
tinuing on,  intelligence  was  received  from  time  to  time  by 
passing  vessels  that  a  Spanish  squadron  was  cruising  off 
Cape  St.  Vincent.  Thus  forewarned,  orders  were  given  to 
all  captains  to  be  prepared  for  battle  as  the  Cape  was  neared. 
On  the  16th  it  was  passed,  and  at  1  p.m.  sails  in  the  south-east 
were  signalled.  These  were  a  Spanish  squadron  of  eleven 
ships  of  the  line,  and  two  26-gun  frigates.  Rodney  at  once 
bore  down  for  them  under  a  press  of  canvas,  making  signal  for 
the  line  abreast.^  Seeing,  however,  that  the  enemy  was 
trying  to  form  line  of  battle  ahead  on  the  starboard  tack, 

1  In  line  "abreast,"  as  the  word  indicates,  the  ships  are  not  in  each 
other's  wake,  as  in  line  "ahead,"  but  abreast;  that  is,  ranged  on 
a  line  perpendicular  to  the  course  steered. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  123 

which  with  a  westerly  wind  was  with  heads  to  the  south- 
ward, towards  Cadiz,  a  hundred  miles  to  the  south-east,  he 
changed  the  orders  to  a  "General  Chase,"  the  ships  to  en- 
gage as  they  came  up;  "to  leeward,"  so  as  to  get  between 
the  enemy  and  his  port,  and  "in  rotation,"  by  which  probably 
was  meant  that  the  leading  British  vessel  should  attack  the 
sternmost  of  the  Spaniards,  and  that  her  followers  should 
pass  her  to  leeward,  successively  engaging  from  the  enemy's 
rear  towards  the  van. 

At  4  P.M.  the  signal  for  battle  was  made,  and  a  few  minutes 
later  the  four  headmost  of  the  pursuers  got  into  action.  At 
4.40  one  of  the  Spanish  ships,  the  Santo  Domingo,  80,  blew 
up  with  all  on  board,  and  at  6  another  struck.  By  this 
hour,  it  being  January,  darkness  had  set  in.  A  night  action 
therefore  followed,  which  lasted  until  2  a.m.,  when  the  head- 
most of  the  enemy  surrendered,  and  all  firing  ceased.  Of 
the  eleven  hostile  ships  of  the  line,  only  four  escaped.  Be- 
sides the  one  blown  up,  six  were  taken.  These  were  the 
Fenix,  80,  flag  of  the  Spanish  Admiral,  Don  Juan  de  Langara, 
the  Monarca,  70,  the  Princesa,  70,  the  Diligente,  70,  the  San 
Julian,  70,  and  the  San  Eugenio,  70.  The  two  latter  drove 
ashore  and  were  lost.^  The  remaining  four  were  brought 
into  Gibraltar,  and  were  ultimately  added  to  the  Navy. 
All  retained  their  old  names,  save  the  Fenix,  which  was  re- 
named Gibraltar.  "The  weather  during  the  night,"  by  Rod- 
ney's report,  "was  at  times  very  tempestuous,  with  a  great 
sea.  It  continued  very  bad  weather  the  next  day,  when  the 
Royal  George,  100,  Prince  George,  90,  Sandwich,  90  (Rodney's 
flagship),  and  several  other  ships  were  in  great  danger,  and 
under  the  necessity  of  making  sail  to  avoid  the  shoals  of  San 
Lucar,  nor  did  they  get  into  deep  water  till  the  next  morn- 
ing." 

1  Rodney's  Report.  Chevalier  says  that  one  of  them  was  retaken 
by  her  crew  and  carried  into  Cadiz. 


124    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

It  was  in  this  danger  from  a  lee  shore,  which  was  dehber- 
ately  though  promptly  incurred,  that  the  distinction  of  this 
action  of  Rodney's  consists.  The  enemy's  squadron,  being 
only  eleven  ships  of  the  line,  was  but  half  the  force  of  the 
British,  and  it  was  taken  by  surprise ;  which,  to  be  sure,  is 
no  excuse  for  a  body  of  war-ships  in  war-time.  Caught  un- 
awares, the  Spaniards  took  to  flight  too  late.  It  was  Rod- 
ney's merit,  and  no  slight  one  under  the  conditions  of  weather 
and  navigation,  that  they  were  not  permitted  to  retrieve  their 
mistake.  His  action  left  nothing  to  be  desired  in  resolution 
or  readiness.  It  is  true  that  Rodney  discussed  the  matter 
with  his  flag-captain,  Walter  Young,  and  that  rumor  attrib- 
uted the  merit  of  the  decision  to  the  latter;  but  this  sort 
of  detraction  is  of  too  common  occurrence  to  affect  opinion. 
Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  Physician  to  the  Fleet,  gives  the  following 
account :  "  When  it  was  close  upon  sunset,  it  became  a  ques- 
tion whether  the  chase  should  be  continued.  After  some  dis- 
cussion between  the  Admiral  and  Captain,  at  which  I  was 
present,  the  Admiral  being  confined  with  the  gout,  it  was 
decided  to  persist  in  the  same  course,  with  the  signal  to  en- 
gage to  leeward."  Rodney  at  that  time  was  nearly  sixty-two, 
and  a  constant  martyr  to  gout  in  both  feet  and  hands. 

The  two  successes  by  the  way  imparted  a  slightly  triumphal 
character  to  the  welcome  of  the  Admiral  by  the  garrison, 
then  sorely  in  need  of  some  good  news.  The  arrival  of  much- 
needed  supplies  from  home  was  itself  a  matter  of  rejoicing; 
but  it  was  more  inspiriting  still  to  see  following  in  the  train 
of  the  friendly  fleet  five  hostile  ships  of  the  line,  one  of  them 
bearing  the  flag  of  a  Commander-in-Chief,  and  to  hear  that, 
besides  these,  three  more  had  been  sunk  or  destroyed.  The 
exultation  in  England  was  even  greater,  and  especially  at 
the  Admiralty,  which  was  labouring  under  the  just  indig- 
nation of  the  people  for  the  unpreparedness  of  the  Navy. 
"You   have   taken   more   line-of-battle   ships,"    wrote   the 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  125 

First  Lord  to  Rodney,  "than  had  been  captured  in  any  one 
action  in  either  of  the  two  last  preceding  wars." 

It  should  be  remembered,  too,  as  an  element  in  the  triumph, 
that  this  advantage  over  an  exposed  detachment  had  been 
snatched,  as  it  were,  in  the  teeth  of  a  main  fleet  superior  to 
Rodney's  own;  for  twenty  Spanish  and  four  French  ships 
of  the  line,  under  Admiral  de  Cordova,  were  lying  then  in 
Cadiz  Bay.  During  the  eighteen  days  when  the  British 
remained  in  and  near  the  Straits,  no  attempt  was  made  by 
Cordova  to  take  revenge  for  the  disaster,  or  to  reap  the  benefit 
of  superior  force.  The  inaction  was  due,  probably,  to  the 
poor  condition  of  the  Spanish  ships  in  point  of  efficiency  and 
equipment,  and  largely  to  their  having  uncoppered  bottoms. 
This  element  of  inferiority  in  the  Spanish  navy  should  be 
kept  in  mind  as  a  factor  in  the  general  war,  although  Spanish 
fleets  did  not  come  much  into  battle.  A  French  Commo- 
dore, then  with  the  Spanish  fleet  in  Ferrol,  wrote  as  follows : 
"Their  ships  all  sail  so  badly  that  they  can  neither  overtake 
an  enemy  nor  escape  from  one.  The  Glorieux  is  a  bad  sailer 
in  the  French  navy,  but  better  than  the  best  among  the 
Spaniards."  He  adds  :  "The  vessels  of  Langara's  squadron 
were  surprised  at  immense  distances  one  from  the  other. 
Thus  they  always  sail,  and  their  negligence  and  security  on 
this  point  are  incredible." 

On  approaching  Gibraltar,  the  continuance  of  bad  weather, 
and  the  strong  easterly  current  of  the  Straits,  set  many  of 
Rodney's  ships  and  convoy  to  leeward,  to  the  back  of  the 
Rock,  and  it  was  not  till  the  26th  that  the  flagship  herself 
anchored.  The  storeships  for  Minorca  were  sent  on  at  once, 
under  charge  of  three  coppered  ships  of  the  line.  The  prac- 
tice of  coppering,  though  then  fully  adopted,  had  not  yet 
been  extended  to  all  vessels.  As  an  element  of  speed,  it  was 
an  important  factor  on  an  occasion  like  this,  when  time 
pressed  to  get  to  the  West  Indies ;  as  it  also  was  in  an  engage- 


126    MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

ment.  The  action  on  the  16th  had  been  opened  by  the  cop- 
pered ships  of  the  Hne,  which  first  overtook  the  retreating 
enemy  and  brought  his  rear  to  battle.  In  the  French  navy 
at  the  time,  SufFren  was  urging  the  adoption  upon  an  ap- 
parently reluctant  Minister.  It  would  seem  to  have  been 
more  general  among  the  British,  going  far  to  compensate  for 
the  otherwise  inferior  qualities  of  their  ships.  "  The  Spanish 
men-of-war  we  have  taken,"  wrote  Rodney  to  his  wife  con- 
cerning these  prizes,  "are  much  superior  to  ours."  It  may 
be  remembered  that  Nelson,  thirteen  years  later,  said  the 
same  of  the  Spanish  vessels  which  came  under  his  observa- 
tion. "  I  never  saw  finer  ships."  "I  perceive  you  cry  out 
loudly  for  coppered  ships,"  wrote  the  First  Lord  to  Rodney 
after  this  action ;  "  and  I  am  therefore  determined  to  stop 
your  mouth.     You  shall  have  copper  enough." 

Upon  the  return  of  the  Minorca  ships,  Rodney  put  to  sea 
again  on  the  13th  of  February,  for  the  West  Indies.  The 
detachment  from  the  Channel  fleet  accompanied  him  three 
days'  sail  on  his  way,  and  then  parted  for  England  with  the 
prizes.  On  this  return  voyage  it  fell  in  with  fifteen  French 
supply  vessels,  convoyed  by  two  64's,  bound  for  the 
He  de  France,^  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  One  of  the  ships  of 
war,  the  Protee,  and  three  of  the  storeships  were  taken. 
Though  trivial,  the  incident  illustrates  the  effect  of  operations 
in  Europe  upon  war  in  India.  It  may  be  mentioned  here 
as  indicative  of  the  government's  dilemmas,  that  Rodney 
was  censured  for  having  left  one  ship  of  the  line  at  the  Rock. 
"  It  has  given  us  the  trouble  and  risk  of  sending  a  frigate  on 
purpose  to  order  her  home  immediately;  and  if  you  will 
look  into  your  original  instructions,  you  will  find  that  there 
was  no  point  more  strongly  guarded  against  than  that  of 
your  leaving  any  line-of-battle  ship  behind  you."    These 

1  Now  the  British  Mauritius. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  127 

words  clearly  show  the  exigency  and  peril  of  the  general 
situation,  owing  to  the  inadequate  development  of  the  naval 
force  as  compared  w^ith  its  foes.  Such  isolated  ships  ran  the 
gantlet  of  the  fleets  in  Cadiz,  Ferrol,  and  Brest  flanking 
the  routes. 


128      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  VIII 

RODNEY  AND  DE  GUICHEN'S  NAVAL  CAMPAIGN 
IN  WEST  INDIES.  DE  GUICHEN  RETURNS  TO 
EUROPE,  AND  RODNEY  GOES  TO  NEW  YORK. 
LORD  CORNWALLIS  IN  THE  CAROLINAS.  TWO 
NAVAL  ACTIONS  OF  COMMODORE  CORNWAL- 
LIS.   RODNEY  RETURNS  TO  WEST  INDIES 

WHEN  Rodney  arrived  at  Santa  Lucia  with  his 
four  ships  of  the  Hne,  on  March  27,  1780, 
he  found  there  a  force  of  sixteen  others,  com- 
posed in  about  equal  proportions  of  ships  that 
had  left  England  with  Byron  in  the  summer  of  1778,  and  of 
a  reinforcement  brought  by  Rear-Admiral  Rowley  in  the 
spring  of  1779. 

During  the  temporary  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Hyde 
Parker,  between  the  departure  of  Byron  and  the  arrival  of 
Rodney,  a  smart  affair  had  taken  place  between  a  detach- 
ment of  the  squadron  and  one  from  the  French  division, 
under  La  Motte-Picquet,  then  lying  in  Fort  Royal,  Marti- 
nique. 

On  the  18th  of  December,  1779,  between  8  and  9  a.m., 
the  British  look-out  ship,  the  Preston,  50,  between  Marti- 
nique and  Santa  Lucia  made  signal  for  a  fleet  to  windward, 
which  proved  to  be  a  body  of  French  supply  ships,  twenty- 
six  in  number,  under  convoy  of  a  frigate.  Both  the  British 
and  the  French  squadrons  were  in  disarray,  sails  unbent, 
ships  on  the  heel  or  partially  disarmed,  crews  ashore  for 
wood  and  water.  In  both,  signals  flew  at  once  for  certain 
ships  to  get  under  way,  and  in  both  the  orders  were  executed 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  129 

with  a  rapidity  gratifying  to  the  two  commanders,  who  also 
went  out  in  person.  The  British,  however,  were  outside 
first,  with  five  sail  of  the  line  and  a  50-gun  ship.  Nine  of 
the  supply  vessels  were  captured  by  them,  and  four  forced 
ashore.  The  French  Rear- Admiral  had  by  this  time  got 
out  of  Fort  Royal  with  three  ships  of  the  line,  —  the  Anni- 
bal,  74,  Vengeur,  64,  and  Reflechi,  64,  —  and,  being  to  wind- 
w^ard,  covered  the  entrance  of  the  remainder  of  the  convoy. 
As  the  two  hostile  divisions  were  now  near  each  other,  with 
a  fine  working  breeze,  the  British  tried  to  beat  up  to  the 
enemy;  the  Conqueror,  74,  Captain  Walter  Griffith,  being 
ahead  and  to  windward  of  her  consorts.  Coming  within 
range  at  5,  firing  began  between  her  and  the  French  flag- 
ship, Annibal,  74,  and  subsequently  between  her  and  all  the 
three  vessels  of  the  enemy.  Towards  sunset,  the  Albion, 
74,  had  got  close  up  with  the  Conqueror,  and  the  other  ships 
were  within  distant  range;  "but  as  they  had  worked  not 
only  well  within  the  dangers  of  the  shoals  of  the  bay  (Fort 
Royal),  but  within  reach  of  the  batteries,  I  called  them  off 
by  night  signal  at  a  quarter  before  seven."  ^  In  this  chival- 
rous skirmish,  —  for  it  was  little  more,  although  the  injury 
to  the  French  in  the  loss  of  the  convoy  was  notable,  —  Parker 
was  equally  delighted  with  his  own  squadron  and  with  his 
enemy.  "The  steadiness  and  coolness  with  which  on  every 
tack  the  Conqueror  received  the  fire  of  these  three  ships,  and 
returned  her  own,  working  his  ship  with  as  much  exact- 
ness as  if  he  had  been  turning  into  Spithead,  and  on  every 
board  gaining  on  the  enemy,  gave  me  infinite  pleasure.  It 
was  with  inexpressible  concern,"  he  added,  "that  I  heard  that 
Captain  Walter  Griffith,  of  the  Conqueror,  was  killed  by  the 
last  broadside."  ^  Having  occasion,  a  few  days  later,  to 
exchange  a  flag  of  truce  with  the  French  Rear-Admiral,  he 
wrote  to  him  ;  "  The  conduct  of  your  Excellency  in  the  affair 
1  Parker's    Report.  ^  l})id. 


130    MAJOR  OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

of  the  18th  of  this  month  fully  justifies  the  reputation  which 
you  enjoy  among  us,  and  I  assure  you  that  I  could  not  wit- 
ness without  envy  the  skill  you  showed  on  that  occasion. 
Our  enmity  is  transient,  depending  upon  our  masters ;  but 
your  merit  has  stamped  upon  my  heart  the  greatest  admira- 
tion for  yourself."  This  was  the  officer  who  was  commonly 
known  in  his  time  as  "Vinegar"  Parker;  but  these  letters 
show  that  the  epithet  fitted  the  rind  rather  than  the  kernel. 

Shortly  after  de  Guichen  ^  took  command,  in  March,  1780, 
he  arranged  with  the  Marquis  de  Bouille,  Governor  of  Marti- 
nique, to  make  a  combined  attack  upon  some  one  of  the 
British  West  India  Islands.  For  this  purpose  three  thousand 
troops  were  embarked  in  the  fleet,  which  sailed  on  the  night 
of  the  13th  of  April,  1780,  intending  first  to  accompany  a 
convoy  for  Santo  Domingo,  until  it  was  safely  out  of  reach 
of  the  British.  Rodney,  who  was  informed  at  once  of  the 
French  departure,  put  to  sea  in  chase  with  all  his  ships, 
twenty  of  the  line,  two  of  which  were  of  90  guns,  and  on  the 
16th  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy  to  leeward  (westward)  of 
Martinique,  beating  up  against  the  north-east  trade-winds, 
and  intending  to  pass  through  the  channel  between  that 
island  and  Dominica.  "A  general  chase  to  the  north-west 
followed,  and  at  five  in  the  evening  we  plainly  discovered  that 
they  consisted  of  twenty-three  sail  of  the  line,  and  one  50 
gun  ship."  ^ 

As  it  fell  dark  Rodney  formed  his  line  of  battle,  standing 
still  to  the  north-west,  therefore  on  the  starboard  tack; 
and  he  was  attentive  to  keep  to  windward  of  the  enemy, 
whom   his   frigates   watched   diligently   during   the   night. 

^  Ante,  p.  115. 

2  Rodney's  Report.  The  French  authorities  give  their  h'ne  of 
battle  as  twenty -two  ships  of  the  line.  There  was  no  90-gun  ship 
among  them  —  no  three-decker ;  but  there  were  two  of  80  guns, 
of  which  also  the  British  had  none. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  131 

"Their  manoeuvres,"  he  wrote,  "indicated  a  wish  to  avoid 
battle,"  and  he  therefore  was  careful  to  counteract  them. 
At  daylight  of  April  17th,  they  were  seen  forming  line  of 
battle,  on  the  port  tack,  four  or  five  leagues  to  leeward,  — 
that  is,  to  the  westward.  The  wind  being  east,  or  east  by 
north,  the  French  would  be  heading  south-south-east  (Fig. 
1,  aa).  The  British  order  now  was  rectified  by  signal  from 
the  irregularities  of  darkness,  the  ships  being  directed  to 
keep  two  cables'  ^  lengths  apart,  and  steering  as  before  to 
the  northward  and  westward.  At  7  a.m.,  considering  this 
line  too  extended,  the  Admiral  closed  the  intervals  to  one 
cable  (aa).  The  two  fleets  thus  were  passing  on  nearly 
parallel  lines,  but  in  opposite  directions,  which  tended  to 
bring  the  whole  force  of  Rodney,  whose  line  was  better  and 
more  compact  than  the  enemy's,  abreast  the  latter's  rear, 
upon  which  he  intended  to  concentrate.  At  8  a.m.  he  made 
general  signal  that  this  was  his  purpose;  and  at  8.30,  to 
execute  it,  he  signalled  for  the  ships  to  form  line  abreast, 
bearing  from  each  other  south  by  east  and  north  by  west, 
and  stood  down  at  once  upon  the  enemy  (Fig.  1,  bb).  The 
object  of  the  British  being  evident,  de  Guichen  made  his 
fleet  wear  together  to  the  starboard  tack  (bb).  The  French 
rear  thus  became  the  van,  and  their  former  van,  which  was 
stretched  too  far  for  prompt  assistance  to  the  threatened 
rear,  now  headed  to  support  it. 

Rodney,  baulked  in  his  first  spring,  hauled  at  once  to  the 
wind  on  the  port  tack  (Fig.  1,  cc),  again  contrary  to  the 
French,  standing  thus  once  more  along  their  line,  for  their 
new  rear.  The  intervals  were  opened  out  again  to  two  ca- 
bles. The  fleets  thus  were  passing  once  more  on  parallel 
lines,  each  having  reversed  its  order;  but  the  British  still 
retained  the  advantage,  on  whatever  course  and  interval, 

1  A  cable  was  then  assumed  to  have  a  length  of  120  fathoms,  — 
720  feet. 


132    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

that  they  were  much  more  compact  than  the  French,  whose 
Hne,  by  Rodney's  estimate,  extended  four  leagues  in  length.^ 
The  wariness  of  the  two  combatants,  both  trained  in  the 
school  of  the  eighteenth  century  with  its  reverence  for  the 
line  of  battle,  will  appear  to  the  careful  reader.  Rodney, 
although  struggling  through  this  chrysalis  stage  to  the  later 
vigor,  and  seriously  bent  on  a  deadly  blow,  still  was  con- 
strained by  the  traditions  of  watchful  fencing.  Nor  was 
his  caution  extravagant ;  conditions  did  not  justify  yet  the 
apparent  recklessness  of  Nelson's  tactics.  "The  different 
movements  of  the  enemy,"  he  wrote,  "obliged  me  to  be  very 
attentive,  and  watch  every  opportunity  that  offered  of  at- 
tacking them  to  advantage." 

The  two  fleets  continued  to  stand  on  opposite  parallel 
courses  —  the  French  north  by  west,  the  British  south  by  east 
—  until  the  flagship  Sandwich,  90,  (Fig.  2,  S  ^)  was  abreast 
the  Couronne,  80,  (C),  the  flagship  of  de  Guichen.  Then, 
at  10.10  A.M.,  the  signal  was  made  to  wear  together,  forming 
on  the  same  tack  as  the  enemy.  There  being  some  delay  in 
execution,  this  had  to  be  repeated,  and  further  enforced  by 
the  pennant  of  the  Stirling  Castle,  which,  as  the  rear  ship, 
should  begin  the  evolution.  At  half-past  ten,  apparently, 
the  fleet  was  about  (Fig.  2,  aa),  for  an  order  was  then  given 
for  rectifying  the  line,  still  at  two  cables.  At  11  a.m.  the 
Admiral  made  the  signal  to  prepare  for  battle,  "to  convince 
the  whole  fleet  I  was  determined  to  bring  the  enemy  to  an 
engagement,"  ^  and  to  this  succeeded  shortly  the  order  to 
alter  the  course  to  port  (bb),  towards  the  enemy. ^     Why  he 

^  A  properly  formed  line  of  twenty  ships,  at  two  cables'  interval, 
would  be  about  five  miles  long.  Rodney  seems  to  have  been  satisfied 
that  this  was  about  the  condition  of  his  fleet  at  this  moment. 

2  Rodney's  Report. 

3  Testimony  of  the  signal  officer  at  the  cDurt-martial  on  Captain 
Bateman. 


Rod]M::y  and  Dk  Gliciii:> 

27th  A)>rih  1780. 

Fkj.I. 

First  Max<i:i  vkk  8  to  0  a.  ^r. 

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Freac-h   o  22  Ships 


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Rod>kya>dDi:  Glichkn 

17  th  April,  1780 

Secox 


17  th  April,  1780.  ^m'^-^' 

Firx.2.  ^^^-^/^tL    Ly 

lEcoxD  3lANa-'rvKK  A>i)  Attack  ^^'^,'    i    •'  i  ■    If     " 


iV 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  133 

thought  that  any  of  the  fleet  should  have  required  such 
assurance  cannot  certainly  be  said.  Possibly,  although  he 
had  so  recently  joined,  he  had  already  detected  the  ill-will, 
or  the  slackness,  of  which  he  afterwards  complained ;  pos- 
sibly he  feared  that  the  wariness  of  his  tactics  might  lead  men 
to  believe  that  he  did  not  mean  to  exceed  the  lukewarm  and 
indecisive  action  of  days  scarce  yet  passed  away,  which  had 
led  Suffren  to  stigmatize  tactics  as  a  mere  veil,  behind  which 
timidity  thinks  to  hide  its  nakedness. 

At  11.50  A.M.  the  decisive  signal  was  made  "for  every 
ship  to  bear  down,  and  steer  for  her  opposite  in  the  enemy^s 
line,  agreeable  to  the  21st  article  of  the  Additional  Fighting 
Instructions."  Five  minutes  later,  when  the  ships,  pre- 
sumably, had  altered  their  course  for  the  enemy,  the  signal 
for  battle  was  made,  followed  by  the  message  that  the  Ad- 
miral's intention  was  to  engage  closely ;  he  expecting,  natu- 
rally, that  every  ship  would  follow  the  example  he  purposed 
to  set.  The  captain  of  the  ship  which  in  the  formation 
(aa)  had  been  the  leader,  upon  whose  action  depended 
that  of  those  near  her,  unfortunately  understood  Rodney's 
signal  to  mean  that  he  was  to  attack  the  enemy's  leader, 
not  the  ship  opposite  to  him  at  the  moment  of  bearing 
away.  This  ship,  therefore,  diverged  markedly  from  the 
Admiral's  course,  drawing  after  her  many  of  the  van.  A 
few  minutes  before  1  p.m.,  one  of  the  headmost  ships  began 
to  engage  at  long  range ;  but  it  was  not  till  some  time  after 
1  P.M.  that  the  Sandwich,  having  received  several  broadsides, 
came  into  close  action  (S^)  with  the  second  vessel  astern 
from  the  French  Admiral,  the  Actionnaire,  64.  The  latter 
was  soon  beat  out  of  the  line  by  the  superiority  of  the  Sand- 
wich's battery,  and  the  same  lot  befell  the  ship  astern  of  her, 
—  probably  the  Intrepide,  74,  —  which  came  up  to  close  the 
gap.  Towards  2.30  p.m.,  the  Sandwich,  either  by  her  own 
efforts  to  close,  or  by  her  immediate  opponents'  keeping 


13i     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

away,  was  found  to  be  to  leeward  (S^)  of  the  enemy's  line  ; 
the  Couronne  (C)  being  on  her  weather  bow.  The  fact  was 
pointed  out  by  Rodney  to  the  captain  of  the  ship,  Walter 
Young,  who  was  then  in  the  lee  gangway.  Young,  going 
over  to  look  for  himself,  saw  that  it  was  so,  and  that  the 
Yarmouth,  64,  had  hauled  off  to  windward,  where  she  lay 
with  her  main  and  mizzen  topsails  aback.  Signals  were  then 
made  to  her,  and  to  the  Cormvall,  74,  to  come  to  closer  en- 
gagement, they  both  being  on  the  weather  bow  of  the  flag- 
ship. 

De  Guichen,  recognising  this  state  of  affairs,  then  or  a 
little  later,  attributed  it  to  the  deliberate  purpose  of  the 
British  Admiral  to  break  his  line.  It  does  not  appear  that 
Rodney  so  intended.  His  tactical  idea  was  to  concentrate 
his  whole  fleet  on  the  French  rear  and  centre,  but  there  is 
no  indication  that  he  now  aimed  at  breaking  the  line.  De 
Guichen  so  construing  it,  however,  gave  the  signal  to  wear 
together,  away  from  the  British  line.  The  effect  of  this,  in 
any  event,  would  have  been  to  carry  his  fleet  somewhat  to 
leeward ;  but  with  ships  more  or  less  crippled,  taking  there- 
fore greater  room  to  manoeuvre,  and  with  the  exigency  of  re- 
forming the  line  upon  them,  the  tendency  was  exaggerated. 
The  movement  which  the  French  called  wearing  together  was 
therefore  differently  interpreted  by  Rodney.  "The  action 
in  the  centre  continued  till  4.15  p.m.,  when  M.  de  Guichen, 
in  the  Couronne,  the  Triomphant,  and  the  Fendant,  after 
engaging  the  Sandwich  for  an  hour  and  a  half,  bore  away. 
The  superiority  of  fire  from  the  Sandwich,  and  the  gallant 
behavior  of  the  officers  and  men,  enabled  her  to  sustain  so 
unequal  a  combat ;  though  before  attacked  by  them,  she  had 
beat  three  ships  out  of  their  line  of  battle,  had  entirely  broke 
it,  and  was  to  leeward  of  the  French  Admiral."  Possibly 
the  French  accounts,  if  they  were  not  so  very  meagre,  might 
dispute  this  prowess  of  the  flagship;    but  there  can  be  no 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  135 

doubt  that  Rodney  had  set  an  example,  which,  had  it  been 
followed  by  all,  would  have  made  this  engagement  memora- 
ble, if  not  decisive.  He  reported  that  the  captains,  with  very 
few  exceptions,  had  placed  their  ships  improperly  (cc) .  The 
Sandwich  had  eighty  shot  in  her  hull,  had  lost  her  foremast 
and  mainyard,  and  had  fired  3288  rounds,  an  average  of 
73  to  each  gun  of  the  broadside  engaged.  Three  of  her  hits 
being  below  the  water  line,  she  was  kept  afloat  with  diffi- 
culty during  the  next  twenty-four  hours.  With  the  wearing 
of  the  French  the  battle  ceased. 

In  the  advantage  offered  by  the  enemy,  whose  order  was 
too  greatly  extended,  and  in  his  own  plan  of  attack,  Rodney 
always  considered  this  action  of  April  17th,  1780,  to  have 
been  the  great  opportunity  of  his  life;  and  his  wrath  was 
bitter  against  those  by  whose  misconduct  he  conceived  it 
had  been  frustrated.  "The  French  admiral,  who  appeared 
to  me  to  be  a  brave  and  gallant  officer,  had  the  honour  to 
be  nobly  supported  during  the  whole  action.  It  is  with 
concern  inexpressible,  mixed  with  indignation,  that  the  duty 
I  owe  my  sovereign  and  my  country  obliges  me  to  acquaint 
your  Lordships  that  during  the  action  between  the  French 
fleet,  on  the  17th  inst,  and  his  Majesty's,  the  British  flag 
was  not  properly  supported."  Divided  as  the  Navy  was 
then  into  factions,  with  their  hands  at  each  other's  throats 
or  at  the  throat  of  the  Admiralty,  the  latter  thought  it  more 
discreet  to  suppress  this  paragraph,  allowing  to  appear  only 
the  negative  stigma  of  the  encomium  upon  the  French  officers, 
unaccompanied  by  any  upon  his  own.  Rodney,  however,  in 
public  and  private  letters  did  not  conceal  his  feelings ;  and 
the  censure  found  its  way  to  the  ears  of  those  concerned. 
Subsequently,  three  months  after  the  action,  in  a  public 
letter,  he  bore  testimony  to  the  excellent  conduct  of  five  of 
the  captains,  Walter  Young,  of  the  flagship,  George  Bowyer 
of  the  Albion,  John  Douglas  of  the  Terrible,  John  Houlton 


136     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

of  the  Montagu,  and  A.  J.  P.  INIolloy  ^  of  the  Trident  "To 
them  I  have  given  certificates,  under  my  hand,"  "free 
and  unsolicited."  Beyond  these,  "no  consideration  in  Hfe 
would  induce"  him  to  go;  and  the  two  junior  flag-officers 
were  implicitly  condemned  in  the  words,  "to  inattention 
to  signals,  both  in  the  van  and  rear  divisions,  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted the  loss  of  that  glorious  opportunity  (perhaps  never 
to  be  recovered)  of  terminating  the  naval  contest  in  these 
seas."  These  junior  admirals  were  Hyde  Parker  and  Row- 
ley; the  latter  the  same  who  had  behaved,  not  only  so 
gallantly,  but  with  such  unusual  initiative,  in  Byron's 
engagement.  A  singular  incident  in  this  case  led  him  to  a 
like  independence  of  action,  which  displeased  Rodney.  The 
Montagu,  of  his  division,  when  closing  the  French  line,  wore 
against  the  helm,  and  could  only  be  brought  into  action  on 
the  wrong  (port)  tack.  Immediately  upon  this,  part  of  the 
French  rear  also  wore,  and  Rowley  followed  them  of  his 
own  motion.  Being  called  to  account  by  Rodney,  he  stated 
the  facts,  justif^dng  the  act  by  the  order  that  "the  greatest 
impression  was  to  be  made  on  the  enemy's  rear."  Both 
parties  soon  wore  back. 

Hyde  Parker  went  home  in  a  rage  a  few  weeks  later.  The 
certificates  to  Bowyer  and  Douglas,  certainly,  and  probably 
to  Molloy,  all  of  Parker's  division,  bore  the  stinging  words 
that  these  officers  "meant  well,  and  would  have  done  their 
duty  had  they  been  permitted."  It  is  stated  that  their  ships, 
which  were  the  rear  of  the  van  division,  were  going  down  to 
engage  close,  following  Rodney's  example,  when  Parker  made 
them  a  signal  to  keep  the  line.  If  this  be  so,  as  Parker's 
courage  was  beyond  all  doubt,  it  was  simply  a  recurrence  of 
the  old  superstition  of  the  line,  aggravated  by  a  misunder- 

^  Singularly  enough,  this  officer  was  afterwards  court-martialled 
for  misbehaviour,  on  the  1st  of  June,  1794,  of  precisely  the  same 
character  as  that  from  all  share  in  which  Rodney  now  cleared  him. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  137 

standing  of  Rodney's  later  signals.  These  must  be  dis- 
cussed, for  the  whole  incident  is  part  of  the  history  of  the 
British  Navy,  far  more  important  than  many  an  indecisive 
though  bloody  encounter. 

One  of  the  captains  more  expressly  blamed,  Carkett  of 
the  Stirling  Castle,  which  had  been  the  leading  ship  at  the 
time  the  signal  to  alter  the  course  toward  the  enemy  was 
made,  wrote  to  Rodney  that  he  understood  that  his  name 
had  been  mentioned,  unfavourably  of  course,  in  the  public 
letter.  Rodney's  reply  makes  perfectly  apparent  the  point 
at  issue,  his  own  plan,  the  ideas  running  in  his  head  as  he 
made  his  successive  signals,  the  misconceptions  of  the  jun- 
iors, and  the  consequent  fiasco.  It  must  be  said,  however, 
that,  granting  the  facts  as  they  seem  certainly  to  have  oc- 
curred, no  misunderstanding,  no  technical  verbal  allegation, 
can  justify  a  military  stupidity  so  great  as  that  of  which 
he  complained.  There  are  occasions  in  which  not  only  is 
literal  disobedience  permissible,  but  literal  obedience,  flying 
in  the  face  of  the  evident  conditions,  becomes  a  crime. 

At  8  in  the  morning,  Rodney  had  made  a  general  signal 
of  his  purpose  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear.  This,  having  been 
understood  and  answered,  was  hauled  down;  all  juniors 
had  been  acquainted  with  a  general  purpose,  to  which  the 
subsequent  manoeuvres  were  to  lead.  How  he  meant  to 
carry  out  his  intention  was  evidenced  by  the  consecutive 
course  of  action  while  on  that  tack,  —  the  starboard ;  when 
the  time  came,  the  fleet  bore  up  together,  in  line  abreast, 
standing  for  the  French  rear.  This  attempt,  being  balked 
then  by  de  Guichen's  wearing,  was  renewed  two  hours  later ; 
only  in  place  of  the  signal  to  form  line  abreast,  was  made  one 
to  alter  the  course  to  port,  —  towards  the  enemy.  As  this 
followed  immediately  upon  that  to  prepare  for  battle,  it 
indicated  almost  beyond  question,  that  Rodney  wished,  for 
reasons  of  the  moment,  to  run  down  at  first  in  a  slanting 


138    MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

direction,  —  not  in  line  abreast,  as  before,  —  ships  taking 
course  and  interval  from  the  flagship.  Later  again,  at  11.50, 
the  signal  was  made,  "agreeable  to  the  21st  Article  of  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions,  for  every  ship  to  steer  for 
her  opposite  in  the  enemy's  line;"  and  here  the  trouble  be- 
gan. Rodney  meant  the  ship  opposite  when  the  signal  was 
hauled  down.  He  had  steered  slanting,  till  he  had  gained 
as  nearly  as  possible  the  position  he  wanted,  probably  till 
within  long  range ;  then  it  was  desirable  to  cover  the  remain- 
ing ground  as  rapidly  and  orderly  as  possible,  for  which  pur- 
pose the  enemy's  ship  then  abreast  gave  each  of  his  fleet  its 
convenient  point  of  direction.  He  conceived  that  his  sig- 
nalled purpose  to  attack  the  enemy's  rear,  never  having  been 
altered,  remained  imperative;  and  further,  that  the  signal 
for  two  cables'  length  interval  should  govern  all  ships,  and 
w^ould  tie  them  to  him,  and  to  his  movements,  in  the  centre. 
Carkett  construed  "opposite"  to  mean  opposite  in  numerical 
order,  British  van  ship  against  French  van  ship,  wherever 
the  latter  was.  Rodney  states  —  in  his  letter  to  Carkett  — 
that  the  French  van  was  then  two  leagues  away.  "You  led 
to  the  van  ship,  notwithstanding  you  had  answered  my  sig- 
nals signifying  that  it  was  my  intention  to  attack  the  enemy's 
rear;  which  signal  I  had  never  altered.  .  .  .  Your  leading 
in  the  manner  you  did,  induced  others  to  follow  so  bad  an 
example ;  and  thereby,  forgetting  that  the  signal  for  the  line 
was  only  at  two  cables'  length  distance  from  each  other, 
the  van  division  was  led  by  you  to  more  than  two  leagues' 
distance  from  the  centre  division,  which  was  thereby  not 
properly  supported."  ^ 

1  The  words  in  Rodney's  public  letter,  suppressed  at  the  time  by 
the  Admiralty,  agree  with  these,  but  are  even  more  explicit.  "I 
cannot  conclude  this  letter  without  acquainting  their  Lordships  that 
had  Captain  Carkett,  who  led  the  van,  properly  obeyed  my  signal 
for  attacking  the  enemy,  and  agreeable  to  the  21st  Article  of  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions,  bore  down  instantly  to  the  ship 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  139 

Carkett  was  the  oldest  captain  in  the  fleet,  his  post  com- 
mission being  dated  March  12th,  1758.  How  far  he  may  have 
been  excusable  in  construing  as  he  did  Fighting  Instructions, 
which  originated  in  the  inane  conception  that  the  supreme 
duty  of  a  Commander-in-Chief  was  to  oppose  ship  to  ship, 
and  that  a  fleet  action  was  only  an  agglomeration  of  naval 
duels,  is  not  very  material,  though  historically  interesting. 
There  certainly  was  that  in  the  past  history  of  the  British 
Navy  which  extenuated  the  offence  of  a  man  who  must  have 
been  well  on  in  middle  life.  But  since  the  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions had  been  first  issued  there  had  been  the  courts-martial, 
also  instructive,  on  Mathews,  Lestock,  Byng,  Keppel,  and 
Palliser,  all  of  which  turned  more  or  less  on  the  constraint 
of  the  line  of  battle,  and  the  duty  of  supporting  ships  engaged, 
—  above  all,  an  engaged  Commander-in-Chief.  Rodney 
perhaps  understimated  the  weight  of  the  Fighting  Instruc- 
tions upon  a  dull  man ;  but  he  was  justified  in  claiming  that 
his  previous  signals,  and  the  prescription  of  distance,  created 

at  that  time  abreast  of  him,  instead  of  leading  as  he  did  to  the  van 
ship,  the  action  had  commenced  much  sooner,  and  the  fleet  engaged 
in  a  more  compact  manner.  .  .  ."  This  clearly  implies  that  the 
Additional  Fighting  Instructions  prescribed  the  direction  which 
Rodney  expected  Carkett  to  take.  If  these  Additional  Instructions 
are  to  be  found,  their  testimony  would  be  interesting. 

Since  this  account  was  written,  the  Navy  Records  Society  has 
published  (1905)  a  volume,  "Fighting  Instructions,  1530-1816," 
by  Mr.  Julian  Corbett,  whose  diligent  researches  in  matters  of 
naval  history  and  warfare  are  appreciated  by  those  interested  in 
such  subjects.  The  specific  "Additional  Instructions"  quoted  by 
Rodney  appear  not  to  have  been  found.  Among  those  given  prior 
to  1780  there  is  none  that  extends  to  twenty-one  articles.  In  a  set 
issued  by  Rodney  in  1782  an  article  (No.  17,  p.  227)  is  apparently 
designed  to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  Carkett's  mistake.  This,  like 
one  by  Hawke,  in  1756  (p.  217),  prescribes  the  intended  action 
rather  by  directing  that  the  hne  of  battle  shall  not  prevent  each  ship 
engaging  its  opponent,  irrespective  of  the  conduct  of  other  ships, 
than  by  making  clear  which  that  opponent  was.  Lucidity  on  this 
point  cannot  be  claimed  for  either. 


140     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

at  the  least  a  conflict  of  orders,  a  doubt,  to  which  there  should 
have  been  but  one  solution,  namely :  to  support  the  ships 
engaged,  and  to  close  down  upon  the  enemy,  as  near  as 
possible  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  And  in  moments  of 
actual  perplexity  such  will  always  be  the  truth.  It  is  like 
marching  towards  the  sound  of  guns,  or,  to  use  Nelson's 
words,  "In  case  signals  cannot  be  understood,  no  captain 
can  do  very  wrong  if  he  places  his  ship  alongside  that  of  an 
enemy."  The  "In  Case,"  however,  needs  also  to  be  kept 
in  mind;  and  that  it  was  Nelson  who  said  it.  Utter- 
ances of  to-day,  like  utterances  of  all  time,  show  how  few 
are  the  men  who  can  hold  both  sides  of  a  truth  firmly,  with- 
out exaggeration  or  defect.  Judicial  impartiality  can  be 
had,  and  positive  convictions  too ;  but  their  combination  is 
rare.     A  two-sided  man  is  apt  also  to  be  double-minded. 

The  loss  of  men  in  this  sharp  encounter  was :  British, 
killed,  120,  wounded,  354;  French,  killed,  222,  wounded, 
537.^  This  gives  three  French  hit  for  every  two  British, 
from  which,  and  from  the  much  greater  damage  received 
aloft  by  the  latter,  it  may  be  inferred  that  both  followed 
their  usual  custom  of  aiming,  the  British  at  the  hull,  the 
French  at  the  spars.  To  the  latter  conduced  also  the  lee- 
gage,  which  the  French  had.  The  British,  as  the  attacking 
party,  suffered  likewise  a  raking  fire  as  they  bore  down. 

Rodney  repaired  damages  at  sea,  and  pursued,  taking 
care  to  keep  between  Martinique  and  the  French.  The 
latter  going  into  Guadeloupe,  he  reconnoitred  them  there 
under  the  batteries,  and  then  took  his  station  ofT  Fort  Royal. 
"The  only  chance  of  bringing  them  to  action,"  he  wrote  to 
the  Admiralty  on  the  26th  of  April,  "  w^as  to  be  off  that  port 
before  them,  where  the  fleet  now  is,  in  daily  expectation  of 

1  Lapeyrouse  Bonfils,  "Histoire  de  la  Marine  Frangaise,"  iii,  132. 
Chevalier  gives  much  smaller  numbers,  but  the  former  has  partic- 
ularised the  ships. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  141 

their  arrival."  The  French  represent  that  he  avoided  them, 
but  as  they  assert  that  they  came  out  best  on  the  17th,  and 
yet  admit  that  he  appeared  off  Guadeloupe,  the  claim  is  not 
tenable.  Rodney  here  showed  thorough  tenacity  of  purpose. 
De  Guichen's  orders  were  "  to  keep  the  sea,  so  far  as  the  force 
maintained  by  England  in  the  Windward  Islands  would  per- 
mit, without  too  far  compromising  the  fleet  intrusted  to  him."  ^ 
With  such  instructions,  he  naturally  and  consistently  shrunk 
from  decisive  engagement.  After  landing  his  wounded  and 
refitting  in  Guadeloupe,  he  again  put  to  sea,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  proceeding  to  Santa  Lucia,  resuming  against  that 
island  the  project  which  both  he  and  De  Bouille  continuously 
entertained.  The  latter  and  his  troops  remained  with  the 
fleet. 

Rodney  meantime  had  felt  compelled  to  return  momen- 
tarily to  Santa  Lucia.  "The  fleet  continued  before  Fort 
Royal  till  the  condition  of  many  of  the  ships  under  my  com- 
mand, and  the  lee  currents,^  rendered  it  necessary  to  anchor 
in  Choque  Bay  (Anse  du  Choc),  St.  Lucie,  in  order  to  put 
the  wounded  and  sick  men  on  shore,  and  to  water  and  refit 
the  fleet,  frigates  having  been  detached  both  to  leeward  and 
to  windward  of  every  island,  in  order  to  gain  intelligence  of 
the  motions  of  the  enemy,  and  timely  notice  of  their  approach 
towards  Martinique,  the  only  place  they  could  refit  at  in  these 
seas."  In  this  last  clause  is  seen  the  strategic  idea  of  the 
British  Admiral :  the  French  must  come  back  to  Martinique. 

From  the  vigilance  of  his  frigates  it  resulted  that  when  the 
look-outs  of  de  Guichen,  who  passed  to  windward  of  Marti- 
nique on  the  7th  of  May,  came  in  sight  of  Gros  Ilet  on  the 
9th,  it  was  simply  to  find  the  British  getting  under  way  to  meet 
the  enemy.     During  the  five  following  days  both  fleets  were 

1  Chevalier,  *'  Marine  Frangaise,"  1778,  p.  185. 

2  A  lee  current  is  one  that  sets  to  leeward,  with  the  wind,  in  thia 
case  the  trade-wind. 


142     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

engaged  in  constant  movements,  upon  the  character  of  which 
the  writers  of  each  nation  put  different  constructions.  Both 
are  agreed,  however,  that  the  French  were  to  windward 
throughout,  except  for  a  brief  hour  on  the  15th,  when  a 
fleeting  change  of  wind  gave  the  British  that  advantage, 
only  to  lose  it  soon  again.  They  at  once  used  it  to  force 
action.  As  the  windward  position  carries  the  power  to 
attack,  and  as  the  French  were  twenty-three  to  the  British 
twenty,  it  is  probably  not  a  strained  inference  to  say  that 
the  latter  were  chasing  to  windward,  and  the  former  avoid- 
ing action,  in  favour,  perhaps,  of  that  ulterior  motive,  the 
conquest  of  Santa  Lucia,  for  which  they  had  sailed.  Rod- 
ney states  in  his  letter  that,  when  the  two  fleets  parted  on  the 
20th  of  May,  they  were  forty  leagues  to  windward  (eastward) 
of  Martinique,  in  sight  of  which  they  had  been  on  the  10th. 

During  these  days  de  Guichen,  whose  fleet,  according  to 
Rodney,  sailed  the  better,  and  certainly  sufficiently  well  to 
preserve  the  advantage  of  the  wind,  bore  down  more  than 
once,  generally  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  breeze  is  steadiest, 
to  within  distant  range  of  the  British.  Upon  this  move- 
ment, the  French  base  the  statement  that  the  British  Ad- 
miral was  avoiding  an  encounter;  it  is  equally  open  to  the 
interpretation  that  he  would  not  throw  away  ammunition 
until  sure  of  effective  distance.  Both  admirals  showed  much 
skill  and  mastery  of  their  profession,  great  wariness  also, 
and  quickness  of  eye ;  but  it  is  wholly  untenable  to  claim  that 
a  fleet  having  the  weather-gage  for  five  days,  in  the  trade- 
winds,  was  unable  to  bring  its  enemy  to  action,  especially 
when  it  is  admitted  that  the  latter  closed  the  instant  the 
wind  permitted  him  to  do  so. 

On  the  afternoon  of  May  15th,  about  the  usual  hour, 
Rodney  "made  a  great  deal  of  sail  upon  the  wind."  The 
French,  inferring  that  he  was  trying  to  get  off,  which  he 
meant  them  to  do,  approached  somewhat  closer  than  on  the 


Rodney  AND  Di:  Guiciijen 

13th  May,  17 80.  .    ^ 

British  »  20  Ships  ^^c^^ 

French  :=  23  Ships        ^.      ^^pC^^^O  0  --^.' 


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WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE        143 

previous  days.  Their  van  ship  had  come  within  long  range, 
abreast  the  centre  of  the  British,  who  were  on  the  port  tack 
standing  to  the  south-south-east,  with  the  wind  at  east 
(aa,  aa).  Here  the  breeze  suddenly  hauled  to  south-south- 
east (wind  b) .  The  heads  of  all  the  ships  in  both  fleets  were 
thus  knocked  off  to  south-west  (s,  s),  on  the  port  tack,  but 
the  shift  left  the  British  rear,  which  on  that  tack  led  the 
fleet,  to  windward  of  the  French  van.  Rodney's  signal 
flew  at  once,  to  tack  in  succession  and  keep  the  wind  of  the 
enemy ;  the  latter,  unwilling  to  yield  the  advantage,  wore  ah 
together  (w) ,  hauling  to  the  wind  on  the  starboard  tack,  and 
to  use  Rodney's  words,  "fled  with  a  crowd  of  sail"  (a^  a')- 
The  British  fleet  tacking  in  succession  after  their  leaders, 
(t,  t),  the  immediate  result  was  that  both  were  now  standing 
on  the  starboard  tack,  —  to  the  eastward,  —  the  British 
having  a  slight  advantage  of  the  wind,  but  well  abaft  the 
beam  of  the  French  (bb,  bb).  The  result,  had  the  wind  held, 
would  have  been  a  trial  of  speed  and  weatherliness.  "His 
Majesty's  fleet,"  wrote  Rodney,  "by  this  manoeuvre  had 
gained  the  wind,  and  would  have  forced  the  enemy  to  battle, 
had  it  not  at  once  changed  six  points  (back  to  east,  its  for- 
mer direction,)  when  near  the  enemy,  and  enabled  them  to 
recover  that  advantage."  When  the  wind  thus  shifted 
again,  de  Guichen  tacked  his  ships  together  and  stood  across 
the  bows  of  the  advancing,  enemy  (cc,  cc).  The  British 
leader  struck  the  French  line  behind  the  centre,  and  ran 
along  to  leeward,  the  British  van  exchanging  a  close  cannon- 
ade with  the  enemy's  rear.  Such  an  engagement,  two  lines 
passing  on  opposite  tacks,  is  usually  indecisive,  even  when 
the  entire  fleets  are  engaged,  as  at  Ushant ;  but  where,  as  in 
this  case,  the  engagement  is  but  partial,  the  result  is  natu- 
rally less.  The  French  van  and  centre,  having  passed  the 
head  of  the  enemy,  diverged  at  that  point  farther  and  farther 
from  the  track  of  the  on-coming  British  ships,  which  from 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  145 

De  Guichen  had  been  successful  in  avoiding  decisive  action, 
and  he  had  momentarily  so  crippled  a  few  of  the  British  ships 
that  the  fleet  must  await  their  repairs  before  again  taking 
the  sea.  The  tactical  gain  was  his,  the  strategic  victory  rested 
with  his  opponent;  but  that  his  ships  also  had  been  much 
maltreated  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  half  a  dozen  could  not 
put  to  sea  three  weeks  later.  The  French  admiral  broke 
down  under  the  strain,  to  which  was  added  the  grief  of  losing 
a  son,  killed  in  the  recent  engagements.  He  asked  for  his 
recall.  "The  command  of  so  large  a  fleet,"  he  wrote,  "is 
infinitely  beyond  my  capacity  in  all  respects.  My  health  can- 
not endure  such  continual  fatigue  and  anxiety."  Certainly 
this  seems  a  tacit  testimony  to  Rodney's  skill,  persistence, 
and  offensive  purpose.  The  latter  wrote  to  his  wife :  "  For 
fourteen  days  and  nights  the  fleets  were  so  near  each  other 
that  neither  officers  nor  men  could  be  said  to  sleep.  Nothing 
but  the  goodness  of  the  weather  and  climate  would  have 
enabled  us  to  endure  so  continual  a  fatigue.  Had  it  been 
in  Europe,  half  the  people  must  have  sunk  under  it.  For  my 
part,  it  did  me  good." 

Rodney  stated  also  in  his  home  letters  that  the  action  of 
his  subordinates  in  the  last  affairs  had  been  efficient;  but 
he  gave  them  little  credit  for  it.  "As  I  had  given  public 
notice  to  all  my  captains,  etc.,  that  I  expected  implicit 
obedience  to  every  signal  made,  under  the  certain  penalty 
of  being  instantly  superseded,  it  had  an  admirable  effect; 
as  they  were  all  convinced,  after  their  late  gross  behaviour, 
that  they  had  nothing  to  expect  at  my  hands  but  instant 
punishment  to  thOse  who  neglected  their  duty.  My  eye  on 
them  had  more  dread  than  the  enemy's  fire,  and  they  knew 
it  would  be  fatal.  No  regard  was  paid  to  rank :  admirals  as 
well  as  captains,  if  out  of  their  station,  were  instantly  rep- 
rimanded by  signals,  or  messages  sent  by  frigates ;  and,  in 
spite  of  themselves,  I  taught  them  to  be,  what  they  had  never 


146    MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

been  before,  —  officers.''  Rodney  told  his  officers  also  that 
he  would  shift  his  flag  into  a  frigate,  if  necessary,  to  watch 
them  better.  It  is  by  no  means  obligatory  to  accept  these 
gross  aspersions  as  significant  of  anything  worse  than  the 
suspiciousness  prevalent  throughout  the  Navy,  traceable 
ultimately  to  a  corrupt  administration  of  the  Admiralty. 
The  latter,  like  the  government  of  1756,  was  open  to  censure 
through  political  maladministration;  every  one  feared  that 
blame  would  be  shifted  on  to  him,  as  it  had  been  on  to  Byng, 
—  who  deserved  it ;  and  not  only  so,  but  that  blame  would 
be  pushed  on  to  ruin,  as  in  his  case.  The  Navy  was  honey- 
combed with  distrust,  falling  little  short  of  panic.  In  this 
state  of  apprehension  and  doubt,  the  tradition  of  the  line 
of  battle,  resting  upon  men  who  did  not  stop  to  study  facts 
or  analyse  impressions,  and  who  had  seen  officers  censured, 
cashiered,  and  shot,  for  errors  of  judgment  or  of  action, 
naturally  produced  hesitations  and  misunderstandings.  An 
order  of  battle  is  a  good  thing,  necessary  to  insure  mutual 
support  and  to  develop  a  plan.  The  error  of  the  century, 
not  then  exploded,  was  to  observe  it  in  the  letter  rather  than 
in  the  spirit;  to  regard  the  order  as  an  end  rather  than  a 
means ;  and  to  seek  in  it  not  merely  efficiency,  which  admits 
broad  construction  in  positions,  but  preciseness,  which  is  as 
narrowing  as  a  brace  of  handcuffs.  Rodney  himself,  Tory 
though  he  was,  found  fault  with  the  administration.  With 
all  his  severity  and  hauteur,  he  did  not  lose  sight  of  justice, 
as  is  shown  by  a  sentence  in  his  letter  to  Carkett.  "  Could  I 
have  imagined  your  conduct  and  inattention  to  signals  had 
proceeded  from  anything  but  error  in  judgment,  I  had  cer- 
tainly superseded  you,  but  God  forbid  I  should  do  so  for 
error  in  judgment  only,"  —  again  an  illusion,  not  obscure,  to 
Byng's  fate. 

In  Barbados,  Rodney  received  certain  information  that 
a  Spanish  squadron  of  twelve  ships  of  the  line,  with  a  large 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  147 

convoy  of  ten  thousand  troops,  had  sailed  from  Cadiz  on 
April  28th  for  the  West  Indies.  The  vessel  bringing  the  news 
had  fallen  in  with  them  on  the  way.  Rodney  spread  a  line 
of  frigates  "to  windward,  from  Barbados  to  Barbuda,"  to 
obtain  timely  warning,  and  with  the  fleet  put  to  sea  on  the 
7th  of  June,  to  cruise  to  the  eastward  of  Martinique  to  in- 
tercept the  enemy.  The  latter  had  been  discovered  on  the 
5th  by  a  frigate,  fifty  leagues  east  of  the  island,  steering  for 
it ;  but  the  Spanish  admiral,  seeing  that  he  would  be  reported, 
changed  his  course,  and  passed  north  of  Gaudeloupe.  On 
the  9th  he  was  joined  in  that  neighbourhood  by  de  Guichen, 
who  was  able  to  bring  with  him  only  fifteen  sail,  —  a  fact 
which  shows  that  he  had  suffered  in  the  late  brushes  quite 
as  severely  as  Rodney,  who  had  with  him  seventeen  of  his 
twenty. 

Having  evaded  the  British,  the  allies  anchored  at  Fort 
Royal;  but  the  Spanish  admiral  absolutely  refused  to  join 
in  any  undertaking  against  the  enemy's  fleet  or  possessions. 
Not  only  so,  but  he  insisted  on  being  accompanied  to  leeward. 
The  Spanish  squadron  was  ravaged  by  an  epidemic,  due  to  un- 
sanitary conditions  of  the  ships  and  the  uncleanliness  of  the 
crews,  and  the  disease  was  communicated  to  their  allies. 
De  Guichen  had  already  orders  to  leave  the  Windward  Islands 
when  winter  approached.  He  decided  now  to  anticipate  that 
time,  and  on  the  5th  of  July  sailed  from  Fort  Royal  with  the 
Spaniards.  Having  accompanied  the  latter  to  the  east  end 
of  Cuba,  he  went  to  Cap  Francois,  in  Haiti,  then  a  principal 
French  station.     The  Spaniards  continued  on  to  Havana. 

At  Cap  Francois,  de  Guichen  found  urgent  entreaties 
from  the  French  Minister  to  the  United  States,  and  from 
Lafayette,  to  carry  his  fleet  to  the  continent,  where  the  clear- 
sighted genius  of  Washington  had  recognised  already  that 
the  issue  of  the  contest  depended  upon  the  navies.  The 
French  admiral  declined  to  comply,  as  contrary  to  his  in- 


148    MAJOR    OPERA  TIONS   OF   THE  NA  VIES  IN  THE 

structions,  and  on  the  16th  of  August  sailed  for  Europe,  with 
nineteen  sail  of  the  line,  leaving  ten  at.Cap  Francois.  Sealed 
orders,  opened  at  sea,  directed  him  to  proceed  to  Cadiz, 
where  he  anchored  on  the  24th  of  October.  His  arrival 
raised  the  allied  force  there  assembled  to  fifty-one  sail  of  the 
line,  besides  the  ninety-five  sugar  and  coffee  ships  which 
he  had  convoyed  from  Haiti.  It  is  significant  of  the  weakness 
of  Great  Britain  in  the  Mediterranean  at  that  time,  that  these 
extremely  valuable  merchant  ships  were  sent  on  to  Toulon, 
instead  of  to  the  more  convenient  Atlantic  ports,  only  five 
ships  of  the  line  accompanying  them  past  Gibraltar.  The 
French  government  had  feared  to  trust  them  to  Brest,  even 
with  de  Guichen's  nineteen  sail. 

The  allied  operations  in  the  Windward  Islands  for  the  sea- 
son of  1780  had  thus  ended  in  nothing,  notwithstanding  an 
incontestable  inferiority  of  the  British  to  the  French  alone, 
of  which  Rodney  strongly  complained.  It  was,  however, 
contrary  to  the  intentions  of  the  Admiralty  that  things  so 
happened.  Orders  had  been  sent  to  Vice- Admiral  Harriot 
Arbuthnot,  at  New  York,  to  detach  ships  to  Rodney;  but 
the  vessel  carrying  them  was  driven  by  weather  to  the  Baha- 
mas, and  her  captain  neglected  to  notify  Arbuthnot  of  his 
whereabouts,  or  of  his  dispatches.  A  detachment  of  five 
ships  of  the  line  under  Commodore  the  Hon.  Robert  Boyle 
Walsingham  was  detained  three  months  in  England,  wind- 
bound.  They  consequently  did  not  join  till  July  12th. 
The  dispositions  at  once  made  by  Rodney  afford  a  very 
good  illustration  of  the  kind  of  duties  that  a  British  Admiral 
had  then  to  discharge.  He  detailed  five  ships  of  the  line 
to  remain  with  Hotham  at  Santa  Lucia,  for  the  protection 
of  the  Windward  Islands.  On  the  17th,  taking  with  him 
a  large  merchant  convoy,  he  put  to  sea  with  the  fleet  for  St. 
Kitts,  where  the  Leeward  Islands  "trade"  was  collecting 
for  England.     On  the  way  he  received  precise  information 


WAR  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  149 

as  to  the  route  and  force  of  the  Franco-Spanish  fleet  under 
de  Guichen,  of  the  sickness  on  board  it,  and  of  the  dissension 
between  the  allies.  From  St.  Kitts  the  July  "trade"  was 
sent  home  with  two  ships  of  the  line.  Three  others,  he  wrote 
to  the  Admiralty,  would  accompany  the  September  fleet, 
"  and  the  remainder  of  the  ships  on  this  station,  which  are  in 
want  of  great  repair  and  are  not  copper-bottomed,  shall 
proceed  with  them  or  with  the  convoy  which  their  Lordships 
have  been  pleased  to  order  shall  sail  from  hence  in  October 
next."  If  these  arrived  before  winter,  he  argued,  they  would 
be  available  by  spring  as  a  reinforcement  for  the  Channel 
fleet,  and  would  enable  the  Admiralty  to  send  him  an  equiv- 
alent number  for  the  winter  work  on  his  station. 

As  de  Guichen  had  taken  the  whole  French  homeward 
merchant  fleet  from  Martinique  to  Cap  Francois  and  as  the 
height  of  the  hurricane  season  was  near,  Rodney  reasoned 
that  but  a  small  French  force  would  remain  in  Haiti,  and 
consequently  that  Jamaica  w^ould  not  require  all  the  British 
fleet  to  save  it  from  any  possible  attack.  He  therefore  sent 
thither  ten  sail  of  the  line,  notifying  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Peter 
Parker  that  they  were  not  merely  to  defend  the  island,  but 
to  enable  him  to  send  home  its  great  trade  in  reasonable 
security. 

These  things  being  done  by  July  31st,  Rodney,  reasoning 
that  the  allies  had  practically  abandoned  all  enterprises  in 
the  West  Indies  for  that  year,  and  that  a  hurricane  might 
at  any  moment  overtake  the  fleet  at  its  anchors,  possibly 
making  for  it  a  lee  shore,  went  to  sea,  to  cruise  w^ith  the  fleet 
off  Barbuda.  His  mind,  however,  was  inclined  already  to 
go  to  the  continent,  whither  he  inferred,  correctly  but  mis- 
takenly, that  the  greater  part  of  de  Guichen's  fleet  would  go, 
because  it  should.  His  purpose  was  confirmed  by  information 
from  an  American  vessel  that  a  French  squadron  of  seven 
ships  of  the  line,  convoying  six  thousand  troops,  had  anchored 


150    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

in  Narragansett  Bay  on  the  12th  of  July.  He  started  at  once 
for  the  coast  of  South  Carohna,  where  he  communicated  with 
the  army  in  Charleston,  and  thence,  "  sweeping  the  southern 
coast  of  America/^  anchored  with  fourteen  ships  of  the  line 
at  Sandy  Hook,  on  the  14th  of  September,  unexpected  and 
unwelcome  to  friends  and  foes  alike. 

Vice-Admiral  Arbuthnot,  being  junior  to  Rodney,  showed 
plainly  and  with  insubordination  his  wrath  at  this  intrusion 
into  his  command,  which  superseded  his  authority  and  divided 
the  prize-money  of  a  lucrative  station.  This,  however,  was 
a  detail.  To  Washington,  Rodney's  coming  was  a  death- 
blow to  the  hopes  raised  by  the  arrival  of  the  French  division 
at  Newport,  which  he  had  expected  to  see  reinforced  by  de 
Guichen.  Actually,  the  departure  of  the  latter  made  im- 
material Rodney's  appearance  on  the  scene ;  but  this  Wash- 
ington did  not  know  then.  As  it  was,  Rodney's  force  joined 
to  Arbuthnot's  constituted  a  fleet  of  over  twenty  sail  of  the 
line,  before  which,  vigorously  used,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  French  squadron  in  Newport  must  have  fallen.  But 
Rodney,  though  he  had  shown  great  energy  in  the  West 
Indies,  and  unusual  resolution  in  quitting  his  own  station  for 
a  more  remote  service,  was  sixty-two,  and  suffered  from  gout. 
"The  sudden  change  of  climate  makes  it  necessary  for  me 
to  go  on  shore  for  some  short  time,"  he  wrote ;  and  although 
he  added  that  his  illness  was  "not  of  such  a  nature  as  shall 
cause  one  moment's  delay  in  his  Majesty's  service,"  he  prob- 
ably lost  a  chance  at  Rhode  Island.  He  did  not  overlook 
the  matter,  it  is  true ;  but  he  decided  upon  the  information 
of  Arbuthnot  and  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  and  did  not  inspect  the 
ground  himself.  Nothing  of  consequence  came  of  his  visit ; 
and  on  the  16th  of  November  he  sailed  again  for  the  West 
Indies,  taking  with  him  only  nine  sail  of  the  line. 

The  arrival  of  de  Ternay's  seven  ships  at  Newport  was  more 
than  offset  by  a  British  reinforcement  of  six  ships  of  the  line 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE         151 

under  Rear-Admiral  Thomas  Graves  which  entered  New  York 
on  July  13th,  —  only  one  day  later.  Arbuthnot's  force  was 
thus  raised  to  ten  of  the  line,  one  of  which  was  of  98  guns. 
After  Rodney  had  come  and  gone,  the  French  division  was 
watched  by  cruisers,  resting  upon  Gardiner's  Bay,  —  a  com- 
modious anchorage  at  the  east  end  of  Long  Island,  between 
thirty  and  forty  miles  from  Rhode  Island.  When  a  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  was  apprehended,  the  squadron  assembled 
there,  but  nothing  of  consequence  occurred  during  the  re- 
mainder of  the  year. 

The  year  1780  had  been  one  of  great  discouragement  to  the 
Americans,  but  the  injury,  except  as  the  lapse  of  time  taxed 
their  staying  power,  was  more  superficial  than  real.  The 
successes  of  the  British  in  the  southern  States,  though  un- 
deniable, and  seemingly  substantial,  were  involving  them  ever 
more  deeply  in  a  ruinously  ex-centric  movement.  They  need 
here  only  to  be  summarised,  as  steps  in  the  process  leading 
to  the  catastrophe  of  Yorktown,  —  a  disaster  which,  as 
Washington  said,  exemplified  naval  rather  than  military 
power. 

The  failure  of  d'Estaing's  attack  upon  Savannah  in  the 
autumn  of  1779  ^  had  left  that  place  in  the  possession  of  the 
British  as  a  base  for  further  advances  in  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia;  lasting  success  in  which  was  expected  from  the 
numbers  of  royalists  in  those  States.  When  the  departure 
of  the  French  fleet  was  ascertained.  Sir  Henry  Clinton  put 
to  sea  from  New  York  in  December,  1779,  for  the  Savannah 
River,  escorted  by  Vice- Admiral  Arbuthnot.  The  details 
of  the  operations,  which  were  leisurely  and  methodical,  will 
not  be  given  here;  for,  although  the  Navy  took  an  active 
part  in  them,  they  scarcely  can  be  considered  of  major  im- 
portance. On  the  12th  of  May,  1780,  the  city  of  Charleston 
capitulated,  between  six  and  seven  thousand  prisoners  being 

^  Ante,  p.  115. 


152     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

taken.  Clinton  then  returned  to  New  York,  leaving  Lord 
Cornwallis  in  command  in  the  south.  The  latter  proposed 
to  remain  quiet  during  the  hot  months ;  but  the  activity  of 
the  American  partisan  troops  prevented  this,  and  in  July 
the  approach  of  a  small,  but  relatively  formidable  force,  under 
General  Gates,  compelled  him  to  take  the  field.  On  the  16th 
of  August  the  two  little  armies  met  at  Camden,  and  the  Ameri- 
cans, who  were  much  the  more  numerous,  but  largely  ir- 
regulars, were  routed  decisively.  This  news  reached  General 
Washington  in  the  north  nearly  at  the  same  moment  that 
the  treason  of  Benedict  Arnold  became  known.  Although 
the  objects  of  his  treachery  were  frustrated,  the  sorrowful 
words,  "Whom  now  can  we  trust?"  show  the  deep  gloom 
which  for  the  moment  shadowed  the  constant  mind  of  the 
American  Commander-in-Chief.  It  was  just  at  this  period, 
too,  that  Rodney  arrived  at  New  York. 

Cornwallis,  not  content  with  his  late  success,  decided  to 
push  on  into  North  Carolina.  Thus  doing,  he  separated 
himself  from  his  naval  base  in  Charleston,  communication 
w^ith  which  by  land  he  had  not  force  to  maintain,  and  could 
recover  effective  touch  with  the  sea  only  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 
This  conclusion  was  not  apparent  from  the  first.  In  North 
Carolina,  the  British  general  did  not  receive  from  the  in- 
habitants the  substantial  support  which  he  had  expected,  and 
found  himself  instead  in  a  very  difficult  and  wild  country,  con- 
fronted by  General  Greene,  the  second  in  ability  of  all  the 
American  leaders.  Harassed  and  baffled,  he  was  compelled 
to  order  supplies  to  be  sent  by  sea  to  Wilmington,  North 
Carolina,  an  out-of-the-way  and  inferior  port,  to  which  he 
turned  aside,  arriving  exhausted  on  the  7th  of  April,  1781. 
The  question  as  to  his  future  course  remained  to  be  settled. 
To  return  to  Charleston  by  sea  was  in  his  power,  but  to  do 
so  would  be  an  open  confession  of  failure,  —  that  he  could 
not  return  by  land,  through  the  country  by  which  he  had  come 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  153 

— much  the  same  dilemma  as  that  of  Howe  and  Clinton  in 
Philadelphia.  To  support  him  in  his  distress  by  a  diversion, 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  had  sent  two  successive  detachments  to 
ravage  the  valley  of  the  James  River  in  Virginia.  These 
were  still  there,  under  the  command  of  General  Phillips; 
and  Cornwallis,  in  the  circumstances,  could  see  many  reasons 
that  thither  was  the  very  scene  to  carry  the  British  opera- 
tions. On  the  25th  of  April,  1781,  he  left  Wilmington,  and  a 
month  later  joined  the  division  at  Petersburg,  Virginia,  then 
commanded  by  Benedict  Arnold;  Phillips  having  died. 
There,  in  touch  now  with  his  fate,  we  must  leave  him  for  the 
moment. 

To  complete  the  naval  transactions  of  1780,  it  is  necessary 
to  mention  briefly  two  incidents,  trivial  in  themselves,  but 
significant,  not  only  as  associated  with  the  greater  movements 
of  the  campaign,  but  as  indicative  of  the  naval  policy  of  the 
States  which  were  at  war.  The  two,  though  not  otherwise 
connected,  have  a  certain  unity  of  interest,  in  that  the  same 
British  officer  commanded  on  both  occasions. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  Byron's  action  off  Grenada, 
in  July,  1779,  the  64-gun  ship  Lion  received  such  injuries  that 
her  commander.  Captain  Cornwallis,  had  been  compelled  to 
run  down  before  the  trade-winds  to  Jamaica,  in  order  to  save 
her  from  capture.  Since  that  time  she  had  remained  there, 
as  one  of  the  squadron  of  Vice-Admiral  Sir  Peter  Parker. 
In  March,  1780,  still  commanded  by  Cornwallis,  she  was  mak- 
ing an  ordinary  service  cruise  off  the  north  side  of  Haiti, 
having  in  company  the  Bristol,  50,  and  the  Janus,  4A.  On  the 
20th  of  March,  off  Monte  Christi,  a  number  of  sail  were 
sighted  to  the  eastward,  which  proved  to  be  a  French  convoy, 
on  its  way  from  Martinique  to  Cap  Fran9ois,  protected  by 
La  Motte-Picquet's  squadron  of  two  74's,  one  64,  one 
50,  and  a  frigate.  The  French  merchant  ships  were  or- 
dered to   crowd  sail   for   their  port,  while  the   men-of-war 


154    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

chased  to  the  north-west.  La  Motte-Picquet's  flagship,  the 
Annihal,  74,  got  within  range  at  5  p.m.,  when  a  distant  can- 
nonade began,  w^hich  lasted  till  past  midnight,  and  was  re- 
sumed on  the  following  morning.  From  it  the  Janus  was  the 
chief  sufferer,  losing  her  mizzen  topmast  and  foretopgallant 
mast.  It  falling  nearly  calm,  the  Bristol  and  Lion  got  out 
their  boats  and  were  towed  by  them  to  her  support.  The  two 
other  French  ships  of  the  line  got  up  during  the  forenoon  of 
the  21st,  so  that  the  action  that  afternoon,  though  desultory, 
might  be  called  general. 

The  two  opposing  commodores  differ  in  their  expressed 
opinions  as  to  the  power  of  the  French  to  make  the  affair  more 
decisive.  Some  of  La  Motte-Picquet's  language  seems  to 
show  that  he  felt  the  responsibility  of  his  position.  "The 
Janus,  being  smaller  and  more  easily  worked,  lay  upon  our 
quarter  and  under  our  stern,  where  she  did  considerable 
damage.  A  little  breeze  springing  up  enabled  us  (the  Anni- 
hal) to  stand  towards  our  own  ships,  which  did  everything 
possible  to  come  up  and  cover  us,  without  which  we  should 
have  been  surrounded.''  It  is  easy  to  see  in  such  an  expression 
the  reflection  of  the  commands  of  the  French  Cabinet,  to 
economise  the  ships.  This  was  still  more  evident  in  La 
Motte-Picquet's  conduct  next  day.  On  the  morning  of 
the  22d,  "  at  daylight  w^e  were  within  one  and  a  half  cannon- 
shot,  breeze  fresh  at  the  east-north-east,  and  I  expected  to 
overtake  the  British  squadron  in  an  hour,  when  we  perceived 
four  ships  in  chase  of  us.  At  6.30  a.m.  three  were  seen  to 
be  men-of-war.  This  superiority  of  force  compelled  me  to 
desist,  and  to  make  signal  to  haul  our  wind  for  Cap  Franyois." 
These  three  new-comers  were  the  Ruby,  64,  and  two  frigates, 
the  Pomona,  28,  and  Niger,  32.  The  comparison  of  forces, 
therefore,  would  be :  French,  tw^o  74's,  one  64,  one  50, 
and  one  frigate,  opposed  to,  British,  two  64's,  one  50, 
and  three  frigates.     La  Motte-Picquet  evidently  did  not 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  155 

wait  to  ascertain  the  size  of  the  approaching  ships.  His 
courage  was  beyond  all  dispute,  and,  as  Hyde  Parker  had  said, 
he  was  among  the  most  distinguished  of  French  officers ;  but, 
like  his  comrades,  he  was  dominated  by  the  faulty  theory 
of  his  government. 

The  captain  of  the  Janus  died  a  natural  death  during  the 
encounter.  It  may  be  interesting  to  note  that  the  ship  was 
given  to  Nelson,  who  was  recalled  for  that  purpose  from  the 
expedition  to  San  Juan,  Nicaragua,  one  of  the  minor  opera- 
tions of  the  war.  His  health,  however,  prevented  this  com- 
mand from  being  more  than  nominal,  and  not  long  afterward 
he  returned  to  England  with  Cornwallis,  in  the  Lion. 

Three  months  later,  Cornwallis  was  sent  by  Parker  to 
accompany  a  body  of  merchant  ships  for  England  as  far  as 
the  neighborhood  of  Bermuda.  This  duty  being  fulfilled, 
he  was  returning  toward  his  station,  having  with  him  two 
74's,  two  64's,  and  one  50,  when,  on  the  morning  of 
June  20,  a  number  of  sail  were  seen  from  north-east  to  east 
(a) ;  the  British  squadron  (aa)  then  steering  east,  with  the 
wind  at  south-south-east.  The  strangers  were  a  body  of 
French  transports,  carrying  the  six  thousand  troops  destined 
for  Rhode  Island,  and  convoyed  by  a  division  of  seven  ships 
of  the  line  —  one  80,  two  74's,  and  four  64's  —  under 
the  command  of  Commodore  de  Ternay.  Two  of  the 
ships  of  war  were  with  the  convoy,  the  other  five  very  prop- 
erly to  windward  of  it.  The  latter  therefore  stood  on,  across 
the  bows  of  the  British,  to  rejoin  their  consorts,  and  then 
all  hauled  their  wind  to  the  south-west,  standing  in  column 
(bb)  towards  the  enemy.  Cornwallis  on  his  part  had  kept  on 
(b)  to  reconnoitre  the  force  opposed  to  him ;  but  one  of  his 
ships,  the  Ruby,  64,  was  so  far  to  leeward  (W)  that  the  French, 
b}'^  keeping  near  the  wind,  could  pass  between  her  and  her 
squadron  (b,b,bO.  She  therefore  went  about  (t)  and  steered 
southwest,  on  the  port  tack  (cO,  close  to  the  wind.     The 


156     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

French,  who  were  already  heading  the  same  way,  were  thus 
brought  on  her  weather  quarter  in  chase.  CornwalUs  then 
wore  his  division  (w),  formed  hne  of  battle  on  the  same  tack 
as  the  others  (c),  and  edged  down  towards  the  Ruby.  If  the 
French  now  kept  their  wind,  either  the  Ruby  (c')  must  be  cut 
off,  or  Cornwallis,  to  save  her,  must  fight  the  large  odds  against 
him.  De  Ternay,  however,  did  not  keep  his  wind  but  bore 
up,  —  yielded  ground  (cc).  "The  enemy,"  wrote  Cornwallis, 
"kept  edging  off  and  forming  line,  though  within  gunshot. 
At  5.30  P.M.,  seeing  we  had  pushed  the  French  ships  to  lee- 
ward sufficiently  to  enable  the  Ruby,  on  our  lee  bow,  to  join 
us,  I  made  the  signal  to  tack."  As  the  British  squadron  w^ent 
about  to  stand  east  again  (d),  the  French,  heading  now  west- 
south-west  (cc),  hoisted  their  colours  and  opened  fire  in  passing. 
The  Ruby  kept  on  till  she  fetched  the  wake  of  the  British 
column  (d^),  when  she  too  tacked.  The  French  then  tacked 
also,  in  succession  (d),  and  the  two  columns  stood  on  for  awhile 
in  parallel  lines,  exchanging  shots  at  long  range,  the  British 
to  windward.  Cornwallis  very  properly  declined  further 
engagement  with  so  superior  a  force.  He  had  already  done 
much  in  saving  a  ship  so  greatly  exposed. 

The  account  above  followed  is  that  of  the  British  com- 
mander, but  it  does  not  differ  in  essentials  from  the  French, 
whose  captains  were  greatly  incensed  at  the  cautious  action 
of  their  chief.  A  French  commissaire  in  the  squadron,  who 
afterwards  published  his  journal,  tells  that  de  Ternay  a  few 
days  later  asked  the  captain  of  one  of  the  ships  what  English 
admiral  he  thought  they  had  engaged,  and  received  the  reply, 
"We  have  lost  our  opportunity  of  finding  out."  He  gives 
also  many  details  of  the  talk  that  went  on  in  the  ships,  which 
need  not  be  repeated.  Chevalier  points  out  correctly,  how- 
ever, that  de  Ternay  had  to  consider  that  an  equal  or  even 
a  superior  force  might  be  encountered  as  Narragansett  Bay 
was  approached,  and  that  he  should  not  risk  crippling  his 


COK>  WALI.IS  A>D  DE  TEKNAY 

20th  Jnnr,  1780. 

"^^ 

abed  SiMLLTANKors  rosixioxs 

a  ^ 

b'c'd'    Ruby 

JJritish   » 
French  c> 

0 

0 

/, 

(S, 

!' 

^5^ 

y 

i    ...._ ..-'■ 

\V  (f 

/ 

111  TT 

> 

s 

''--o  o  o    ^  ^  o  o  , 

A " 

♦ 

-''^...W'-^r  -- 

• 

b^' 

\S"} 

WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  157 

squadron  for  such  a  contingency.  The  charge  of  six  thousand 
troops,  under  the  then  conditions,  was  no  Hght  responsibihty, 
and  at  the  least  must  silence  off-hand  criticism  now.  Com- 
ment upon  his  action  does  not  belong  to  British  naval  history, 
to  which  the  firmness  and  seamanship  of  Captain  Cornwallis 
added  a  lasting  glory.  It  may  be  noted  that  fifteen  years 
later,  in  the  French  Revolution,  the  same  officer,  then  a  Vice- 
Admiral,  again  distinguished  himself  by  his  bearing  in  face 
of  great  odds,  bringing  five  ships  safe  off,  out  of  the  jaws  of 
a  dozen.  It  illustrates  how  luck  seems  in  many  cases  to 
characterise  a  man's  personality,  much  as  temperament  does. 
Cornwallis,  famiharly  known  as  "Billy  Blue"  to  the  seamen 
of  his  day,  never  won  a  victory,  nor  had  a  chance  of  winning 
one;  but  in  command  both  of  ships  and  of  divisions,  he 
repeatedly  distinguished  himself  by  successfully  facing  odds 
which  he  could  not  overcome. 

The  year  1780  was  uneventful  also  in  European  waters, 
after  Rodney's  rehef  of  Gibraltar  in  January.  The  detach- 
ment of  the  Channel  Fleet  which  accompanied  him  on  that 
mission  returned  safely  to  England.  The  "Grand  Fleet,"* 
as  it  still  was  styled  occasionally,  cruised  at  sea  from  June  8th 
to  August  18th,  an  imposing  force  of  thirty-one  ships  of  the 
line,  eleven  of  them  three-deckers  of  90  guns  and  upwards. 
Admiral  Francis  Geary  was  then  Commander-in-Chief,  but, 
his  health  failing,  and  Barrington  refusing  to  take  the  posi- 
tion, through  professed  distrust  of  himself  and  actual  dis- 
trust of  the  Admiralty,  Vice-Admiral  George  Darby  suc- 
ceeded to  it,  and  held  it  during  the  year  1781. 

The  most  notable  maritime  event  in  1780  in  Europe  was 
the  capture  on  August  9th  of  a  large  British  convoy,  two 
or  three  hundred  miles  west  of  Cape  St.  Vincent,  by  the  allied 
fleets  from  Cadiz.  As  out  of  sixty- three  sail  only  eight 
escaped,  and  as  of  those  taken  sixteen  were  carrying  troops 
and  supplies  necessary  for  the  West  India  garrisons,  such  a 


158  MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

disaster  claims  mention  among  the  greater  operations  of  war, 
the  success  of  which  it  could  not  fail  to  influence.  Captain 
John  Moutray,  the  officer  commanding  the  convoy,  was 
brought  to  trial  and  dismissed  his  ship ;  but  there  were  not 
wanting  those  who  charged  the  misadventure  to  the  Admi- 
ralty, and  saw  in  the  captain  a  victim.  It  was  the  greatest 
single  blow  that  British  commerce  had  received  in  war  during 
the  memory  of  men  then  living,  and  "a  general  inclination 
prevailed  to  lay  the  blame  upon  some  individual,  who  might 
be  punished  according  to  the  magnitude  of  the  object,  rather 
than  in  proportion  to  his  demerit."  ^ 

During  the  year  1780  was  formed  the  League  of  the  Baltic 
Powers,  known  historically  as  the  Armed  Neutrality,  to  exact 
from  Great  Britain  the  concession  of  certain  points  thought 
essential  to  neutral  interests.  The  accession  of  Holland  to 
this  combination,  together  with  other  motives  of  dissatisfac- 
tion, caused  Great  Britain  to  declare  war  against  the  United 
Provinces  on  the  20th  of  December.  Orders  were  at  once 
sent  to  the  East  and  West  Indies  to  seize  Dutch  possessions 
and  ships,  but  these  did  not  issue  in  action  until  the  following 
year. 

Towards  the  end  of  1780  the  French  Government,  dis- 
satisfied with  the  lack  of  results  from  the  immense  combined 
force  assembled  in  Cadiz  during  the  summer  months,  decided 
to  recall  its  ships,  and  to  refit  them  during  the  winter  for 
the  more  extensive  and  aggressive  movements  planned  for  the 
campaign  of  1781.  D'Estaing  was  sent  from  France  for 
the  purpose ;  and  under  his  command  thirty-eight  ships  of 
the  line,  in  which  were  included  those  brought  by  de  Guichen 
from  the  West  Indies,  sailed  on  the  7th  of  November  for 
Brest.  Extraordinary  as  it  may  seem,  this  fleet  did  not  reach 
its  port  until  the  3d  of  January,  1781. 

1  Beatson,  "  Military  and  Naval  Memoirs." 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  159 


CHAPTER  IX 

NAVAL  CAMPAIGN  IN  WEST  INDIES  IN  1781.  CAP- 
TURE OF  ST.  EUSTATIUS  BY  RODNEY.  DE 
GRASSE  ARRIVES  IN  PLACE  OF  DE  GUICHEN. 
TOBAGO  SURRENDERS  TO  DE  GRASSE 

RODNEY,  returning  to  the  West  Indies  from  New 
York,  reached  Barbados  on  December  6th,  1780. 
There  he  seems  first  to  have  learned  of  the  dis- 
astrous effects  of  the  great  October  hurricanes 
of  that  year.  Not  only  had  several  ships  — 
among  them  two  of  the  line  —  been  wrecked,  with  the  loss 
of  almost  all  on  board,  but  the  greater  part  of  those  which 
survived  had  been  dismasted,  wholly  or  in  part,  as  well  as 
injured  in  the  hull.  There  were  in  the  West  Indies  no  dock- 
ing facilities;  under-water  damage  could  be  repaired  only 
by  careening  or  heaving-down.  Furthermore,  as  Barbados, 
Santa  Lucia,  and  Jamaica,  all  had  been  swept,  their  supplies 
were  mainly  destroyed.  Antigua,  it  is  true,  had  escaped,  the 
hurricane  passing  south  of  St.  Kitts ;  but  Rodney  wrote  home 
that  no  stores  for  refitting  were  obtainable  in  the  Caribbee 
Islands.  He  was  hoping  then  that  Sir  Peter  Parker  might 
supply  his  needs  in  part ;  for  when  writing  from  Santa  Lucia 
on  December  10th,  two  months  after  the  storm,  he  was  still 
ignorant  that  the  Jamaica  Station  had  suffered  to  the  full 
as  severely  as  the  eastern  islands.  The  fact  shows  not  merely 
the  ordinary  slowness  of  communications  in  those  days,  but 
also  the  paralysis  that  fell  upon  all  movements  in  consequence 
of  that  great  disaster.  "The  most  beautiful  island  in  the 
world,"  he  said  of  Barbados,  "has  the  appearance  of  a  country 
laid  waste  by  fire  and  sword." 


160     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

Hearing  that  the  fortifications  at  St.  Vincent  had  been 
almost  destroyed  by  the  hurricane,  Rodney,  in  combination 
with  General  Vaughan,  commanding  the  troops  on  the  station, 
made  an  attempt  to  reconquer  the  island,  landing  there  on 
December  15th ;  but  the  intelligence  proved  erroneous,  and 
the  fleet  returned  to  Santa  Lucia.  "I  have  only  nine  sail 
of  the  fine  now  with  me  capable  of  going  to  sea,"  wrote  the 
Admiral  on  the  22d,  "  and  not  one  of  them  has  spare  rigging 
or  sails."  In  the  course  of  January,  1781,  he  was  joined  by 
a  division  of  eight  ships  of  the  Hne  from  England,  under  the 
command  of  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Samuel  Hood,  —  Nelson's 
Lord  Hood.  These,  with  four  others  refitted  during  that 
month,  not  improbably  from  stores  brought  in  Hood's  convoy 
of  over  a  hundred  sail,  raised  the  disposable  force  to  twenty- 
one  ships  of  the  line :  two  90's,  one  80,  fifteen  74's,  and 
three  64' s. 

On  the  27th  of  January,  an  express  arrived  from  England, 
directing  the  seizure  of  the  Dutch  possessions  in  the  Carib- 
bean, and  specifying,  as  first  to  be  attacked,  St.  Eustatius 
and  St.  Martin,  two  small  islands  lying  within  fifty  miles 
north  of  the  British  St.  Kitts.  St.  Eustatius,  a  rocky  patch 
six  miles  in  length  by  three  in  breadth,  had  been  conspicuous, 
since  the  war  began,  as  a  great  trade  centre,  where  supplies 
of  all  kinds  were  gathered  under  the  protection  of  its  neutral 
flag,  to  be  distributed  afterwards  in  the  belligerent  islands 
and  the  North  American  continent.  The  British,  owing  to 
their  extensive  commerce  and  maritime  aptitudes,  derived 
from  such  an  intermediary  much  less  benefit  than  their 
enemies;  and  the  island  had  been  jealously  regarded  by 
Rodney  for  some  time.  He  asserted  that  when  de  Guichen's 
fleet  could  not  regain  Fort  Royal,  because  of  its  injuries  re- 
ceived in  the  action  of  April  17th,  it  was  refitted  to  meet  him 
by  mechanics  and  materials  sent  from  St.  Eustatius,  On  the 
other  hand,  when  cordage  was  to  be  bought  for  the  British 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  161 

vessels  after  the  hurricanes  of  1780,  the  merchants  of  the 
island,  he  said,  alleged  that  there  was  none  there ;  although, 
when  he  took  the  island  soon  afterwards,  many  hundred  tons 
were  found  that  had  been  long  in  stock. 

Rodney  and  Vaughan  moved  promptly.  Three  days  after 
their  orders  arrived,  they  sailed  for  St.  Eustatius.  There 
being  in  Fort  Royal  four  French  ships  of  the  line,  six  British 
were  left  to  check  them,  and  on  the  3d  of  February  the  fleet 
reached  its  destination.  A  peremptory  summons  from  the 
commander  of  a  dozen  ships  of  the  line  secured  immediate 
submission.  Over  a  hundred  and  fifty  merchant  ships  were 
taken ;  and  a  convoy  of  thirty  sail,  which  had  left  the  island 
two  days  before,  was  pursued  and  brought  back.  The 
merchandise  found  was  valued  at  over  £3,000,000.  The 
neighbouring  islands  of  St.  Martin  and  Saba  were  seized  also 
at  this  time. 

Rodney's  imagination,  as  is  shown  in  his  letters,  was  greatly 
impressed  by  the  magnitude  of  the  prize  and  by  the  defence- 
less condition  of  his  capture.  He  alleged  these  as  the  motives 
for  staying  in  person  at  St.  Eustatius,  to  settle  the  complicated 
tangle  of  neutral  and  belligerent  rights  in  the  property  in- 
volved, and  to  provide  against  the  enemy's  again  possessing 
himself  of  a  place  now  so  equipped  for  transactions  harmful 
to  Great  Britain.  The  storehouses  and  conveniences  pro- 
vided for  the  particular  traffic,  if  not  properly  guarded,  were 
Hke  fortifications  insufficiently  garrisoned.  If  they  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  they  became  sources  of  injury. 
The  illicit  trade  could  start  again  at  once  in  full  force,  with 
means  which  elsewhere  would  have  first  to  be  created.  There 
were  a  mile  and  a  half  of  storehouses  in  the  lower  town,  he 
said,  and  these  he  must  leave  at  the  least  roofless,  if  not  wholly 
demoHshed. 

For  such  reasons  he  remained  at  St.  Eustatius  throughout 
February,  March,  and  April.     The  amount  of  money  in- 


162     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

volved,  and  the  arbitrary  methods  pursued  by  him  and  by 
Vaughan,  gave  rise  to  much  scandal,  which  was  not  dimin- 
ished by  the  King's  rehnquishing  all  the  booty  to  the 
captors,  nor  by  the  latters'  professed  disinterestedness.  Men 
thought  they  did  protest  too  much.  Meanwhile,  other  mat- 
ters arose  to  claim  attention.  A  week  after  the  capture,  a 
vessel  arrived  from  the  Bay  of  Biscay  announcing  that  eight 
or  ten  French  sail  of  the  line,  with  a  large  convoy,  had  been 
seen  on  the  31st  of  December  steering  for  the  West  Indies. 
Rodney  at  once  detached  Sir  Samuel  Hood  with  eleven  ships 
of  the  line,  directing  him  to  take  also  under  his  command  the 
six  left  before  Fort  Royal,  and  to  cruise  with  them  to  wind- 
ward of  ]\Iartinique,  to  intercept  the  force  reported.  Hood 
sailed  February  12th.  The  particular  intelligence  proved 
afterwards  to  be  false,  but  Hood  was  continued  on  his  duty. 
A  month  later  he  was  ordered  to  move  from  the  windward  to 
the  leeward  side  of  the  island,  and  to  blockade  Fort  Royal 
closely.  Against  this  change  he  remonstrated,  and  the  event 
showed  him  to  be  right;  but  Rodney  insisted,  saying  that 
from  his  experience  he  knew  that  a  fleet  could  remain  off  Fort 
Royal  for  months  without  dropping  to  leeward,  and  that  there 
ships  detached  to  Santa  Lucia,  for  water  and  refreshments, 
could  rejoin  before  an  enemy's  fleet,  discovered  to  windward, 
could  come  up.  Hood  thought  the  Admiral's  object  was 
merely  to  shelter  his  own  doings  at  St.  Eustatius ;  and  he  con- 
sidered the  blockade  of  Fort  Royal  to  be  futile,  if  no  descent 
upon  the  island  were  intended.  "It  would  doubtless  have 
been  fortunate  for  the  public,"  he  remarked  afterwards,  "had 
Sir  George  been  with  his  fleet,  as  I  am  confident  he  would 
have  been  to  windward  instead  of  to  leeward,  when  de  Grasse 
made  his  approach." 

The  preparations  of  the  French  in  Brest  were  completed 
towards  the  end  of  March,  and  on  the  22d  of  that  month 
Rear-Admiral  de  Grasse  sailed,  having  a  large  convoy  under 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  163 

the  protection  of  twenty-six  ships  of  the  Hne.  A  week  later 
six  of  the  latter  parted  company,  five  under  Suffren  for  the 
East  Indies  and  one  for  North  America.  The  remaining 
twenty  continued  their  course  for  Martinique,  which  was 
sighted  on  the  28th  of  April.  Before  sunset.  Hood's  squadron 
also  was  discovered  to  leeward  of  the  island,  as  ordered  by 
Rodney  to  cruise,  and  off  the  southern  point,  —  Pointe  des 
Salines.  De  Grasse  then  hove-to  for  the  night,  but  sent  an 
officer  ashore  both  to  give  and  to  obtain  intelligence,  and  to 
reach  an  understanding  for  concerted  action  next  day. 

The  French  fleet  consisted  of  one  ship  of  110  guns,  three 
80's,  fifteen  74's,  and  one  64,  in  all  20  of  the  line,  besides 
three  armed  en  flute,^  which  need  not  be  taken  into  account, 
although  they  served  to  cover  the  convoy.  Besides  these 
there  were  the  four  in  Fort  Royal,  one  74  and  three  64's,  a 
junction  of  which  with  the  approaching  enemy  it  was  one 
of  Hood's  objects  to  prevent.  The  force  of  the  British  was 
one  90,  one  80,  twelve  74's,  one  70,  and  two  64's :  total,  17. 
Thus  both  in  numbers  and  in  rates  of  ships  Hood  was  inferior 
to  the  main  body  alone  of  the  French;  but  he  had  the 
advantage  of  ships  all  coppered,  owing  to  Rodney's  insis- 
tence with  the  Admiralty.  He  also  had  no  convoy  to  worry 
him ;  but  he  was  to  leeward. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  29th,  de  Grasse  advanced  to 
round  the  southern  point  of  the  island,  which  was  the  usual 
course  for  sailing  ships.  Hood  was  too  far  to  leeward  to 
intercept  this  movement,  for  which  he  was  blamed  by  Rodney, 
who  claimed  that  the  night  had  not  been  properly  utilised  by 
beating  to  windward  of  Pointe  des  Salines.^     Hood,  on  the 

1  This  latter  is  applied  to  vessels,  usually  ships  of  war,  which  are 
used  as  transports  or  supply  ships,  and  therefore  carry  only  a  part 
of  their  normal  battery. 

2  Rodney  said  that  Hood  "lay-to"  for  the  night.  This  is  ante- 
cedently incredible  of  an  officer  of  Hood's  character,  and  is  expressly 
contradicted  by  Captain  Sutherland  of  the  Russell.     "At  6  p.m.  (of 


164    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

other  hand,  said  in  a  private  letter :  "  I  never  once  lost  sight 
of  getting  to  windward,  but  it  was  totally  impossible.  .  .  . 
Had  I  fortunately  been  there,  I  must  have  brought  the  enemy 
to  close  action  upon  more  equal  terms,  or  they  must  have 
given  up  their  transports,  trade,  etc.''  Hood's  subsequent 
career  places  it  beyond  doubt  that  had  he  been  to  windward 
there  would  have  been  a  severe  action,  whatever  the  result ; 
but  it  is  not  possible  to  decide  positively  between  his  state- 
ment and  Rodney's,  as  to  where  the  fault  of  being  to  leeward 
lay.  The  writer  believes  that  Hood  would  have  been  to 
windward,  if  in  any  way  possible.  It  must  be  added  that 
the  British  had  no  word  that  so  great  a  force  was  coming. 
On  this  point  Hood  and  Rodney  are  agreed. 

Under  the  conditions,  the  French  passed  without  difficulty 
round  Pointe  des  Salines,  the  transports  hugging  the  coast, 
the  ships  of  war  being  outside  and  to  leeward  of  them.  Thus 
they  headed  up  to  the  northward  for  Fort  Royal  Bay  (Cul 
de  Sac  Royal),  Hood  standing  to  the  southward  until  after 
10,  and  being  joined  at  9.20  by  a  sixty-four  (not  reckoned 
in  the  list  above)  from  Santa  Lucia,  making  his  force  eighteen. 
At  10.35  the  British  tacked  together  to  the  northward.  The 
two  fleets  were  now  steering  the  same  way,  the  French  van 
abreast  of  the  British  centre.  At  11  the  French  opened  their 
fire,  to  which  no  reply  was  made  then.  At  11.20,  the  British 
van  being  close  in  with  the  shore  to  the  northward  of  the  Bay, 
Hood  tacked  again  together,  and  the  enemy,  seeing  his  con- 
voy secure,  wore,  also  together,  which  brought  the  two  lines 
nearer,  heading  south.  At  this  time  the  four  French  ships 
in  the  Bay  got  under  way  and  easily  joined  the  rear  of  their 
fleet,  it  having  the  weather-gage.     The  French  were  thus  24 

the  28th)  our  fleet  tacked  to  the  north,  and  kept  moving  across  the 
bay  (Fort  Royal)  for  the  right  {sic),  in  line  of  battle."  Ekins, 
"Naval Battles,"  p.  136.  The  word  "right"  is  evidently  a  misprint 
for  "night."  Rodney's  criticisms  seem  to  the  author  captious 
throughout. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  165 

to  18.  As  their  shot  were  passing  over  the  British,  the  latter 
now  began  to  reply.  At  noon  Hood,  finding  that  he  could 
not  close  the  enemy,  shortened  sail  to  topsails  and  hove-to, 
hoping  by  this  defiance  to  bring  them  down  to  him.  At 
12.30  the  French  admiral  was  abreast  of  the  British  flagship, 
and  the  action  became  general,  but  at  too  long  range.  "  Never, 
I  believe,"  wrote  Hood,  "was  more  powder  and  shot  thrown 
away  in  one  day  before."  The  French  continuing  to  stand 
on.  Hood  filled  his  sails  again  at  1  p.m.,  as  their  van  had 
stretched  beyond  his. 

As  the  leading  ships,  heading  south,  opened  the  channel 
between  Santa  Lucia  and  Martinique,  they  got  the  breeze 
fresher,  which  caused  them  to  draw  away  from  the  centre. 
Hood,  therefore,  at  1.34  made  the  signal  for  a  close  order, 
and  immediately  afterwards  ceased  firing,  finding  not  one  in 
ten  of  the  enemy's  shot  to  reach.  The  engagement,  however, 
continued  somewhat  longer  between  the  southern  —  van  — 
ships,  where,  by  the  account  of  Captain  Sutherland,  who  was 
in  that  part  of  the  line,  four  of  the  British  were  attacked  very 
smartly  by  eight  of  the  French.  The  Centaur,  Russell, 
Intrepid,  and  Shrewsbury  appear  to  have  been  the  ships  that 
suffered  most  heavily,  either  in  hull,  spars,  or  crews.  They 
were  all  in  the  van  on  the  southern  tack.  The  Russell, 
having  several  shot  between  wind  and  water,  was  with 
difficulty  kept  afloat,  the  water  rising  over  the  platform  of 
the  magazine.  Hood  sent  her  off  at  nightfall  to  St.  Eustatius, 
w^here  she  arrived  on  the  4th  of  May,  bringing  Rodney  the 
first  news  of  the  action,  and  of  the  numbers  of  the  French 
reinforcement.  During  the  30th  Hood  held  his  ground,  still 
endeavouring  to  get  to  windward  of  the  enemy ;  but  failing 
in  that  attempt,  and  finding  two  of  his  squadron  much  dis- 
abled, he  decided  at  sunset  to  bear  away  to  the  northward, 
because  to  the  southward  the  westerly  currents  set  so  strong 
that  the  crippled  ships  could  not  regain  Santa  Lucia.     On  the 


166     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

11th  of  May,  between  St.  Kitts  and  Antigua,  he  joined  Rod- 
ney, who,  after  hurried  repairs  to  the  Russell,  had  left  St. 
Eustatius  on  the  5th,  with  that  ship,  the  Sandwich,  and  the 
Trium'ph. 

It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  criticise  positively  the  conduct 
of  Hood  and  of  de  Grasse  in  this  affair.  It  is  clear  that  Hood 
on  the  first  day  seriously  sought  action,  though  his  force  was 
but  three-fourths  that  of  his  foe.  He  tried  first  to  take  the 
offensive,  and,  failing  that,  to  induce  his  enemy  to  attack 
frankly  and  decisively.  Troude  is  doubtless  correct  in  say- 
ing that  it  was  optional  with  de  Grasse  to  bring  on  a  gen- 
eral engagement ;  and  the  writer  finds  himself  in  agreement 
also  with  another  French  authority.  Captain  Chevalier,  that 
''  Count  de  Grasse  seems  to  have  been  too  much  preoccupied 
with  the  safety  of  his  convoy  on  the  29th,  Admiral  Hood  hav- 
ing shown  himself  much  less  circumspect  on  that  day  than 
he  was  on  the  next.  Notwithstanding  our  numerical  supe- 
riority. Count  de  Grasse  kept  near  the  land  until  all  the  con- 
voy were  safe."  He  represents  Hood  as  fencing  cautiously 
on  the  following  day,  keeping  on  the  field,  but  avoiding  a 
decisive  encounter.  This  differs  somewhat  from  the  version 
of  Hood  himself,  who  mentions  signalling  a  general  chase  to 
windward  at  12.30  p.m.  of  the  30th.  The  two  statements  are 
not  irreconcilable.  Hood  having  coppered  ships,  had 
the  speed  of  the  French,  whose  vessels,  being  partly  coppered 
and  partly  not,  sailed  unevenly.  The  British  commander 
consequently  could  afford  to  take  risks,  and  he  therefore 
played  with  the  enemy,  watching  for  a  chance.  Hood  was 
an  officer  of  exceptional  capacity,  much  in  advance  of  his 
time.  He  thoroughly  understood  a  watching  game,  and  that 
an  opportunity  might  offer  to  seize  an  advantage  over  part 
of  the  enemy,  if  the  eagerness  of  pursuit,  or  any  mishap, 
caused  the  French  to  separate.  From  any  dilemma  that 
ensued,  the  reserve  of  speed  gave  him  a  power  of  withdrawal. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  167 

in  relying  upon  which  he  was  right.  The  present  writer 
adopts  here  also  Chevalier's  conclusion  :  "  Admiral  Hood  evi- 
dently had  the  very  great  advantage  over  his  enemy  of  com- 
manding a  squadron  of  coppered  ships.  Nevertheless,  hom- 
age is  due  to  his  skill  and  to  the  confidence  shown  by  him 
in  his  captains.  If  "Some  of  his  ships  had  dropped  behind 
through  injuries  received,  he  would  have  had  to  sacrifice  them, 
or  to  fight  a  superior  force."  This  means  that  Hood  for  an 
adequate  gain  ran  a  great  risk;  that  he  thoroughly  under- 
stood both  the  advantages  and  the  disadvantages  of  his 
situation;  and  that  he  acted  not  only  with  great  skill,  but 
warily  and  boldly,  —  a  rare  combination.  The  British  loss 
in  this  affair  was  39  killed,  including  Captain  Nott,  of  the 
Centaur,  and  162  wounded.  The  French  loss  is  given  by 
Chevalier  as  18  killed  and  56  wounded;  by  Beatson,  as  119 
killed  and  150  wounded. 

Rodney,  having  collected  his  fleet,  proceeded  south,  and  on 
the  18th  of  May  put  into  Barbados  for  water.  Much  anxiety 
had  been  felt  at  first  for  Santa  Lucia,  which  Hood's  retreat 
had  uncovered.  As  was  feared,  the  French  had  attacked  it  at 
once,  their  fleet,  with  the  exception  of  one  or  two  ships, 
going  there,  and  twelve  hundred  troops  landing  at  Gros  Ilet 
Bay ;  but  the  batteries  on  Pigeon  Island,  which  Rodney  had 
erected  and  manned,  kept  them  at  arms'  length.  The  works 
elsewhere  being  found  too  strong,  the  attempt  was  abandoned. 

At  the  same  time,  two  French  ships  of  the  line  and  thirteen 
hundred  troops  had  sailed  from  Martinique  against  Tobago. 
When  de  Grasse  returned  from  the  failure  at  Santa  Lucia, 
he  learned  that  the  British  were  at  sea,  apparently  bound  for 
Barbados.  Alarmed  for  his  detachment  before  Tobago,  he 
again  sailed  with  the  fleet  for  that  island  on  the  25th  of  May, 
accompanied  by  three  thousand  more  troops.  Rodney 
learned  at  Barbados  of  the  attempt  on  Tobago,  and  on  the 
29th  dispatched  a  squadron  of  six  sail  of  the  line,  under  Rear- 


168     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

Admiral  Francis  Samuel  Drake,  to  support  the  defence. 
On  the  30th  he  heard  that  the  French  main  fleet  had  been 
seen  to  windward  of  Santa  Lucia,  steering  south,  evidently 
for  Tobago.  On  the  same  day  Drake  and  de  Grasse  en- 
countered one  another  off  the  latter  island,  the  French  being 
to  leeward,  nearest  the  land.  Drake  necessarily  retired,  and 
on  the  morning  of  June  3d  was  again  off  Barbados,  where- 
upon Rodney  at  once  sailed  for  Tobago  with  the  whole  fleet. 
On  the  4th  the  island  was  sighted,  and  next  morning  informa- 
tion was  received  that  it  had  capitulated  on  the  2d. 

The  two  fleets  returning  north  were  in  presence  of  one 
another  on  the  9th ;  but  no  engagement  took  place.  Rodney, 
who  was  to  windward,  having  twenty  sail  to  twenty-three,^ 
was  unwiUing  to  attack  unless  he  could  get  a  clear  sea.  The 
strength  of  the  currents,  he  said,  would  throw  his  fleet  too 
far  to  leeward,  in  case  of  reverse,  into  the  foul  ground  between 
St.  Vincent  and  Grenada,  thus  exposing  Barbados,  which 
had  not  recovered  sufficiently  from  the  hurricane  to  stand 
alone.  He  therefore  put  into  Barbados.  De  Grasse  went 
to  Martinique  to  prepare  the  expedition  to  the  American 
continent,  which  resulted  in  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  at 
Yorktown.  On  the  5th  of  July  he  sailed  from  Fort  Royal 
taking  with  him  the  "trade"  for  France,  and  on  the  26th 
anchored  with  it  at  Cap  Francois  in  Haiti,  where  he  found  a 
division  of  four  ships  of  the  line  which  had  been  left  the  year 
before  by  de  Guichen.  There  also  was  a  frigate,  which  had 
left  Boston  on  the  20th  of  June,  and  by  which  De  Grasse 
received  dispatches  from  Washington,  and  from  Rochambeau, 
the  general  commanding  the  French  troops  in  America. 
These  acquainted  him  with  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  conti- 
nent, and  requested  that  the  fleet  should  come  to  either  the 
Chesapeake  or  New  York,  to  strike  a  decisive  blow  at  the 
British  power  in  one  quarter  or  the  other. 

1  One  French  ship  had  left  the  fleet,  disabled. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  169 


CHAPTER  X 

NAVAL  OPERATIONS  PRECEDING  AND  DETER- 
MINING  THE  FALL  OF  YORKTOWN.  CORN- 
WALLIS  SURRENDERS 

1781 

HAVING  now  brought  the  major  naval  transac- 
tions in  the  West  Indies  to  the  eve  of  the  great 
events  which  determined  the  independence  of 
the  American  States,  it  is  expedient  here  to 
resume  the  thread  of  operations,  both  sea  and  land,  on  the 
American  continent,  so  as  to  bring  these  also  up  to  the  same 
decisive  moment,  when  the  military  and  naval  blended  and 
in  mutual  support  forced  the  surrender  of  the  British  army 
at  Yorktown  under  Lord  Cornwallis. 

It  has  been  said  that,  to  support  the  operations  of  Corn- 
wallis in  the  Carolinas,  Clinton  had  begun  a  series  of  diver- 
sions in  the  valley  of  the  James  River.^  The  first  de- 
tachment so  sent,  under  General  Leslie,  had  been  trans- 
ferred speedily  to  South  Carolina,  to  meet  the  exigencies  of 
Cornwallis's  campaign.  The  second,  of  sixteen  hundred 
troops  under  Benedict  Arnold,  left  New  York  at  the  end  of 
December,  and  began  its  work  on  the  banks  of  the  James  at 
the  end  of  January,  1781.  It  advanced  to  Richmond,  nearly 
a  hundred  miles  from  the  sea,  wasting  the  country  round 
about,  and  finding  no  opposition  adequate  to  check  its  free- 
dom of  movement.     Returning  down  stream,  on  the  20th  it 

, ^  1  Ante,  p.  153. 


170     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

occupied  Portsmouth,  south  of  the  James  River;  near  the 
sea,  and  valuable  as  a  naval  station. 

Washington  urged  Commodore  des  Touches,  who  by  de 
Ternay's  death  had  been  left  in  command  of  the  French 
squadron  at  Newport,  to  interrupt  these  proceedings,  by 
dispatching  a  strong  detachment  to  Chesapeake  Bay ;  and 
he  asked  Rochambeau  also  to  let  some  troops  accompany  the 
naval  division,  to  support  the  scanty  force  which  he  himself 
could  spare  to  Virginia.  It  happened,  however,  that  a  gale 
of  wind  just  then  had  inflicted  severe  injury  upon  Arbuthnot's 
squadron,  three  of  which  had  gone  to  sea  from  Gardiner's 
Bay  upon  a  report  that  three  French  ships  of  the  line  had 
left  Newport  to  meet  an  expected  convoy.  One  seventy- 
four,  the  Bedford,  was  wholly  dismasted;  another,  the 
Culloden,  drove  ashore  on  Long  Island  and  was  wrecked. 
The  French  ships  had  returned  to  port  the  day  before  the  gale, 
but  the  incident  indisposed  des  Touches  to  risk  his  vessels 
at  sea  at  that  time.  He  sent  only  a  sixty-four,  with  two 
frigates.  These  left  Newport  on  February  9th,  and  entered 
the  Chesapeake,  but  were  unable  to  reach  the  British  vessels, 
which,  being  smaller,  withdrew  up  the  Elizabeth  River.  Ar- 
buthnot,  hearing  of  this  expedition,  sent  orders  to  some  frig- 
ates off  Charleston  to  go  to  the  scene.  The  French  division, 
when  leaving  the  Bay,  met  one  of  these,  the  Romulus,  44,  off 
the  Capes,  captured  her,  and  returned  to  Newport  on  Feb- 
ruary 25th.  On  the  8th  of  March,  Arnold  reported  to 
Clinton  that  the  Chesapeake  was  clear  of  French  vessels. 

On  the  same  day  Arbuthnot  also  was  writing  to  Clinton, 
from  Gardiner's  Bay,  that  the  French  were  evidently  pre- 
paring to  quit  Newport.  His  utmost  diligence  had  failed 
as  yet  to  repair  entirely  the  damage  done  his  squadron  by 
the  storm,  but  on  the  9th  it  was  ready  for  sea.  On  the 
evening  of  the  8th  the  French  had  sailed.  On  the  10th  Ar- 
buthnot knew  it,  and,  having  taken  the  precaution  to  move 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  171 

down  to  the  entrance  of  the  bay,  he  was  able  to  follow  at 
once.  On  the  13th  he  spoke  a  vessel  which  had  seen  the 
enemy  and  gave  him  their  course.  Favoured  by  a  strong 
north-west  wind,  and  his  ships  being  coppered,  he  out- 
stripped the  French,  only  three  of  which  had  coppered  bot- 
toms. At  6  A.M.  of  March  16th  a  British  frigate  reported 
that  the  enemy  were  astern  —  to  the  north-east  —  about 
a  league  distant,  a  thick  haze  preventing  the  squadron 
from  seeing  them  even  at  that  distance  (A,  A).  Cape 
Henry,  the  southern  point  of  the  entrance  to  the  Chesapeake, 
then  bore  southwest  by  west,  distant  forty  miles.  The 
wind  as  stated  by  Arbuthnot  was  west;  by  the  French, 
south-west. 

The  British  admiral  at  once  went  about,  steering  in  the 
direction  reported,  and  the  opposing  squadrons  soon  sighted 
one  another.  The  French  finding  the  British  between  them 
and  their  port,  hauled  to  the  wind,  which  between  8  and  9 
shifted  to  north  by  west,  putting  them  to  windward.  Some 
prehminary  manoeuvres  then  followed,  both  parties  seeking 
the  weather-gage.  The  weather  remained  thick  and  squally, 
often  intercepting  the  view ;  and  the  wind  continued  to  shift 
until  towards  noon,  when  it  settled  at  north-east.  The 
better  sailing,  or  the  better  seamanship,  of  the  British  had 
enabled  them  to  gain  so  far  upon  their  opponents  that  at 
1  P.M.  they  were  lying  nearly  up  in  their  wake,  on  the  port 
tack,  overhauling  them;  both  squadrons  in  line  of  battle, 
heading  east-south-east,  the  French  bearing  from  their 
pursuers  east  by  south, — one  point  on  the  weather  bow  (B,  B). 
The  wind  was  rising  with  squalls,  so  that  the  ships  lay  over 
well  to  their  canvas,  and  the  sea  was  getting  big. 

As  the  enemy  now  was  threatening  his  rear,  and  had  the 
speed  to  overtake,  des  Touches  felt  it  necessary  to  resort  to  the 
usual  parry  to  such  a  thrust,  by  wearing  his  squadron  and 
passing  on  the  other  tack.    This  could  be  done  either  together, 


172     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

reversing  the  order  of  the  ships,  or  in  succession,  preserving 
the  natural  order ;  depending  much  upon  the  distance  of  the 
enemy.  Having  room  enough,  des  Touches  chose  the  latter, 
but,  as  fighting  was  inevitable,  he  decided  also  to  utilise  the 
manoeuvre  by  surrendering  the  weather-gage,  and  passing 
to  leeward.  The  advantage  of  this  course  was  that,  with  the 
existing  sea  and  wind,  and  the  inclination  of  the  ships,  the 
party  that  had  the  opponent  on  his  weather  side  could  open 
the  lower-deck  ports  and  use  those  guns.  There  was  thus  a 
great  increase  of  battery  power,  for  the  lower  guns  were  the 
heaviest.  Des  Touches  accordingly  put  his  helm  up,  his  line 
passing  in  succession  to  the  southward  (c)  across  the  head 
of  the  advancing  British  column,  and  then  hauling  up  so  as  to 
run  parallel  to  the  latter,  to  leeward,  with  the  wind  four 
points  free. 

Arbuthnot  accepted  the  position  offered,  stood  on  as  he 
was  until  nearly  abreast  of  the  French,  and  at  2  p.m.  made 
the  signal  to  wear.  It  does  not  appear  certainly  how  this 
was  executed ;  but  from  the  expression  in  the  official  report, 
"the  van  of  the  squadron  wore  in  the  line,"  and  from  the 
fact  that  the  ships  which  led  in  the  attack  were  those  which 
were  leading  on  the  port  tack,  —  the  tack  before  the  signal 
was  made,  —  it  seems  likely  that  the  movement  was  made  in 
succession  (a).  The  whole  squadron  then  stood  down  into 
action,  but  with  the  customary  result.  The  ships  in  the  van 
and  centre  were  all  engaged  by  2.30,  so  Arbuthnot  states; 
but  the  brunt  of  the  engagement  had  already  fallen  upon  the 
three  leading  vessels,  which  got  the  first  raking  fire,  and,  as  is 
also  usual,  came  to  closer  action  than  those  which  followed 
them  (C) .  They  therefore  not  only  lost  most  heavily  in  men, 
but  also  were  so  damaged  aloft  as  to  be  crippled.  The 
British  Vice-Admiral,  keeping  the  signal  for  the  line  flying, 
and  not  hoisting  that  for  close  action,  appears  to  have  caused 
a  movement  of  indecision  in  the  squadron,  —  an  evidence 


0      f 


0 


4,. 


f  0 

0 
0 
0 


\  Q 


A! 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE         173 

again  of  the  hold  which  the  line  then  still  had  upon  men's 
minds.  Of  this  des  Touches  cleverly  availed  himself,  by 
ordering  his  van  ships,  which  so  far  had  borne  the  brunt,  to 
keep  away  together  and  haul  up  on  the  other  tack  (e),  while 
the  ships  behind  them  were  to  wear  in  succession ;  that  is,  in 
column,  one  following  the  other.  The  French  column  then 
filed  by  the  three  disabled  British  vessels  (d),  gave  them  their 
broadsides  one  by  one,  and  then  hauled  off  to  the  eastward, 
quitting  the  field  (D).  Arbuthnot  made  signal  to  wear  in 
pursuit,  but  the  Robust  and  Prudent,  two  of  the  van  ships, 
were  now  wholly  unmanageable  from  the  concentration  of 
fire  upon  them  caused  by  des  Touches's  last  movement; 
and  the  maintopsail  yard  of  the  London,  the  only  British 
three-decker,  had  been  shot  away.  The  chase  therefore  was 
abandoned,  and  the  squadron  put  into  Chesapeake  Bay,  for 
which  the  wind  was  fair  (D).  The  French  returned  to  New- 
port. The  respective  losses  in  men  were :  British,  30  killed, 
73  wounded;  French,  72  killed,  112  wounded. 

In  this  encounter,  both  sides  had  eight  ships  in  fine,  besides 
smaller  craft.  The  advantage  in  force  was  distinctly  with 
the  British,  who  had  one  three-decked  ship,  three  74's,  three 
64's,  and  a  50 ;  while  the  French  had  one  84,  two  74's,  four 
64's,  and  the  late  British  Romulus,  44.  Because  of  this 
superiority,  probably,  the  action  was  considered  particularly 
discreditable  by  contemporaries ;  the  more  so  because  several 
vessels  did  not  engage  closely,  —  a  fault  laid  to  the  British 
admiral's  failure  to  make  the  signal  for  close  action,  hauling 
down  that  for  the  line.  This  criticism  is  interesting,  for  it 
indicates  how  men*s  minds  were  changing ;  and  it  shows  also 
that  Arbuthnot  had  not  changed,  but  still  lived  in  the 
middle  of  the  century.  The  French  commodore  displayed 
very  considerable  tactical  skill ;  his  squadron  was  handled 
neatly,  quickly,  and  with  precision.  With  inferior  force  he 
carried   off   a  decided  advantage  by  sheer  intelligence  and 


174     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

good  management.  Unluckily,  he  failed  in  resolution  to  pur- 
sue his  advantage.  He  probably  could  have  controlled  the 
Chesapeake  had  he  persisted. 

His  neglect  to  do  so  was  justified  by  Commodore  de  Barras, 
who  on  the  10th  of  May  arrived  in  Newport  from  France  to 
command  the  squadron.  This  officer,  after  pointing  out  the 
indisputable  tactical  success,  continued  thus  :  — 

"As  to  the  advantage  which  the  English  obtained,  in  fulfilling 
their  object,  that  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  their  superiority, 
and,  still  more,  of  their  purely  defensive  attitude.  It  is  a  principle 
in  war  that  one  should  risk  much  to  defend  one's  own  positions,  arid 
very  little  to  attack  those  of  the  enemy.  M.  des  Touches,  whose  object 
was  purely  offensive,  could  and  should,  when  the  enemy  opposed  to 
him  superior  forces,  renounce  a  project  which  could  no  longer  suc- 
ceed, unless,  contrary  to  all  probability,  it  ended  not  only  in  beating 
but  also  in  destroying  entirely,  that  superior  squadron." 

This  exaltation  of  the  defensive  above  the  offensive,  this 
despairing  view  of  probabilities,  this  aversion  from  risks,  go 
far  to  explain  the  French  want  of  success  in  this  war.  No 
matter  how  badly  the  enemy  was  thrashed,  unless  he  were 
entirely  destroyed,  he  was  still  a  fleet  "in  being,"  a  paralys- 
ing factor. 

The  retreat  of  des  Touches  and  the  coming  of  Arbuthnot 
restored  to  the  British  the  command  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 
Clinton,  as  soon  as  he  knew  that  the  British  and  French 
squadrons  had  sailed,  had  sent  off  a  reinforcement  of  two 
thousand  troops  for  Arnold,  under  General  Phillips.  These 
arrived  in  Lynnhaven  Bay  on  March  26th,  ten  days  after 
the  naval  battle,  and  proceeded  at  once  to  Portsmouth, 
Virginia.  It  is  unnecessary  to  speak  of  the  various  opera- 
tions of  this  land  force.  On  the  9th  of  JNIay,  in  consequence 
of  letters  received  from  Cornwallis,  it  moved  to  Petersburg. 
There  on  the  13th  Phillips  died,  the  command  reverting 
momentarily  to   Arnold.     On  the   20th   Cornwallis  joined 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  175 

from  Wilmington,  North  Carolina/  and  Arnold  soon  after 
returned  to  New  York. 

Cornwallis  now  had  with  him  about  seven  thousand  troops, 
including  the  garrison  at  Portsmouth ;  but  a  serious  differ- 
ence of  opinion  existed  between  him  and  Clinton,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. The  latter  had  begun  the  conquest  of 
South  Carolina,  and  did  not  welcome  the  conclusion  of  his 
lieutenant  that  the  conquest  could  not  be  maintained  away 
from  the  seaboard,  unless  Virginia  also  were  subdued ; 
for  from  there,  a  rich  and  populous  region,  men  and  supplies 
supported  the  American  cause  in  the  south.  Cornwallis 
had  tested  the  asserted  strength  of  the  Royalists  in  the 
Carolinas,  and  had  found  it  wanting.  Offensive  operations  in 
Virginia  were  what  he  wished ;  but  Clinton  did  not  approve 
this  project,  nor  feel  that  he  could  spare  troops  enough  for 
the  purpose.  Between  October,  1780,  and  June,  1781,  he 
said,  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  and  twenty-four  effectives 
had  been  sent  from  New  York  to  the  Chesapeake;  and  he 
could  not  understand  the  failure  to  cut  off  the  greatly  inferior 
force  of  the  enemy  in  Virginia.  This  at  least  did  not  indi- 
cate probable  success  for  a  renewed  offensive.  The  garrison 
of  New  York  was  now  short  of  eleven  thousand  and  could  not 
be  diminished  further,  as  he  was  threatened  with  a  siege. 
In  short,  the  British  situation  in  America  had  become  essen- 
tially false,  by  the  concurring  effect  of  insufficient  force  and 
ex-centric  —  double  —  operations.  Sent  to  conquer,  their 
numbers  now  were  so  divided  that  they  could  barely  maintain 
the  defensive.  Cornwallis  therefore  was  ordered  to  occupy 
a  defensive  position  which  should  control  an  anchorage  for 
ships  of  the  line,  and  to  strengthen  himself  in  it.  After 
some  discussion,  which  revealed  further  disagreement,  he 
placed  himself  at  Yorktown,  on  the  peninsula  formed  by  the 
James  and  York  rivers.  Portsmouth  was  evacuated,  the 
1  See  ante,  p.  153. 


176     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

garrison  reaching  Yorktown  on  the  22d  of  August.  Corn- 
walHs's  force  was  then  seven  thousand  troops ;  and  there  were 
with  him  besides  about  a  thousand  seamen,  belonging  to 
some  half-dozen  small  vessels,  which  were  shut  up  in  the  York 
by  the  arrival  from  Haiti  of  the  French  fleet  under  de  Grasse, 
which  on  August  30th,  1781,  had  anchored  in  Lynnhaven 
Bay,  inside  of  Cape  Henry. 

On  July  2^  Arbuthnot  had  sailed  for  England,  leaving 
the  command  at  New  York  to  Rear-Admiral  Thomas  Graves. 
Graves  on  the  same  day  wrote  to  Rodney  by  the  brig  Active, 
that  intercepted  dispatches  of  the  enemy  had  revealed  that  a 
large  division  from  the  West  Indies  was  to  arrive  on  the 
American  coast  during  the  summer,  to  cooperate  with  the 
force  already  in  Newport.  Rodney,  on  the  other  hand, 
dispatched  to  New  York  on  July  7th  the  Swallow  sloop,  16, 
with  word  that,  if  he  sent  reinforcements  from  the  West 
Indies,  they  would  be  ordered  to  make  the  Capes  of  the 
Chesapeake,  and  to  coast  thence  to  New  York.  He  asked, 
therefore,  that  cruisers  with  information  might  be  stationed 
along  that  route.  Two  days  later,  having  then  certain 
news  that  de  Grasse  had  sailed  for  Cap  Fran9ois,  he  sent 
this  intelligence  to  Sir  Peter  Parker  at  Jamaica,  and  gave 
Sir  Samuel  Hood  preparatory  orders  to  command  a  rein- 
forcement of  ships  destined  for  the  continent.  This,  however, 
was  limited  in  numbers  to  fifteen  sail  of  the  line,  Rodney 
being  misled  by  his  intelligence,  which  gave  fourteen  ships 
as  the  size  of  the  French  division  having  the  same  destination, 
and  reported  that  de  Grasse  himself  would  convoy  the 
trade  from  Cap  Francois  to  France.  On  the  24th  instruc- 
tions were  issued  for  Hood  to  proceed  on  this  duty.  He  was 
first  to  convoy  the  trade  from  Jamaica  as  far  as  the  passage 
between  Cuba  and  Haiti,  and  thence  to  make  the  utmost 
speed  to  the  Chesapeake.  A  false  rumour,  of  French  ships 
reaching   Martinique   from   Europe,    slightly   delayed   this 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  177 

movement.  The  convoy  was  dispatched  to  Jamaica  with 
two  ships  of  the  Hne,  which  Sir  Peter  Parker  was  directed  to 
send  at  once  to  America,  and  requested  to  reinforce  with 
others  from  his  own  squadron.  Hood  was  detained  until 
the  rumour  could  be  verified.  On  the  1st  of  August  Rodney 
sailed  for  England  on  leave  of  absence.  On  the  10th  Hood 
left  Antigua  with  fourteen  ships  of  the  line,  direct  for  the 
Capes.  He  had  already  received,  on  August  3d,  Graves's 
letter  by  the  Active,  which  he  sent  back  on  the  8th  with  his 
answers  and  with  a  notification  of  his  speedy  departure. 

The  Swallow  and  the  Active  should  have  reached  Graves 
before  Hood;  but  neither  got  to  him  at  all.  The  Swallow 
arrived  safely  in  New  York  on  the  27th  of  July ;  but  Graves 
had  sailed  with  all  his  squadron  on  the  21st,  for  Boston  Bay, 
hoping  there  to  intercept  an  expected  convoy  from  France, 
concerning  which  a  special  caution  had  been  sent  him  by 
the  Admiralty.  The  Swallow  was  at  once  sent  on  by  the 
senior  naval  officer  at  New  York,  but  was  attacked  by 
hostile  vessels,  forced  ashore  on  Long  Island,  and  lost.  The 
Active  was  captured  before  she  reached  New  York.  Graves, 
thus  uninformed  of  the  momentous  crisis  at  hand,  continued 
cruising  until  the  16th  of  August,  when  he  returned  to  Sandy 
Hook.  There  he  found  the  duplicates  of  the  Swallow's 
letters,  but  they  only  notified  him  of  the  course  a  reinforce- 
ment would  take,  not  that  Hood  had  started.  On  August 
25th  the  latter,  being  then  off  the  Chesapeake,  sent  duplicates 
of  the  Active's  dispatches,  but  these  preceded  by  little  his 
own  arrival  on  the  28th.  That  evening  news  was  received 
in  New  York  that  de  Barras  had  sailed  from  Newport  on  the 
25th,  with  his  whole  division.  Hood  anchored  outside  the 
Hook,  where  Graves,  who  was  senior  to  him,  undertook  to 
join  at  once.  On  the  31st  five  sail  of  the  line  and  a  50-gun 
ship,  all  that  could  be  got  ready  in  time,  crossed  the  bar,  and 
the  entire  body  of  nineteen  ships  of  the  line  started  at  once 


178    MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

for  the  Chesapeake,  whither  it  was  understood  now  that  both 
the  French  fleet  and  the  united  armies  of  Washington  and 
Rochambeau  were  hurrying. 

Count  de  Grasseupon  his  arrival  at  Cap  Francois  had  found 
that  many  things  must  be  done  before  he  could  sail  for  the 
continent.  Measures  needed  to  be  taken  for  the  security  of 
Haiti ;  and  a  large  sum  of  money,  with  a  .considerable  rein- 
forcement of  troops,  was  required  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
projected  operation,  for  which  but  a  short  time  was  allowed, 
as  it  was  now  August  and  he  must  be  again  in  the  West  Indies 
in  October.  It  was  not  the  least  among  the  fortunate 
concurrences  for  the  American  cause  at  that  moment,  that 
de  Grasse,  whose  military  capacity  was  not  conspicuous, 
showed  then  a  remarkable  energy,  politic  tact,  and  breadth 
of  view.  He  decided  to  take  with  him  every  ship  he  could 
command,  postponing  the  sailing  of  the  convoys;  and  by 
dexterous  arrangement  with  the  Spaniards  he  contrived  to 
secure  both  the  funds  required  and  an  efficient  corps  of  thirty- 
three  hundred  French  troops,  without  stripping  Haiti  too 
closely.  On  the  5th  of  August  he  left  Cap  Francois,  with 
twenty-eight  ships  of  the  line,  taking  the  route  through  the 
Old  Bahama  Channel,^  and  anchored  in  Lynnhaven  Bay, 
just  within  the  entrance  of  the  Chesapeake,  on  the  30th,  the 
day  before  Graves  sailed  from  New  York  for  the  same  place. 
The  troops  were  landed  instantly  on  the  south  side  of  the 
James  River,  and  soon  reached  La  Fayette,  who  commanded 
the  forces  so  far  opposed  to  Cornwallis,  which  were  thus 
raised  to  eight  thousand  men.  At  the  same  time  Washington, 
having  thrown  Clinton  off  his  guard,  was  crossing  the  Dela- 
ware on  his  way  south,  with  six  thousand  regular  troops, 
two  thousand  American  and  four  thousand  French,  to  join 
La  Fayette.     French  cruisers  took  position  in  the  James 

1  Along  the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  between  it  and  the  Bahama 
Banks. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  179 

River,  to  prevent  Cornwallis  from  crossing,  and  escaping  to 
the  southward  into  CaroKna.  Others  were  sent  to  close  the 
mouth  of  the  York.  By  these  detachments  the  main  fleet 
was  reduced  to  twenty-four  sail  of  the  line. 

On  the  5th  of  September,  at  8  a.m.,  the  French  look-out 
frigate,  cruising  outside  Cape  Henry,  made  the  signal  for  a 
fleet  steering  for  the  Bay.  It  was  hoped  at  first  that  this  was 
de  Barras's  squadron  from  Newport,  known  to  be  on  its  way, 
but  it  was  soon  evident  from  the  numbers  that  it  must  be 
an  enemy.  The  forces  now  about  to  be  opposed,  nineteen 
British  sail  of  the  line  to  twenty-four  French,  were  consti- 
tuted as  follows  :  British,  two  98's  (three-deckers) ;  twelve 
74's,  one  70,  four  64's,  besides  frigates;  French,  one  104 
(three-decker),^  three  80's,  seventeen  74's,  three  64's. 

The  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake  is  about  ten  miles  wide, 
from  Cape  Charles  on  the  north  to  Cape  Henry  on  the  south. 
The  main  channel  is  between  the  latter  and  a  shoal,  three 
miles  to  the  north w^ard,  called  the  Middle  Ground.  The 
British  fleet,  when  the  French  were  first  seen  from  it,  was 
steering  south-west  for  the  entrance,  under  foresails  and  top- 
gallant sails,  and  it  so  continued,  forming  line  as  it  approached. 
The  wind  was  north-north-east.  At  noon  the  ebb-tide  made, 
and  the  French  began  to  get  under  way,  but  many  of  their 
ships  had  to  make  several  tacks  to  clear  Cape  Henry.  Their 
line  was  consequently  late  in  forming,  and  w^as  by  no  means 
regular  or  closed  as  they  got  outside. 

At  1  P.M.  Graves  made  the  signal  to  form  column  on  an 
east  and  west  line,  which  with  the  wind  as  it  was  would  be 
the  close-hauled  line  heading  out  to  sea,  on  the  other  tack 
from  that  on  which  his  fleet  still  was.  In  this  order  he  con- 
tinued to  head  in  for  the  entrance.  At  2  p.m.  the  French  van, 
standing  out,  three  miles  distant  by  estimate,  bore  south 

1  The  Ville  de  Paris,  to  which  Troude  attributes  104  guns.  She 
was  considered  the  biggest  and  finest  ship  of  her  day. 


180     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

from  the  London,  Graves's  flagship,  and  was  therefore 
abreast  of  the  centre  of  the  British  line.  As  the  British  van 
came  near  the  Middle  Ground,  at  2.13  p.m.,  the  ships  wore 
together.  This  put  them  on  the  same  tack  as  the  French, 
Hood's  division,  which  had  been  leading,  being  now  the  rear 
in  the  reversed  order.  The  fleet  then  brought-to,  —  stopped, 
—  in  order  to  allow  the  centre  of  the  enemy  to  come  abreast 
of  the  centre  of  the  British  (aa,  aa.)  The  two  lines  now  were 
nearly  parallel,  but  the  British,  being  five  ships  fewer, 
naturally  did  not  extend  so  far  as  the  rear  of  the  French, 
which  in  fact  was  not  yet  clear  of  the  Cape.  At  2.30  Graves 
made  the  signal  for  the  van  ship  (the  Shrewsbury),  to  lead 
more  to  starboard  (1)  —  towards  the  enemy.  As  each  ship 
in  succession  would  take  her  course  to  follow  the  leader,  the 
effect  of  this  was  to  put  the  British  on  a  line  inclined  to  that 
of  the  enemy,  the  van  nearest,  and  as  the  signal  was  renewed 
three  quarters  of  an  hour  later,  —  at  3.17, — this  angle 
became  still  more  marked  (bb).^  This  was  the  original  and 
enduring  cause  of  a  lamentable  failure  by  which  seven  of  the 
rear  ships,  in  an  inferior  force  undertaking  to  attack,  never 
came  into  battle  at  all.  At  3.34  the  van  was  ordered  again 
to  keep  still  more  toward  the  enemy. 

At  3.46  the  signal  was  made  for  ships  to  close  to  one  cable, 
followed  almost  immediately  by  that  to  bear  down  and  engage 
the  enemy,  —  the  signal  for  the  line  still  flying.  Graves's 
flagship,  the  London,  98  (f),  which  w^as  hove-to,  filled  and 
bore  down.  Under  the  conditions,  the  van  ships  of  course 
got  first  under  fire,  and  the  action  gradually  extended  from 
them  to  the  twelfth  in  the  order,  two  ships  astern  of  the 
London.  According  to  the  log  of  the  latter,  at  4.11  the  signal 
for  the  line  ahead  was  hauled  down,  that  it  might  not  in- 
terfere with  that  for  close  action,  but  at  4.22  it  was  rehoisted, 

1  This  reproduced  the  blunder  of  Byng,  between  whose  action  and 
the  one  now  under  discussion  there  is  a  marked  resemblance. 


Graves  AKD  De  Grasse 

oth  Sept.  1781 

Ol-K  ClIESArKAKE  BAY 

British  »  I'J  Ships 
French  o  24  Ships 


a      "  f 


Middle  Ground 


h         \:^t' 


CSk  pk  p>,  ex  p*.  c>.  c>^p»-^ 


-oooo  ooc>oc>c>oc>c>c>o 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  181 

"the  ships  not  being  sufficiently  extended."    The  meaning 
of  this  expression  may  be  inferred  from  Beatson's  account :  — 

"The  London,  by  taking  the  lead,  had  advanced  farther  towards 
the  enemy  than  some  of  the  ships  stationed  immediately  ahead  of  her 
in  the  line  of  battle ;  and  upon  luffing  up  (f ')  to  bring  her  broadside 
to  bear,  they  having  done  the  same  thing,  her  second  ahead  (m) 
was  brought  nearly  upon  her  weather  beam.  The  other  ships  ahead 
of  her  were  likewise  too  much  crowded  together." 

As  the  ship  on  the  London's  weather  beam  could  not  fire 
upon  the  enemy  unless  she  drew  ahead,  this  condition  prob- 
ably accounts  for  the  flagship  being  again  hove-to,  while 
firing,  as  Hood  says  that  she  was.  The  signal  for  the  line 
was  hauled  down  again  at  4.27,  by  the  London's  log,  that  for 
close  action  being  up,  and  repeated  at  5.20,  when  Hood  (h)  at 
last  bore  down  with  his  division  (W),  but  the  French  ships  bear- 
ing up  also,  he  did  not  near  them.  Firing  ceased  shortly  after 
sunset.  The  loss  of  the  British  was  90  killed,  246  wounded ; 
that  of  the  French  is  given  only  in  round  numbers,  as  about 
200  killed  and  wounded. 

Hood's  statement  introduces  certain  important  qualifica- 
tions into  the  above  account :  — 

"Our  centre  began  to  engage  at  the  same  time  as  the  van,  at  four, 
but  at  a  most  improper  distance,  and  our  rear,  being  barely  within 
random  shot,  did  not  fire  while  the  signal  for  the  fine  was  flying. 
The  London  had  the  signal  for  close  action  flying,  as  well  as  the  signal 
for  the  line  ahead  at  half  a  cable  was  under  her  topsails,  with  the 
main  topsail  to  the  mast,^  though  the  enemy's  ships  were  pushing  on." 

As  showing  the  improper  distance  at  which  the  London 
brought-to  to  fire,  he  says  :  — 

"The  second  ship  astern  of  her  (of  the  London)  received  but 
trifling  damage,  and  the  third  astern  of  her  received  no  damage  at 
all,  which  most  clearly  proves  [at]  how  much  too  great  a  distance  was 
the  centre  division  engaged." 

^  I.e.  she  had  stopped. 


182     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

The  day  after  the  action  Hood  made  a  memorandum  of 
his  criticisms  upon  it,  which  has  been  pubhshed.  The  gist 
of  this  is  as  follows.  As  the  French  stood  out,  their  line  was 
not  regular  or  connected.  The  van  was  much  separated 
from  the  centre  and  rear,  and  it  appears  also,  from  the 
French  narratives,  that  it  was  to  windward  of  the  rest  of  the 
fleet.  From  these  causes  it  was  much  exposed  to  be  attacked 
unsupported.  There  was,  by  Hood's  estimate,  "a  full  hour 
and  a  half  to  have  engaged  it  before  any  of  the  rear  could 
have  come  up."  The  line  of  battle  on  the  port  tack,  with 
the  then  wind,  was  east  and  west,  and  Graves  had  first 
ranged  his  fleet  on  it,  as  the  French  were  doing ;  but  after- 
wards, owing  to  his  method  of  approach,  by  the  van  bearing 
down  and  the  other  ships  following  in  its  wake,  the  two  lines, 
instead  of  being  parallel,  formed  an  angle,  the  British  centre 
and  rear  being  much  more  distant  from  the  enemy  than  the 
van  was.  This  alone  would  cause  the  ships  to  come  into 
battle  successively  instead  of  together,  a  fault  of  itself; 
but  the  Commander-in-Chief,  according  to  Hood,  com- 
mitted the  further  mistake  that  he  kept  the  signal  for  the 
line  of  .battle  flying  until  5.30  p.m.,  near  to  sunset.  In  Hood's 
understanding,  while  that  signal  flew  the  position  of  each  ship 
was  determined  by  that  of  Graves's  flagship.  None  could  go 
closer  than  the  line  through  her  parallel  to  the  enemy. 
Hence  Hood's  criticism,  which  is  marked  by  much  acerbity 
towards  his  superior,  but  does  not  betray  any  consciousness 
that  he  himself  needed  any  justification  for  his  division  not 
having  taken  part. 

''Had  the  centre  gone  to  the  support  of  the  van,  and  the  signal 
for  the  line  been  hauled  down,  or  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  set  the 
example  of  close  action,  even  with  the  signal  for  the  line  flying,  the  van 
of  the  enemy  must  have  been  cut  to  pieces,  and  the  rear  division 
of  the  British  fleet  would  have  been  opposed  to  those  ships  the  centre 
division  fired  at,  and  at  the  proper  distance  for  engaging,  or  the 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  183 

Rear-Adiniral  who  commanded  it  ^  would  have  a  great  deal  to  an- 
swer for."  2 

So  much  for  the  tactical  failure  of  that  day.  The  question 
remained  what  next  was  to  be  done.  Graves  contem- 
plated renewing  the  action,  but  early  in  the  night  was  in- 
formed that  several  of  the  van  ships  were  too  crippled  to 
permit  this.  He  held  his  ground,  however,  in  sight  of  the 
French,  until  dark  on  the  9th,  when  they  were  seen  for  the 
last  time.  They  were  then  under  a  cloud  of  sail,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  10th  had  disappeared.  From  their  actions 
during  this  interval.  Hood  had  inferred  that  de  Grasse  meant 
to  get  back  into  the  Chesapeake  without  further  fighting; 
and  he  implies  that  he  advised  Graves  to  anticipate  the  enemy 
in  so  doing.  Though  some  ships  were  crippled  aloft,  the 
British  batteries  were  practically  intact,  nor  had  men  enough 
been  disabled  to  prevent  any  gun  in  the  fleet  from  being 
fought.  Could  but  a  single  working  day  be  gained  in  taking 
up  an  anchorage,  a  defensive  order  could  be  assumed,  practi- 
cally impregnable  to  the  enemy,  covering  Cornwallis,  and 
not  impossibly  intercepting  the  French  ships  left  in  the  Bay. 
In  the  case  of  many  men  such  comment  might  be  dismissed 
as  the  idle  talk  of  the  captious  fault-finder,  always  to  the  fore 

^  Hood  himself. 

2  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  p.  32.  Navy  Records  Society.  My 
italics.  Concerning  the  crucial  fact  of  the  signal  for  the  line  of 
battle  being  kept  flying  continuously  until  5.30  p.m.,  upon  which 
there  is  a  direct  contradiction  between  Hood  and  the  log  of  the 
London,  it  is  necessary  to  give  the  statement  of  Captain  Thomas 
White,  who  was  present  in  the  action  in  one  of  the  rear  ships.  "If 
the  London's  log,  or  the  log  of  any  other  individual  ship  in  the  fleet, 
confirm  this  statement,"  (that  Hood  was  dilatory  in  obeying  the 
order  for  close  action),  "  I  shall  be  induced  to  fancy  that  what  I  that 
day  saw  and  heard  was  a  mere  chimera  of  the  brain,  and  that  what 
I  believed  to  be  the  signal  for  the  line  was  not  a  union  jack,  but  an 
ignis  fatuus  conjured  up  to  mock  me."  White  and  Hood  also  agree 
that  the  signal  for  the  line  was  rehoisted  at  6.30.  (White :  "Naval 
Researches,"  London,  1830,  p.  45.) 


184    MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

in  life;  but  in  the  case  of  Hood  it  must  be  received  with 
deference,  for,  but  a  few  months  later,  when  confronted 
with  greater  odds,  he  himself  did  the  very  thing  he  here 
recommended,  for  an  object  less  vital  than  the  relief  of  Corn- 
wallis.  Having  regard  to  the  character  of  de  Grasse,  it 
is  reasonable  to  believe  that,  if  he  had  found  the  British  fleet 
thus  drawn  up  at  anchor  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  as  he  found 
Hood  at  St.  Kitts  in  the  following  January,  he  would  have 
waited  off  the  entrance  for  de  Barras,  and  then  have  gone  to 
sea,  leaving  Washington  and  Rochambeau  to  look  at  Corn- 
wallis  slipping  out  of  their  grasp. 

On  the  10th  of  September  Graves  decided  to  burn  the 
Terrible,  74,  which  had  been  kept  afloat  with  difficulty  since 
the  action.  This  done,  the  fleet  stood  towards  the  Chesa- 
peake, a  frigate  going  ahead  to  reconnoitre.  On  the  13th, 
at  6  A.M.,  Graves  wrote  to  Hood  that  the  look-outs  reported 
the  French  at  anchor  above  the  Horse  Shoe  (shoal)  in  the 
Chesapeake,  and  desired  his  opinion  what  to  do  with  the 
fleet.  To  this  Hood  sent  the  comforting  reply  that  it  was  no 
more  than  what  he  had  expected,  as  the  press  of  sail  the 
(French)  fleet  carried  on  the  9th,  and  on  the  night  of  the  8th, 
made  it  very  clear  to  him  what  de  Grasse's  intentions  were. 
He  "would  be  very  glad  to  send  an  opinion,  but  he  really 
knows  not  what  to  say  in  the  truly  lamentable  state  [to  which] 
we  have  brought  ourselves."  ^  On  the  10th  de  Barras  had 
reached  the  Bay,  where  he  was  joined  by  de  Grasse  on  the  11th, 
so  that  there  were  then  present  thirty-six  French  ships  of 
the  line.  Graves,  therefore,  returned  to  New  York,  reaching 
Sandy  Hook  September  19th.  On  the  14th  Washington 
had  arrived  before  Yorktown,  where  he  took  the  chief  com- 
mand; and  the  armies  closed  in  upon  Cornwallis  by  land 
as  the  French  fleets  had  done  already  by  water.  On  the 
19th  of  October  the  British  force  was  compelled  to  surrender, 

*  "Letters  of  Lord  Hood.""   Navy  Records  Society,  p.  35. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  185 

seven  thousand  two  hundred  and  forty-seven  troops  and 
eight  hundred  and  forty  seamen  laying  down  their  arms. 
During  the  siege  the  latter  had  served  in  the  works,  the  batter- 
ies of  which  were  largely  composed  of  ships'  guns. 

After  Graves's  return  to  New  York,  Rear-Admiral  the  Hon. 
Robert  Digby  arrived  from  England  on  the  24th  of  Sep- 
tember, to  take  command  of  the  station  in  Arbuthnot's  place. 
He  brought  with  him  three  ships  of  the  line ;  and  the  two 
which  Sir  Peter  Parker  had  been  ordered  by  Rodney  to  send 
on  at  once  had  also  reached  the  port.  It  was  decided  by  the 
land  and  sea  officers  concerned  to  attempt  the  relief  of 
Cornwallis,  and  that  it  was  expedient  for  Graves  to  remain 
in  command  until  after  this  expedition.  He  could  not  start, 
however,  until  the  18th  of  October,  by  which  time  Corn- 
wallis's  fate  was  decided.  Graves  then  departed  for 
Jamaica  to  supersede  Sir  Peter  Parker.  On  the  11th  of 
November  Hood  sailed  from  Sandy  Hook  with  eighteen  ships 
of  the  line,  and  on  the  5th  of  December  anchored  at 
Barbados.  On  the  5th  of  November  de  Grasse  also  quitted 
the  continent  with  his  whole  fleet,  and  returned  to  the  West 
Indies. 


186     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 


CHAPTER  XI 

NAVAL  EVENTS  OF  1781  IN  EUROPE.  DARBY'S 
RELIEF  OF  GIBRALTAR,  AND  THE  BATTLE 
OF  THE  DOGGER  BANK 

IN  Europe,  during  the  year  1781,  the  two  leading 
questions  which  dominated  the  action  of  the  belH- 
gerents  were  the  protection,  or  destruction,  of  com- 
merce, and  the  attack  and  defence  of  Gibraltar. 
The  British  Channel  Fleet  was  much  inferior  to  the 
aggregate  sea  forces  of  France  and  Spain  in  the  waters 
of  Europe ;  and  the  Dutch  navy  also  was  now  hostile.  The 
French  government  represented  to  its  allies  that  by  concen- 
trating their  squadrons  near  the  entrance  of  the  Channel 
they  would  control  the  situation  in  every  point  of  view; 
but  the  Spaniards,  intent  upon  Gibraltar,  declined  to  with- 
draw their  fleet  from  Cadiz  until  late  in  the  summer,  while 
the  French  persisted  in  keeping  their  own  at  Brest.  The 
Channel  Fleet  was  decisively  superior  to  the  latter,  and  in- 
ferior to  the  Spaniards  in  numbers  only. 

No  relief  having  been  given  Gibraltar  since  Rodney  had 
left  it  in  February,  1780,  the  question  of  supplying  the  for- 
tress became  pressing.  For  this  purpose,  twenty-eight  ships 
of  the  line,  under  Vice-Admiral  George  Darby,  sailed  from 
St.  Helen's  on  the  13th  of  March,  1781,  with  a  large  convoy. 
Off  Cork  a  number  of  victuallers  joined,  and  the  whole 
body  then  proceeded  for  Gibraltar,  accompanied  by  five 
ships  of  the  line  which  were  destined  for  the  East  Indies,  as 
well  as  by  the  West  India  and  American  "trade."  These 
several  attachments  parted  from  time  to  time  on  the  way,  and 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  187 

on  the  11th  of  April  the  main  expedition  sighted  Cape  Spartel, 
on  the  African  coast.  No  attempt  to  intercept  it  was  made 
by  the  great  Spanish  fleet  in  Cadiz  ;  and  on  the  12th  of  April, 
at  noon,  the  convoy  anchored  in  the  Bay  of  Gibraltar.  That 
night  thirteen  sail  of  the  transports,  under  charge  of  two 
frigates,  slipped  out  and  made  their  w^ay  to  Minorca,  then  a 
British  possession.  The  British  ships  of  war  continued  under 
way,  cruising  in  the  Bay  and  Gut  of  Gibraltar. 

As  the  convoy  entered,  the  besiegers  opened  a  tremendous 
cannonade,  which  was  ineffectual,  however,  to  stop  the  land- 
ing of  the  stores.  More  annoyance  was  caused  by  a  flotilla 
of  gunboats,  specially  built  for  this  siege,  the  peculiar  fighting 
power  of  which  lay  in  one  26-pounder,  whose  great  length 
gave  a  range  superior  to  the  batteries  of  ships  of  the  line. 
Being  moved  by  oars  as  well  as  by  sails,  these  little  vessels 
could  choose  their  distance  in  light  airs  and  calms,  and  were 
used  so  actively  to  harass  the  transports  at  anchor  that 
Darby  was  obliged  to  cover  them  with  three  ships  of  the  line. 
These  proved  pow^erless  effectually  to  injure  the  gunboats ; 
but,  while  the  latter  caused  great  annoyance  and  petty  injury, 
they  did  not  hinder  the  unlading  nor  even  greatly  delay  it. 
The  experience  illustrates  again  the  unlikelihood  that  great 
results  can  be  obtained  by  petty  means,  or  that  massed  force, 
force  concentrated,  can  be  eflPectually  counteracted  either 
by  cheap  and  ingenious  expedients,  or  by  the  cooperative 
exertions  of  many  small  independent  units.  "They  were 
only  capable  of  producing  trouble  and  vexation.  So  far  were 
they  from  preventing  the  succours  from  being  thrown  into 
the  garrison,  or  from  burning  the  convoy,  that  the  only 
damage  of  any  consequence  that  they  did  to  the  shipping  was 
the  wounding  of  the  mizzen-mast  of  the  Nonsuch  so  much 
that  it  required  to  be  shifted."^  On  the  19th  of  April  —  in 
one  week  —  the  revictualling  was  completed,  and  the  expedi- 

1  Beatson,  "Military  and  Naval  Memoirs,"  v.  347. 


188     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

tion  started  back  for  England.  The  fleet  anchored  again 
at  Spithead  on  the  22d  of  May. 

While  Darby  was  returning,  La  Motte  Picquet  had  gone 
to  sea  from  Brest  with  six  ships  of  the  line  and  some  frigates 
to  cruise  in  the  approaches  to  the  Channel.  There,  on  the 
2d  of  May,  he  fell  in  with  the  convoy  returning  from  the 
West  Indies  with  the  spoils  of  St.  Eustatius.  The  ships  of 
war  for  the  most  part  escaped,  but  La  Motte  Picquet  carried 
twenty-two  out  of  thirty  merchant  ships  into  Brest  before 
he  could  be  intercepted,  although  a  detachment  of  eight 
sail  sent  by  Darby  got  close  upon  his  heels. 

After  a  long  refit,  Darby  put  to  sea  again,  about  the  1st  of 
August,  to  cover  the  approach  of  the  large  convoys  then  ex- 
pected to  arrive.  Being  greatly  delayed  by  head  winds,  he 
had  got  no  further  than  the  Lizard,  when  news  was  brought 
him  that  the  Franco-Spanish  grand  fleet,  of  forty-nine  ships 
of  the  line,  was  cruising  near  the  Scilly  Isles.  Having  him- 
self but  thirty  of  the  line,  he  put  into  Tor  Bay  on  the  24th 
of  August,  and  moored  his  squadron  across  the  entrance  to 
the  Bay. 

This  appearance  of  the  allies  was  a  surprise  to  the  British 
authorities,  w^ho  saw  thus  unexpectedly  renewed  the  invasion 
of  the  Channel  made  in  1779.  Spain,  mortified  justly  by 
her  failure  even  to  molest  the  intrusion  of  succours  into  Gib- 
raltar, had  thought  to  retrieve  her  honour  by  an  attack  upon 
Minorca,  for  which  she  asked  the  cooperation  of  France.  De 
Guichen  was  sent  in  July  with  nineteen  ships  of  the  line  ;  and 
the  combined  fleets,  under  the  chief  command  of  the  Spanish 
admiral,  Don  Luis  de  Cordova,  convoyed  the  troops  into  the 
INIediterranean  beyond  the  reach  of  Gibraltar  cruisers. 
Returning  thence  into  the  Atlantic,  de  Cordova  directed 
his  course  for  the  Channel,  keeping  far  out  to  sea  to  conceal 
his  movements.  But  though  thus  successful  in  reaching 
his  ground  unheralded,  he  made  no  attempt  to  profit  by 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  189 

the  advantage  gained.  The  question  of  attacking  Darby 
at  his  anchors  was  discussed  in  a  council  of  war,  at  which  de 
Guichen  strongly  advocated  the  measure ;  but  a  majority  of 
votes  decided  that  Great  Britain  would  be  less  hurt  by  ruining 
her  fleet  than  by  intercepting  the  expected  convoys.  Even 
for  the  latter  purpose,  however,  de  Cordova  could  not  wait. 
On  the  5th  of  September  he  informed  de  Guichen  that  he  was 
at  liberty  to  return  to  Brest;  and  he  himself  went  back  to 
Cadiz  with  thirty-nine  ships,  nine  of  which  were  French. 
"This  cruise  of  the  combined  fleet,"  says  Chevalier,  "dimin- 
ished the  consideration  of  France  and  Spain.  These  two 
powers  had  made  a  great  display  of  force,  without  producing 
the  slightest  result."  It  may  be  mentioned  here  that  Minorca, 
after  a  six  months'  siege,  capitulated  in  February,  1782. 

While  Darby  was  beating  down  Channel  in  the  early  days 
of  x^ugust,  1781,  Vice- Admiral  Hyde  Parker,  lately  Rodney's 
second  in  command  in  the  West  Indies,  was  returning  to 
England  convoying  a  large  merchant  fleet  from  the  Baltic. 
On  the  5th  of  August,  at  daylight,  a  Dutch  squadron,  also 
with  a  convoy,  but  outward  bound,  from  the  Texel  to  the 
Baltic,  was  discovered  in  the  south-west,  near  the  Doggers- 
bank.  Heading  as  the  two  enemies  then  were,  their  courses 
must  shortly  intersect.  Parker,  therefore,  ordered  his  con- 
voy to  steer  to  the  westward  for  England,  while  he  himself 
bore  down  for  the  enemy.  The  Dutch  Rear-Admiral,  Johan 
Arnold  Zoutman,  on  the  contrary,  kept  the  merchant  vessels 
with  him,  under  his  lee,  but  drew  out  the  ships  of  war  from 
among  them,  to  form  his  order  on  the  side  towards  the  enemy. 
Each  opponent  put  seven  sail  into  the  line.  The  British 
vessels,  besides  being  of  different  rates,  were  chiefly  very 
old  ships,  dragged  out  from  Rotten  Row  to  meet  the  pressing 
emergency  caused  by  the  greatly  superior  forces  which  were 
in  coalition  against  Great  Britain.  Owing  to  the  decayed 
condition  of  some  of  them,  their  batteries  had  been  lightened, 


190    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

to  the  detriment  of  their  fighting  power.  Two  of  them,  how- 
ever, were  good  and  new  seventy-fours.  It  is  probable 
that  the  Dutch  vessels,  after  a  long  peace,  were  not  much 
better  than  their  antagonists.  In  fact,  each  squadron 
was  a  scratch  lot,  in  the  worst  sense  of  the  phrase.  The 
conduct  of  the  affair  by  the  two  admirals,  even  to  the  very 
intensity  of  their  pugnaciousness,  contributes  a  tinge  of 
the  comic  to  the  history  of  a  desperately  fought  action. 
The  breeze  was  fresh  at  north-east,  and  the  sea  smooth. 
The  Dutch,  being  to  leeward,  awaited  attack,  forming  line 
on  the  port  tack,  heading  south-east  by  east,  a  point  off  the 
wind,  under  topsails  and  foresails,  a  cable's  length  apart. 
There  is  little  room  to  doubt  that  an  adversary  who  thus  holds 
his  ground  means  to  make  a  stand-up  fight,  but  Parker, 
although  the  sun  of  a  midsummer  day  had  scarcely  risen, 
thought  advisable  to  order  a  general  chase.  Of  course,  no 
ship  spared  her  canvas  to  this,  while  the  worse  sailers  had 
to  set  their  studdingsails  to  keep  up;  and  the  handling  of 
the  sails  took  the  men  off  from  the  preparations  for  battle. 
Parker,  who  doubtless  was  still  sore  over  Rodney's  censure 
of  the  year  before,  and  who  moreover  had  incurred  the  Ad- 
miralty's rebuke,  for  apparent  hesitation  to  attack  the 
enemy's  islands  while  temporarily  in  command  in  the  West 
Indies,  was  determined  now  to  show  the  fight  that  was  in 
him.  "  It  is  related  that,  upon  being  informed  of  the  force  of 
the  Dutch  squadron  in  the  morning,  he  replied  (pulling  up 
his  breeches),  'It  matters  little  what  their  force  is;  we  must 
fight  them  if  they  are  double  the  number.'"  At  6.10  a.m. 
the  signal  was  made  for  line  abreast,  the  ships  running  down 
nearly  before  the  wind.  This  of  course  introduced  more 
regularity,  the  leading  ships  taking  in  their  lighter  sails  to 
permit  the  others  to  reach  their  places;  but  the  pace  still 
was  rapid.  At  6.45  the  order  was  closed  to  one  cable,  and 
at  7.56  the  signal  for  battle  was  hoisted.     It  is  said  that  at 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  191 

that  moment  the  80-gun  ship  was  still  securing  a  studding- 
sail-boom,  which  indicates  how  closely  action  trod  on  the 
heels  of  preparation. 

The  Dutch  admiral  was  as  deliberate  as  Parker  was  head- 
long.    An  English  witness  writes  :  — 

"  They  appeared  to  be  in  great  order ;  and  their  hammocks,  quar- 
ter-cloths, etc.,  were  spread  in  as  nice  order  as  if  for  show  in  harbour. 
Their  marines  also  were  well  drawn  up,  and  stood  with  their  muskets 
shouldered,  with  all  the  regularity  and  exactness  of  a  review.  Their 
politeness  ought  to  be  remembered  by  every  man  in  our  line ;  for, 
as  if  certain  of  what  happened,  we  came  down  almost  end-on  upon 
their  broadsides ;  yet  did  not  the  Dutch  admiral  fire  a  gun,  or  make 
the  signal  to  engage,  till  the  red  flag  was  at  the  Fortitude's  masthead, 
and  her  shot  finding  their  way  into  his  ship.  This  was  a  manoeuvre 
which  Admiral  Zutman  should  not  be  warmly  thanked  for  by  their 
High  Mightinesses ;  as  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  have  done  infinite 
mischief  to  our  fleet,  coming  down  in  that  unofficer-like  manner. 
Having  suffered  Admiral  Parker  to  place  himself  as  he  pleased,  he 
calmly  waited  till  the  signal  was  hoisted  on  board  the  Fortitude,  and 
at  the  same  time  we  saw  the  signal  going  up  on  board  Admiral 
Zutman's  ship.'' 

The  British,  thus  unmolested,  rounded-to  just  to  windward 
of  the  enemy.  A  pilot  who  was  on  board  their  leading  ship 
was  for  some  reason  told  to  assist  in  laying  her  close  to  her 
opponent.  "By  close,"  he  asked,  "do  you  mean  about  a 
ship's  breadth?"  "Not  a  gun  was  fired  on  either  side," 
says  the  official  British  report,  "until  within  the  distance 
of  half  musket-shot."  Parker,  whom  an  on-looker  describes 
as  full  of  life  and  spirits,  here  made  a  mistake,  of  a  routine 
character,  which  somewhat  dislocated  his  order.  It  was  a 
matter  of  tradition  for  flagship  to  seek  flagship,  just  as  it  was 
to  signal  a  general  chase,  and  to  bear  down  together,  each 
ship  for  its  opposite,  well  extended  with  the  enemy.  Now 
Parker,  as  was  usual,  was  in  the  centre  of  his  line,  the  fourth 
ship ;  but  Zoutman  was  for  some  reason  in  the  fifth.     Parker 


192     MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

therefore  placed  his  fourth  by  the  enemy's  fifth.  In  conse- 
quence, the  rear  British  ship  overlapped  the  enemy,  and  for 
a  time  had  no  opponent ;  while  the  second  and  third  found 
themselves  engaged  with  three  of  the  Dutch.  At  8  a.m.  the 
signal  for  the  line  was  hauled  down,  and  that  for  close  action 
hoisted,  —  thus  avoiding  a  mistake  often  made. 

All  the  vessels  were  soon  satisfactorily  and  hotly  at  work, 
and  the  action  continued  with  varying  phases  till  11.35  a.m. 
The  leading  two  ships  in  both  orders  got  well  to  leeward  of 
the  lines,  the  British  two  having  to  tack  to  regain  their  places 
to  windward.  Towards  the  middle  of  the  engagement 
the  Dutch  convoy  bore  away,  back  to  the  Texel,  as  the 
British  had  steered  for  England  before  it  began ;  the  differ- 
ence being  that  the  voyage  was  abandoned  by  the  Dutch  and 
completed  by  the  British.  At  eleven  o'clock  Parker  made 
sail,  and  passed  with  the  flagship  between  the  enemy  and  the 
Buffalo,  his  next  ahead  and  third  in  the  British  order ;  the 
three  rear  ships  following  close  in  his  wake,  in  obedience  to 
the  signal  for  line  ahead,  which  had  been  rehoisted  at  10.43.^ 
A  heavy  cannonade  attended  this  evolution,  the  Dutch 
fighting  gloriously  to  the  last.  When  it  was  completed,  the 
British  fleet  wore  and  the  action  ceased.  "I  made  an 
effort  to  form  the  line,  in  order  to  renew  the  action,"  wrote 
Parker  in  his  report,  "but  found  it  impracticable.  The 
enemy  appeared  to  be  in  as  bad  a  condition.  Both  squadrons 
lay-to  a  considerable  time  near  each  other,  when  the  Dutch, 
with  their  convoy,  bore  away  for  the  Texel.  We  were  not  in 
a  condition  to  follow  them." 

1  Sir  John  Ross,  in  his  "  Life  of  Saumarez,"  who  was  lieutenant  in 
the  flagship,  says  that  the  flagship  only  passed  ahead  of  the  Buffalo^ 
and  that  the  rear  ships  closed  upon  the  latter.  The  version  in  the 
text  rests  upon  the  detailed  and  circumstantial  statements  of  another 
lieutenant  of  the  squadron,  in  Ekins's  "Naval  Battles."  As  Ekins 
also  was  present  as  a  midshipman,  this  gives,  as  it  were,  the  con- 
firmation of  two  witnesses. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  193 

This  was  a  most  satisfactory  exhibition  of  valour,  and  a 
most  unsatisfactory  battle ;  magnificent,  but  not  war.  The 
completion  of  their  voyage  by  the  British  merchant  ships, 
while  the  Dutch  were  obliged  to  return  to  the  port  which 
they  had  just  left,  may  be  considered  to  award  success,  and 
therefore  the  essentials  of  victory,  to  Parker's  fleet.  With  this 
exception  the  status  quo  remained  much  as  before,  although 
one  of  the  Dutch  ships  sank  next  day ;  yet  the  British  loss 
104  killed  and  339  wounded,  was  nearly  as  great  as  in  Kep- 
pel's  action,  where  thirty  ships  fought  on  each  side,  or  in 
Rodney's  of  April  17th,  1780,  where  the  British  had  twenty 
sail ;  greater  than  with  Graves  off  the  Chesapeake,  and,  in 
proportion,  fully  equal  to  the  sanguinary  conflicts  between 
Suffren  and  Hughes  in  the  East  Indies.  The  Dutch  loss  is 
reported  as  142  killed,  403  wounded.  Both  sides  aimed  at 
the  hull,  as  is  shown  by  the  injuries ;  for  though  much  harm 
was  done  aloft,  few  spars  were  wholly  shot  away.  The 
Buffalo,  a  small  ship,  had  39  shot  through  and  through  her, 
and  a  very  great  number  pierced  between  wind  and  water ; 
in  the  British  van  ship  as  many  as  14,  another  proof  that  the 
Dutch  fired  low. 

With  the  rudimentary  notions  of  manoeuvring  evinced,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  Parker  was  found  an  unsatisfactory 
second  by  an  enlightened  tactician  like  Rodney.  The  Vice- 
Admiral,  however,  laid  his  unsuccess  to  the  indifferent  qual- 
ity of  his  ships.  George  III  visited  the  squadron  after  the 
action,  but  Parker  was  not  open  to  compliments.  "I  wish 
your  Majesty  better  ships  and  younger  officers,"  he  said. 
"For  myself,  I  am  now  too  old  for  service."  No  rewards 
were  given,  and  it  is  asserted  that  Parker  made  no  secret 
that  none  would  be  accepted,  if  offered,  at  the  hands  of  the 
then  Admiralty.  He  voiced  the  protest  of  the  Navy  and  of 
the  nation  against  the  mal-administration  of  the  peace  days, 
which  had  left  the  country  unprepared  for  war.     The  gallant 


194     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

veteran  was  ordered  soon  afterwards  to  command  in  the 
East  Indies.  He  sailed  for  his  station  in  the  Cato,  which 
was  never  heard  of  again. 

Though  unfruitful  in  substantial  results,  Parker's  action 
merits  commemoration ;  for,  after  all,  even  where  skill  does 
its  utmost,  staunchness  such  as  his  shows  the  sound  consti- 
tution of  a  military  body. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  195 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  FINAL  NAVAL  CAMPAIGN  IN  THE  WEST 
INDIES.  HOOD  AND  DE  GRASSE.  RODNEY 
AND  DE  GRASSE.  THE  GREAT  BATTLE  OF 
APRIL  12,  1782 

THE  year  1781  closed  with  an  incident  more  deci- 
sive in  character  than  most  of  the  events  that 
occurred  in  European  waters  during  its  course ; 
one  also  which  transfers  the  interest,  by  natural 
transition,  again  to  the  West  Indies.  The  French  govern- 
ment had  felt  throughout  the  summer  the  necessity  of  send- 
ing de  Grasse  reinforcements  both  of  ships  and  of  supplies, 
but  the  transports  and  material  of  war  needed  could  not  be 
collected  before  December.  As  the  British  probably  would 
attempt  to  intercept  a  convoy  upon  which  the  next  cam- 
paign so  much  depended,  Rear-Admiral  de  Guichen  was  or- 
dered to  accompany  it  clear  of  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  with  twelve 
ships  of  the  line,  and  then  to  go  to  Cadiz.  Five  ships  of  the 
line  destined  to  de  Grasse,  and  two  going  to  the  East  Indies, 
raised  to  nineteen  the  total  force  with  which  de  Guichen  left 
Brest  on  the  10th  of  December.  On  the  afternoon  of  the 
12th,  the  French  being  then  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  to 
the  southward  and  westward  of  Ushant,  with  a  south-east 
wind,  the  weather,  which  had  been  thick  and  squally,  sud- 
denly cleared  and  showed  sails  to  windward.  These  were 
twelve  ships  of  the  line,  one  50,  and  some  frigates,  under  Rear- 
Admiral  Richard  Kempenfelt,  who  had  left  England  on  the  2d 
of  the  month,  to  cruise  in  wait  for  this  expedition.  The  French 
numbers  were  amply  sufficient  to  frustrate  any  attack,  but  de 


196     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

Guichen,  ordinarily  a  careful  officer,  had  allowed  his  ships  of 
war  to  be  to  leeward  and  ahead  of  the  convoy.  The  latter 
scattered  in  every  direction,  as  the  British  swooped  down  upon 
them,  but  all  could  not  escape ;  and  the  French  ships  of  war 
remained  helpless  spectators,  while  the  victims  were  hauling 
down  their  flags  right  and  left.  Night  coming  on,  some  prizes 
could  not  be  secured,  but  Kempenfelt  carried  off  fifteen,  laden 
with  military  and  naval  stores  of  great  money  value  and 
greater  military  importance.  A  few  days  later  a  violent 
storm  dispersed  and  shattered  the  remainder  of  the  French 
body.  Two  ships  of  the  line  only,  the  Triomphant,  84,  and 
Brave,  74,  and  five  transports,  could  pursue  their  way  to  the 
West  Indies.  The  rest  went  back  to  Brest.  This  event 
may  be  considered  as  opening  the  naval  campaign  of  1782 
in  the  West  Indies. 

Kempenfelt,  before  returning  to  England,  sent  off  express 
to  Hood  in  the  West  Indies  the  fireship  Tisiphone,  8,  Com- 
mander James  Saumarez,^  —  afterwards  the  distinguished 
admiral,  —  with  news  of  the  French  approach.  Saumarez, 
having  been  first  to  Barbados,  joined  Hood  on  the  31st  of 
January,  1782,  in  Basse  Terre  Roads,  on  the  lee  side  of  St. 
Kitts ;  a  position  from  which  Hood  had  dislodged  de  Grasse 
six  days  before  by  a  brilliant  manoeuvre,  resembling  that 
which  he  had  contemplated  ^  as  open  to  Graves  the  previous 
September  at  Chesapeake  Bay  for  the  relief  of  Cornwallis. 
The  campaign  for  the  year  1782  had  opened  already  with  an 

1  James  Saumarez,  Lord  de  Saumarez,  G.C.B.  Born,  1757. 
Commander,  1781.  Captain,  1782.  Captain  of  Russell  in  Rodney's 
action,  1782.  Knighted  for  capture  of  frigate  Reunion,  1793. 
Captain  of  Orion  in  Bridport's  action,  at  St.  Vincent,  and  at  the 
Nile  (when  he  was  second  in  command).  Rear-Admiral  and  Baro- 
net, 1801.  Defeated  French  and  Spaniards  off  Cadiz,  July  12th, 
1801.  Vice-Admiral,  1805.  Vice- Admiral  of  England  and  a  peer, 
1831.     Died,  1836. 

^  Ante, -p.  183. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  197 

attack  upon  St.  Kitts  by  the  French  army  and  navy ;  and 
the  French  fleet  was  even  then  cruising  close  at  hand  to  lee- 
ward,, between  St.  Kitts  and  Nevis. 

The  original  intention  of  de  Grasse  and  de  Bouille  had  been 
to  capture  Barbados,  the  most  important  of  the  Eastern 
Antilles  still  remaining  to  the  British ;  but  the  heavy  trade- 
wdnds,  which  in  those  days  made  a  winter  passage  to  wind- 
ward so  long  and  dreary  a  beat,  twice  drove  them  back  to 
port.  "  The  whole  French  fleet, "  wrote  Hood,  "  appeared  off 
Santa  Lucia  on  the  17th  of  last  month,  endeavouring  to  get 
to  windward,  and  having  carried  away  many  topmasts  and 
yards  in  struggling  against  very  squally  weather,  returned  to 
Fort  Royal  Bay  on  the  23d,  and  on  the  28th  came  out  again 
with  forty  transports,  manoeuvring  as  before."  On  the  2d 
of  January  it  disappeared  from  Santa  Lucia,  and,  after  a  short 
stay  again  at  Martinique,  proceeded  on  the  5th  to  St.  Kitts, 
anchoring  in  Basse  Terre  Roads  on  the  11th.  The  British 
garrison  retired  to  Brimstone  Hill,  a  fortified  position  at  the 
north-west  of  the  island,  while  the  inhabitants  surrendered 
the  government  to  the  French,  pledging  themselves  to  neu- 
trality. The  adjacent  island  of  Nevis  capitulated  on  the 
same  terms  on  the  20th. 

On  the  14th  of  January,  an  express  sent  by  General  Shirley, 
governor  of  St.  Kitts,  had  informed  Hood  at  Barbados  that 
a  great  fleet  approaching  had  been  seen  from  the  heights  of 
Nevis  on  the  10th.  Hood  at  once  put  to  sea,  though  short 
of  bread  and  flour,  which  could  not  be  had,  and  with  the  ma- 
terial of  his  ships  in  wretched  condition.  "  When  the  Presi- 
dent ^  joins,"  he  wrote  the  Admiralty,  "I  shall  be  twenty-two 
strong,  with  which  I  beg  you  will  assure  their  Lordships  I 
will  seek  and  give  battle  to  the  Count  de  Grasse,  be  his 
numbers  as  they  may."  On  the  way  a  ship  reached  him  with 
word  that  the  French  fleet  had  invested  St.  Kitts.     On  the 

^  Probably  Prudent,  64.     There  was  no  President  in  the  fleet. 


198     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

21st  he  anchored  at  Antigua  for  repairs  and  suppHes,  indis- 
pensable for  keeping  the  sea  in  the  operations  which  he  con- 
templated, the  duration  of  which  could  not  be  foreseen. 
About  a  thousand  troops  also  were  embarked,  which,  with  the 
marines  that  could  be  spared  from  the  squadron,  would  give 
a  landing  force  of  twenty-four  hundred  men. 

St.  Kitts  being  less  than  fifty  miles  from  Antigua,  Hood 
doubtless  now  got  accurate  information  of  the  enemy's  dis- 
positions, and  could  form  a  definite,  well-matured  plan. 
This  seems  to  have  been  carefully  imparted  to  all  his  captains, 
as  was  the  practice  of  Nelson,  who  was  the  pupil  of  Hood,  if 
of  any  one.  "At  9.15  a.m.  the  Admiral  made  the  signal  for 
all  flag-officers,"  says  the  log  of  the  Canada;  "and  at  4  p.m. 
the  Admirals  and  Commodore  made  the  signals  for  all  cap- 
tains of  their  divisions.''  At  5  p.m.  of  the  same  day, 
January  23d,  the  fleet  weighed  and  stood  over  for  Nevis, 
round  the  southern  point  of  which  Basse  Terre  must  be 
approached ;  for,  the  channel  between  Nevis  and  St.  Kitts 
being  impracticable  for  ships  of  the  line,  the  two  islands 
were  virtually  one,  and,  their  common  axis  lying  north-west 
and  south-east,  the  trade-wind  is  fair  only  when  coming  from 
the  south. 

Basse  Terre,  w^here  de  Grasse  then  was,  is  about  fifteen 
miles  from  the  south  point  of  Nevis.  The  roadstead  lies 
east  and  west,  and  the  French  fleet,  then  twenty-four  of  the 
line  and  two  fifties,  were  anchored  without  attention  to  order, 
three  or  four  deep  ;  the  eastern  ships  so  placed  that  an  enemy 
coming  from  the  southward  could  reach  them  with  the  pre- 
vailing trade-wind,  against  which  the  western  ships  could  not 
beat  up  quickly  to  their  support.  This  being  so,  we  are  told 
that  Hood,  starting  shortly  before  sunset  with  a  fair,  and 
probably  fresh  wind,  from  a  point  only  sixty  miles  distant, 
hoped  to  come  upon  the  French  by  surprise  at  early  daybreak, 
to  attack  the  weather  ships,  and  from  them  to  sail  along  the 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  199 

hostile  order  so  far  as  might  seem  expedient.  His  column, 
thus  passing  in  its  entirety  close  to  a  certain  exposed  fraction 
of  the  enemy,  the  latter  would  be  cut  up  in  detail  by  the  con- 
centration upon  it.  The  British  then,  wearing  to  the  south- 
ward, would  haul  their  wind,  tack,  and  again  stand  up  to  the 
assault,  if  the  enemy  continued  to  await  it. 

This  reasonable  expectation,  and  skilful  conception,  was 
thwarted  by  a  collision,  during  the  night,  between  a  frigate, 
the  Nymphe,  36,  and  the  leading  ship  of  the  line,  the  Alfred, 
74.  The  repairs  to  the  latter  delayed  the  fleet,  the  approach 
of  which  was  discovered  by  daylight.  De  Grasse  therefore 
put  to  sea.  He  imagined  Hood's  purpose  was  to  throw  suc- 
cours into  Brimstone  Hill ;  and  moreover  the  position  of  the 
enemy  now  was  between  him  and  four  ships  of  the  line 
momentarily  expected  from  Martinique,  one  of  which  joined 
him  on  the  same  day.  The  French  were  all  under  way  by 
sunset,  standing  to  the  southward  under  easy  sail,  towards 
the  British,  w^ho  had  rounded  the  south  point  of  Nevis  at 
1  P.M.  Towards  dark.  Hood  went  about  and  stood  also  to 
the  southward,  seemingly  in  retreat. 

During  the  following  night  the  British  tacked  several  times, 
to  keep  their  position  to  windward.  At  daylight  of  January 
25th,  the  two  fleets  were  to  the  westward  of  Nevis ;  the  Brit- 
ish near  the  island,  the  French  abreast,  but  several  miles  to 
leeward.  Foiled  in  his  first  spring  by  an  unexpected  acci- 
dent, Hood  had  not  relinquished  his  enterprise,  and  now  pro- 
posed to  seize  the  anchorage  quitted  by  the  French,  so  estab- 
lishing himself  there,  —  as  he  had  proposed  to  Graves  to  do 
in  the  Chesapeake,  —  that  he  could  not  be  dislodged.  For 
such  a  defensive  position  St.  Kitts  offered  special  advantages. 
The  anchorage  was  a  narrow  ledge,  dropping  precipitately 
to  very  deep  water ;  and  it  was  possible  so  to  place  the  ships 
that  the  enemy  could  not  easily  anchor  near  them. 

At  5.30  A.M.  of  the  25th  Hood  made  the  signal  to  form  line 


200    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

of  battle  on  the  starboard  tack,  at  one  cable  interval.-^  It  is 
mentioned  in  the  log  of  the  Canada,  74,  Captain  Cornwallis, 
that  that  ship  brought-to  in  her  station,  fourth  from  the  rear, 
at  7  o'clock.  By  10  o'clock  the  line  was  formed,  and  the 
ships  hove-to  in  it.  At  10.45  the  signal  was  made  to  fill  [to 
go  ahead],  the  van  ships  to  carry  the  same  sail  as  the  Ad- 
miral, —  topsails  and  foresails,  —  followed,  just  before  noon, 
by  the  order  to  prepare  to  anchor,  with  springs  on  the 
cables.  The  French,  w^ho  were  steering  south,  on  the  port 
tack,  while  the  British  were  hove-to,  went  about  as  soon  as 
the  latter  filled,  and  stood  towards  them  in  bow  and  quarter 
line.^ 

At  noon  the  British  fleet  was  running  along  close  under  the 
high  land  of  Nevis ;  so  close  that  the  Solehay,  28,  one  of  the 
frigates  inshore  of  the  line,  grounded  and  was  wrecked.  No 
signals  were  needed,  except  to  correct  irregularities  in  the 
order,  for  the  captains  knew  what  they  were  to  do.  The 
French  were  approaching  steadily,  but  inevitably  dropping 
astern  with  reference  to  the  point  of  the  enemy's  line  for 
which  they  were  heading.  At  2  p.m.  de  Grasse's  flagship,  the 
Ville  de  Paris,  fired  several  shot  at  the  British  rear,  which 
alone  she  could  reach,  while  his  left  wing  was  nearing  the 
Barfleur,  Hood's  flagship,  and  the  vessels  astern  of  her,  the 
centre  of  the  column,  which  opened  their  fire  at  2.30.     Hood, 

^  The  times  and  general  movements  are  put  together  from  Hood's 
Journal  and  the  Log  of  the  Canada,  published  by  the  Navy  Records 
Society.     "  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,"  pp.  64,  86. 

2  When  ships  were  in  order  of  battle,  or  column,  close  to  the  wind, 
if  they  all  tacked  at  the  same  time  they  would  still  be  ranged  on  the 
same  line  but  steering  at  an  angle  to  it,  on  the  opposite  tack.  This 
formation  was  called  bow  and  quarter  line,  because  each  vessel  had 
a  comrade  off  its  bow  —  to  one  side  and  ahead  —  and  one  off  its 
quarter  —  to  one  side  but  astern.  The  advantage  of  this,  if  heading 
towards  the  enemy,  was  that  by  tacking  again  together  they  would 
be  at  once  again  in  column,  or  line  ahead,  the  customary  order  of 
battle. 


Hood  and  De  Grasse 

25th  Jan.- 1782 

Fig  1. 
British  •-  22  Ships 
French  o  24  Ships 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE         201 

trusting  to  his  captains,  disregarded  this  threat  to  the  rear 
half  of  his  force.  Signals  flew  for  the  van  to  crowd  sail  and 
take  its  anchorage,  and  at  3.30  p.m.  the  leading  ships  began  to 
anchor  in  line  ahead,  (Fig.  1,  a),  covered  as  they  did  so  by  the 
broadsides  of  the  rear  and  the  rear  centre  (b).  Upon  the 
latter  the  French  were  now  keeping  up  a  smart  fire.  Be- 
tween the  Canada  and  her  next  astern,  the  Prudent,  64,  — 
which  was  a  dull  sailer,  —  there  was  a  considerable  interval. 
Towards  it  the  French  admiral  pressed,  aiming  to  cut  off  the 
three  rear  vessels;  but  Cornwallis  threw  everything  aback 
and  closed  down  upon  his  consort,  —  a  stirring  deed  in  which 
he  was  imitated  by  the  Resolution  and  Bedford,  74's,  imme- 
diately ahead  of  him.  De  Grasse  was  thus  foiled,  but  so 
narrowly,  that  an  officer,  looking  from  one  of  the  ships  which 
had  anchored,  asserted  that  for  a  moment  he  could  perceive 
the  Ville  de  Paris's  jib  inside  the  British  line.  As  the  rear 
of  the  latter  pushed  on  to  its  place,  it  cleared  the  broadsides 
of  the  now  anchored  van  and  centre,  (Fig.  2,  a),  and  these 
opened  upon  the  enemy,  a  great  part  of  whom  were  strung  out 
behind  the  British  column,  without  opponents  as  yet,  but 
hastening  up  to  get  their  share  of  the  action.  Hood's  flagship, 
(f),  which  anchored  at  4.03,  opened  flre  again  at  4.40  p.m. 
Thus,  as  the  Canada  and  her  few  companions,  who  bore  the 
brunt  of  the  day,  were  shortening  sail  and  rounding-to,  (b),  still 
under  a  hot  cannonade,  the  batteries  of  their  predecessors  were 
ringing  out  their  welcome,  and  at  the  same  time  covering 
their  movements  by  giving  the  enemy  much  else  to  think 
about.  The  Canada,  fetching  up  near  the  tail  of  the 
column  and  letting  go  in  a  hurry,  ran  out  two  cables  on  end, 
and  found  upon  sounding  that  she  had  dropped  her  anchor 
in  a  hundred  and  fifty  fathoms  of  water.  The  French  col- 
umn stood  on,  off  soundings,  though  close  to,  firing  as  it 
passed,  and  then,  wearing  to  the  southward  in  succession, 
stood  out  of  action  on  the  port  tack,  (c),  its  ineffectual  broad- 


202    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

sides  adding  to  the  grandeur  and  excitement  of  the  scene,  and 
swelUng  the  glory  of  Hood's  successful  daring,  of  which  it  is 
difficult  to  speak  too  highly.  Lord  Robert  Manners,  the 
captain  of  the  Resolution,  which  was  fifth  ship  from  the 
British  rear,  writing  a  week  later,  passed  upon  this  achieve- 
ment a  verdict,  which  posterity  will  confirm.  "The  taking 
possession  of  this  road  was  well  judged,  well  conducted,  and 
well  executed,  though  indeed  the  French  had  an  opportunity 
—  which  they  missed  —  of  bringing  our  rear  to  a  very  severe 
account.  The  van  and  centre  divisions  brought  to  an  anchor 
under  the  fire  of  the  rear,  w^hich  was  engaged  with  the  enemy's 
centre  (Fig.  1) ;  and  then  the  centre,  being  at  an  anchor  and 
properly  placed,  covered  us  while  we  anchored  (Fig.  2), 
making,  I  think,  the  most  masterly  manoeuvre  I  ever  saw." 
Whether  regard  be  had  to  the  thoughtful  preparation,  the 
crafty  management  of  the  fleet  antecedent  to  the  final  push, 
the  calculated  audacity  of  the  latter,  or  the  firm  and  sagacious 
tactical  handling  from  the  first  moment  to  the  last.  Nelson 
himself  never  did  a  more  brilliant  deed  than  this  of  Hood's.^ 
All  firing  ceased  at  5.30. 

Naturally,  an  order  taken  up  under  such  conditions  needed 
some  rectifying  before  further  battle.  As  the  proper  station- 
ing of  the  fleet  depended  in  great  measure  upon  the  position 
of  the  van  ship.  Hood  had  put  a  local  pilot  on  board  her; 
but  when  the  action  ceased,  he  found  that  she  w^as  not  as 
close  to  the  shore  as  he  had  intended.  The  rear,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  naturally  in  the  most  disorder,  owing  to  the  cir- 
cumstances attending  its  anchorage.  Three  ships  from  the 
rear  were  consequently  directed  to  place  themselves  ahead 
of  the  van,  closing  the  interval,  while  others  shifted  their 
berths,  according  to  specific  directions.  The  order  as  finally 
assumed    (Fig.    3)    was    as   follows.      The    van    ship    was 

^  Illustrations  of  other  phases  of  this  battle  can  be  found  in  Ma- 
han's  "  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History,"  pp.  470,  472. 


%\ 


Hoods  Order  of  Battle 

AT  ANCHOR  AT  Sx.KlTTS 

26th  Jan.-14th  Feb.  1782 
Fig  3. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  203 

anchored  so  close  to  the  shore  that  it  was  impossible  to  pass 
within  her,  or,  with  the  prevailing  wind,  even  to  reach  her, 
because  of  a  point  and  shoal  just  outside,  covering  her  posi- 
tion. From  her  the  line  extended  in  a  west-north-west  direc- 
tion to  the  fifteenth  ship,  —  the  Barfleur,  98,  Hood's  flagship, 
—  when  it  turned  to  north,  the  last  six  ships  being  on  a 
north  and  south  line.  These  six,  with  their  broadsides  turned 
to  the  westward,  prevented  a  column  passing  from  south  to 
north,  the  only  way  one  could  pass,  from  enfilading  the  main 
line  with  impunity.  The  latter  covered  with  its  guns  the 
approach  from  the  south.  All  the  ships  had  springs  on  their 
cables,  enabling  them  to  turn  their  sides  so  as  to  cover  a  large 
arc  of  a  circle  with  their  batteries. 

At  daylight  on  the  following  morning,  January  26th,  the 
ships  began  changing  their  places,  the  French  being  then 
seven  or  eight  miles  distant  in  the  south-south-east.  At 
7  A.M.  they  were  seen  to  be  approaching  in  line  of  battle, 
under  a  press  of  sail,  heading  for  the  British  van.  The 
Canada,  which  had  begun  at  5  a.m.  to  tackle  her  200-odd 
fathoms  of  cable,  was  obliged  to  cut,  whereby  "we  lost  the 
small  bower  anchor  and  two  cables  with  one  8-inch  and  one 
9-inch  hawsers,  which  were  bent  for  springs."  The  ship 
had  to  work  to  windward  to  close  with  the  fleet,  and  was 
therefore  ordered  by  the  Rear-Admiral  to  keep  engaging 
under  way,  until  10.50,  when  a  message  was  sent  her  to  anchor 
in  support  of  the  rear.  The  action  began  between  8.30  and 
9  A.M.,  the  leading  French  ship  heading  for  the  British  van, 
seemingly  with  the  view  of  passing  round  and  inside  it. 
Against  this  attempt  Hood's  precautions  probably  were  suffi- 
cient; but  as  the  enemy's  vessel  approached,  the  wind 
headed  her,  so  that  she  could  only  fetch  the  third  ship.  The 
latter,  with  the  vessels  ahead  and  astern,  sprung  their  bat- 
teries upon  her.  "  The  crash  occasioned  by  their  destructive 
broadsides  was  so  tremendous  on  board  her  that  whole  pieces 


204      MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

of  plank  were  seen  flying  from  her  off  side,  ere  she  could  es- 
cape the  cool  concentrated  fire  of  her  determined  adver- 
saries." ^  She  put  her  helm  up,  and  ran  along  outside  the 
British  line,  receiving  the  first  fire  of  each  successive  ship. 
Her  movement  was  imitated  by  her  followers,  some  keeping 
off  sooner,  some  later ;  but  de  Grasse  in  his  flagship  not  only 
came  close,  but  pointed  his  after  yards  to  the  wind,^  to  move 
the  slower.  As  he  ported  his  helm  when  leaving  the  Barfleur, 
this  brought  these  sails  aback,  keeping  him  a  still  longer  time 
before  the  British  ships  thrown  to  the  rear.  "In  this  he 
was  supported  by  those  ships  which  were  astern,  or  imme- 
diately ahead  of  him.  During  this  short  but  tremendous 
conflict  in  that  part  of  the  field  of  battle,  nothing  whatever 
could  be  seen  of  them  for  upwards  of  twenty  minutes,  save 
de  Grasse's  white  fiag  at  the  main-topgallant  masthead  of  the 
Ville  de  Paris,  gracefully  floating  above  the  immense  vol- 
umes of  smoke  that  enveloped  them,  or  the  pennants  of  those 
ships  which  were  occasionally  perceptible,  when  an  increase 
of  breeze  would  waft  away  the  smoke."  ^ 

Though  most  gallantly  done,  no  such  routine  manoeuvre  as 
this  could  shake  Hood's  solidly  assumed  position.  The 
attempt  was  repeated  in  the  afternoon,  but  more  feebly,  and 
upon  the  centre  and  rear  only.  This  also  was  ineffectual; 
and  Hood  was  left  in  triumphant  possession  of  the  field. 
The  losses  in  the  several  affairs  of  the  two  days  had  been : 
British,  72  killed,  244  wounded;  French,  107  killed,  207 
wounded.  Thenceforth  the  French  fleet  continued  cruising 
to  leeward  of  the  island,  approaching  almost  daily,  fre- 
quently  threatening   attack,    and   occasionally   exchanging 

1  White,  "Naval  Researches." 

2  Sharp  up  by  the  starboard  braces,  the  wind  being  on  the  star- 
board quarter.  This  emptied  the  aftersails  of  mnd,  neutrahzing 
their  effect,  and,  by  causing  the  ship  to  move  more  slowly,  kept 
her  longer  abreast  an  anchored  opponent. 

3  White,  "Naval  Researches." 


o    ^ 

I  i 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  205 

distant  shots ;  but  no  serious  encounter  took  place.  Inter- 
est was  centred  on  Brimstone  Hill,  where  alone  on  the  island 
the  British  flag  still  flew.  De  Grasse  awaited  its  surrender, 
flattering  himself  that  the  British  would  be  forced  then  to 
put  to  sea,  and  that  his  fleet,  increased  by  successive  arrivals 
to  thirty-two  of  the  line,  would  then  find  an  opportunity 
to  crush  the  man  who  had  outwitted  and  out-manoeuvred  him 
on  January  25th  and  26th.  In  this  hope  he  was  deceived  by 
his  own  inaptness  and  his  adversary's  readiness.  Hood  was 
unable  to  succour  Brimstone  Hill,  for  want  of  troops;  the 
French  having  landed  six  thousand  men,  against  which  the 
British  twenty-four  hundred  could  effect  nothing,  either 
alone  or  in  cooperation  with  the  garrison,  which  was  but 
twelve  hundred  strong.  The  work  capitulated  on  the  13th 
of  February.  De  Grasse,  who  had  neglected  to  keep  his 
ships  provisioned,  went  next  day  to  Nevis  and  anchored 
there  to  empty  the  storeships.  That  evening  Hood  called 
his  captains  on  board,  explained  his  intentions,  had  them 
set  their  watches  by  his,  and  at  11  p.m.  the  cables  were  cut 
one  by  one,  lights  being  left  on  the  buoys,  and  the  fleet  si- 
lently decamped,  passing  round  the  north  end  of  St.  Kitts, 
and  so  towards  Antigua.  When  de  Grasse  opened  his  eyes 
next  morning,  the  British  were  no  longer  to  be  seen.  "Noth- 
ing could  have  been  more  fortunately  executed,"  wrote 
Lord  Robert  Manners,  "as  not  one  accident  happened  from 
it.  Taking  the  whole  in  one  light,  though  not  successful  in 
the  point  we  aimed  at,  nevertheless  it  was  well  conducted, 
and  has  given  the  enemy  a  pretty  severe  check ;  and  if  you 
give  him  half  the  credit  the  enemy  does.  Sir  Samuel  Hood 
will  stand  very  high  in  the  public  estimation." 

Hood's  intention  had  been  to  return  to  Barbados;  but 
on  the  25th  of  February  he  was  joined,  to  windward  of 
Antigua,  by  Rodney,  who  had  arrived  from  England  a 
week   earlier,  bringing   with  him   twelve  ships   of  the  line. 


206     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

The  new  Commander-in-Chief  endeavoured  to  cut  off  de 
Grasse  from  Martinique,  but  the  French  fleet  got  in  there  on 
the  26th.  Rodney  consequently  went  to  Santa  Lucia,  to 
refit  Hood's  ships,  and  to  prepare  for  the  coming  campaign, 
in  which  it  was  understood  that  the  conquest  of  Jamaica  was 
to  be  the  first  object  of  the  alhes.  An  important  condition 
to  their  success  was  the  arrival  of  a  great  convoy,  known  to 
be  on  its  way  from  Brest  to  repair  the  losses  which  Kempen- 
felt's  raid  and  subsequent  bad  weather  had  inflicted  in  De- 
cember. Hood  suggested  to  Rodney  to  halve  the  fleet, 
which  then  numbered  thirty-six  of  the  line,  letting  one  part 
cruise  north  of  Dominica,  between  that  island  and  Deseada, 
while  the  other  guarded  the  southern  approach,  between 
Martinique  and  Santa  Lucia.  Rodney,  however,  was  unwill- 
ing to  do  this,  and  adopted  a  half-measure,  —  Hood's  division 
being  stationed  to  windward  of  the  north  end  of  Martinique, 
reaching  only  as  far  north  as  the  latitude  of  Dominica, 
while  the  center  and  rear  were  abreast  of  the  centre  and  south 
of  Martinique ;  all  in  mutual  touch  by  intermediate  vessels. 
It  would  seem  —  reading  between  the  lines  —  that  Hood 
tried  to  stretch  his  cruising  ground  northwards,  in  pur- 
suance of  his  own  ideas,  but  Rodney  recalled  him.  The 
French  convoy  consequently  passed  north  of  Deseada,  con- 
voyed by  two  ships  of  the  line,  and  on  the  20th  of  March 
reached  Martinique  safely.  De  Grasse's  force  was  thus  raised 
to  thirty-five  of  the  line,  including  two  50-gun  ships,  as 
against  the  British  thirty-six.  At  the  end  of  the  month 
Rodney  returned  to  Santa  Lucia,  and  there  remained  at 
anchor,  vigilantly  watching  the  French  fleet  in  Fort  Royal 
by  means  of  a  chain  of  frigates. 

The  problem  now  immediately  confronting  de  Grasse  — - 
the  first  step  towards  the  conquest  of  Jamaica  —  was  ex- 
tremely difficult.  It  was  to  convoy  to  Cap  Franyois  the 
supply  vessels  essential  to  his  enterprise,  besides  the  mer- 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  207 

chant  fleet  bound  for  France;  making  in  all  one  hundred 
and  fifty  unarmed  ships  to  be  protected  by  his  thirty-five 
sail  of  the  line,  in  face  of  the  British  thirty-six.  The  trade- 
wind  being  fair,  he  purposed  to  skirt  the  inner  northern  edge 
of  the  Caribbean  Sea ;  by  which  means  he  would  keep  close 
to  a  succession  of  friendly  ports,  wherein  the  convoy  might 
find  refuge  in  case  of  need. 

With  this  plan  the  French  armament  put  to  sea  on  the 
8th  of  April,  1782.  The  fact  being  reported  promptly  to 
Rodney,  by  noon  his  whole  fleet  was  clear  of  its  anchorage 
and  in  pursuit.  Then  was  evident  the  vital  importance  of 
Barrington's  conquest  of  Santa  Lucia;  for,  had  the  British 
been  at  Barbados,  the  most  probable  alternative,  the  French 
movement  not  only  would  have  been  longer  unknown,  but 
pursuit  would  have  started  from  a  hundred  miles  distant, 
instead  of  thirty.  If  the  British  had  met  this  disadvantage 
by  cruising  before  Martinique,  they  would  have  en- 
countered the  difficulty  of  keeping  their  ships  supplied 
with  water  and  other  necessaries,  which  Santa  Lucia  afforded. 
In  truth,  without  in  any  degree  minimizing  the  faults  of  the 
loser,  or  the  merits  of  the  winner,  in  the  exciting  week  that 
followed,  the  opening  situation  may  be  said  to  have  repre- 
sented on  either  side  an  accumulation  of  neglects  or  of  suc- 
cesses, which  at  the  moment  of  their  occurrence  may  have 
seemed  individually  trivial ;  a  conspicuous  warning  against 
the  risk  incurred  by  losing  single  points  in  the  game 
of  war.  De  Grasse  was  tremendously  handicapped  from 
the  outset  by  the  errors  of  his  predecessors  and  of  himself. 
That  the  British  had  Santa  Lucia  as  their  outpost  was  due 
not  only  to  Barrington's  diligence,  but  also  to  d'Estaing's 
slackness  and  professional  timidity;  and  it  may  be 
questioned  whether  de  Grasse  himself  had  shown  a  proper 
understanding  of  strategic  conditions,  when  he  neglected 
that    island   in   favour   of   Tobago   and   St,    Kitts.      Cer- 


208    MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

tainly,  Hood  had  feared  for  it  greatly  the  year  before.  That 
the  convoy  was  there  to  embarrass  his  movements,  may  not 
have  been  the  fault  of  the  French  admiral ;  but  it  was  greatly 
and  entirely  his  fault  that,  of  the  thirty-six  ships  pursuing 
him,  twenty-one  represented  a  force  that  he  might  have 
crushed  in  detail  a  few  weeks  before,  —  not  to  mention  the 
similar  failure  of  April,  1781.^ 

Large  bodies  of  ships  commonly  will  move  less  rapidly  than 
small.  By  2.30  p.m.  of  the  day  of  starting,  Rodney's  look- 
outs had  sighted  the  French  fleet;  and  before  sundown  it 
could  be  seen  from  the  mastheads  of  the  main  body.  At 
6  next  morning,  April  9th,  the  enemy,  both  fleet  and  convoy, 
was  visible  from  the  deck  of  the  Barfleur,  the  flagship  of 
Hood's  division,  then  in  the  British  van.  The  French  bore 
north-east,  distant  four  to  twelve  miles,  extending  from 
abreast  of  the  centre  of  Dominica  northwards  towards  Guade- 
loupe. The  British  had  gained  much  during  the  night,  and 
their  centre  was  now  off  Dominica  to  leeward  of  the  enemy's 
rear,  which  was  becalmed  under  the  island.  Some  fourteen 
or  fifteen  of  the  French  van,  having  opened  out  the  channel 
between  Dominica  and  Guadeloupe,  felt  a  fresh  trade-wind, 
from  east  by  north,  with  which  they  steered  north;  and 
their  number  was  gradually  increased  as  individual  ships, 
utilising  the  catspaws,  stole  clear  of  the  high  land  of 
Dominica.  Hood's  division  in  like  manner,  first  among  the 
British,  got  the  breeze,  and,  with  eight  ships,  the  commander  of 
the  van  stood  north  in  order  of  battle.  To  the  north-west  of 
him  were  two  French  vessels,  separated  from  their  consorts 
and  threatened  to  be  cut  off  (i).  These  stood  boldly  down 
and  crossed  the  head  of  Hood's  column ;  one  passing  so  close 
to  the  leading  ship,  the  Alfred,  that  the  latter  had  to  bear  up 
to  let  her  pass.  Rodney  had  hoisted  a  signal  to  engage  at 
6.38  A.M.,  but  had  hauled  it  down  almost  immediately,  and 

1  Ante,  p.  164. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  209 

Hood  would  not  fire  without  orders.  These  ships  therefore 
rejoined  their  main  body  unharmed.  At  8.30  the  French 
hoisted  their  colours,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  vessels  which 
had  cleared  Dominica  tacked  and  stood  south,  opposite  to 
Hood. 

De  Grasse  now  had  recognised  that  he  could  not  escape 
action,  if  the  convoy  kept  company.  He  therefore  directed 
the  two  50-gun  ships,  Experiment  and  Sagittaire,  to  accompany 
it  into  Guadeloupe,  where  it  arrived  safely  that  day  (Position 
1,  dd) ;  and  he  decided  that  the  fleet  should  ply  to  windward 
through  the  channel  between  Dominica  and  Guadeloupe, 
nearly  midway  in  which  lies  a  group  of  small  islands  called 
Les  Saintes,  —  a  name  at  times  given  to  the  battle  of  April 
12th.  By  this  course  he  hoped  not  only  to  lead  the  enemy 
away  from  the  convoy,  but  also  to  throw  off  pursuit  through 
his  superior  speed,  and  so  to  accomplish  his  mission  un- 
harmed. The  French  ships,  larger,  deeper,  and  with  better 
lines  than  their  opponents,  were  naturally  better  sailers, 
and  it  may  be  inferred  that  even  coppering  had  not  entirely 
overcome  this  original  disadvantage  of  the  British. 

At  the  very  moment  of  beginning  his  new  policy,  however, 
a  subtle  temptation  assailed  de  Grasse  irresistibly,  in  the 
exposed  position  of  Hood's  column  (h) ;  and  he  met  it,  not  by 
a  frank  and  hearty  acceptance  of  a  great  opportunity,  but 
by  a  half-measure.  Hood  thoroughly  crushed,  the  British 
fleet  became  hopelessly  inferior  to  the  French;  Hood  dam- 
aged, and  it  became  somewhat  inferior :  possibly  it  would 
be  deterred  from  further  pursuit.  De  Grasse  decided  for 
this  second  course,  and  ordered  part  of  his  fleet  to  attack. 
This  operation  was  carried  out  under  the  orders  of  the 
Marquis  de  Vaudreuil,  the  second  in  command.  The  ships 
engaged  in  it  bore  down  from  the  windward,  attacked  Hood's 
rear  ships,  stood  along  northward  (f)  on  the  weather  side  of  his 
column  at  long  range,  and,  having  passed  ahead,  tacked  (t)  in 


210     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

succession  and  formed  again  in  the  rear,  (i^)  whence  they  re- 
peated the  same  manoeuvre  (Positions  1  and  2).  Thus  a  pro- 
cession of  fifteen  ships  kept  passing  by  eight,  describing  a 
continuous  curve  of  elhptical  form.  They  were  able  to  do  this 
because  Hood  was  condemned  to  a  low  speed,  lest  he  should 
draw^  too  far  away  from  the  British  centre  (a)  and  rear  (c), 
still  becalmed  under  Dominica  (Position  2).  The  French, 
having  choice  of  distance,  kept  at  long  gunshot,  because  they 
were  deficient  in  carronades,  of  which  the  British  had  many. 
These  guns,  of  short  range  but  large  calibre,  were  thus  ren- 
dered useless.  Could  they  have  come  into  play,  the  French 
rigging  and  sails  would  have  suffered  severely.  This  first 
engagement  (Position  1)  lasted,  by  Hood's  log,  from  9.48  to 
10.25  A.M.  It  was  resumed  in  stronger  force  (Position  2)  at 
14  minutes  past  noon,  and  continued  till  1.45  p.m.,  when  firing 
ceased  for  that  day;  Rodney  hauhng  down  the  signal  for 
battle  at  2.  Between  the  two  affairs,  which  were  identical  in 
general  character,  Hood's  column  was  reinforced,  and  great 
part  of  the  British  centre  also  got  into  action  with  some 
of  the  French  main  body,  though  at  long  range  only. 
"Except  the  two  rear  ships,"  wrote  Rodney  to  Hood  that 
night,  "the  others  fired  at  such  a  distance  that  I  returned 
none." 

The  injuries  to  the  British  ships  engaged  were  not  such  as 
to  compel  them  to  leave  the  fleet.  The  Royal  Oak  lost  her 
main  topmast,  and  that  of  the  Warrior  fell  two  days  later, 
not  improbably  from  wounds ;  but  in  these  was  nothing  that 
the  ready  hands  of  seamen  could  not  repair  so  as  to  continue 
the  chase.  Rodney,  therefore,  contented  himself  with 
reversing  the  order  of  sailing,  putting  Hood  in  the  rear, 
whereby  he  was  able  to  refit,  and  yet  follow  fast  enough 
not  to  be  out  of  supporting  distance.  This  circumstance 
caused  Hood's  division  to  be  in  the  rear  in  the  battle  of  the 
12th.     One  of  the  French  ships,  the  Caton,  64,  had  been  so 


Basse  Terre 

dV 


Rodney  andDe  Grasse 

PosITIO^'  1. 

9th  April,  1782 

9.45  A.M. 

British    »   3G  Ships 

Freneli  <=>  33iShii)S 

French  Convoys  *> 


o^ 


LES  SAINTES 


~'« r 

X 

A    ^ 

i  Of 

<^ 

H 

hi  a 

L 

i  0 

.  •  '^ 

(^  '    D 

o 

1  1    ^ 

^0 

<^ 

.^- 

\- 

^    a 

^0 

Basse  Terra^ 


KODTVEY  AND  DE  GRASSE 

•  Position  2. 

9th  Avrll,  1782 

12  m. 

British    •■  36  Ships 

French  <=>  33  Ships 

French  Convoys  ■=> 

LES  SAINTES 


MARIE 
GALANTE 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  211 

injured  that  de  Grasse  detached  her  into  Guadeloupe.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  a  crippled  ship  in  a  chased  fleet 
not  only  embarrasses  movement,  but  may  compromise  the 
whole  body,  if  the  latter  delay  to  protect  it;  whereas  the 
chaser  keeps  between  his  lame  birds  and  the  enemy. 

During  the  night  of  the  9th  the  British  lay-to  for  repairs. 
The  next  morning  they  resumed  the  pursuit,  turning  to 
windward  after  the  enemy,  but  upon  the  whole  losing  through- 
out the  lOth  and  the  11th.  At  daylight  of  the  10th  the 
French,  by  the  logs  of  Hood  and  Cornwallis,  were  "  from  four 
to  five  leagues  distant,"  "just  in  sight  from  the  deck." 
During  that  night,  however,  the  Zele,  74,  had  collided  with 
the  Jason,  64;  and  the  latter  was  injured  so  far  as  to  be 
compelled  to  follow  the  Caton  into  Guadeloupe.  At  sunset 
of  that  day  Rodney  signalled  a  general  chase  to  windward, 
the  eflFect  of  which  was  to  enable  each  ship  to  do  her  best 
according  to  her  captain's  judgment  during  the  dark  hours. 
Nevertheless,  on  the  morning  of  the  11th  the  French  seem 
again  to  have  gained,  for  Hood,  who,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  now  in  the  rear,  notes  that  at  10  a.m.  twenty-two  French 
sail  (not  all  the  fleet)  could  be  counted  from  the  masthead; 
Cornwallis,  further  to  windward,  could  count  thirty-three. 
Troude,  a  French  authority,  says  that  at  that  time  nearly 
all  the  French  had  doubled  The  Saintes,  that  is,  had  got 
to  windward  of  them,  and  it  looked  as  though  de  Grasse 
might  succeed  in  throwing  off  his  pursuer.  Unluckily, 
two  ships,  the  Magnanime,  74,  and  the  Zele,  74,  the  latter 
of  which  had  lost  her  main  topmast,  were  several  miles  to 
leeward  of  the  French  main  body.  It  was  necessary  to  de- 
lay, or  to  drop  those  vessels.  Again,  trivial  circumstances 
conspired  to  further  a  great  disaster,  and  de  Grasse  bore 
down  to  cover  the  crippled  ships;  so  losing  much  of  his 
hard-won  ground,  and  entailing  a  further  misfortune  that 
night.     Rodney  hung  doggedly  on,  relying  on  the  chapter 


212     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

of  accidents,  as  one  who  knows  that  all  things  come  to  him 
who  endures.  To  be  sure,  there  was  not  much  else  he  could 
do;  yet  he  deserves  credit  for  unremitting  industry  and 
pluck.  During  the  afternoon,  the  signals  noted  in  the 
British  logs  —  to  call  in  all  cruisers  and  for  the  fleet  to  close 

—  attest  mutely  the  movement  of  de  Grasse  in  bearing  down, 

—  coming  nearer. 

During  the  night,  at  2  a.m.  of  April  12th,  the  Zele  and  de 
Grasse's  flagship,  the  Ville  de  Paris,  110,  crossing  on  opposite 
tacks,  came  into  collision.  The  former  lost  both  foremast 
and  bowsprit.  It  has  been  stated  by  John  Paul  Jones,  who 
by  permission  of  Congress  embarked  a  few  months  later  on 
board  the  French  fleet  as  a  volunteer,  and  doubtless  thus 
heard  many  personal  narratives,  that  this  accident  was  due 
to  the  deficiency  of  watch-officers  in  the  French  navy;  the 
deck  of  the  Zele  being  in  charge  of  a  young  ensign,  instead 
of  an  experienced  lieutenant.  It  was  necessary  to  rid  the 
fleet  of  the  Zele  at  once,  or  an  action  could  not  be  avoided ; 
so  a  frigate  was  summoned  to  tow  her,  and  the  two  were  left 
to  make  their  way  to  Guadeloupe,  while  the  others  resumed 
the  beat  to  windward.  At  5  a.m.  she  and  the  frigate  were 
again  under  way,  steering  for  Guadeloupe,  to  the  north-west, 
making  from  five  to  six  miles  (Position  3,  a) ;  but  in  the 
interval  they  had  been  nearly  motionless,  and  consequently 
when  day  broke  at  5.30  they  were  only  two  leagues  from  the 
Barfleur,  Hood's  flagship,  which,  still  in  the  British  rear,  was 
then  standing  south  on  the  port  tack.  The  body  of  the  French, 
(Position  3) ,  was  at  about  the  same  distance  as  on  the  previous 
evening,  —  ten  to  fifteen  miles,  —  but  the  Ville  de  Paris  (c) 
not  more  than  eight.  Just  before  6  a.m.  Rodney  signalled 
Hood,  who  was  nearest,  to  chase  the  Zele;  and  four  of  the 
rearmost  ships  of  the  line  were  detached  for  that  purpose  (b) . 
De  Grasse,  seeing  this,  signalled  his  vessels  at  6  a.m.  to  close 
the  flagship,  making  all  sail;   and  he  himself  bore  down  to 


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WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  213 

the  westward  (ccO,  on  the  port  tack,  but  running  free,  to 
frighten  away  Rodney's  chasers.  The  British  Admiral  kept 
them  out  until  7  o'clock,  by  which  time  de  Grasse  was  fairly 
committed  to  his  false  step.  All  cruisers  were  then  called 
in,  and  the  line  was  closed  to  one  cable.^  Within  an  hour 
were  heard  the  opening  guns  of  the  great  battle,  since  known 
by  the  names  of  the  12th  of  April,  or  of  The  Saintes,  and,  in 
the  French  navy,  of  Dominica.  The  successive  losses  of 
the  Colon,  Jason,  and  Zele,  with  the  previous  detachment 
of  the  two  50-gun  ships  with  the  convoy,  had  reduced  the 
French  numbers  from  thirty-jBve  to  thirty  effective  vessels. 
The  thirty- six  British  remained  undiminished. 

The  British  appear  to  have  been  standing  to  the  south  on 
the  port  tack  at  daylight;  but,  soon  after  sending  out  the 
chasers,  Rodney  had  ordered  the  line  of  bearing  (from  ship 
to  ship)  to  be  north-north-east  to  south-south-west,  evidently 
in  preparation  for  a  close-hauled  line  of  battle  on  the  star- 
board tack,  heading  northerly  to  an  east  wind.  Somewhat 
unusually,  the  wind  that  morning  held  at  south-east  for  some 
time,  enabling  the  British  to  lie  up  as  high  as  east-north-east 
on  the  starboard  tack  (Position  3,  d),  on  which  they  were  when 
the  battle  joined ;  and  this  circumstance,  being  very  favour- 
able for  gaining  to  windward, — to  th^  eastward, — doubt- 
less led  to  the  annulling  of  the  signal  for  the  line  of  bearing, 
half  an  hour  after  it  was  made,  and  the  substitution  for  it  of 
the  line  of  battle  ahead  at  one  cable.  It  is  to  be  inferred  that 
Rodney's  first  purpose  was  to  tack  together,  thus  restoring 
Hood  to  the  van,  his  natural  station;  but  the  accident  of 
the  wind  holding  to  the  southward  placed  the  actual  van  — 
regularly  the  rear  —  most  to  windward,   and  rendered  it 

^  Seven  hundred  and  twenty  feet.  For  ships  of  the  line  of  that 
day  this  would  make  the  interval  between  each  two  about  four 
ships'  length.  At  five  knots  speed  this  distance  would  be  covered 
in  something  over  a  minute. 


214    MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

expedient  to  tack  in  succession,  instead  of  all  together, 
preserving  to  the  full  the  opportunity  which  chance  had 
extended  for  reaching  the  enemy.  In  the  engagement,  there- 
fore. Hood  commanded  in  the  rear,  and  Rear-Admiral  Drake 
in  the  van.  The  wind  with  the  French  seems  to  have  been 
more  to  the  eastward  than  with  the  British,  —  not  an  un- 
usual circumstance  in  the  neighbourhood  of  land. 

As  Rodney,  notwithstanding  his  haste,  had  formed  line 
from  time  to  time  during  the  past  three  days,  his  fleet  was 
now  in  good  order,  and  his  signals  were  chiefly  confined  to 
keeping  it  closed.  The  French,  on  the  other  hand,  w^ere 
greatly  scattered  when  their  Commander-in-Chief,  in  an  im- 
pulse of  hasty,  unbalanced  judgment,  abandoned  his  pre- 
vious cautious  policy  and  hurried  them  into  action.  Some  of 
them  were  over  ten  miles  to  windward  of  the  flagship. 
Though  they  crowded  sail  to  rejoin  her,  there  was  not  time 
enough  for  all  to  take  their  stations  properly,  between  day- 
light and  8  a.m.,  when  the  firing  began.  "Our  line  of  battle 
was  formed  under  the  fire  of  musketry,"^  WTote  the  jNIarquis 
de  Vaudreuil,  the  second  in  command,  who,  being  in  the 
rear  of  the  fleet  on  this  occasion,  and  consequently  among 
the  last  to  be  engaged,  had  excellent  opportunity  for  obser- 
vation. At  the  beginning  it  was  in  de  Grasse's  power  to 
postpone  action,  until  the  order  should  be  formed,  by  hold- 
ing his  wind  under  short  canvas;  while  the  mere  sight  of 
his  vessels  hurrying  down  for  action  would  have  compelled 
Rodney  to  call  in  the  ships  chasing  the  Zele,  the  rescue  of 
which  was  the  sole  motive  of  the  French  manoeuvre.  In- 
stead of  this,  the  French  flagship  kept  off  the  wind ;  which 
precipitated  the  collision,  while  at  the  same  time  delaying 
the  preparations  needed  to  sustain  it.  To  this  de  Grasse 
added  another  fault  by  forming  on  the  port  tack,  the  con- 
trary to  that  on  which  the  British  were,  and  standing  south- 

1  Probably  not  over  one  or  two  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy. 


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WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  215 

erly  towards  Dominica.  The  effect  of  this  was  to  bring 
his  ships  into  the  calms  and  baffling  winds  which  cHng  to  ^J' 
the  shore-Hne,  thus  depriving  them  of  their  power  of  ma- 
noeuvre. His  object  probably  was  to  confine  the  engage- 
ment to  a  mere  pass-by  on  opposite  tacks,  by  which  in  all 
previous  instances  the  French  had  thwarted  the  decisive 
action  that  Rodney  sought.  Nevertheless,  the  blunder  was 
evident  at  once  to  French  eyes.  "What  evil  genius  has  in- 
spired the  admiral?"  exclaimed  du  Pavilion,  Vaudreuil's 
flag-captain,  who  was  esteemed  one  of  the  best  tacticians 
in  France,  and  who  fell  in  the  battle. 

As  the  two  lines  drew  near  to  one  another,  standing,  the 
French  south,  the  British  east-north-east,  the  wind  shifted 
back  to  the  eastward,  allowing  the  French  to  head  higher, 
to  south-south-east,  and  knocking  the  British  off  to  north- 
north-east  (Position  4).  The  head  of  the  French  column 
thus  passed  out  of  gunshot,  across  the  bows  of  Rodney's 
leading  vessel,  the  Marlborough,  (m),  which  came  within  range 
when  abreast  the  eighth  ship.  The  first  shots  were  fired 
by  the  Brave,  74,  ninth  in  the  French  line,  at  8  a.m.  The 
British  captain  then  put  his  helm  up  and  ran  slowly  along, 
north-north-west,  under  the  lee  of  the  French,  towards  their 
rear.  The  rest  of  the  British  fleet  followed  in  his  wake. 
The  battle  thus  assumed  the  form  of  passing  in  opposite  di- 
rections on  parallel  lines ;  except  that  the  French  ships,  as 
they  successively  cleared  the  point  where  the  British  column 
struck  their  line,  would  draw  out  of  fire,  their  course  diverg- 
ing thenceforth  from  that  of  the  British  approach.  The 
effect  of  this  would  be  that  the  British  rear,  when  it  reached 
that  point,  would  be  fresh,  having  undergone  no  fire,  and  with 
that  advantage  would  encounter  the  French  rear,  which  had 
received  already  the  fire  of  the  British  van  and  centre.  To 
obviate  this,  by  bringing  his  own  van  into  action,  de  Grasse 
signalled  the  van  ships  to  lead  south-south-west,  parallel 


216    MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

with  the  British  north-north-east  (4,  a).  The  engagement 
thus  became  general  all  along  the  lines;  but  it  is  probable 
that  the  French  van  was  never  well  formed.  Its  commander, 
at  all  events,  reached  his  post  later  than  the  commander  of 
the  rear  did  his.^ 

At  five  minutes  past  eight,  Rodney  made  a  general  signal 
for  close  action,  followed  immediately  by  another  for  the 
leading  ships  to  head  one  point  to  starboard  —  towards  the 
enemy  —  which  indicates  that  he  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
distance  first  taken  by  the  Marlborough.  The  Formidable, 
his  flagship,  eighteenth  in  the  column,  began  to  fire  at  8.23  ;2 
but  the  Barfleur,  Hood's  fiagship,  which  was  thirty-first, 
not  till  9.25.  This  difference  in  time  is  to  be  accounted  for 
chiefly  by  the  light  airs  near  Dominica,  contrasted  with  the 
fresh  trades  in  the  open  channel  to  the  northward,  which 
the  leading  British  vessels  felt  before  their  rear.  De  Grasse 
now,  too  late,  had  realised  the  disastrous  effect  which  this 
would  have  upon  his  fleet.  If  he  escaped  all  else,  his  ships, 
baffled  by  calms  and  catspaws  while  the  British  had  a  breeze, 
must  lose  the  weather-gage,  and  with  it  the  hope  of  evading 
pursuit,  hitherto  his  chief  preoccupation.  Twice  he  sig- 
nalled to  wear,  —  first,  all  together,  then  in  succession,  — 
—  but,  although  the  signals  were  seen,  they  could  not  be 
obeyed  with  the  enemy  close  under  the  lee.  "The  French 
fleet,''  comments  Chevalier  justly,  "had  freedom  of  move- 
ment no  longer.  A  fleet  cannot  wear  with  an  enemy's  fleet 
within  musket-range  to  leeward." 

The  movement  therefore  continued  as  described,  the  op- 
posing ships  slowly  "sliding  by"  each  other  until  about 
9.15,  when  the  wind  suddenly  shifted  back  to  south-east 

^  The  position,  in  the  French  order,  of  the  ships  taken  in  the  battle, 
is  shown  by  the  crosses  in  Positions  4,  5,  6. 

2  Canada's  log,  8.15 ;  reduced  to  Hood's  times,  which  are  generally 
followed. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  217 

again.  The  necessity  of  keeping  the  sails  full  forced  the  bows 
of  each  French  vessel  towards  the  enemy  (Position  5), 
destroying  the  order  in  column,  and  throwing  the  fleet  into 
echelon,  or,  as  the  phrase  then  was,  into  bow  and  quarter  line.^ 
The  British,  on  the  contrary,  were  free  either  to  hold  their 
course  or  to  head  towards  the  enemy.  Rodney's  flagship 
(5,  a)  luffed,  and  led  through  the  French  line  just  astern  of 
the  Glorieux,  74,  (g),  which  was  the  nineteenth  in  their  order. 
She  was  followed  by  five  ships;  and  her  next  ahead  also, 
the  Duke  (d),  seeing  her  chief's  movement,  imitated  it,  break- 
ing through  the  line  astern  of  the  twenty-third  French.  The 
Glorieux,  on  the  starboard  hand  of  Rodney's  little  column, 
received  its  successive  broadsides.  Her  main  and  mizzen 
masts  went  overboard  at  9.28,  when  the  Canada,  third  astern 
of  the  Formidable,  had  just  passed  her ;  and  a  few  moments 
later  her  foremast  and  bowsprit  fell.  At  9.33  the  Canada  was 
to  windward  of  the  French  line.  The  flagship  Formidable 
was  using  both  broadsides  as  she  broke  through  the  enemy's 
order.  On  her  port  hand,  between  her  and  the  Duke,  were 
four  French  ships  huddled  together  (c),  one  of  which  had 
paid  off  the  wrong  w^ay ;  that  is,  after  the  shift  of  wind  took 
her  aback,  her  sails  had  filled  on  the  opposite  tack  from  that 
of  the  rest  of  her  fleet.^  These  four,  receiving  the  repeated 
broadsides,  at  close  quarters,  of  the  Formidable,  Duke,  and 
Namur,  and  having  undergone  besides  the  fire  of  the  British 
van,  were  very  severely  mauled.  While  these  things  were 
happening,  the  Bedford,  the  sixth  astern  of  the  Formidable, 
perhaps  unable  to  see  her  next  ahead  in  the  smoke,  had 
luffed  independently  (b),  and  was  followed  by  the  twelve 
rearmost  British  ships,  whom  she  led  through  the  French 
order  astern  of  the  Cesar,  74,  (k),  twelfth  from  the  van.  This 
ship  and  her  next  ahead,  the  Hector,  74,  (h),  suffered  as  did  the 

1  Ante,  p.  200  (note). 

2  This  mishap  occurred  to  three  French  vessels. 


218     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

Glorieux.  The  Barfleur,  which  was  in  the  centre  of  this 
column  of  thirteen,  opened  fire  at  9.25.  At  10.45  she  "  ceased 
firing,  having  passed  the  enemy's  van  ships ;  "  that  is,  she  was 
well  on  the  weather  side  of  the  French  fleet.  Some  of  the 
rearmost  of  Hood's  division,  however,  were  still  engaged  at 
noon  ;  but  probably  all  were  then  to  windward  of  the  enemy. 

The  British  ships  ahead  of  the  Duke,  the  van  and  part  of 
the  centre,  in  all  sixteen  sail,  had  continued  to  stand  to  the 
northward.  At  the  time  Rodney  broke  the  line,  several 
of  them  must  have  passed  beyond  the  French  rear,  and  out 
of  action.  One,  the  America,  the  twelfth  from  the  van,  wore 
without  signals,  to  pursue  the  enemy,  and  her  example  was 
followed  at  once  by  the  ship  next  ahead,  the  Russell,  Cap- 
tain Saumarez.  No  signal  following,  the  America  again 
wore  and  followed  her  leaders,  but  the  Russell  continued  as 
she  was,  now  to  windward  of  the  French ;  by  which  course 
she  was  able  to  take  a  conspicuous  share  in  the  closing  scenes. 
At  11.33  Rodney  signalled  the  van  to  tack,  but  the  delay  of 
an  hour  or  more  had  given  the  Russell  a  start  over  the  other 
ships  of  her  division  ''towards  the  enemy"  which  could  not 
be  overcome. 

The  effect  of  these  several  occurrences  had  been  to  trans- 
fer the  weather-gage,  the  position  for  attack,  to  the  British 
V  from  the  French,  and  to  divide  the  latter  also  into  three 

groups,  w^idely  separated  and  disordered  (Position  6).  In 
the  centre  was  the  flagship  Ville  de  Paris  with  five  ships  (c). 
To  windward  of  her,  and  two  miles  distant,  was  the  van,  of 
some  dozen  vessels  (v).  The  rear  was  four  miles  away  to 
leeward  (r).  To  restore  the  order,  and  to  connect  the  fleet 
again,  it  was  decided  to  re-form  on  the  leewardmost  ships; 
and  several  signals  to  this  effect  were  made  by  de  Grasse. 
They  received  but  imperfect  execution.  The  manageable 
vessels  succeeded  easily  enough  in  running  before  the  wind  to 
leeward,  but,  when  there,  exactitude  of  position  and  of  move- 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  219 

ment  was  unattainable  to  ships  in  various  degrees  of  dis- 
ability, with  light  and  baffling  side  airs.  The  French  were 
never  again  in  order  after  the  wind  shifted  and  the  line  was 
broken;  but  the  movement  to  leeward  left  the  dismasted 
Glorieux,  (g),  Hector,  (h),  and  Cesar,  (k),  motionless  between 
the  hostile  lines. 

It  has  been  remarked,  disparagingly,  that  the  British  fleet 
also  was  divided  into  three  by  the  manoeuvre  of  breaking 
the  line.  This  is  true ;  but  the  advantage  remained  with  it 
incontestably,  in  two  respects.  By  favor  of  the  wind,  each 
of  the  three  groups  had  been  able  to  maintain  its  general 
formation  in  line  or  column,  instead  of  being  thrown  entirely 
out,  as  the  French  were ;  and  passing  thus  in  column  along 
the  Glorieux,  Hector,  and  Cesar,  they  wrought  upon  these 
three  ships  a  concentration  of  injury  which  had  no  parallel 
among  the  British  vessels.  The  French  in  fact  had  lost 
three  ships,  as  well  as  the  wind.  To  these  certain  disad- 
vantages is  probably  to  be  added  a  demoralisation  among 
the  French  crews,  from  the  much  heavier  losses  resultant 
upon  the  British  practice  of  firing  at  the  hull.  An  officer 
present  in  the  action  told  Sir  John  Ross  ^  afterwards  that 
the  French  fired  very  high  throughout ;  and  he  cited  in  illus- 
tration that  the  three  trucks  ^  of  the  British  Princesa  were 
shot  away.  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  who,  though  Physician  to 
the  Fleet,  obtained  permission  to  be  on  deck  throughout 
the  action,  wrote  ten  days  after  it,  "  I  can  aver  from  my  own 
observation  that  the  French  fire  slackens  as  we  approach, 
and  is  totally  silent  when  we  are  close  alongside."  It  is 
needless  to  say  that  a  marked  superiority  ®f  fire  will  silence 
that  of  the  bravest  enemy;  and  the  practice  of  aiming  at 
the  spars  and  sails,  however  suited  for  frustrating  an  approach, 
•substantially  conceded  that  superiority  upon  which  the  issue 

1  Ross,  "Life  of  Saumarez,"  i.  71. 

2  Circular  pieces  of  wood  which  cap  the  top  of  the  masts. 


220     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

of  decisive  battle  depends.  As  illustrative  of  this  result, 
the  British  loss  will  be  stated  here.  It  was  but  243  killed 
and  816  wounded  in  a  fleet  of  thirty-six  sail.  The  highest 
in  any  one  ship  was  that  of  the  Duke,  73  killed  and  wounded. 
No  certain  account,  or  even  very  probable  estimate,  of  the 
French  loss  has  ever  been  given.  None  is  cited  by  French 
authorities.  Sir  Gilbert  Blane,  who  was  favourably  placed 
for  information,  reckoned  that  of  the  Ville  de  Paris  alone  to 
be  300.  There  being  fifty-four  hundred  troops  distributed 
among  the  vessels  of  the  fleet,  the  casualties  would  be  pro- 
portionately more  numerous;  but,  even  allowing  for  this, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  loss  of  the  French,  to  use  Che- 
valier's words,  "was  certainly  much  more  considerable" 
than  that  reported  by  the  British.  Six  post-captains  out 
of  thirty  were  killed,  against  two  British  out  of  thirty-six. 
Rodney  did  not  make  adequate  use  of  the  great  oppor- 
tunity, which  accident  rather  than  design  had  given  him  at 
noon  of  April  12th.  He  did  allow  a  certain  liberty  of  ma- 
noeuvre, by  discontinuing  the  order  for  the  line  of  battle; 
but  the  signal  for  close  action,  hoisted  at  1  p.m.,  was  hauled 
down  a  half-hour  later.  Hood,  who  realised  the  conditions 
plainly  visible,  as  well  as  the  reasonable  inferences  there- 
from, wished  the  order  given  for  a  general  chase,  which  would 
have  applied  the  spur  of  emulation  to  every  captain  present, 
without  surrendering  the  hold  that  particular  signals  afford 
upon  indiscreet  movements.  He  bitterly  censured  the  Ad- 
miral's failure  to  issue  this  command.  Had  it  been  done, 
he  said :  — 

''I  am  very  confident  we  should  have  had  twenty  sail  of  the 
enemy's  ships  before  dark.  Instead  of  that,  he  pursued  only  under 
his  topsails  (sometimes  his  foresail  was  set  and  at  others  his  mizzen 
topsail  aback)  the  greatest  part  of  the  afternoon,  though  the  flying 
enemy  had  all  the  sail  set  their  very  shattered  state  would  allow."  ^ 

1  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  p.  103.     Navy  Records  Society. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  221 

To  make  signal  for  a  general  chase  was  beyond  the  com- 
petence of  a  junior  admiral;  but  Hood  did  what  he  could, 
by  repeated  signals  to  individual  ships  of  his  own  division 
to  make  more  sail,  by  setting  all  he  could  on  the  Barfleur, 
and  by  getting  out  his  boats  to  tow  her  head  round.  Sir 
Gilbert  Blane  unintentionally  gives  a  similar  impression  of 
laxity. 

''After  cutting  the  French  line,  the  action  during  the  rest  of  the 
day  was  partial  and  desultory,  the  enemy  never  being  able  to  form, 
and  several  of  the  [our]  ships  being  obliged  to  lie  by  and  repair  their 
damages.  As  the  signal  for  the  line  was  now  hauled  down,  every 
ship  annoyed  the  enemy  as  their  respective  commanders  judged 
best."  1 

For  this  indolent  abandonment  of  the  captains  to  their 
own  devices,  the  correctest  remedy  was,  as  Hood  indicated, 
the  order  for  a  general  chase,  supplemented  by  a  watchful 
supervision,  which  should  check  the  over-rash  and  stimulate 
the  over-cautious.  If  Hood's  account  of  the  sail  carried 
by  Rodney  be  correct,  the  Commander-in-Chief  did  not  even 
set  the  best  example.  In  this  languid  pursuit,  the  three 
crippled  French  ships  were  overhauled,  and  of  course  had  to 
strike ;  and  a  fourth,  the  Ardent,  64,  was  taken,  owing  to  her 
indifferent  sailing.  Towards  sunset  the  flagship  Ville  de 
Paris,  110,^  the  finest  ship  of  war  afloat,  having  been  val- 
iantly defended  against  a  host  of  enemies  throughout  great 
part  of  the  afternoon,  and  having  expended  all  her  ammuni- 
tion, hauled  down  her  colours.  The  two  British  vessels 
then  immediately  engaged  with  her  were  the  Russell  and  the 
Barfleur,  Hood's  flagship,  to  the  latter  of  which  she  formally 
surrendered ;  the  exact  moment,  noted  in  Hood's  journal, 
being  6.29  p.m. 

1  Mundy,  "Life  of  Rodney,"  ii.  234. 

2  She  is  thus  rated  in  the  British  Navy  Lists  published  between  the 
time  of  her  capture  and  the  receipt  of  news  of  her  loss ;  but  she 
seems  to  have  carried  120  guns. 


222     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

At  6.45  Rodney  made  the  signal  for  the  fleet  to  bring-to 
(form  line  and  stop)  on  the  port  tack,  and  he  remained 
lying-to  during  the  night,  while  the  French  continued  to 
retreat  under  the  orders  of  the  Marquis  de  Vaudreuil,  who 
by  de  Grasse's  capture  had  become  commander-in-chief.  For 
this  easy-going  deliberation  also  Hood  had  strong  words  of 
condemnation. 

"Why  he  should  bring  the  fleet  to  because  the  Ville  de  Paris  was 
taken,  I  cannot  reconcile.  He  did  not  pursue  under  easy  sail,  so  as 
never  to  have  lost  sight  of  the  enemy  in  the  night,  which  would 
clearly  and  most  undoubtedly  have  enabled  him  to  have  taken 
almost  every  ship  the  next  day.  .  .  .  Had  I  had  the  honour  of 
commanding  his  Majesty's  noble  fleet  on  the  12th,  I  may,  without 
much  imputation  of  vanity,  say  the  flag  of  England  should  now  have 
graced  the  sterns  of  upwards  of  twenty  sail  of  the  enemy's  ships  of 
the  line."  ^ 

Such  criticisms  by  those  not  responsible  are  to  be  received 
generally  with  caution;  but  Hood  was,  in  thought  and  in 
deed,  a  man  so  much  above  the  common  that  these  cannot  be 
dismissed  lightly.  His  opinion  is  known  to  have  been  shared 
by  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Rodney's  Captain  of  the  Fleet ;  ^ 
and  their  conclusion  is  supported  by  the  inferences  to  be 
draw^n  from  Rodney's  own  assumptions  as  to  the  condition 
of  the  French,  contrasted  with  the  known  facts.  The  enemy, 
he  WTote,  in  assigning  his  reasons  for  not  pursuing,  "went 
off  in  a  close  connected  body,^  and  might  have  defeated,  by 
rotation,  the  ships  that  had  come  up  with  them."  "The 
enemy  ivho  ivent  off  in  a  body  of  twenty-six  ships  of  the  line,^ 
might,  by  ordering  two  or  three  of  their  best  sailing  ships 
or  frigates  to  have  show^n  lights  at  times,  and  by  changing 
their  course,  have  induced  the  British  fleet  to  have  followed 

1  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  pp.  103,  104. 

2  See  letter  of  Sir  Howard  Douglas,  son  to  Sir  Charles ;  "United 
Service  Journal,"  1834,  Part  II,  p.  97. 

3  Author's  italics;   Mundy,  "Life  of  Rodney,"  ii.  248. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  223 

them,  while  the  main  of  their  fleet,  by  hiding  their  Hghts, 
might  have  hauled  their  wind,  and  have  been  far  to  wind- 
ward by  daylight,  and  intercepted  the  captured  ships,  and 
the  most  crippled  ships  of  the  English  ;  "  and  he  adds  that  the 
Windward  Islands  even  might  have  been  endangered.  That 
such  action  was  in  a  remote  degree  possible  to  a  well-condi- 
tioned fleet  may  be  guardedly  conceded ;  but  it  was  wildly 
improbable  to  a  fleet  staggering  under  such  a  blow  as  the 
day  had  seen,  which  had  changed  its  commander  just  as 
dark  came  on,  and  was  widely  scattered  and  disordered  up 
to  the  moment  when  signals  by  flags  became  invisible. 

The  facts,  however,  were  utterly  at  variance  with  these 
ingenious  suppositions.  Instead  of  being  connected,  as  Rod- 
ney represents,  de  Vaudreuil  had  with  him  next  morning 
but  ten  ships ;  and  no  others  during  the  whole  of  the  13th. 
He  made  sail  for  Cap  Francois,  and  was  joined  on  the  way  by 
five  more,  so  that  at  no  time  were  there  upwards  of  fifteen  ^ 
French  ships  of  the  line  together,  prior  to  his  arrival  at  that 
port  on  April  25th.  He  there  found  four  others  of  the  fleet. 
The  tale  of  twenty-five  survivors,  from  the  thirty  engaged 
on  April  12th,  was  completed  by  six  which  had  gone  to 
Curasao,  and  which  did  not  rejoin  until  May.  So  much 
for  the  close  connected  body  of  the  French.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  Rodney's  reasons  illustrate  the  frame  of  mind 
against  which  Napoleon  used  to  caution  his  generals  as 
"making  to  themselves  a  picture"  of  possibilities;  and  that 
his  conclusion  at  best  was  based  upon  the  ruinous  idea,  which 
a  vivid  imagination  or  slothful  temper  is  prone  to  present 
to  itself,  that  war  may  be  made  decisive  without  running 
risks.  That  Jamaica  even  was  saved  was  not  due  to  this 
fine,  but  indecisive  battle,  but  to  the  hesitation  of  the  allies. 
When  de  Vaudreuil  reached  Cap  Francois,  he  found  there  the 

1  Troude.  Chevalier  says  sixteen,  differing  with  Troude  as  to  the 
whereabouts  of  the  Brave. 


224     MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

French  convoy  safely  arrived  from  Guadeloupe,  and  also  a 
body  of  fifteen  Spanish  ships  of  the  line.  The  troops  avail- 
able for  the  descent  upon  Jamaica  were  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
thousand.  Well  might  Hood  write  :  "  Had  Sir  George  Rod- 
ney's judgment,  after  the  enemy  had  been  so  totally  put  to 
flight,  borne  any  proportion  to  the  high  courage,  zeal  and 
exertion,  so  very  manifestly  shown  by  every  captain,  all 
difficulty  would  now  have  been  at  an  end.  We  might  have 
done  just  as  we  pleased,  instead  of  being  at  this  hour  upon 
the  defensive."  ^ 

The  allies,  however,  though  superior  in  numbers,  did  not 
venture  to  assume  the  offensive.  After  the  battle,  Rodney 
remained  near  Guadeloupe  until  the  17th  of  April,  refitting, 
and  searching  the  neighbouring  islands,  in  case  the  French 
fleet  might  have  entered  some  one  of  them.  For  most  of 
this  time  the  British  w^ere  becalmed,  but  Hood  remarks  that 
there  had  been  wind  enough  to  get  twenty  leagues  to  the 
westward ;  and  there  more  wind  probably  would  have  been 
found.  On  the  17th  Hood  was  detached  in  pursuit  with  ten 
sail  of  the  line;  and  a  day  or  two  later  Rodney  himself 
started  for  Jamaica.  Left  to  his  own  discretion,  Hood  pushed 
for  the  Mona  Passage,  between  Puerto  Rico  and  Santo 
Domingo,  carrying  studding-sails  below  and  aloft  in  his 
haste.  At  daybreak  of  the  19th  he  sighted  the  west  end  of 
Puerto  Rico ;  and  soon  afterwards  a  small  French  squadron 
was  seen.  A  general  chase  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the 
Jason  and  Caton,  sixty-fours,  which  had  parted  from  their 
fleet  before  the  battle  and  were  on  their  way  to  Cap  Fran- 
cois. A  frigate,  the  Aimahle,  32,  and  a  sloop,  the  CereSy 
18,  also  were  taken.  In  reporting  this  affair  to  Rodney, 
Hood  got  a  thrust  into  his  superior.  "  It  is  a  very  mortify- 
ing circumstance  to  relate  to  you.  Sir,  that  the  French  fleet 
which  you  put  to  flight  on  the  12th  went  through  the  Mona 

^  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  p.  136. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE        225 

Channel  on  the  18th,  only  the  day  before  I  was  in  it."  ^  A 
further  proof  of  the  utility  of  pursuit,  here  hinted  at,  is  to 
be  found  in  the  fact  that  Rodney,  starting  six  days  later  than 
de  Vaudreuil,  reached  Jamaica,  April  28th,  only  three  days 
after  the  French  got  into  Cap  Fran9ois.  He  had  therefore 
gained  three  days  in  a  fortnight's  run.  What  might  not  have 
been  done  by  an  untiring  chase  I  But  a  remark  recorded 
by  Hood  summed  up  the  frame  of  mind  which  dominated 
Rodney :  "I  lamented  to  Sir  George  on  the  13th  that  the  sig- 
nal for  a  general  chase  was  not  made  when  that  for  the  line 
was  hauled  down  and  that  he  did  not  continue  to  pursue  so 
as  to  keep  sight  of  the  enemy  all  night,  to  which  he  only 
answered,  'Come,  we  have  done  very  handsomely  as  it  is.'"  ^ 

Rodney  stayed  at  Jamaica  until  the  10th  of  July,  when 
Admiral  Hugh  Pigot  arrived  from  England  to  supersede  him. 
This  change  was  consequent  upon  the  fall  of  Lord  North's 
ministry,  in  March,  1782,  and  had  been  decided  before  the 
news  of  the  victory  could  reach  England.  Admiral  Keppel 
now  became  the  head  of  the  Admiralty.  Rodney  sailed  for 
home  from  Port  Royal  on  the  22d  of  July;  and  with  his 
departure  the  war  in  the  West  Indies  and  North  America 
may  be  said  to  have  ended.  Pigot  started  almost  immedi- 
ately for  New  York,  and  remained  in  North  American  waters 
until  the  end  of  October,  when  he  returned  to  Barbados, 
first  having  detached  Hood  with  thirteen  ships  of  the  line 
from  the  main  fleet,  to  cruise  off  Cap  Francois.  It  is  of  interest 
to  note  that  at  this  time  Hood  took  with  him  from  New  York 
the  frigate  Albemarle,  28,  then  commanded  by  Nelson,  who 
had  been  serving  on  the  North  American  station.  These 
various  movements  were  dictated  by  those  of  the  enemy,  either 
actually  made  or  supposed  to  be  in  contemplation ;  for  it  was 
an  inevitable  part  of  the  ill-effects  of  Rodney's  most  imper- 
fect success,  that  the  British  fleet  was  thenceforth  on  the 

1  Letters  of  Lord  Hood,  p.  134.  ^  ji^i^^^  p.  io4. 


226     MAJOR   OPERATIONS  OF  THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

defensive  purely,  with  all  the  perplexities  of  him  who  waits 
upon  the  initiative  of  an  opponent.  Nothing  came  of  them 
all,  however,  for  the  war  now  was  but  lingering  in  its  death 
stupor.  The  defeat  of  de  Grasse,  partial  though  it  was ;  the 
abandonment  of  the  enterprise  upon  Jamaica;  the  failure 
of  the  attack  upon  Gibraltar ;  and  the  success  of  Howe  in 
re-victualling  that  fortress,  —  these  had  taken  all  heart  out 
of  the  French  and  Spaniards ;  while  the  numerical  superiority 
of  the  allies,  inefficiently  though  it  had  been  used  heretofore, 
weighed  heavily  upon  the  imagination  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment, which  now  had  abandoned  all  hope  of  subduing  its 
American  Colonies.  Upon  the  conclusion  of  peace,  in  1783, 
Pigot  and  Hood  returned  to  England,  leaving  the  Leeward 
Islands'  Station  under  the  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Sir 
Richard  Hughes,  an  officer  remembered  by  history  only 
through  Nelson's  refusing  to  obey  his  orders  not  to  enforce 
the  Navigation  Acts,  in  1785. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  227 


CHAPTER  XIII 

HOWE  AGAIN  GOES  AFLOAT.    THE  FINAL  RELIEF 
OF  GIBRALTAR 

1782 

THE  fall  of  Lord  North's  Ministry,  besides  oc- 
casioning the  recall  of  Rodney,  drew  Lord 
Howe  out  of  his  long  retirement,  to  command 
the  Channel  Fleet.  He  hoisted  his  flag  on  the 
20th  of  April,  1782,  on  board  the  Victory,  100.  Owing  to 
the  various  directions  in  which  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain 
had  to  be  made,  either  to  defend  her  own  interests  or  to  crush 
the  movements  of  the  many  enemies  now  combined  against 
her,  the  operations  of  the  Channel  fleet  were  for  some  months 
carried  on  by  detached  squadrons,  —  in  the  North  Sea,  in 
the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  at  the  entrance  of  the  Channel; 
Howe  having  under  him  several  distinguished  subordinates, 
at  the  head  of  whom,  in  professional  reputation,  were  Vice- 
Admiral  Barrington,  the  captor  of  Santa  Lucia,  and  Rear- 
Admiral  Kempenfelt.  In  the  North  Sea,  the  Dutch  were 
kept  in  their  ports;  and  a  convoy  of  near  400  merchant 
ships  from  the  Baltic  reached  England  unmolested.  In  the 
Bay  of  Biscay,  Barrington,  having  with  him  twelve  of  the 
line,  discovered  and  chased  a  convoy  laden  with  stores  for 
the  fleet  in  the  East  Indies.  One  of  the  ships  of  the  line 
accompanying  it,  the  Pegase,  74,  surrendered,  after  a  night 
action  of  three  hours  with  the  Foudroyant,  80,  Captain  John 
Jervis,  afterwards  Earl  St.  Vincent.  Of  nineteen  transports, 
thirteen,  one  of  which,  the  Actionnaire,  was  a  64-gun  ship 


228     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF    THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

armed  en  flute,^  were  taken ;  a  weighty  blow  to  the  great 
Suffren,  whose  chief  difficulty  in  India  was  inadequate 
material  of  war,  and  especially  of  spars,  of  which  the  Action- 
naire  carried  an  outfit  for  four  ships  of  the  line.  After  Bar- 
rington's  return,  Kempenfelt  made  a  similar  but  uneventful 
cruise  of  a  month  in  the  Bay. 

Howe  himself  went  first  to  the  North  Sea  in  the  month  of 
May.  Having  there  held  the  Dutch  in  check  during  a  criti- 
cal moment,  he  was  directed  next  to  go  to  the  entrance  of 
the  Channel,  leaving  only  a  division  in  the  Downs.  Infor- 
mation had  been  received  that  an  allied  fleet  of  thirty-two 
ships  of  the  line,  five  only  of  which  were  French,  had  sailed 
from  Cadiz  early  in  June,  to  cruise  between  Ushant  and 
Scilly.  It  was  expected  that  they  would  be  joined  there  by 
a  reinforcement  from  Brest,  and  by  the  Dutch  squadron  in 
the  Texel,  making  a  total  of  about  fifty  of  the  line,  under 
the  command  of  the  Spanish  Admiral,  Don  Luis  de  Cordova. 
The  Dutch  did  not  appear,  omng  probably  to  Howe's  demon- 
stration before  their  ports ;  but  eight  ships  from  Brest  raised 
the  allied  fleet  to  forty.  To  oppose  these  Howe  sailed  on 
the  2d  of  July  with  twenty-two  sail,  of  which  eight  were 
three-deckers.  Before  his  return,  in  the  7th  of  August,  he 
was  joined  by  eight  others;  mostly,  however,  sixty-fours. 
With  this  inferiority  of  numbers  the  British  Admiral  could 
expect  only  to  act  on  the  defensive,  unless  some  specially 
favourable  opportunity  should  offer.  The  matter  of  most 
immediate  concern  was  the  arrival  of  the  Jamaica  convoy, 
then  daily  expected;  with  which,  it  may  be  mentioned,  de 
Grasse  also  was  returning  to  England,  a  prisoner  of  war  on 
board  the  Sandivich. 

On  its  voyage  north,  the  allied  fleet  captured  on  June  25th 
eighteen  ships  of  a  British  convoy  bound  for  Canada.     A  few 

1  That  is,  with  a  great  part  of  her  guns  dismounted,  and  below 
as  cargo. 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  229 

days  later  it  was  fixed  in  the  chops  of  the  Channel,  covering 
the  ground  from  Ushant  to  Scilly.  On  the  evening  of  July 
7th  it  was  sighted  off  Scilly  by  Howe,  who  then  had  with  him 
twenty-five  sail.  The  allies  prepared  for  action;  but  the 
British  Admiral,  possessing  a  thorough  know^ledge  of  the 
neighbouring  coasts,  either  in  his  own  person  or  in  some  of 
his  officers,  led  the  fleet  by  night  to  the  westward  through  the 
passage  between  Scilly  and  Land's  End.  On  the  following 
morning  he  was  no  more  to  be  seen,  and  the  enemy,  ignorant 
of  the  manner  of  his  evasion,  was  thrown  wholly  off  his  track.^ 
Howe  met  the  convoy ;  and  a  strong  gale  of  wind  afterwards 
forcing  the  allies  to  the  southward,  both  it  and  the  fleet 
slipped  by  successfully,  and  reached  England. 

Howe  was  ordered  now  to  prepare  to  throw  reinforcements 
and  supplies  into  Gibraltar,  which  had  not  received  relief 
since  Darby's  visit,  in  April,  1781.  For  this  urgent  and 
critical  service  it  was  determined  to  concentrate  the  whole 
Channel  Fleet  at  Spithead,  where  also  the  transports  and 
supply-ships  were  directed  to  rendezvous.  It  was  while 
thus  assembling  for  the  relief  of  Gibraltar  that  there  occurred 
the  celebrated  incident  of  the  Royal  George,  a  100-gun  ship, 
while  being  heeled  for  under-water  repairs,  oversetting  and 
sinking  at  her  anchors,  carrying  down  with  her  Rear-Admiral 
Kempenfelt  and  about  nine  hundred  souls,  including  many 
women  and  children.  This  was  on  the  29th  of  August,  1782. 
On  the  11th  of  September  the  expedition  started,  one  hundred 
and  eighty-three  sail  in  all ;  thirty-four  being  ships  of  the  line, 
with  a  dozen  smaller  cruisers,  the  rest  unarmed  vessels.  Of 
the  latter,  thirty-one  were  destined  for  Gibraltar,  the  re- 

1  Chevalier,  following  La  Motte-Picquet's  report,  ascribes  Howe's 
escape  to  greater  speed.  ("Mar.  Fran,  en  1778,"  p.  335.)  It  must 
be  noted  that  Howe's  object  was  not  merely  to  escape  eastward, 
up  Channel,  by  better  sailing,  but  to  get  to  the  westward,  past  the 
allies,  a  feat  impracticable  save  by  a  stratagem  such  as  is  mentioned. 


280      MAJOR    OPERATIONS  OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

mainder  being  trading  ships  for  different  parts  of  the  world. 
With  so  extensive  a  charge,  the  danger  to  which  had  been 
emphasised  by  numerous  captures  from  convoys  during  the 
war,  Howe's  progress  was  slow.  It  is  told  that  shortly  before 
reaching  Cape  Finisterre,  but  after  a  violent  gale  of  wind, 
the  full  tally  of  one  hundred  eighty-three  sail  was  counted. 
After  passing  Finisterre,  the  several  "trades"  probably 
parted  from  the  grand  fleet. 

On  the  8th  of  October,  off  Cape  St.  Vincent,  a  frigate 
was  sent  ahead  for  information.  It  was  known  that  a  great 
combined  force  of  ships  of  war  lay  in  Algeciras  Bay,  —  oppo- 
site Gibraltar,  —  and  that  an  attack  upon  the  works  was  in 
contemplation;  but  much  might  have  happened  meantime. 
Much,  in  fact,  had  happened.  A  violent  gale  of  wind  on 
the  10th  of  September  had  driven  some  of  the  allied  fleet 
from  their  moorings,  one  vessel,  the  San  Miguel,  72,  being 
forced  under  the  batteries  of  Gibraltar,  where  she  had  to 
surrender ;  but  there  still  remained  the  formidable  number  of 
forty-eight  ships  of  the  line,  anchored  only  four  miles  from  the 
point  which  the  relief  ships  must  reach.  This  was  the  problem 
which  Howe  had  to  solve.  More  important  still,  though  of  less 
bearing  upon  his  mission,  was  the  cheering  news  brought  by 
the  frigate,  when  she  rejoined  on  October  10th,  that  the  long- 
intended  attack  had  been  made  on  the  13th  of  September, 
and  had  been  repelled  gloriously  and  decisively.  The  heavily 
protected  Spanish  floating  batteries,  from  which  success  had 
been  expected  confidently,  one  and  all  had  been  set  on  fire 
and  destroyed.  If  Howe  could  introduce  his  succours,  the 
fortress  was  saved. 

The  admiral  at  once  summoned  his  subordinate  officers, 
gave  them  full  and  particular  instructions  for  the  momentous 
undertaking,  and  issued  at  the  same  time,  to  the  masters  of 
the  supply-ships,  precise  information  as  to  local  conditions 
of  wind  and  currents  at  Gibraltar,  to  enable  them  more 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  231 

surely  to  reach  their  anchorage.  On  the  11th  of  October, 
being  now  close  to  its  destination,  the  fleet  bore  up  for  the 
Straits,  which  it  entered  at  noon  with  a  fair  westerly  wind. 
The  convoy  went  first,  —  sailing  before  the  wind  it  was  thus 
to  leeward  of  the  fleet,  in  a  position  to  be  defended,  —  and 
the  ships  of  war  followed  at  some  distance  in  three  divisions, 
one  of  which  was  led  by  Howe  himself.  At  6  p.m.  the  supply- 
ships  were  off  the  mouth  of  the  Bay,  with  a  wind  fair  for  the 
mole ;  but,  through  neglect  of  the  instructions  given,  all  but 
four  missed  the  entrance,  and  were  swept  to  the  eastward 
of  the  Rock,  whither  the  fleet  of  course  had  to  follow  them. 
On  the  13th  the  allied  fleets  came  out,  being  induced  to 
quit  their  commanding  position  at  Algeciras  by  fears  for 
two  of  their  number,  which  shortly  before  had  been  driven 
to  the  eastward.  During  the  forenoon  of  the  same  day  the 
British  were  off  the  Spanish  coast,  fifty  miles  east  of  Gibraltar. 
At  sunset  the  allies  were  seen  approaching,  and  Howe  formed 
his  fleet,  but  sent  the  supply-ships  to  anchor  at  the  Zaffarine 
Islands,  on  the  coast  of  Barbary,  to  await  events.  Next  morn- 
ing the  enemy  was  close  to  land  northward,  but  visible  only 
from  the  mastheads ;  the  British  apparently  having  headed 
south  during  the  night.  On  the  loth  the  wind  came  east,  fair 
for  Gibraltar,  towards  which  all  the  British  began  cautiously 
to  move.  By  the  evening  of  the  16th,  eighteen  of  the  convoy 
were  safe  at  the  mole ;  and  on  the  18th  all  had  arrived,  be- 
sides a  fireship  with  1,500  barrels  of  powder,  sent  in  by  the 
Admiral  upon  the  governor's  requisition.  Throughout  these 
critical  hours,  the  combined  fleets  seem  to  have  been  out  of 
sight.  Either  intentionally  or  carelessly,  they  had  got  to 
the  eastward  and  there  remained ;  having  rallied  their  sepa- 
rated ships,  but  allowed  Gibraltar  to  be  replenished  for  a  year. 
On  the  morning  of  the  19th  they  appeared  in  the  north-east, 
but  the  relief  was  then  accomplished  and  Howe  put  out  to 
sea.     He  was  not  willing  to  fight  in  mid-Straits,  embarrassed 


232    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

by  currents  and  the  land ;  but  when  outside  he  brought-to, 
—  stopped,  by  backing  some  of  the  sails,  —  to  allow  the 
enemy  to  attack  if  they  would,  they  having  the  weather- 
gage.  On  the  following  day,  the  20th,  towards  sunset  they 
bore  down,  and  a  partial  engagement  ensued ;  but  it  was 
wholly  indecisive,  and  next  day  was  not  renewed.  The 
British  loss  was  68  killed  and  208  w^ounded ;  that  of  the  allies 
60  killed  and  320  wounded.  On  the  14th  of  November  the 
fleet  regained  Spithead. 

The  services  rendered  to  his  country  by  Howe  on  this 
occasion  were  eminently  characteristic  of  the  special  qualities 
of  that  great  officer,  in  w^hom  was  illustrated  to  the  highest 
degree  the  solid  strength  attainable  by  a  man  not  brilliant, 
but  most  able,  who  gives  himself  heart  and  soul  to  profes- 
sional acquirement.  In  him,  profound  and  extensive  profes- 
sional knowledge,  which  is  not  inborn  but  gained,  was  joined 
to  great  natural  staying  powers ;  and  the  combination  emi- 
nently fitted  him  for  the  part  we  have  seen  him  play  in  Dela- 
ware Bay,  at  New  York,  before  Rhode  Island,  in  the  Channel, 
and  now  at  Gibraltar.  The  utmost  of  skill,  the  utmost  of 
patience,  the  utmost  of  persistence,  such  had  How^e;  and 
having  these,  he  w^as  particularly  apt  for  the  defensive  opera- 
tions, upon  the  conduct  of  which  chiefly  must  rest  his  well- 
deserved  renown. 

A  true  and  noble  tribute  has  been  paid  by  a  French  officer 
to  this  relief  of  Gibraltar  :  ^  — 

''The  qualities  displayed  by  Lord  Howe  during  this  short  cam- 
paign rose  to  the  full  height  of  the  mission  which  he  had  to  fulfil. 
This  operation,  one  of  the  finest  in  the  War  of  American  Independ- 
ence, merits  a  praise  equal  to  that  of  a  \dctory.  If  the  English  fleet 
was  favoured  by  circumstances,  —  and  it  is  rare  that  in  such  enter- 
prises one  can  succeed  without  the  aid  of  fortune  —  it  was  above  all 
the  Commander-in-Chief's  quickness  of  perception,  the  accuracy  of 
his  judgment,  and  the  rapidity  of  his  decisions,  that  assured  success." 

1  Chevalier,  "Mar.  Fran,  dans  la  Guerre  de  1778,"  p.  358. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  233 

To  this  well-weighed,  yet  lofty  praise  of  the  Admiral,  the 
same  writer  has  added  words  that  the  British  Navy  may 
remember  long  with  pride,  as  sealing  the  record  of  this  war, 
of  which  the  relief  of  Gibraltar  marked  the  close  in  Euro- 
pean and  American  waters.  After  according  credit  to  the 
Admiralty  for  the  uniform  high  speed  of  the  British  vessels, 
and  to  Howe  for  his  comprehension  and  use  of  this  advan- 
tage, Captain  Chevalier  goes  on  :  — 

"Finally,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  results,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  English  fleet  could  not  but  think  himself  most  happy  in 
his  captains.  There  were  neither  separations,  nor  collisions,  nor 
casualties;  and  there  occurred  none  of  those  events,  so  frequent 
in  the  experiences  of  a  squadron,  which  often  oblige  admirals  to  take 
a  course  wholly  contrary  to  the  end  they  have  in  view.  In  con- 
templation of  this  imvexed  navigation  of  Admiral  Howe,  it  is  im- 
possible not  to  recall  the  unhappy  incidents  which  from  the  9th  to 
the  12th  of  April  befell  the  squadron  of  the  Count  de  Grasse.  .  .  . 
If  it  is  just  to  admit  that  Lord  Howe  displayed  the  highest  talent, 
it  should  be  added  that  he  had  in  his  hands  excellent  instruments." 

To  quote  another  French  writer:   "Quantity  disappeared 
before  quality." 


234     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN    THE 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  NAVAL  OPERATIONS  IN  THE  EAST  INDIES, 
1778-1783.  THE  CAREER  OF  THE  BAILLI  DE 
SUFFREN 

THE  operations  in  India,  both  naval  and  military, 
stand  by  themselves,  without  direct  influence 
upon  transactions  elsewhere,  and  unaffected 
also  by  these,  except  in  so  far  as  necessary 
succours  were  intercepted  sometimes  in  European  waters. 
The  cause  of  this  isolation  was  the  distance  of  India  from 
Europe ;  from  four  to  six  months  being  required  by  a  fleet 
for  the  voyage. 

Certain  intelligence  of  the  war  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  reached  Calcutta  July  7th,  1778.  On  the  same  day 
the  Governor-General  ordered  immediate  preparations  to 
attack  Pondicherry,  the  principal  seaport  of  the  French. 
The  army  arrived  before  the  place  on  the  8th  of  August, 
and  on  the  same  day  Commodore  Sir  Edward  Vernon  an- 
chored in  the  roads  to  blockade  by  sea.  A  French  squadron, 
under  Captain  Tronjoly,  soon  after  appearing  in  the  offing, 
Vernon  gave  chase,  and  on  the  10th  an  action  ensued.  The 
forces  engaged  were  about  equal,  the  French,  if  anything, 
slightly  superior;  a  60-gun  ship  and  four  smaller  vessels 
being  on  each  side.  As  the  French  then  went  into  Pondi- 
cherry, the  immediate  advantage  may  be  conceded  to  them ; 
but,  Vernon  returning  on  the  20th,  Tronjoly  soon  after 
quitted  the  roads,  and  returned  to  the  He  de  France.^    From 

^  Now  Mauritius. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE         235 

that  day  the  British  squadron  blockaded  closely,  and  on  the 
17th  of  October  Pondicherry  capitulated. 

On  the  7th  of  March,  1779,  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward 
Hughes  sailed  for  the  East  Indies  with  a  small  squad- 
ron. The  French  also  sent  out  occasional  ships;  but  in 
1779  and  1780  these  went  no  further  than  the  He  de  France, 
their  naval  station  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  Hughes's  force 
remained  unopposed  during  those  years.  The  period  was 
critical,  for  the  British  were  at  war  with  Hyder  Ali,  Sultan  of 
Mysore,  and  with  the  Mahrattas;  and  all  depended  upon 
command  of  the  sea.  In  January,  1781,  when  Hughes  was 
wintering  at  Bombay,  the  French  squadron  under  Comte 
d'Orves  appeared  off  the  Coromandel  coast,  but,  despite 
Hyder  All's  entreaties,  it  refused  to  cooperate  with  him. 
The  different  spirit  of  the  two  commanders  may  be  illus- 
trated from  contemporary  documents. 

''We  have  advices  from  Fort  St.  George  of  a  French  squadron 
which  appeared  off  that  place  on  January  25,  26,  and  27,  consisting 
of  1  seventy-four,  4  sixty-fours,  and  2  fifties.  They  proceeded  south 
without  making  any  attempt  on  five  Indiamen  then  in  the  roads, 
with  a  number  of  vessels  laden  with  grain  and  provisions ;  the  de- 
stroying of  which  might  have  been  easily  accomplished,  and  would 
have  been  severely  felt." 

''On  December  8th,  off  Mangalore,"  ^  writes  Hughes,  "I  saw  two 
ships,  a  large  snow,  three  ketches,  and  many  smaller  vessels  at 
anchor  in  the  road  with  Hyder's  flag  flying ;  and,  standing  close, 
found  them  vessels  of  force  and  all  armed  for  war.  I  anchored  as 
close  as  possible,  sent  in  all  armed  boats,  under  cover  of  three  smaller 
ships  of  war,  which  anchored  in  four  fathoms  water,  close  to  the 
enemy's  ships.  In  two  hours  took  and  burned  the  two  ships,  one 
of  28  and  one  of  26  guns,  and  took  or  destroyed  all  the  others,  save 
one  which,  by  throwing  everything  overboard,  escaped  over  the  bar 
into  the  port.  Lost  1  lieutenant  and  10  men  killed,  2  heutenants 
and  51  wounded." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  these  evidences  of  Hughes's  con- 

1  On  the  Malabar  —  western  —  coast. 


236    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

ceptions  of  naval  warfare  and  enterprise,  common  though 
they  were  to  the  British  service ;  for  their  positive  character 
brings  into  strong  rehef  the  quaUties  of  his  next  antagonist, 
Suffren,  and  his  great  superiority  in  these  respects  over  the 
average  run  of  French  officers  of  that  day. 

D'Orves  returned  to  the  He  de  France. 

When  war  with  Holland  began,  the  British  government 
decided  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 
For  that  object  a  squadron  of  one  74,  one  64,  and  three  50's, 
with  numerous  smaller  vessels,  under  Commodore  George 
Johnstone,  convoying  a  considerable  body  of  troops,  sailed 
from  England  on  the  13th  of  March,  1781,  in  company  with 
the  Channel  fleet  under  Vice-Admiral  George  Darby,  then 
on  its  way  to  relieve  Gibraltar.  The  French  government, 
having  timely  notice  of  the  expedition,  undertook  to  frus- 
trate it ;  detailing  for  that  purpose  a  division  of  two  74' s, 
and  three  64 's,  under  the  since  celebrated  Suffren.^  These 
ships  left  Brest  on  the  22d  of  March,  with  the  fleet  of 
de  Grasse.     They  also  carried  some  battalions  of  troops. 

On  April  11th  the  British  squadron  reached  Porto  Praya, 
Cape  de  Verde  Islands.  This  bay  is  open  to  the  southward, 
extending  from  east  to  west  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  is 
within  the  limits  of  the  north-east  trade-winds.  Although 
aware  that  a  French  division  was  on  his  track,  and  conscious, 
by  the  admissions  of  his  report,  that  protection  could  not  be 
expected  from  the  neutrality  of  the  place,  Johnstone  per- 
mitted his  vessels  to  anchor  without  reference  to  attack. 
His  own  flagship,  the  Romney,  50,  was  so  surrounded  by 
others  that  she  could  fire  only  with  great  caution  through 
intervals.  On  the  16th  of  April,  at  9.30  a.m.,  the  Isis,  50, 
which  was  the  outermost  of  the  British  squadron,  signalled 
eleven  sail  in  the  north-east.  Fifteen  hundred  persons  were 
then  ashore  engaged  in  watering,  fishing,  embarking  cattle, 

1  See  ante,  p.  163. 


Porto    Praya 

16th  AvriL  1781 

British  »  French  o 

British  Convoy  o 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  237 

and  amusing  themselves.  The  strangers  were  Suffren's  divi- 
sion. The  meeting  was  not  expected  by  the  French  com- 
mander, whose  object  in  entering  was  simply  to  complete 
the  water  of  the  ships ;  but  he  determined  at  once  to  attack, 
and  hauled  round  the  east  point  of  the  bay  in  column,  the 
two  seventy-fours  at  the  head,  his  own  ship,  the  Hews, 
leading  with  the  signal  for  battle  (line  ab).  Passing  through, 
or  along,  the  disordered  enemy  until  he  reached  the  only 
seventy-four  among  them,  he  there  luffed  to  the  wind,  an- 
choring five  hundred  feet  from  the  starboard  beam  of  this 
vessel  (f)  which  by  an  odd  coincidence  bore  the  same  name 
—  Hero.  From  this  position  he  at  once  opened  fire  from  both 
broadsides.  His  next  astern,  the  Annihal  (b),  brought  up 
immediately  ahead  of  him,  but  so  close  that  the  Heros  had 
to  veer  cable  and  drop  astern  (a),  which  brought  her  on  the 
beam  of  the  Monmouth,  64  ^  (m) .  The  captain  of  the  Annihal 
had  thought  the  order  for  battle  merely  precautionary,  and 
had  not  cleared  for  action.  He  was  therefore  taken  una- 
wares, and  his  ship  did  no  service  proportionate  to  her  force. 
The  third  French  vessel  (c)  reached  her  station,  but  her 
captain  was  struck  dead  just  when  about  to  anchor,  and  in 
the  confusion  the  anchor  was  not  let  go.  The  ship  drifted 
foul  of  a  British  East  Indiaman,  which  she  carried  out  to 
sea  (c'  c").  The  two  remaining  French  (d,  e)  simply  cannon- 
aded as  they  passed  across  the  bay's  mouth,  failing  through 
mishap  or  awkwardness  to  reach  an  effective  position. 

The  attack  thus  became  a  mere  rough  and  tumble,  in  which 
the  two  seventy-fours  alone  sustained  the  French  side. 
After  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  Suffren,  seeing  that  the 
attempt  had  failed,  slipped  his  cable  and  put  to  sea.  The 
Annihal  followed,  but  she  had  been  so  damaged  that  all  her 

1 1  infer,  from  the  accounts,  that  the  Monmouth  was  well  east  of 
the  Hero,  that  the  French  had  passed  her  first,  and  that  the  Heros 
was  now  on  her  port  beam ;  but  this  point  is  not  certain. 


238     MAJOR    OPERATIONS    OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

masts  went  overboard ;  fortunately,  not  until  her  head  was 
pointed  out  of  the  harbour.  Johnstone,  thus  luckily  escap- 
ing the  consequences  of-  his  neglect,  now  called  his  captains 
together  to  learn  the  condition  of  their  ships,  and  then  ordered 
them  to  cut  their  cables  and  pursue.  All  obeyed  except 
Captain  Sutton  of  the  Isis,  who  represented  that  the  spars 
and  rigging  of  his  ship  could  not  bear  sail  at  once.  John- 
stone then  ordered  him  to  come  out  anyhow,  which  he  did, 
and  his  fore  topmast  shortly  went  overboard.  The  dis- 
ability of  this  ship  so  weighed  upon  the  Commodore  that 
his  pursuit  was  exceedingly  sluggish;  and  the  French  kept 
drawing  him  away  to  leeward,  the  Annihal  having  got  a  bit 
of  canvas  on  a  jury  foremast.  Night,  therefore,  was  falling 
as  Johnstone  came  near  them;  the  Isis  and  Monmouth 
were  two  or  three  miles  astern;  the  sea  was  increasing; 
if  he  got  much  further  to  leeward,  he  could  not  get  back; 
he  had  forgotten  to  appoint  a  rendezvous  where  the  convoy 
might  rejoin;  a  night  action,  he  considered,  was  not  to  be 
thought  of.  Yet,  if  he  let  the  enemy  go,  they  might  antici- 
pate him  at  the  Cape.  In  short,  Johnstone  underwent  the 
"anguish"  of  an  undecided  man  in  a  "cruel  situation,"^ 
and  of  course  decided  to  run  no  risks.  He  returned  therefore 
to  Porto  Praya,  put  the  captain  of  the  Isis  under  arrest,  and 
remained  in  port  for  a  fortnight.  Suffren  hurried  on  to  the 
Cape,  got  there  first,  landed  his  troops,  and  secured  the 
colony  against  attack.  Johnstone  arrived  in  the  neighbour- 
hood some  time  later,  and,  finding  himself  anticipated, 
turned  aside  to  Saldanha  Bay,  where  he  captured  five  Dutch 
East  Indiamen.  He  then  sent  the  Hero,  Monmouth,  and 
Isis  on  to  India,  to  reinforce  Hughes,  and  himself  went  back 
to  England. 

No  accusation  of  misbehavior  lies    against    any  of   the 
British  subordinates  in  this   affair  of  Porto   Praya.      The 
1  Expressions  in  Johnstone's  Report. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  239 

captain  of  the  Isis  was  brought  to  a  court-martial,  and 
honourably  acquitted  of  all  the  charges.  The  discredit  of 
the  surprise  was  not  redeemed  by  any  exhibition  of  intelli- 
gence, energy,  or  professional  capacity,  on  the  part  of  the 
officer  in  charge.  It  has  been  said  that  he  never  had  com- 
manded a  post-ship  ^  before  he  was  intrusted  with  this  very 
important  mission,  and  it  is  reasonably  sure  that  his  selection 
for  it  was  due  to  attacks  made  by  him  upon  the  professional 
conduct  of  Keppel  and  Howe,  when  those  admirals  were  at 
variance  with  the  administration.^  His  preposterous  mis- 
management, therefore,  was  probably  not  wholly  bitter  to  the 
Navy  at  large.  In  the  British  ships  of  war,  the  entire  loss 
in  men,  as  reported,  was  only  9  killed,  47  wounded.  Several 
casualties  from  chance  shots  occurred  on  board  the  convoy, 
bringing  up  the  total  to  36  killed  and  130  wounded.  The 
French  admit  105  killed  and  204  wounded,  all  but  19  being 
in  the  Hews  and  Annihal.  Although  precipitated  by  Suffren, 
the  affair  clearly  was  as  great  a  surprise  to  his  squadron  as  to 
the  British.  Therefore,  the  latter,  being  already  at  anchor 
and  more  numerous  as  engaged,  had  a  distinct  advantage; 
to  which  also  contributed  musketry  fire  from  the  transports. 
Nevertheless,  the  result  cannot  be  deemed  creditable  to  the 
French  captains  or  gunnery. 

Suffren  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Cape  for  two 
months.  Then,  having  seen  the  colony  secure,  independent 
of  his  squadron,  he  departed  for  the  He  de  France,  arriving 
there  October  25th.  On  the  17th  of  December  the  whole 
French  force,  under  the  command  of  d'Orves,  sailed  for  the 

1  Charnock,  however,  says  that  in  1762,  immediately  after  re- 
ceiving his  post-commission,  he  commanded  in  succession  the 
Hind,  20,  and  the  Wager,  20.  Moreover,  before  his  appointment 
to  the  expedition  of  1781,  he  had  been  Commodore  on  the  Lisbon 
Station.  But  he  had  spent  comparatively  little  time  at  sea  as  a 
captain.  —  W.  L.  C. 
2  See  ante,  pp.  79,  80. 


240     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF  THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

Coromandel  coast.  On  the  way  the  British  50-gun  ship 
Hannibal,  Captain  Alexander  Christie,  was  taken.  On  the 
9th  of  February,  1782,  Comte  d'Orves  died,  and  Suffren 
found  himself  at  the  head  of  twelve  ships  of  the  line :  three 
74's,  seven  64's  and  two  50's.^  On  the  15th  Hughes's 
fleet  was  sighted,  under  the  guns  of  Madras.  It  numbered 
nine  of  the  line :  two  74's,  one  68,  five  64's,  and  one  50. 
Suffren  stood  south  towards  Pondicherry,  which  had  passed 
into  the  power  of  Hyder  Ali.  After  nightfall  Hughes  got 
under  way,  and  also  steered  south.  He  feared  for  Trin- 
comalee,  in  Ceylon,  recently  a  Dutch  port,  which  the 
British  had  captured  on  the  5th  of  January.  It  was  a 
valuable  naval  position,  as  yet  most  imperfectly  defended. 
At  daylight  the  British  saw  the  French  squadron  twelve 
miles  east  (A,  A)  and  its  transports  nine  miles  south-west 
(c).  Hughes  chased  the  latter  and  took  six.  Suffren  pur- 
sued, but  could  not  overtake  before  sunset,  and  both  fleets 
steered  south-east  during  the  night.  Next  morning  there 
were  light  north-north-east  airs,  and  the  French  were  six 
miles  north-east  of  the  British  (B,  B).  The  latter  formed 
line  on  the  port  tack  (a),  heading  to  seaward;  Hughes 
hoping  that  thus  the  usual  sea-breeze  would  find  him  to  wind- 
ward. The  breeze,  however,  did  not  make  as  expected; 
and,  as  the  north-east  puffs  were  bringing  the  enemy  down, 
he  kept  off  before  the  wind  (b)  to  gain  time  for  his  ships  to 
close  their  intervals,  which  were  too  great.  At  4  p.m.  the 
near  approach  of  the  French  compelled  him  to  form  line 
again,  (C),  on  the  port  tack,  heading  easterly.  The  rear 
ship,  Exeter,  64  (e),  was  left  separated,  out  of  due  support 
from  those  ahead.     Suffren,  leading  one  section  of  his  fleet 

^  One  being  the  captured  Bri-tish  Hannibal,  50,  which  was  com- 
missioned by  Captain  Morard  de  Galles,  retaining  the  English  form 
of  the  name,  Hannibal,  to  distinguish  her  from  the  Annibal,  74, 
already  in  the  squadron. 


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WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  241 

in  person,  passed  to  windward  of  the  British  line,  from  the 
rear,  as  far  as  Hughes's  flagship,  which  was  fifth  from  the 
van.  There  he  stopped,  and  kept  at  half  cannon-shot,  to 
prevent  the  four  ships  in  the  British  van  from  tacking  to 
relieve  their  consorts.  It  was  his  intention  that  the  second 
half  of  his  fleet  should  attack  the  other  side  of  the  English  rear. 
This  plan  of  intended  battle  is  shown  by  the  figure  D  in  the 
diagram.  Actually,  only  two  of  the  French  rear  did  what 
Suffren  expected,  engaging  to  leeward  of  the  extreme  British 
rear;  the  others  of  the  French  rear  remaining  long  out  of 
action  (C) .  The  figure  C  shows  the  imperfect  achievement 
of  the  design  D.  However,  as  the  position  of  Suffren's 
flagship  prevented  the  British  van  from  tacking  into  action, 
the  net  result  was,  to  use  Hughes's  own  words,  that  "the 
enemy  brought  eight  of  their  best  ships  to  the  attack  of  five 
of  ours."  It  will  be  noted  with  interest  that  these  were 
exactly  the  numbers  engaged  in  the  first  act  of  the  battle  of 
the  Nile.  The  Exeter  (like  the  Guerrier  at  the  Nile)  received 
the  fresh  broadsides  of  the  first  five  of  the  enemy,  and  then 
remained  in  close  action  on  both  sides,  assailed  by  two, 
and  at  last  by  three,  opponents,  —  two  50's,  and  one 
64.  When  the  third  approached,  the  master  of  the 
ship  asked  Commodore  Richard  King,  whose  broad  pennant 
flew  at  her  masthead,  "What  is  to  be  done?"  "There  is 
nothing  to  be  done,"  replied  King,  "but  to  fight  her  till  she 
sinks."  Her  loss,  10  killed  and  45  wounded,  was  not  credit- 
able under  the  circumstances  to  the  French  gunnery,  which 
had  been  poor  also  at  Porto  Praya.  At  6  p.m.  the  wind  shifted 
to  south-east,  throwing  all  on  the  other  tack,  and  enabling 
the  British  van  at  last  to  come  into  action.  Darkness  now 
approaching,  Suffren  hauled  off  and  anchored  at  Pondicherry. 
Hughes  went  on  to  Trincomalee  to  refit.  The  British  loss  had 
been  32  killed,  among  whom  were  Captain  William  Stevens 
of  the  flagship,  and  Captain  Henry  Reynolds,  of  the  Exeter, 


242     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

and  83  wounded.     The  French  had  30  killed ;  the  number  of 
their  wounded  is  put  by  Professor  Laughton  at  100. 

On  the  12th  of  March  Hughes  returned  to  Madras,  and 
towards  the  end  of  the  month  sailed  again  for  Trincomalee 
carrying  reinforcements  and  supplies.  On  the  30th  he  was 
joined  at  sea  by  the  Sultan,  74,  and  the  Magnanime,  64,  just 
from  England.  Suffren  had  remained  on  the  coast  from 
reasons  of  policy,  to  encourage  Hyder  Ali  in  his  leaning  to 
the  French ;  but,  after  landing  a  contingent  of  troops  on  the 
22d  of  March,  to  assist  at  the  siege  of  the  British  port  of 
Cuddalore,  he  put  to  sea  on  the  23d,  and  went  south,  hoping 
to  intercept  the  Sultan  and  Magnanime  off  the  south  end  of 
Ceylon.  On  the  9th  of  iVpril  he  sighted  the  British  fleet  to 
the  south  and  west  of  him.  Hughes,  attaching  the  first  im- 
portance to  the  strengthening  of  Trincomalee,  had  resolved 
neither  to  seek  nor  to  shun  action.  He  therefore  continued 
his  course,  light  northerly  airs  prevailing,  until  the  11th, 
when,  being  about  fifty  miles  to  the  north-east  of  his  port,  he 
bore  away  for  it.  Next  morning,  April  12th,  finding  that  the 
enemy  could  overtake  his  rear  ships,  he  formed  line  on  the 
starboard  tack,  at  two  cables'  intervals,  heading  to  the  west- 
ward, towards  the  coast  of  Ceylon,  wdnd  north  by  east,  and 
the  French  dead  to  windward  (A,  A).  Suffren  drew  up  his 
line  (a)  on  the  same  tack,  parallel  to  the  British,  and  at  11 
A.M.  gave  the  signal  to  steer  west-south-west  all  together; 
his  vessels  going  down  in  a  slanting  direction  (bbO,  each 
to  steer  for  one  of  the  enemy.  Having  twelve  ships  to 
eleven,  the  twelfth  was  ordered  to  place  herself  on  the  off 
side  of  the  rear  British,  which  would  thus  have  two  antago- 
nists. 

In  such  simultaneous  approach  it  commonly  occurred  that 
the  attacking  line  ceased  to  be  parallel  with  the  foe's,  its  van 
becoming  nearer  and  rear  more  distant.  So  it  was  here. 
Further,  the  British  opening  fire  as  soon  as  the  leading  French 


. 

SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES 

''  ,.-'^    a      A 

12th  April,  1782 
British  »>  11  Ships 
French  ^  12  Ships 

pp p  a          b'  /> 

■•  ^  ^^  ^                  C3  0    <D 

k. 

s 

rO.SJTlON 


SUFFREIS  A>D  HUGHES 

6tli  July,  17 82 
British  ••II  Ships 
French  «=>11  Ships 


a  0      --- 


0      '■- 


Positions  W.&l  III.  ^    ^'' 


'''; 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  243 

were  within  range,  the  latter  at  once  hauled  up  to  reply. 
Suffren,  in  the  centre,  wishing  closest  action,  signalled  them 
to  keep  away  again,  and  himself  bore  down  wrathfully  upon 
Hughes  to  within  pistol-shot ;  in  which  he  was  supported 
closely  by  his  next  ahead  and  the  two  next  astern.  The 
rear  of  the  French,  though  engaged,  remained  too  far  distant. 
Their  line,  therefore,  resembled  a  curve,  the  middle  of  which 
—  four  or  five  ships  —  was  tangent  to  the  British  centre  (B). 
At  this  point  the  heat  of  the  attack  fell  upon  Hughes's  flag- 
ship, the  Superb,  74  (C,  d),  and  her  next  ahead,  the  Mon- 
mouth, 64.  Suffren's  ship,  the  Hews,  having  much  of  her 
rigging  cut,  could  not  shorten  sail,  shot  by  the  Superb,  and 
brought  up  abreast  the  Monmouth.  The  latter,  already  hotly 
engaged  by  one  of  her  own  class,  and  losing  her  main  and 
mizzen  masts  in  this  unequal  new  contest,  was  forced  at  3 
P.M.  to  bear  up  out  of  the  line  (m).  The  place  of  the  Heros 
alongside  the  Superb  was  taken  by  the  Orient,  74,  supported 
by  the  Brillant,  64 ;  and  when  the  Monmouth  kept  off,  the 
attack  of  these  two  ships  was  reinforced  by  the  half-dozen 
stern  chasers  of  the  Heros,  which  had  drifted  into  the  British 
line,  and  now  fired  into  the  Superb's  bows.  The  conflict 
between  these  five  ships,  two  British  and  three  French,  was 
one  of  the  bloodiest  in  naval  annals ;  the  loss  of  the  Superb, 
59  killed  and  96  wounded,  and  of  the  Monmouth,  45  killed 
and  102  wounded,  equalling  that  of  the  much  larger  vessels 
which  bore  the  flags  of  Nelson  and  Collingwood  at  Trafalgar. 
The  loss  of  the  three  French  was  52  killed  and  142  wounded ; 
but  to  this  should  be  added  properly  that  of  the  Sphinx,  64, 
the  Monmouth's  first  adversary :  22  killed  and  74  wounded. 
At  3.40  P.M.,  fearing  that  if  he  continued  steering  west  he 
would  get  entangled  with  the  shore,  Hughes  wore  his  ships, 
forming  line  on  the  port  tack,  heading  off  shore.  The 
French  also  wore,  and  Suffren  hoped  to  secure  the  Mon- 
mouth, which  was  left  between  the  two  lines ;  but  the  quick- 


244     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN   THE 

ness  of  a  British  captain,  Hawker,  of  the  Hero,  ran  a  tow-rope 
to  her  in  time,  and  she  was  thus  dragged  out  of  danger.  At 
5.40  Hughes  anchored,  and  Suffren  did  the  same  at  8  p.m. 
The  total  British  loss  in  men  on  this  occasion  was  137  killed 
and  430  wounded;  that  of  the  French  137  killed,  and  357 
wounded. 

The  exhausted  enemies  remained  at  anchor  in  the  open  sea, 
two  miles  apart,  for  a  week,  repairing.  On  the  19th  of 
April  the  French  got  under  way  and  made  a  demonstration 
before  the  British,  inviting  battle,  yet  not  attacking;  but 
the  condition  of  the  Monmouth  forbade  Hughes  from  moving. 
Suffren  therefore  departed  to  Batacalo,  in  Ceylon,  south  of 
Trincomalee,  where  he  covered  his  own  convoys  from  Europe, 
and  flanked  the  approach  of  his  adversary's.  Hughes,  on 
the  22d  of  April,  got  into  Trincomalee,  where  he  remained 
till  June  23d.  He  then  went  to  Negapatam,  formerly  a 
Dutch  possession,  but  then  held  by  the  British.  There  he 
learned  that  Suffren,  who  meanwhile  had  captured  several 
British  transports,  was  a  few  miles  north  of  him,  at 
Cuddalore,  which  had  surrendered  to  Hyder  Ali  on  April 
4th.  On  the  5th  of  July,  at  1  p.m.,  the  French  squadron 
appeared.  At  3  p.m.  Hughes  put  to  sea,  and  stood  south 
during  the  night  to  gain  the  wind,  —  the  south-west  mon- 
soon now  blowing. 

Next  morning,  at  daylight,  the  French  were  seen  at  anchor, 
seven  or  eight  miles  to  leeward.  At  6  a.m.  they  began  to  get 
under  way.  One  of  their  sixty-fours,  the  Ajax,  had  lost  her 
main  and  mizzen  topmasts  in  a  violent  squall  on  the  previous 
afternoon,  and  was  not  in  the  line.  There  were  therefore 
eleven  ships  on  each  side.  The  action,  known  as  that  of 
Negapatam,  began  shortly  before  11,  when  both  fleets  were 
on  the  starboard  tack,  heading  south-south-east,  wind  south- 
west. The  British  being  to  windward,  Hughes  ordered  his 
fleet  to  bear  up  together  to  the  attack,  exactly  as  Suffren 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  245 

had  done  on  the  12th  of  April.  As  commonly  happened,  the 
rear  got  less  close  than  the  van  (Position  I) .  The  fourth  ship 
in  the  French  order,  the  Brillant,  64  (a),  losing  her  main- 
mast early,  dropped  to  leeward  of  the  line,  (aO,  and  astern 
of  her  place  (a'O .  At  half-past  noon  the  wind  flew  suddenly 
to  south-south-east,  —  the  sea-breeze,  —  taking  the  ships 
a  little  on  the  port  bow.  Most  of  them,  on  both  sides,  paid 
off  from  the  enemy,  the  British  to  starboard,  the  French  to 
port ;  but  between  the  main  lines,  which  were  in  the  momen- 
tary confusion  consequent  upon  such  an  incident,  were  left 
six  ships  —  four  British  and  two  French  —  that  had  turned 
the  other  way  (Positions  II  and  III).^  These  were  the 
Burford,  Sultan  (s),  Worcester,  and  Eagle,  fourth,  fifth,  eighth 
and  tenth,  in  the  British  order;  and  the  Severe  (b),  third  in 
the  French,  with  the  dismasted  Brillant,  which  was  now 
towards  the  rear  of  the  fight  (a).  Under  these  conditions, 
the  Severe,  64,  underwent  a  short  but  close  action  with  the 
Sultan,  74 ;  and  with  two  other  British  ships,  according  to 
the  report  of  the  Severe's  captain.  The  remainder  of  the 
incident  shall  be  given  in  the  latter 's  own  words. 

"Seeing  the  French  squadron  drawing  off,  —  for  all  the  ships 
except  the  Brillant  had  fallen  off  on  the  other  tack,  —  Captain  de 
Cillart  thought  it  useless  to  prolong  his  defence,  and  had  the  flag 
hauled  down.  The  ships  engaged  with  him  immediately  ceased 
their  fire,  and  the  one  on  the  starboard  side  moved  away.  At  this 
moment  the  Severe  fell  off  to  starboard,  and  her  sails  filled.  Captain 
de  Cillart  then  ordered  the  fire  to  be  resumed  by  his  lower-deck  guns, 
the  only  ones  which  remained  manned,  and  he  rejoined  his 
squadron." 

When  the  Severe' s  flag  came  down,  Suffren  was  approaching 

1  In  the  plan,  Positions  II  and  III,  the  second  position  is  indicated 
by  ships  with  broken  outhnes.  These  show  the  two  Hnes  of  battle 
in  the  engagement  until  the  wind  shifted  to  south-south-east.  The 
results  of  the  shift  constituted  a  third  position,  consecutive  with 
the  second,  and  is  indicated  by  ships  in  full  outline. 


246    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE   NAVIES  IN  THE 

with  his  flagship.  The  Sultan  wore  to  rejoin  her  fleet,  and 
was  raked  by  the  Severe  in  so  doing.  The  Brillant,  whose 
mainmast  had  been  shot  away  in  conflict  with  either  the 
Sultan  or  the  Burford,  both  much  heavier  ships,  had  at  this 
later  phase  of  the  fight  fallen  under  the  guns  of  the  Worcester 
and  the  Eagle.  Her  captain,  de  Saint-Felix,  was  one  of  the 
most  resolute  of  Suffren's  officers.  She  was  rescued  by  the 
flagship,  but  she  had  lost  47  killed  and  136  wounded,  — 
an  almost  incredible  slaughter,  being  over  a  third  of  the 
usual  complement  of  a  sixty-four ;  and  Suffren's  ships  were 
undermanned. 

These  spirited  episodes,  and  the  fact  that  his  four  separated 
ships  were  approaching  the  enemy,  and  being  approached  by 
them,  caused  Hughes  to  give  the  orders  to  wear,  and  for  a 
general  chase ;  the  flag  for  the  line  being  hauled  down.  These 
signals  would  bring  all  the  main  body  to  the  support  of  the 
separated  ships,  without  regard  to  their  order  in  battle,  and 
therefore  with  the  utmost  expedition  that  their  remaining 
sail  power  would  admit.  Two  of  the  fleet,  however,  made 
signals  of  disability ;  so  Hughes  annulled  the  orders,  and  at 
1.30  formed  on  the  port  tack,  recalling  the  engaged  vessels. 
Both  squadrons  now  stood  in  shore,  and  anchored  at  about 
6  P.M. ;  the  British  near  Negapatam,  the  French  some  ten 
miles  north.  The  loss  in  the  action  had  been :  British,  77 
killed,  233  wounded ;  French,  178  killed,  601  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  Suffren  sailed  for  Cuddalore.  There 
he  received  word  that  two  ships  of  the  line  —  the  Illustre, 
74,  and  St.  Michel,  60,  with  a  convoy  of  supplies  and  600 
troops  —  were  to  be  expected  shortly  at  Pointe  de  Galle, 
then  a  Dutch  port,  on  the  south-west  side  of  Ceylon.  It 
was  essential  to  cover  these,  and  on  the  18th  he  was  ready  for 
sea ;  but  the  necessity  of  an  interview  with  Hyder  Ali  delayed 
him  until  the  1st  of  August,  when  he  started  for  Batacalo. 
On  the  9th  he  arrived  there,  and  on  the  21st  the  reinforce- 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  247 

ment  joined  him.  Within  forty-eight  hours  the  supply- 
ships  were  cleared,  and  the  squadron  sailed  again  with  the 
object  of  taking  Trincomalee.  On  the  25th  he  was  off  the 
port,  and,  the  operation  being  pushed  energetically,  the 
place  capitulated  on  the  31st  of  August. 

It  is  difficult  to  resist  the  impression  that  greater  energy  on 
Hughes's  part  might  have  brought  him  up  in  time  to  prevent 
this  mishap.  He  reached  Madras  only  on  July  20th,  a 
fortnight  after  the  late  action;  and  he  did  not  sail  thence 
until  the  20th  of  August,  notwithstanding  that  he  appre- 
hended an  attempt  upon  Trincomalee.  Hence,  when  he 
arrived  there  on  the  2d  of  September,  not  only  had  it  passed 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  but  Suffren  had  reembarked 
already  the  men  and  the  guns  that  had  been  landed  from  his 
fleet.  When  Hughes's  approach  was  signalled,  all  prepara- 
tions for  sea  were  hastened,  and  the  following  morning,  at 
daybreak,  the  French  came  out.  Hughes  had  been  joined 
since  the  last  action  by  the  Sceptre,  64,  so  that  the  respective 
forces  in  the  action  fought  off  Trincomalee  on  September 
3d  were  twelve  of  the  line  to  fourteen,  viz. :  British,  three  74's, 
one  70,  one  68,  six  64's,  one  50 ;  French,  four  74's,  seven 
64's,  one  60,  two  50's.  Suffren  had  also  put  into  the  line  a 
36-gun  ship,  the  Consolante} 

While  the  French  were  getting  underway  from  Trincomalee, 
the  British  fleet  was  standing  south-south-east  towards  the 
entrance,  close-hauled  on  the  starboard  tack,  a  fresh  south- 
west monsoon  blowing.  When  Hughes  made  out  the  hostile 
flags  on  the  works,  he  kept  away  four  points,^  and  steered 
east-south-east,  still  in  column,  under  short  canvas  (A)- 
Suffren  pursued,  being  to  windward  yet  astern,  with  his 
fleet  on  a  line  of  bearing;  that  is,  the  line  on  which  the 
ships  were  ranged  was  not  the  same  as  the  course  which 

1  Previously  the  British  East  Indiaman,  Elizabeth. 

2  Forty-five  degrees. 


248     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN  THE 

they  were  steering.  This  formation,  (A) ,  wherein  the  advance 
is  obhque  to  the  front,  is  very  difficult  to  maintain.  Wishing 
to  make  the  action,  whatever  the  immediate  event,  decisive 
in  results,  by  drawing  the  French  well  to  leeward  of  the  port, 
Hughes,  who  was  a  thorough  seaman  and  had  good  captains, 
played  with  his  eager  enemy.  "He  kept  avoiding  me  with- 
out taking  ffight,"  wrote  Suffren;  "or  rather,  he  fled,  in 
good  order,  regulating  his  canvas  by  his  worst  sailers ;  and, 
keeping  off  by  degrees,  he  steered  from  first  to  last  ten  or 
twelve  different  courses."  Hughes,  on  his  part,  while 
perfectly  clear  as  to  his  own  object,  was  somewhat  perplexed 
by  the  seeming  indecision  of  an  adversary  whose  fighting 
purpose  he  knew  by  experience.  "Sometimes  they  edged 
down,"  he  wrote ;  "  sometimes  they  brought-to ;  in  no  regular 
order,  as  if  undetermined  what  to  do."  These  apparent 
vacillations  were  due  to  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  the  line 
of  bearing,  which  was  to  be  the  line  of  battle;  and  this 
difficulty  was  the  greater,  because  Hughes  was  continually 
altering  his  course  and  Suffren's  ships  were  of  unequal 
speed. 

At  length,  at  2  p.m.,  being  then  twenty-five  miles  south-east 
of  the  port,  the  French  drew  near  enough  to  bear  down. 
That  this  movement  might  be  carried  out  with  precision, 
and  all  the  vessels  come  into  action  together,  Suffren  caused 
his  fleet  to  haul  to  the  wind,  on  the  starboard  tack,  to  rectify 
the  order.  This  also  being  done  poorly  and  slowly,  he  lost 
patience,  —  as  Nelson  afterwards  said,  '^A  day  is  soon  lost 
in  manoeuvring,"  —  and  at  2.30,  to  spur  on  the  laggard 
ships,  the  French  admiral  gave  the  signal  to  attack,  (a),  speci- 
fying pistol-range.  Even  this  not  sufficing  to  fetch  the  delin- 
quents promptly  into  line  with  the  flagship,  the  latter  fired  a 
gun  to  enforce  obedience.  Her  own  side  being  still  turned 
towards  the  British,  as  she  waited,  the  report  was  taken  by 
the  flagship's  men  below  decks  to  be  the  signal  for  opening 


^ 


*i^ 


SUFFREN  AND  HUGHES 

3rd  Sept.  1782 
British  »  12  Ships 
French  o  14    " 


WAR    OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE^         249 

fire,  and  her  whole  broadside  was  discharged.  This  example 
was  followed  by  the  other  ships,  so  that  the  engagement, 
instead  of  being  close,  was  begun  at  half  cannon-shot. 

Owing  to  his  measured  and  deliberate  retreat,  Hughes 
had  his  fleet  now  in  thoroughly  good  shape,  well  aligned 
and  closed-up.  The  French,  starting  from  a  poor  formation 
to  perform  a  difficult  evolution,  under  fire,  engaged  in  utter 
disorder  (B).  Seven  ships,  prematurely  rounding-to  to  bring 
their  broadsides  to  the  enemy,  and  fore-reaching,  formed  a 
confused  group  (v),  much  to  windward  and  somewhat  ahead 
of  the  British  van.  Imperfectly  deployed,  they  interfered 
with  one  another  and  their  fire  consequently  could  not  be 
adequately  developed.  In  the  rear  a  somewhat  similar 
condition  existed.  SufFren,  expecting  the  bulk  of  his  line 
to  fight  the  British  to  windward,  had  directed  the  Vengeur, 
64,  and  the  Consolante,  36,  to  double  to  leeward  on  the 
extreme  rear;  but  they,  finding  that  the  weather  sides  of 
the  enemy  were  not  occupied,  feared  to  go  to  leeward,  lest 
they  should  be  cut  off.  They  attacked  the  rear  British  ship, 
the  Worcester,  64  (w),  to  windward;  but  the  Monmouth,  64 
(m),  dropping  down  to  her  support,  and  the  Vengeur  catching 
fire  in  the  mizzen  top,  they  were  compelled  to  haul  off.  Only 
Suffren's  own  ship,  the  Heros,  74  (a),  and  her  next  astern,  the 
lUustre,  74,  (i),  came  at  once  to  close  action  with  the  British 
centre ;  but  subsequently  the  Ajax,  64,  succeeding  in  clearing 
herself  from  the  snarl  in  the  rear,  took  station  ahead  (j)  of  the 
Heros.  Upon  these  three  fell  the  brunt  of  the  fight.  They 
not  only  received  the  broadsides  of  the  ships  immediately 
opposed  to  them,  but,  the  wind  having  now  become  light  yet 
free,  the  British  vessels  ahead  and  astern,  (h,s,)  by  luffing  or 
keeping  off,  played  also  upon  them.  "The  enemy  formed  a 
semicircle  around  us,"  wrote  Suffren's  chief  of  staff,  "and 
raked  us  ahead  and  astern,  as  the  ship  came  up  and  fell  off 
with  the  helm  to  leeward."    The  two  seventy-fours  were 


250    MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

crushed  under  this  fire.  Both  lost  their  main  and  mizzen 
masts  in  the  course  of  the  day,  and  the  foretopmast  of  the 
flagship  also  fell.  The  Ajax,  arriving  later,  and  probably 
drawing  less  attention,  had  only  a  topmast  shot  away. 

The  British  total  of  killed  and  wounded  was  very  evenly 
distributed  throughout  the  fleet.  Only  the  rear  ship  lost 
an  important  spar,  —  the  main  topmast.  It  was  upon  her,  as 
already  mentioned,  and  upon  the  two  leading  ships,  the  Exeter 
and  Isis,  that  fell  the  heaviest  fire,  proportionately,  of  the 
French.  From  the  position  of  the  seven  van  ships  of  the 
latter,  such  fire  as  they  could  make  must  needs  be  upon  the 
extreme  British  van,  and  the  Exeter  was  forced  to  leave 
the  line.  The  loss  of  the  French  that  day  was  82  killed  and 
255  wounded ;  of  which  64  killed  and  178  wounded  belonged 
to  the  Heros,  Illustre,  and  Ajax.  The  British  had  51  killed 
and  283  wounded ;  the  greatest  number  of  casualties  in  one 
ship  being  56.  Singularly  enough,  in  such  a  small  list  of 
deaths,  three  were  commanding  officers :  Captains  Watt  of 
the  Sultan,  Wood  of  the  Worcester,  and  Lumley  of  the  Isis. 

At  5.30  P.M.  the  wind  shifted  suddenly  from  south-west 
to  east-south-east  (C).  The  British  wore  together,  formed  on 
the  other  tack,  and  continued  the  fight.  It  was  during  this 
final  act,  and  at  6  p.m.,  that  the  mainmast  of  the  French 
flagship  came  down.  The  van  ships  of  the  French  had  towed 
their  heads  round  with  boats  before  4,  in  order  to  come  to 
the  support  of  the  centre,  in  obedience  to  a  signal  from 
Suffren;  but  the  light  airs  and  calms  had  retarded  them. 
With  the  shift  they  approached,  and  passed  in  column  (c) 
between  their  crippled  vessels  and  the  enemy.  This  manoeu- 
vre, and  the  failure  of  daylight,  brought  the  battle  to  an  end. 
According  to  Hughes's  report,  several  of  his  fleet  "were 
making  much  water  from  shot-holes  so  very  low  down  in  the 
bottom  as  not  to  be  come  at  to  be  effectually  stopped; 
and  the  whole  had  suffered    severelv  in  their   masts  and 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  251 

rigging."  Trincomalee  being  in  the  enemy's  possession,  and 
the  east  coast  of  Ceylon  an  unsafe  anchorage  now,  at  the 
change  of  the  monsoon,  he  felt  compelled  to  return  to  Madras, 
where  he  anchored  on  the  9th  of  September.  SufFren  re- 
gained Trincomalee  on  the  7th  of  the  month,  but  the  Orient, 
74,  running  ashore  at  the  entrance  and  being  lost,  he  remained 
outside  until  the  17th,  saving  material  from  the  wreck. 

The  break-up  of  the  south-west  monsoon,  then  at  hand,  is 
apt  to  be  accompanied  by  violent  hurricanes,  and  is  succeeded 
by  the  north-east  monsoon,  during  which  the  east  coasts  of 
the  peninsula  and  of  Ceylon  give  a  lee  shore,  with  heavy  surf. 
Naval  operations,  therefore,  were  suspended  for  the  winter. 
During  that  season  Trincomalee  is  the  only  secure  port. 
Deprived  of  it,  Hughes  determined  to  go  to  Bombay,  and 
for  that  purpose  left  Madras  on  the  17th  of  October.  Four 
days  later  a  reinforcement  of  five  ships  of  the  line  arrived 
from  England,  under  Commodore  Sir  Richard  Bickerton,  who 
at  once  followed  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  west  coast. 
In  the  course  of  December  the  entire  British  force  was 
united  at  Bombay. 

In  Trincomalee  Suffren  had  a  good  anchorage;  but  the 
insufficiency  of  its  resources,  with  other  military  considera- 
tions, decided  him  to  winter  at  Acheen,  at  the  west  end  of 
Sumatra.  He  arrived  there  on  the  2d  of  November,  having 
first  paid  a  visit  to  Cuddalore,  where  the  Bizarre,  64,  was 
wrecked  by  carelessness.  On  the  20th  of  December  he  left 
Acheen  for  the  Coromandel  coast,  having  shortened  his  stay 
to  the  eastward  for  reasons  of  policy.  On  the  8th  of  January, 
1783,  he  was  off  Ganjam,  on  the  Orissa  coast,  and  thence 
reached  Trincomalee  again  on  the  23d  of  February.  There 
he  was  joined  on  the  10th  of  March  by  three  ships  of  the  line 
from  Europe :  two  74's  and  one  64.  Under  their  con- 
voy came  General  de  Bussy,  with  twenty-five  hundred 
troops,  which  were  at  once  despatched  to  Cuddalore. 


252     MAJOR   OPERATIONS   OF   THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

On  the  10th  of  April  Vice- Admiral  Hughes,  returning 
from  Bombay,  passed  Trincomalee  on  the  way  to  Madras, 
The  various  maritime  occurrences,  wrecks  and  reinforce- 
ments, since  the  battle  of  September  3d  had  reversed  the 
naval  odds,  and  Hughes  now  had  eighteen  ships  of  the  line, 
one  of  which  was  an  eighty,  opposed  to  fifteen  under  Suffren. 
Another  important  event  in  the  affairs  of  India  was  the  death 
of  Hyder  Ali,  on  the  7th  of  December,  1782.  Although  his 
policy  was  continued  by  his  son,  Tippoo  Saib,  the  blow  to 
the  French  was  serious.  Under  all  the  conditions,  the  Brit- 
ish authorities  were  emboldened  to  attempt  the  reduction  of 
Cuddalore.  The  army  destined  to  this  enterprise  marched 
from  Madras,  passed  round  Cuddalore,  and  encamped 
south  of  it  by  the  shore.  The  supply-ships  and  lighter 
cruisers  anchored  near,  while  the  fleet  cruised  to  the  south- 
ward. Being  there  to  windward,  for  the  south-west  mon- 
soon had  then  set  in,  it  covered  the  operations  against  dis- 
turbance from  the  sea. 

Towards  the  beginning  of  June  the  investment  of  the  place 
was  complete  by  land  and  by  water.  Intelligence  of  this 
state  of  things  w^as  brought  on  the  10th  of  June  to  Suffren, 
who  by  Bussey's  direction  was  keeping  his  inferior  fleet  in 
Trincomalee  until  its  services  should  be  absolutely  indis- 
pensable. Immediately  upon  receiving  the  news  he  left  port, 
and  on  the  13th  sighted  the  British  fleet,  then  at  anchor  off 
Porto  Novo,  a  little  south  of  Cuddalore.  Upon  his  ap- 
proach Hughes  moved  off,  and  anchored  again  five  miles 
from  the  besieged  place.  For  the  next  two  days  the  French 
were  baffled  by  the  winds ;  but  on  the  17th  the  south-west 
monsoon  resumed,  and  Suffren  again  drew  near.  The 
British  Vice-Admiral,  not  caring  to  accept  action  at  anchor, 
got  under  way,  and  from  that  time  till  the  20th  remained 
outside,  trying  to  obtain  the  weather-gage,  in  which  he 
was  frustrated  by  the  variableness  of  the  winds.     Mean- 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  253 

while  Suffren  had  anchored  near  the  town,  communicated 
with  the  general,  and,  being  very  short  of  men  at  the  guns,  had 
embarked  twelve  hundred  troops  for  his  expected  battle; 
for  it  was  evident  that  the  issue  of  the  siege  would  turn 
upon  the  control  of  the  sea.  On  the  18th  he  weighed  again, 
and  the  two  fleets  manoeuvred  for  the  advantage,  with 
light  bafiling  airs,  the  British  furthest  from  shore. 

On  the  20th  of  June,  the  wind  holding  at  west  with  un- 
expected constancy,  Hughes  decided  to  accept  the  attack 
which  Suffren  evidently  intended.  The  latter,  being  dis- 
tinctly inferior  in  force,  —  fifteen  to  eighteen,  —  probably 
contemplated  an  action  that  should  be  decisive  only  as 
regarded  the  fate  of  Cuddalore;  that  is,  one  which,  while 
not  resulting  in  the  capture  or  destruction  of  ships,  should 
compel  his  opponent  to  leave  the  neighbourhood  to  repair 
damages.  The  British  formed  line  on  the  port  tack,  heading 
to  the  northward.  Suffren  ranged  his  fleet  in  the  same 
manner,  parallel  to  the  enemy,  and  was  careful  to  see  the 
order  exact  before  bearing  down.  When  the  signal  to 
attack  was  given,  the  French  kept  away  together,  and 
brought-to  again  on  the  weather  beam  of  the  British,  just 
within  point-blank  range.  The  action  lasted  from  shortly 
after  4  p.m.  to  nearly  7,  and  was  general  throughout  both 
lines ;  but,  as  always  experienced,  the  rears  were  less  engaged 
than  the  centres  and  vans.  No  ship  was  taken;  no  very 
important  spars  seem  to  have  been  shot  away.  The  loss 
of  the  British  was  99  killed,  434  wounded;  of  the  French, 
102  killed,  386  wounded. 

As  the  ships'  heads  were  north,  the  course  of  the  action 
carried  them  in  that  direction.  Suffren  anchored  next 
morning  twenty-five  miles  north  of  Cuddalore.  There  he 
was  sighted  on  the  22d  by  Hughes,  who  had  remained 
lying-to  the  day  after  the  fight.  The  British  Vice-Admiral 
reported  several  ships  much  disabled,  a  great  number  of  his 


254     MAJOR    OPERATIONS   OF  THE  NAVIES  IN   THE 

men  —  1,121  —  down  with  scurvy,  and  the  water  of  the  fleet 
very  short.  He  therefore  thought  it  necessary  to  go  to  Ma- 
dras, where  he  anchored  on  the  2oth.  Suffren  regained 
Cuddalore  on  the  afternoon  of  the  23d.  His  return  and 
Hughes's  departure  completely  changed  the  military  situa- 
tion. The  supply-ships,  upon  which  the  British  scheme  of 
operations  depended,  had  been  forced  to  take  flight  when 
Suffren  first  approached,  and  of  course  could  not  come 
back  now.  "My  mind  is  on  the  rack  without  a  moment's 
rest  since  the  departure  of  the  fleet,"  wrote  the  commanding 
general  on  the  25th,  "considering  the  character  of  jNI.  de 
Suffren,  and  the  infinite  superiority  on  the  part  of  the  French 
now  that  we  are  left  to  ourselves." 

The  battle  of  June  20th,  1783,  off  Cuddalore,  was  the  last 
of  the  maritime  war  of  1778.  It  was  fought,  actually, 
exactly  five  months  after  the  preliminaries  of  peace  had  been 
signed  on  January  20th,  1783.  Although  the  relative  force 
of  the  two  fleets  remained  unchanged,  it  was  a  French  victory, 
both  tactically  and  strategically :  tactically,  because  the 
inferior  fleet  held  its  ground,  and  remained  in  possession 
of  the  field;  strategically,  because  it  decided  the  object 
immediately  at  stake,  the  fate  of  Cuddalore,  and  with  it, 
momentarily  at  least,  the  issue  of  the  campaign.  It  was,  how- 
ever, the  triumph  of  one  commander-in-chief  over  another ; 
of  the  greater  man  over  the  lesser.  Hughes's  reasons  for 
quitting  the  field  involve  the  admission  of  his  opponent's 
greater  skill.  "Short  of  water,"  —  with  eighteen  ships  to 
fifteen,  able  therefore  to  spare  ships  by  detachments  for 
watering,  that  should  not  have  happened;  "injury  to 
spars,"  —  that  resulted  from  the  action ;  "1,121  men  short," 
—  Suffren  had  embarked  just  that  number  —  1,200  —  be- 
cause Hughes  let  him  communicate  with  the  port  without 
fighting.  Notwithstanding  the  much  better  seamanship 
of   the   British   subordinates,    and   their   dogged   tenacity, 


•  ■"rsfiiBsiw.Ji'ja.fcs.. 


WAR   OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE  255 

Suffren  here,  as  throughout  the  campaign,  demonstrated 
again  the  old  experience  that  generalship  is  the  supreme 
factor  in  war.  With  inferior  resources,  though  not  at 
first  with  inferior  numbers,  by  a  steady  offensive,  and  by 
the  attendant  anxiety  about  Trincomalee  impressed  upon 
the  British  admiral,  he  reduced  him  to  a  fruitless  defensive. 
By  the  seizure  of  that  place  as  a  base  he  planted  himself 
firmly  upon  the  scene  of  action.  Able  thus  to  remain, 
while  the  British  had  to  retire  to  Bombay,  he  sustained  the 
Sultan  of  Mysore  in  his  embarrassing  hostility  to  the  British ; 
and  in  the  end  he  saved  Cuddalore  by  readiness  and  dexterity 
despite  the  now  superior  numbers  of  the  British  fleet.  He 
was  a  great  sea-captain,  Hughes  was  not ;  and  with  poorer 
instruments,  both  in  men  and  ships,  the  former  overcame 
the  latter. 

On  the  29th  of  June  a  British  frigate,  the  Medea,  bearing 
a  flag  of  truce,  reached  Cuddalore.  She  brought  well- 
authenticated  intelligence  of  the  conclusion  of  peace;  and 
hostilities  ceased  by  common  consent. 


GLOSSARY 

OF 
NAUTICAL  AND  NAVAL   TERMS   USED   IN   THE   TEXT 


(This  glossary  is  intended  to  cover  only  the  technical  expressions  actually 
used  in  the  book  itself.) 


Aback.     A  sail  is  aback  when  the  wind  blows  on  the  forward  part 

tending  to  move  the  vessel  astern. 

Abaft.     Behind,  towards  the  stern. 

Abeam.      ,0      ^^  t->       •       » 
See     Bearing. 


Abreast. 
Aft.     See  "  Bearing." 
Ahead.     See  "  Bearing." 
Astern.     See  "  Bearing." 

Beam.     The  width  of  a  vessel,  so  used  because  of  the  cross  timbers, 

called  beams. 
Bear,  to.     To  be  in  a  specified  direction  from  a  vessel. 
Bear,  to.     To  change  the  direction  of  a  vessel's  movement. 

To  bear  down,  to  move  towards ;   to  bear  up,  or  away,  to  move 

away,  from  the  wind  or  from  an  enemy. 
Bearing.     The  direction  of  an  object  from  a  vessel;    either  by 

compass,  or  with  reference  to  the  vessel  itself.     Thus,  the 

lighthouse  bears  north ;    the  enemy  bears  abeam,  or  two 

points  off  the  port  bow. 
Bearing,  Line  of.     The    compass   bearing    on   which    the    vessels 

of  a   fleet   are  ranged,   whatever   their  bearings  from   one 

another. 
Bearings,  with  reference  to  the  vessel. 

. ,         '    \  Perpendicular  to  the  vessel's  length. 

Astern.    }  Directly  behind. 

Ahead.     Directly  before  ;    forward. 

Abaft  the  beam,  starboard  or  port,  weather  or  lee.  To  the 
rear  of  abeam,  to  the  right  or  left,  to  windward  or  to  lee- 
ward. 

257 


258  GLOSSARY 

Before  (or  forward  of)  the  beam  (as  above).     Ahead  of  abeam, 

etc. 
Broad.     A  large  angle  of  bearing,  used  ordinarily  of  the  bow. 

"Broad  off  the  bow  "  approaches  "  before  the  beam." 
On  the  bow,  starboard  or  port,  weather  or  lee.     To  one  side  of 

ahead,  to  right  or  left,  to  windward  or  to  leeward. 
On  the  quarter,  starboard  or  port,  weather  or  lee.     To  one  side 
of  astern ;   to  right  or  left,  to  windward  or  to  leeward. 

Bearings,  by  compass.  The  full  circle  of  the  compass,  360 
degrees,  is  divided  into  thirty-two  joints,  each  point  being 
subdivided  into  fourths.  From  north  to  east,  eight  points, 
are  thus  named  :  North  ;  north  by  east ;  north-northeast ; 
northeast  by  north  ;  northeast ;  northeast  by  east ;  east- 
northeast  ;  east  by  north  ;  East. 
From  East  to  South,  from  South  to  West,  and  from  West  to 
North,  a  like  naming  is  used. 

Beat,  to.  To  gain  ground  to  windward,  by  successive  changes 
of  direction,  called  tacks. 

Boom.     See  "  Spars." 

Bow,  or  head.     The  forward  part  of  a  vessel,  which  is  foremost 
when  in  motion  ahead. 
On  the  Bow.    See  "  Bearing."     To  head  "bows-on"  :    to  move 
directly  towards. 

Bow  AND  Quarter  Line.     See  pp.  84,  200. 

Bowsprit.     See  "  Spars." 

Braces.  Ropes  by  which  the  yards  are  turned,  so  that  the  wind 
may  strike  the  sails  in  the  manner  desired. 

Bring-to.  To  bring  a  vessel's  head  as  near  as  possible  to  the 
direction  from  which  the  wind  blows ;  usually  with  a  view 
to  heaving-to,  that  is,  stopping.     See  heave-to  and  luff. 

Broadside.  The  whole  number  of  guns  carried  on  one  side  of  a 
vessel;  starboard  or  port  broadside,  weather  or  lee  broad- 
side. 

Cable.  The  heavy  rope  which  was  attached  to  the  anchor,  and 
held  the  ship  to  it.  Cables  are  now  chains,  but  in  the  period 
of  this  book  were  always  hemp.  To  veer  cable,  to  let  more 
out,  to  let  the  ship  go  farther  from  the  anchor.  To  slip 
the  cable,  to  let  it  all  go  overboard,  releasing  the  vessel. 
Cable's  length  :    120  fathoms. 

Chase,  General.  A  chase  by  a  fleet,  in  which,  in  order  to  more 
rapid  advance,  the  places  of  the  vessels  in  their  usual  order 
are  not  to  be  observed. 

Close-hauled.     See  "  Course." 

Column.     See  "  Line  Ahead." 

Come  up.  A  ship  comes  up,  when  her  bow  comes  more  nearly 
to  the  direction  of  the  wind.  Used  generally  when  the  move- 
ment proceeds  from  some  other  cause  than  the  movement 
of  the  helm.     See  "  Luff." 


GLOSSARY  259 

Convoy.     A  body  of  unarmed  or  weakly  armed  vessels,  in  com- 
pany with  ships  of  war. 
Convoy,  to.     To  accompany  a  number  of  unarmed  vessels,  for 

their  protection. 
Course.     The  direction  of  a  vessel's  movement,  with  regard  to  the 
compass  or  to  the  wind. 
Compass  course.    The  point  of  the  compass  towards  which  the 

vessel  heads. 
Wind  courses  : 

Close-hauled.    As  nearly  in  the  direction  from  which  the  wind 
blows  as  is  compatible  with  keeping  the  sails  full ;  for  square- 
rigged  vessels  six  points.      (See  "  Bearings  by  Compass.") 
For  a  north  wind,  the  close-hauled  courses  are  east-northeast 
and  west-northwest. 
Free.     Not  close-hauled. 
Large.     Very  free. 
Off  the  wind.     Free. 
On  (or  by)  the  wind.     Close-hauled. 
Courses.     The  lowest  sails  on  the  fore  and  main  masts. 
Cruise,  to.     To  cover  a  certain  portion  of  sea  by  movement  back 

and  forth  over  it. 
Cruiser.     A  general  term  for  armed  ships,  but  applied  more  speci- 
fically to  those  not  "of  the  line,"  which  therefore  are  more 
free  and  wider  in  their  movements. 
Current. 

Lee  Current.     One  the  movement  of  which  is  away  from  the 

wind. 
Weather  Current.     One  which  sets  towards  the  wind. 

Ebb,  ebb-tide.     See  "  Tide." 

Fair,  wind.     A  wind  which  allows  a  vessel  to  head  her  desired 

compass  course. 
Fall  off.     A  vessel  falls  off,  when,  without  the  action  of  the  helm, 

her  head  moves  away  from  the  wind.     See  "  Come  up." 
Fill.  ]  Sails  are  said  to  fill,  or  to  be  full,  when  the  wind  strikes  the 
Full.  J  rear  side,  tending  to  move  the  vessel  ahead. 

Flood,  flood  tide.     See  "  Tide." 
Fore  and  Aft,     In  classification  of  vessels,  indicates  those  whose 

sails,   when   set,    stretch   from   forward   aft ;     more   nearly 

lengthwise  than  across.     Opposite  to  square-rigged. 
Foremast,  fore-topmast,  etc.     See  "  Spars." 
Foresail,  fore-topsail,  etc.     See  "  Sails." 
Foul,  to.     To  entangle,  to  collide.     A  foul  anchor,  when  the  cable 

gets  round  the  anchor. 
Foul,  wind.     A  wind  which  prevents  the  vessel  heading  the  desired 

compass  course,  compelling  her  to  beat. 
Free,  wind.     A  wind  which  allows  the  vessel  to  head  the  course 


260  GLOSSARY 

desired.     The  amount  to  spare  from  the  close-hauled  course 
is  sometimes  designated.     E.g.,  the  wind  four  points  free; 
the  wind  would  allow  the  vessel  to  come  four  points  nearer 
the  wind  than  her  course  requires. 
Frigate.     See  "  Vessel." 

Gage,  weather  and  lee.  A  vessel,  or  fleet,  is  said  to  have  the 
weather  gage,  when  it  is  to  windward  of  its  opponent.  Lee 
is  opposite  to  weather. 

Haul,  to.     To  haul  (to)  the  wind  is  to  change  the  course  to  that 

nearest  the  direction  whence  the  wind  comes. 
To  haul  down  the  colors  :  to  strike,  to  surrender. 
Heave  down.     To  incline  a  vessel  on  one  side,  by  purchases  at  the 

lower  mastheads. 
Heave-to.     To  bring-to,  (which  see),  and  then  to  lay  some  sails 
(HovE-TO.)  aback,  in  order  to  keep  the  ship  without  move- 

ment ahead  or  astern. 
Heel,  to.     To  incline  a  vessel  on  one  side  by  shifting  the  weights 

on  board,  such  as  guns.     "On  the  heel "  :   to  be  thus  inclined. 
Helm.     The  tiller,  or  bar,  which  Kke  a  handle  turns  the  rudder, 

and  thus  changes  the  course  of  the  vessel. 
Port  the  helm.     To  put  the  tiller  to  port,  which  turns  the  vessel's 

head  to  the  right ;   to  starboard  the  helm  is  the  reverse. 
Helm  down.     Tiller  to  leeward,  vessel's  head  to  windward  ;  helm 

up,  the  reverse.     See  "  Rudder." 
Hull.     The  body  of  a  vessel,  as  distinguished  from  the  spars,  or 

engines. 
Hull,  to.     A  cannon  ball  striking  the  hull  of  a  vessel  is  said  to  hull 
(Hulled.)  her. 

Jib.     See  "Sails." 
JiB-BOOM.     See  "Spars." 

Keep,  to.  To  keep  off,  or  away,  is  to  change  course  away  from 
the  wind  or  from  an  enemy.     See  "To  bear  up." 

Large.     See  "  Course." 

Lee.     The  direction  toward  which  the  wind  blows.     "Under  the 

lee  of,"  protected  from  wind  and  sea  by  land,  or  by  a  vessel, 

interposed. 
Lee  Tide.     See  "Tide." 
Leech.     The  vertical  side  of  a  square  sail.     The  upper  and  lower 

sides,  horizontal,  are  called  head  and  foot. 
Leeward    (pronounced  looard).      Direction   of  movement,    or  of 

bearing,  opposite  to  the  wind. 
Lie-to,   to.     To  bring  the  vessels  head   on,   or    near,   the  wind, 

and   remain   nearly   stopped.     Usually   in   heavy   weather, 

but  not  always. 


GLOSSARY  261 

Line  Abreast.     See  p.  122. 

Line  Ahead.     See  p.  85. 

Line  of  Battle.  In  the  line  of  battle  the  vessels  are  ranged  on 
the  same  straight  line,  steering  the  same  course,  one  behind  the 
others,  so  that  all  the  broadsides  are  clear  to  bear  upon  an 
enemy.  The  line  preferred  is  one  of  the  close-hauled  lines, 
because  on  them  the  movement  of  a  vessel  in  the  line  is 
more  easily  regulated  by  backing,  or  shaking,  some  of  the 
sails. 

Line  of  Bearing.     See  "  Bearing,  line  of." 

Line,  Ship  of  the.  A  vessel  fitted  by  its  force  for  the  line  of  battle. 
Opposite  generically  to  "  cruiser."  The  modern  term  is 
"  battleship." 

Luff,  to.  The  movement  of  changing  the  course  to  nearer  the 
direction  whence  the  wind  comes,  by  using  the  helm. 

Mi'^z'^en  1  ^®®  "  ^P^""^  "  ^^^  "Sails." 

Mast.     See  "Spars."     "To  the  mast."   A  sail  is  said  to  be  so  when 

aback. 
Monsoon.     A  trade  wind,  in  the  China  and   Indian  seas,  which 

blows  uniformly  from  the  northeast   in  winter,  and  from 

southwest  in  summer. 

Neap.     See  "Tide." 

Off  —  the  wind.     See  "Course." 
On  —  the  wind.     See  "Course." 

Pennant.  A  flag,  indicating  either  the  rank  of  the  senior  ofi&cer 
on  board,  or  a  signal  applicable  to  a  particular  vessel. 

Point.     See  "Bearings,  by  Compass." 

Port.  To  the  left  hand,  or  on  the  left  side,  of  a  vessel,  looking 
from  aft  forward.     Opposite  to  Starboard. 

Port,  to.  Apphed  to  steering.  To  move  the  tiller,  or  helm,  to 
the  left,  which  moves  the  rudder  to  the  right  and  causes  the 
vessel  to  change  course  towards  the  right  hand. 

Quarter.  Either  side  of  the  after  part  of  a  vessel ;  —  as  starboard 
quarter,  port  quarter  ;  weather  quarter,  lee  quarter.  Quar- 
ter deck :  one  side  of  the  after  upper  deck,  reserved  for  the 
officer  exercising  command,  and  for  ceremonial  purposes. 

Quarters.  A  crew  is  at  quarters  when  at  the  stations  for 
battle. 

Rake,  to.  To  fire  the  broadside  from  ahead  or  astern  of  an  an- 
tagonist, so  that  the  shot  may  sweep  the  length  of  the  vessel, 
which  at  the  period  of  this  book  was  about  four  times  the 
width. 


262  '        GLOSSARY 

Random  Shot.     The  extreme  range  to  which  a  gun  could  send 

its  shot,  giving  very  uncertain  results. 
Reef,  to.     To  reduce  the  surface  of  a  sail. 
Rudder.     A  solid  framework,  pivoted  at  the  stern  of  a  vessel, 

which  being  turned  to  one  side  deflects  her  course.     See 

"  Helm  "  and  "  Wheel." 

Sails.  Sails  are  of  two  kinds :  square,  and  fore  and  aft.  Square 
sails  spread  more  across  the  vessel,  in  the  direction  of  her 
width.  Fore  and  aft  sails  more  in  the  direction  of  the 
length.  Square  sails  are  better  for  a  free  wind;  and  also 
for  large  vessels,  because  they  can  be  more  readily  subdivided. 
Fore  and  aft  sails  trim  nearer  to  the  wind,  and  so  are  con- 
venient for  coasters,  which  generally  are  smaller. 
Vessels  carrying  square  sails  are  called  square-rigged.  They 
have  always  two  masts,  usually  three ;  each  carrying  three 
or  four  sails,  one  above  the  other.  These  are  named  from 
the  mast  on  which  they  are  carried  (see  "  Spars") ;  e.g.,  main 
sail,  fore  topsail,  mizzen  topgallant-sail ;  and  also  from  their 
positions  on  the  same  mast.  Thus,  from  lowest  up,  main 
sail,  main  topsail,  m.ain  topgallantsail ;  and  main  royal,  if 
there  be  a  fourth.  The  fore  and  main  sails  are  called  also 
courses. 
The  topsails  were  the  chief  battle  sails,  because  the  largest, 
except  the  courses,  and  more  manageable  than  the  courses. 
All  square-rigged  vessels  carry  fore  and  aft  sails,  three  cornered, 
stretched  between  the  bowsprit  and  jib-booms,  and  the 
fore  topmast.  These  sails  are  called  jibs. 
Fore  and  aft  vessels  also  carry  jibs ;  but  on  each  upright  mast 
they  have  one  great  sail,  the  size  of  which  makes  it  less  easily 
handled  in  an  emergency,  therefore  less  fit  for  fighting. 
Above  the  big  sail  they  have  a  small,  light,  three-cornered 
topsail,  but  this  is  merely  a  fair  weather  sail,  useless  in 
battle. 
Vessels  of  war  were  almost  all  square-rigged,  with  three  masts. 

Sails,  Studding.  Light  square  sails,  for  moderate  weather,  ex- 
tended beyond  the  other  square  sails,  to  increase  the  normal 
spread  of  canvas.  Set  only  with  a  free  wind,  and  never  in 
battle. 

Scantling.  The  size,  and  consequent  weight  and  strength,  of 
the  timbers  of  a  vessel's  hull. 

Schooner.     See  "  Vessel." 

Shake,  to.  So  to  place  a  sail  that  the  wind  blows  along  it,  neither 
filling  nor  backing.  The  sail  is  thus  neutralized  without 
taking  in. 

Sharp-up.  A  yard  is  sharp-up,  when  turned  by  the  braces  as  far 
as  the  rigging  of  the  mast  will  allow.  A  close-hauled  course 
requires  the  yards  to  be  sharp-up,  in  order  that  the  sails 
may  be  full. 


GLOSSARY  263 

Ship.     See  "  Vessel." 

Slip.     See  "  Cable." 

Sloop.     See  "Vessel." 

Spars.     A  spar  is  a  long   piece    of   timber,  cylindrical,  tapering, 
in  masts,    towards   one   end,   and  in  yards   towards   both. 
Spars  serve  for  spreading  the  several  sails  of  a  vessel. 
The  names  of  spars  vary  with  their  use  and  position.     Chiefly, 

for  ships  of  war,  they  divide  into  masts,  yards,  and  booms. 
A  mast  is  an  upright,  and  is  in  three   connected  pieces :    the 
lower  mast,  the  topmast,  and  the  top-gallant-mast.     Most 
ships  of  war  had    three  such    masts :    fore,  near  the  bow ; 
main,  near  the  centre ;   mizzen,  near  the  stern. 
The  bowsprit  is  also  a  mast ;  not  upright,  but  projecting  straight 
ahead  from  the  bow,  approaching  horizontal,  but  inclining 
upwards.     Like  the  masts,  it  has  three  divisions  :   the  lower, 
or  bowsprit  proper,  the  jib-boom,  and  the  flying-jib-boom. 
Across  the  masts,  horizontal,  are  the    yards,  four  in  number, 
lower,    topsail,    topgallant,    and   royal.      Yards   are   further 
designated   by   the   name  of   the    mast   to  which   each   be- 
longs;    e.g.,   foreyard,    main    topsail  yard,    mizzen    topgal- 
lant yard,  main  royal  yard. 
The  bowsprit  formerly  had  one  yard,  called  the  spritsail  yard. 
This  has  disappeared.     Otherwise  it  serves  to  spread  the  three- 
cornered  sails  called  jibs.     These  sails  were  useful  for  turn- 
ing a  vessel,  because  their  projection  before  the  centre  gave 
them  great  leverage. 
Fore  and  aft  vessels  had  no  yards.     See  "  Sails." 

Spring.     See  p.  65,  note. 

Square-rigged.     See  "Sails"  and  "Spars." 

Stand,  to.  Used,  nautically,  to  express  movement  and  direction, 
e.g.,  "to  stand  toward  the  enemy,"  "to  stand  out  of  har- 
bor," "to  stand  down,"  "to  stand  south."  The  under- 
lying idea  seems  to  be  that  of  sustained,  decided  move- 
ment. 

Starboard.  To  the  right  hand,  or  on  the  right  side,  of  a  vessel, 
looking  from  aft  forward.     Opposite  to  Port. 

Steer,  to.  To  control  the  course  by  the  use  of  the  helm  and 
rudder. 

Stern.     The  extreme  rear,  or  after,  part  of  a  vessel. 

Strategy.  That  department  of  the  Art  of  War  which  decides 
the  distribution  and  movements  of  armies,  or  of  fleets, 
with  reference  to  the  objects  of  a  campaign  as  a  whole. 

Strike,  to.  Applied  to  the  flag.  To  haul  down  the  flag  in  token  of 
surrender. 

Tack.  A  vessel  is  on  the  starboard  tack,  or  port  tack,  according 
as  the  wind  comes  from  the  starboard  or  port  hand.  See 
p.  84,  note. 

Tack,  to.     When  a  vessel  is  close-hauled,  with  the  wind  on  one 


264  GLOSSARY 

side,  to  tack  is  to  turn  round  towards  the  wind,  in  order  to 
be  again  close-hauled,  with  the  wind  on  the  other  side. 

To  wear  is  to  attain  the  same  object  by  turning  away  from  the 
wind.  Wearing  is  surer  than  tacking,  but  loses  ground  to 
leeward. 

To  tack,  or  wear,  in  succession,  the  leading  vessel  tacks,  and  those 
which  follow  tack,  each,  as  it  arrives  at  the  same  point ;  the 
order  thus  remaining  the  same.  To  tack,  or  wear  together, 
all  tack  at  the  same  moment,  which  reverses  the  order. 
Tactics.  That  department  of  the  Art  of  War  which  decides  the 
disposition  and  movements  of  an  army,  or  of  a  fleet,  on  a 
particular  field  of  battle,  in  presence  of  an  enemy. 
Tidal  Currents. 

Ebb  tide,  the  outflow  of  the  water  due  to  the  tides. 

Flood  tide,  the  inflow  of  the  water  due  to  the  tides. 

Lee  tide,  the  set  of  the  current  to  leeward. 

Weather  tide,  the  set  of  the  current  to  windward. 
Tide.     The  rise  and  fall  of  the  water  of  the  oceans  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  moon.     Used  customarily,  but  inaccurately,  to 
express  the  currents  produced  by  the  changes  of  level. 

High  tide,  or  high  water,  the  two  highest  levels  of  the  day. 

Low  tide,  or  low  water,  the  two  lowest. 

Neap  tide  :  the  least  rise  and  fall  during  the  lunar  month. 

Spring  tide :    the  greatest  rise  and  fall  during  the  same,  being 
soon  after  full  and  change  of  moon. 
Trade,  the.     A  term  applied  to  a  body  of  merchant  vessels,  to  or 

from  a  particular  destination. 
Trade  Wind.     A  wind  which  blows  uniformly  from  the  same  gen- 
eral   direction    throughout    a    fixed    period.     In    the    West 
Indies,  from  the  northeast  the  year  round.     See  also  "  Mon- 
soon." 

Veer.     See  "Cable." 

Vessel.     A  general  term  for  all  constructions  intended  to  float 

upon   and   move   through   the   water.     Specific   definitions 

applicable  to  this  book : 
Ship,  a  square-rigged  vessel  with  three  masts. 
Brig,  a  square-rigged  vessel  with  two  masts. 
Schooner,  a  fore  and  aft  rigged  vessel  with  two  or  more  masts. 
Sloop,  a  fore  and  aft  rigged  vessel  with  one  mast.     See  pp.  9, 

15,  17. 
Vessels  of  War.     Ship  of  the  Line.     A  ship  with  three  or  more 

tiers  of  guns,  of  which  two  are  on  covered  decks;    that  is, 

have  a  deck  above  them.  See  "Line  of  Battle  Ship." 
Frigate.  A  ship  with  one  tier  of  guns  on  a  covered  deck. 
Sloop  of  War.     A  ship,  the  guns  of  which  are  not  covered,  being 

on  the  upper  (spar)  deck. 
Sloops  of  war  were  sometimes  brigs,  but  then  were  usually  so 

styled. 


GLOSSARY  265 

Wake.     The  track  left  by  a  vessel's  passage  through  the  water. 

"In  the  wake  of  "  :   directly  astern  of. 
Way.     Movement  through  the  water.     "To   get    underway":  to 

pass  from  stand-still  to  movement. 
Wear,  to.     See  under  "Tack." 
Weather.     Relative    position    to    windward    of    another    object. 

Opposite  to  Lee.     Weather  side,  lee  side,  of  a  vessel ;  weather 

fleet,    lee   fleet;     weather    gage,    lee    gage    (see    "Gage"); 

weather  shore,  lee  shore. 
Weather,  to.     To  pass  to  windward  of  a  vessel,  or  of  any  other 

object. 
Weatherly.     The  quality  of  a  vessel  which  favors  her  getting, 

or  keeping,  to  windward. 
Weigh,  to.     To  raise  the  anchor  from  the  bottom.     Used  alone; 

e.g.,  "the  fleet  weighed." 
Wheel.     So  called  from  its  form.     The  mechanical  appliance,  a 

wheel,  with  several  handles  for  turning  it,  by  which  power 

is  increased,  and  also  transmitted  from  the  steersman  on 

deck  to  the  tiller  below,  in  order  to  steer  the  vessel. 
Wind  and  Water,  between.     That  part  of  a  vessel's  side  which 

comes  out  of  water  when  she  inclines  to  a  strong  side  wind, 

but  otherwise  is  under  water. 
Windward.     Direction  from  which  the  wind  blows. 

Yard.     See  "Spars." 


INDEX 


Algeciras,  in  Gibraltar  Bay,  station 
of  Franco-Spanish  Fleet  sup- 
porting the  Siege  of  Gibraltar, 
121,  230,  231. 

Arbuthnot,  Marriott,  British  Ad- 
miral, commands  North 
American  Station,  1779,  113, 
148 ;  anger  at  Rodney's  in- 
trusion on  his  command,  150 ; 
supports  the  attack  on 
Charleston,  1780,  151 ;  sta- 
tion in  Gardiner's  Bay,  151, 
170 ;  action  with  French 
squadron  under  des  Touches, 
1781,  171 ;  regains  command 
of  Chesapeake  Bay,  174 ; 
superseded,     1781,     176. 

Arethusa,  British  frigate.  En- 
counter with  French  frigate 
Belle  Poule  marks  beginning 
of  War  of  1778  with  France, 
62,  82. 

Armed  Neutrality,  The,  of  1780, 
3,  158. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  American  Gen- 
eral. Effects  following  his 
action  on  Lake  Champlain 
in  1776,  3,  4,  7,  25;  with 
Ethan  Allen,  seizes  Ticon- 
deroga  and  Crown  Point, 
1775,  8  ;  captures  or  destroys 
all  hostile  shipping  on  Lake 
Champlain,  9 ;  traverses 
Maine  forests,  and  joins  Mont- 
gomery before  Quebec,  10 ; 
maintains  blockade  of  Quebec 
till  arrival  of  a  British  squad- 
ron, 10 ;  retreats  to  Crown 
Point,  and  destitution  of  his 
troops,  11 ;  schemes  for  main- 
taining command  of  Lake 
Champlain,  12;  his  force, 
and  its  character,  14,  15,  17; 
compelled  by  shore  batteries 
to    abandon    lower    Narrows  i 


of  the  Lake,  15 ;  selects 
Valcour  Island  as  position 
for  defence,  15 ;  decision  to 
risk  destruction  of  force  ra- 
ther than  retire,  18,  19  ;  sound 
strategic  and  tactical  ideas, 
20  ;  Battle  of  Valcour  Island, 
21 ;  successful  withdrawal 
after  defeat,  23 ;  overtaken 
and  flotilla  destroyed,  25 ; 
effect  of  his  resistance  in 
delaying  British  advance,  25 ; 
conduct,  courage,  and  heroism 
throughout,  27 ;  his  subsequent 
treason,  18,  27, 152  ;  commands 
British  detachment  in  Vir- 
ginia, 153,  169,  170,  174. 
Asiatic  Immigration,  Danger  in- 
volved in,  4. 

Barbados,  West  India  Island,  head- 
quarters of  British  Leeward 
Islands  Station,  99 ;  advan- 
tage of  Santa  Lucia  over,  104, 
144,  207  ;  notably  for  crippled 
ships,  144 ;  devastated  by 
hurricane,  1780,  159. 

Barrington,  Samuel,  British  Admiral, 
commands  Leeward  Islands 
Station,  99  ;  capture  of  Santa 
Lucia  by,  100-102 ;  success- 
fully resists  d'Estaing's  effort 
to  recapture,  103,  104  ;  super- 
seded in  chief  command  by 
Byron,  105  ;  share  in  Byron's 
action  with  d'Estaing,  107, 
109 ;  goes  home  wounded, 
112;  refuses  command-in- 
chief  of  the  Channel  Fleet, 
1780,  157;  serves  in  it  under 
Howe,  227  ;  captures  a  French 
convoy  for  East  Indies,   227. 

Basse  Terre,  St.  Kitts,  Operations 
around,  1782,  196-205;  char- 
acter of  anchorage  at,  199. 


267 


268 


INDEX 


Battle,  Order  of,  defined,  93  (note), 

200  (note). 
Battles,  Naval,  Valcour  Island,  Octo- 
ber 11,  1776,  19-23. 
Charleston    Harbor,     June    28, 

1776,  33. 
D'Estaing    and    Howe,    August 

10  and  11,  1778,  73-75. 
Ushant,  July  27,   1778,  84-91. 
Barrington       and        d'Estaing, 

Santa    Lucia,    December    15, 

1778,  102-104. 
Byron  and  d'Estaing,  Grenada, 

July  6,   1779,   105-112. 
De  Langara  and  Rodney,  Cape 

St.  Vincent,  January  16,  1780, 

123. 
De    Guichen    and    Rodney,  off 

Martinique,    April    17,    1780, 

131-135. 
De  Guichen  and  Rodney,  May 

15,  1780,  143,  144. 
De  Guichen    and    Rodney,  May 

19,  1780,  144. 

Cornwallis  and  La  Motte-Pic- 
quet,    off    Haiti,    March    20, 

1780,  153. 

Cornwallis  and  de  Ternay,  June 

20,  1780,  155-157. 

De  Grasse  and  Hood,  off  Mar- 
tinique, April  29,  1781,  163- 
167. 

Arbuthnot  and  des  Touches,  off 
Cape  Henry,  March  16,  1781, 
171-173. 

De  Grasse  and  Graves,  off  Cape 
Henry,  September  5,  1781, 
179-183. 

The   Doggers  Bank,   August  5, 

1781,  189-193. 

De  Grasse  and  Hood,  St.  Kitts, 
January  25  and  26,  1782,  199- 
204. 

De  Grasse  and  Rodney,  near 
Dominica,    April    9    and    12, 

1782,  207-221. 

Howe  with  Franco-Spanish  Fleet 
near  Gibraltar,  October  20, 
1782,  231,  232. 

Johnstone  and  Suffren,  Porto 
Praya,  Cape  Verde  Islands, 
April   16,   1781,   236-238. 

Hughes  and  Suffren,  Coro- 
mandel  Coast,  February  17, 
1781,  240-242. 


Hughes  and  Suffren,  off  Ceylon, 

April   12,    1782,   242-244. 

Hughes  and  Suffren,  off  Nega- 

patam,  July  6,  1782,  244-246. 

Hughes   and   Suffren,    off   Trin- 

comalee,    September   3,    1782, 

247-251. 

Hughes   and    Suffren,    off   Cud- 

dalore,    June    20,    1783,    253. 

N.B.     Naval  Battles  end  here. 

Belle  Poule,  French  Frigate.  En- 
counter with  British  Arethusa 
marks  beginning  of  War  of 
1778  with  Great  Britain,  61, 
82. 

Blane,  Sir  Gilbert,  Physician  to 
British  Fleet  under  Rodney, 
quoted,  124,  219,  220,  221. 

Burgoyne,  Sir  John,  British  Gen- 
eral, 3,  6,  14,  23,  27,  28,  50-53, 
55 ;  decisive  effect  of  Ameri- 
can control  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  in  1776,  upon  his  ex- 
pedition, in  1777,  3,  9,  13, 
14,  25 ;  his  surrender  at 
Saratoga,  53 ;  it  determines 
France  to  intervene,  6,  58. 

Byng,  John,  British  Admiral,  in- 
fluence of  his  execution,  in 
1756,  upon  the  minds  of 
naval  officers,  93,  139,  146. 

Byron,  John,  British  Admiral,  or- 
dered to  North  American 
Station,  1778,  59;  delayed 
by  heavy  weather,  and  puts 
into  Halifax,  62 ;  Howe  sup- 
erseded by,  80  ;  goes  to  West 
Indies,  105 ;  action  with 
D'Estaing  off  Grenada,  105- 
111 ;  comments  upon  course 
of,  110-112;  returns  to  Eng- 
land, 112. 

Canada,  Strength  of,  against  attack 
from  southward,  7 ;  its  ad- 
vantage in  this  respect  over 
New  York,  8 ;  comprehen- 
sion of  these  facts  by  Ameri- 
cans of  1775,  from  the  old 
French  Wars,  8 ;  attempt  to 
utilize,  by  British,  frustrated 
by  Arnold's  promptitude,  9 ; 
invasion  of,  under  Mont- 
gomery, ordered  by  American 
Congress,    1775,  9;    failure  of 


INDEX 


269 


the  attempt,  decided  by  Brit- 
ish Navy,  10-12;  British 
advance  from,  under  Carle- 
ton,  1776,  15-26;  Burgoyne's 
advance  from,    1777,   51-53. 

Cap  Frangois  (now  Cap  Haitien), 
French  naval  station  on  north 
side  of  Haiti,  147-149, 153, 154, 
168,   176,   178,  206,  223,  225. 

Carkett,  Robert,  British  Naval  Cap- 
tain, misunderstanding  of 
Rodney's  orders  by,  causes 
failure  of  British  attack  of 
April  17,  1780,  133  ;  Rodney's 
censure  of,  137-139. 

Carleton,  Sir  Guy,  Governor  and 
Commander-in-Chief,  in  Can- 
ada, 1775-6,  9  ;  besieged  and 
blockaded  in  Quebec  by 
Americans,  10-12 ;  relieved 
by  British  Navy,  11;  takes 
the  offensive,  17;  delayed 
decisively  by  Arnold's  prep- 
arations on  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  13,  18;  battle  of  Val- 
cour  Island,  20-23 ;  success- 
fully eluded  by  Arnold,  23 ; 
honored  by  Government  for 
the  campaign,  26. 

Carolinas,  North  and  South,  sup- 
posed British  sympathies  in, 
31,  exaggerated,  175;  ex- 
pedition against  Charleston, 
and  battle  of  Charleston  Har- 
bor, 1776,  31-38;  opera- 
tions against,  and  against 
Georgia,  renewed,  1779,  113- 
115,  and  1780,  151-153;  dis- 
astrous consequences  to  Brit- 
ish operations,  114,  152,  174- 
176. 

Champlain,  Lake,  Decisive  effect  of 
naval  operations  upon,  3, 
4,  7,  13,  14,  25,  26 ;  strategic 
importance  of,  7  ;  naval  cam- 
paign upon,  1775-1776,  chap- 
ter i ;  remains  in  naval  con- 
trol of  British  throughout 
the  war,  28. 

Charleston,  South  Carolina,  attack 
upon  by  British  squadron, 
1776,  32-37 ;  siege  and  cap- 
ture of,  by  the  British,  1780, 
114,  151. 

Chesapeake    Bay,    naval    command 


of,  by  French,  1781,  accom- 
plishes independence  of  United 
States,  4,  114,  184;  Sir 
William  Howe  moves  by  way 
of,  against  Philadelphia,  1777, 
52 ;  operations  in  and  near, 
1781,  169-174,  177-185;  Brit- 
ish control  of,  in  1781,  prior 
to  arrival  of  de  Grasse,  174 ; 
de  Grasse  reaches,   1781,  178. 

Clinton,  Sir  Henry,  British  General, 
commands  land  force  em- 
ployed in  Carolinas,  1776,  31, 
32  ;  in  seizure  of  Narragansett 
Bay,  48 ;  left  in  command  at 
New  York  by  Howe,  1777, 
52 ;  advance  up  the  Hudson 
River,  1777,  55;  relieves 
Howe  as  Commander-in-Chief 
in  North  America,  56,  63 ; 
evacuates  Philadelphia,  and 
retreats  upon  New  York, 
1778,  63 ;  narrowness  of  his 
escape,  63,  64 ;  evacuates 
Narragansett  Bay,  1779,  115; 
operations  of,  in  South  Caro- 
lina, and  capture  of  Charles- 
ton, 151 ;  leaves  Cornwallis  in 
command  in  Carolina,  and  re- 
turns to  New  York,  152  ;  sends 
detachments  to  Virginia,  for 
diversion  in  favor  of  Corn- 
wallis, 1781,  153,  169;  seri- 
ous difference  of  opinion  be- 
tween, and  Cornwallis,  115, 
175 ;  orders  of,  to  Corn- 
wallis, which  result  in  posi- 
tion at  Yorktown,   1781,  175. 

Commerce,  effects  upon,  through 
inadequate  naval  preparation, 
59-61,  117,  126,  158;  table 
of  losses  of  British,  61  (note). 

Convoys,  effect  of,  upon  naval 
action,  strategic  or  tactical, 
105,  106,  109,  122,  126,  130, 
148,  155-157,  158,  166,  176, 
188,  189,  193,  199,  206-209, 
227-229,  229-231,  235,  236- 
238,  240,  246. 

Cornwallis,  Charles,  Earl,  British 
General,  accompanies  expedi- 
tion against  Charleston,  1776, 
31 ;  hurried  to  Trenton,  after 
Washington's  victory  there, 
49  ;    professional  quarrel  with 


270 


INDEX 


Sir  H.  Clinton,  115,  175;  at 
siege  and  capture  of  Charles- 
ton, 152 ;  left  in  command 
of  southern  department,  1780, 
152 ;  defeats  Gates  at  Cam- 
den, 1780,  152;  pushes  on 
to  North  Carolina,  152 ;  em- 
barrassments there,  152 ;  en- 
ters Virginia,  and  joins  Arnold 
at  Petersburg,  1781,  153,  174; 
ordered  by  Clinton  to  occupy 
a  defensive  position  which 
should  cover  anchorage  for  a 
fleet,  175 ;  evacuates  Ports- 
mouth, and  takes  position 
at  Yorktown,  175 ;  French 
cruisers  bar  his  retreat  towards 
the  Carolinas,  and  occupy 
York  River,  179 ;  enclosed 
by  French  fleet  and  French 
and  American  armies,  184; 
compelled  to  surrender, 
185. 

Cornwallis,  Sir  William  (brother  of 
Lord),  British  naval  captain, 
share  in  action  between  Byron 
and  d'Estaing,  1779,  108- 
110,  153;  in  command  of  a 
squadron,  action  with  La 
Motte-Picquet,  1780,  153  ;  ac- 
tion with  de  Ternay's  squad- 
ron, 155-157 ;  characteris- 
tics, and  nickname  of,  157 ; 
distinguished  part  in  Hood's 
action  with  de  Grasse,  1782, 
201 ;  share  in  Rodney's  vic- 
tory, 217;  quoted,  156,  198, 
200,  203,  211. 

Crown  Point,  military  post  on  Lake 
Champlain,  8 ;  seized  by 
Benedict  Arnold  and  Ethan 
Allen,  1775,  8 ;  General  Mont- 
gomery embarks  at,  to  in- 
vade Canada,  1775,  9 ;  Ar- 
nold retreats  to,  in  1776,  after 
reverses  in  Canada,  12  ;  part 
in  campaign  of  1776,  24 ;  re- 
covered by  British,  25 ;  re- 
occupied  by  Americans  after 
Burgoyne's    surrender,     28. 

Cuddalore,  British  post  in  India, 
on  Coromandel  Coast,  be- 
sieged by  Hyder  Ali  and 
Suffren,  242  ;  taken  by  Hyder 
Ali,  244 ;    British  attempt  to 


retake,  252;  relieved  by  Suf- 
fren, 252-254. 

Darby,  George,  British  Admiral, 
commands      Channel      Fleet, 

1780,  157 ;  relief  of  Gibraltar 
by,  1781,  186-188;  blocked 
in  Torbay  by  Franco-Span- 
ish fleet,  1781,  188-189. 

Delaware,  Naval  Operations  in  the, 
1777,  52-55 ;  in  1778,  59,  62- 
64. 

De  Barras,  French  Commodore,  com- 
mands squadron  in  Newport, 

1781,  174;  opinion  concern- 
ing des  Touches'  conduct,  174  ; 
junction  with  de  Grasse  in 
Chesapeake   Bay,    1781,    184. 

De  Bouille,  French  General,  governor 
of  Martinique,  1780,  concerts 
with  de  Guichen  an  attack 
on  British  West  Indies,  130; 
project      against      Barbados, 

1782,  197;  capture  of  St. 
Kitts,  197-205. 

De  Cordova,  Spanish  Admiral,  com- 
mands in  allied  fleet  under 
d'OrviUiers,  1779,  118,  119; 
in  chief  command,  at  Cadiz, 
125;  in  Channel,  1781,  188; 
in  1782,  228;  at  Algeciras, 
during  Howe's  relief  of  Gibral- 
tar,   230-232. 

D'Estaing,  Comte,  French  Admiral, 
in  chief  command,  in  1778, 
of  first  French  fleet  sent  to 
America,  59 ;  biographical 
summary  of,  59  (note) ;  Gov- 
ernment instructions  to,  59 ; 
slowness  of  movements  of, 
62-64  ;  failure  to  attack  Howe 
at  Sandy  Hook,  66-68;  pro- 
fessional inefficiency  of,  67, 
79,  111,  112;  proceeds  to 
Newport,  R.  I.,  69,  and  enters 
the  harbor,  70 ;  joins  Ameri- 
cans in  siege  of  the  town,  70 ; 
abandons  it  on  Howe's  ap- 
pearance and  puts  to  sea,  73 ; 
mancBUvres  against  Howe,  73- 
75 ;  fleet  scattered  by  gale, 
75 ;  refuses  to  renew  siege 
of  Newport,  and  goes  to 
Boston,  77,  78 ;  outgeneralled 
throughout     by     Howe,     78; 


INDEX 


271 


goes  to  West  Indies,  1779, 
100 ;  fails  to  recover  Santa 
Lucia,  102-104 ;  captures 
Grenada,  105 ;  action  with 
Byron,  106-112;  fails  in  at- 
tempt to  retake  Savannah, 
115;  returns  to  Europe  with 
ships  of  his  original  command, 
115;  sent  to  Cadiz,  in  1780, 
to  bring  back  to  Brest  French 
contingent  of  Allied  Fleet,  158. 
De  Grasse,  Comte,  French  Admiral, 
exercises  the  decisive  effect 
in  obtaining  American  Inde- 
pendence, 4 ;  sails  to  take 
chief    command    in    America, 

1781,  162;  action  with  Hood 
off  Martinique,  163-165  ;  Che- 
valier's comment  on  conduct 
of,  166 ;  abortive  attempt 
against  Santa  Lucia,  167 ; 
capture  of  Tobago  by,  168 ; 
goes  to  Cap  Frangois,  168, 
176,  and  there  prepares  for 
expedition  against  Cornwallis, 
178 ;  on  this  occasion  shows 
energy  and  foresight  unusual 
to  him,  178 ;  anchors  in 
Chesapeake  Bay,  178 ;  ac- 
tion with  Graves,  179-184; 
regains  Chesapeake,  184 ;  re- 
turns to  West  Indies  after 
Cornwallis's  surrender,  185 ; 
expedition   against   St.    Kitts, 

1782,  197-205;  outgeneralled 
by  Hood,  201,  204,  205;  St. 
Kitts  surrenders  to,  205 ; 
Hood  escapes  from,  205 ;  re- 
turns to  Martinique,  206 ; 
expedition  against  Jamaica, 
plan  of,  206 ;  puts  to  sea, 
207  ;  transactions  from  April 
8  to  April  12,  207-212;  de- 
feated in  great  battle  of 
April  12,  213-221,  and  cap- 
tured with  flagship,  221 ; 
professional  character  of,  illus- 
trated, 166,  178,  184,  198, 
205,  207,  209,  214,  215,  216. 

De  Guichen,  Comte  de,  succeeds 
d'Estaing  in  North  American 
command,  1780,  115,  130; 
biographical  summary  of,  115 
(note)  ;  project  of  against 
Barbados,      130 ;       frustrated 


by  Rodney,  130 ;  action  of 
April  17,  with  Rodney,  130- 
135 ;  orders  of  French  Gov- 
ernment to,  141 ;  consequent 
conduct  of,  141-145 ;  actions 
with  Rodney,  May  15,  142, 
and  May  19,  144 ;  broken 
down  by  responsibility,  145 ; 
under  orders,  accompanies 
Spanish  squadron  to  Cap 
Frangois,  147 ;  there  refuses 
to  cooperate  with  Americans, 
147  ;  returns  to  Europe,  148  ; 
commands  French  contingent 
to  Allied  Fleet  under  de  Cor- 
dova, 1781,  188;  advises 
attack  upon  British  Fleet 
in  Tor  Bay,  189 ;  loses  great 
part  of  West  India  military 
convoy  entrusted  to  his  charge, 
196. 

De  Langara,  Spanish  Admiral,  squad- 
ron under  command  of,  de- 
feated, and  himself  captured 
by  Rodney,  122,  123;  in- 
efficiency of,  125. 

D'Orves,  Comte,  French  Admiral, 
commands  in  East  Indies, 
1781,  235,  236;  joined  by 
Suffren,  239 ;  sails  for  Coro- 
mandel  Coast,  240 ;  dies,  and 
succeeded  by  Suffren,   240. 

D'Orvilliers,  Comte,  French  Admiral, 
commander-in-chief  of  Brest 
Fleet,  1778,  82;  puts  to  sea, 
82 ;  Government  instructions 
to,  83  ;  encounter  with  Brit- 
ish Fleet  under  Keppel,  83 ; 
manoeuvres  of,  and  action  of 
July  27,  83-91 ;  comment 
upon,  92,  97 ;  summer  cruise 
of,  1779,  116-120;  hampered 
by  instructions,  119;  re- 
turns to  Brest  unsuccessful, 
120. 

De  Suffren,  Bailli,  French  Captain 
and  Admiral,  with  d'Estaing 
in  Narragansett  Bay,  1778, 
69 ;  in  the  action  with  Byron 
off  Grenada,  111 ;  his  comment 
upon  d'Estaing's  conduct, 
111;  biographical  summary 
of.  111  (note)  ;  sails  for  East 
Indies,  1781,  163,  236;  effect 
upon  operations  of,  in  India, 


272 


INDEX 


by  capture  of  a  French  con- 
voy in  Bay  of  Biscay,  228 ; 
attacks  British  squadron  in 
Porto  Praya,  236-238;  saves 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  238; 
arrives  He  de  France,  239 ; 
succeeds  to  chief  command  in 
East  Indies,  240 ;  five  battles 
with  British  squadron,  240, 
242,  244,  247,  253;  captures 
Trincomalee,  1782,  247;  re- 
lieves Cuddalore,  252-254 ; 
estimate  of,  254,  255. 

De  Ternay,  French  Commodore, 
commands  squadron  with  con- 
voy, from  Brest  for  Newport, 
R.  I.,  155 ;  action  with  Brit- 
ish squadron  under  Corn- 
wallis,  1780,  155-157;  com- 
ment, favorable  and  unfavor- 
able, 156;  death  of,  1781, 
and  succeeded  by  des 
Touches,      170. 

Des  Touches,  French  Commodore, 
succeeds  de  Ternay  in  com- 
mand at  Newport,  1781,  170; 
sails  to  enter  Chesapeake 
Bay,  to  check  British  opera- 
tions in  Virginia,  170 ;  pur- 
sued by  Arbuthnot,  171 ; 
action  between  the  two  squad- 
rons, 171-173  ;  gains  tactical 
advantage,  but  leaves  the  field 
to  the  British,  174 ;  justified 
by  de  Barras,  who  arrives 
and    supersedes    him,   174. 

De  Vaudreuil,  Marquis,  French 
Admiral,  second  to  de  Grasse 
in  1782,  209;  commands-in- 
chief  partial  attack  on  Hood's 
division,  209  ;  quoted,  214 ; 
succeeds  to  chief  command 
upon  de  Grasse's  surrender, 
222 ;  condition  of  his  com- 
mand after  the  battle,  223 ; 
pursued  by  Rodney,  but 
reaches  Cap  Francois,  225. 

Doggers  Bank,  Battle  of  the,  1781, 
189-194. 

Dominica,  British  West  India  Island, 
captured  by  French,  1778,  99  ; 
battle  of,  208,  209,  210,  213, 
215. 

Douglas,  Sir  Charles,  British  naval 
captain,   commands  squadron 


which  relieves  Quebec,  1776, 
10;  quoted,  11,  14,  17,  18, 
22,  25,  26 ;  energetic  prepara- 
tions by,  to  regain  control 
of  Lake  Champlain,  15-17 ; 
force  created  by,  17;  made 
a  baronet  for  his  services  at 
this  time,  26 ;  captain  of  the 
fleet  to  Rodney,  1782,  222; 
opinion  as  to  Rodney's  con- 
duct cited,  222. 

Farragut,  at  Mobile,  cited  in  illus- 
tration, 66  (note). 

Fighting  Instructions,  Additional, 
point  in,  bearing  upon  the 
failure  of  Rodney's  plan  of 
attack,  April  17,  1780,  133, 
138,   139   (and  note). 

"Fleet  in  Being,"  73,  174;  how 
regarded,  apparently,  by 
D'OrviUiers  in   1779,    119. 

France,  intervention  of  France  in 
the  American  quarrel  deter- 
mined by  Burgoyne's  defeat, 
and  leads  to  Spanish  inter- 
vention, 3,  58,  116;  vacil- 
lating naval  instructions  of 
Government  of,  83,  118,  119, 
141,  154;  divergence  of  views 
between  Spain  and,  120,  121, 
147,  158,  186,  188,   189. 

France,  He  de  (now  Mauritius), 
French  naval  station  in  Indian 
Ocean,  126,  234,  236,  239. 

Gardiner's  Bay,  east  end  of  Long 
Island,  station  of  British 
fleet  under  Arbuthnot,  watch- 
ing French  at  Newport,  151, 
170. 

Gates,  Horatio,  American  General, 
defeated  by  Cornwallis  at 
Camden,  152. 

George,  Lake,  a  link  in  consecutive 
water  communications  from 
New  York  to  Canada,  7,  51. 

Gibraltar,  d'Estaing  ordered  to 
commence  hostilities  when 
forty  leagues  west  of,  59 ; 
capture  of,  a  leading  object 
with  Spanish  Government, 
120 ;  this  desire  affects  the 
major  operations  of  Allies 
throughout  the  war,  121,  186; 


INDEX 


273 


blockade  of,  by  land  and  sea, 
121 ;  Rodney's  relief  of,  1780, 
121-126,  157;  Darby's  relief 
of,  1781,  186,  188;  Howe's 
relief   of,    1782,   229-233. 

Glossary,  of  technical  terms  used 
in  this  book,  257. 

Grant,  James,  British  General,  share 
of  in  capture  of  Santa  Lucia, 
102-104. 

Graves,  Sir  Thomas,  British  Admiral, 
brings  reinforcement  of  vessels 
to  New  York,  151 ;  relieves 
Arbuthnot  in  command  of 
North  American  Station,  1781, 
176 ;  difficulties  of,  owing  to 
interception  of  communica- 
tions, 177;  joined  by  Hood 
off  New  York,  177;  sails  for 
the  relief  of  Cornwallis,  178 ; 
action  of,  with  French  fleet 
under  de  Grasse,  179-184 ; 
conduct  of,  criticized  by  Hood, 
181,  182,  184;  returns  to 
New  York,  184 ;  relieves 
Sir  Peter  Parker  in  Jamaica^ 
command,  185. 

Great  Britain,  feeble  hold  of,  upon 
Canada,  1775,  10 ;  shown  by 
rewards  for  saving  the  colony, 
26 ;  inadequate  provision  of 
force  by,  1774-1776,  29,  30, 
59,  62,  79,  82,  99,  112,  116, 
117,  120,  127,  148,  189,  193, 
226 ;  improper  dispersion  of 
effort  by,  30,  31,  48,  52,  56, 
62,  63,  72,  113-115,  151-153, 
175 ;  distrust  of  Government 
of,  among  naval  officers,  79, 
81,  93,  95,  97,  99,  135,  146, 
157,  158,  193;  alarm  in, 
produced  by  Allied  fleets  in 
Channel,  1779,  117;  declares 
war  against  Holland,  1780, 158. 

Grenada,  British  West  India  Island, 
captured  by  French,  105 ; 
naval  battle  off,   105-112. 

Haiti,  French  West  India  Island, 
147,  148,  168  (see  "Cap 
Francois ") ;  squadron  action 
off  north  coast  of,  153-155. 

Hardy,  Sir  Charles,  British  Admiral, 
commands  Channel  Fleet,  117, 
119. 


Holland,  brought  into  War  of  Ameri- 
can Independence  by  con- 
curring in  Armed  Neutrality 
of  Baltic  Powers,  1780,  3,  158, 
236 ;  colonial  possessions  of, 
3,  158,  160-162,  236,  240, 
246;  St.  Eustatius,  St.  Mar- 
tin, and  Saba,  West  India 
Islands  of,  taken  by  Rodney, 
160-162;  battle  of  Doggers 
Bank,  189-193 ;  fleet  of,  held 
in  check  by  Howe,  1782,  228 ; 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  menaced 
by  British,  saved  by  Suffren, 
236-238 ;  Trincomalee,  in 
Ceylon,  taken  by  British, 
240,  recaptured  by  Suffren, 
247. 

Hood,  Sir  Samuel  (afterwards  Lord), 
British  Admiral,  arrives  in 
West  Indies,  1781,  with  re- 
inforcements for  Rodney,  160 ; 
sent  to  cruise  off  Martinique, 
to  intercept  de  Grasse,  162 ; 
action  between,  and  de 
Grasse,  163-167 ;  exceptional 
abiHty  of,  166,  184;  French 
tribute  to,  167;  sent  by  Rod- 
ney with  fourteen  ships-of-the- 
line  to  reinforce  North  Ameri- 
can station,  176 ;  under  com- 
mand of  Admiral  Graves, 
sails  for  Chesapeake,  177 ; 
part  of,  in  action  between 
Graves  and  de  Grasse,  180- 
183 ;  criticisms  of,  upon 
Graves's  conduct,  181,  182, 
184 ;  returns  to  West  Indies, 
185 ;  in  chief  command  there 
for  two  months,  196-205; 
brilliant  operations  of,  at 
St.  Kitts,  197-205;  super- 
seded by  Rodney's  return, 
205 ;  part  of,  in  action  of 
April  9,  1782,  208-210;  in 
battle  of  April  12,  212-221; 
de  Grasse' s  flagship  strikes 
to,  221 ;  censures  passed  by, 
upon  Rodney's  course  after 
the  battle,  220,  222,  224,  225 ; 
detached  in  pursuit,  captures 
a  small  French  squadron,  224 ; 
returns  to  England  after  the 
peace,  226. 

Hotham,     William,     British     naval 


274 


INDEX 


Captain,  in  operations  against 
New  York,  1776,  42  ;  convoys 
reinforcement  of  troops  to 
West  Indies,  100;  left  in 
West  Indies  in  temporary 
command,  by  Rodney,  148. 
Howe,  Richard,  Earl,  British  Ad- 
miral, appointed  to  command 
North  American  Station,  1776, 
30  ;  invested  also  with  powers 
as  peace  commissioner,  39  ; 
arrives  at  New  York,  39 ; 
failure  of  peace  negotiations, 
39  ;  operations  at  and  about 
New  York,  39,  42-47;  trib- 
ute of,  to  force  under  his 
command,  47 ;  accompanies 
army  expedition  to  Chesa- 
peake Bay,  52 ;  operations 
in  the  Delaware,  53-55,  and 
coastwise,  56 ;  purpose  of 
d'Estaing  to  intercept,  in 
Delaware,  59 ;  serious  ex- 
posure of,  through  inadequate 
force,  62,  66 ;  extricates  him- 
self by  rapid  movements,  62- 
64 ;  preparations  to  defend 
entrance  to  New  York,  65- 
68 ;  inferiority  of  force  to 
d'Estaing,  66  ;  follows  French 
Fleet  to  Narragansett  Bay, 
70,  and  by  his  presence  there 
induces  d'Estaing  to  abandon 
siege  of  Newport,  and  put 
to  sea,  73 ;  manoeuvres  of, 
with  inferior  force,  73-75; 
fleet  of,  scattered  by  gale,  75 ; 
returns  to  New  York,  76, 
and  again  follows  French 
Fleet  to  Boston,  77 ;  admir- 
able qualities  of,  as  illustrated 
in  this  campaign,  78 ;  fu- 
tile contemporary  criticism 
of,  79  ;  relinquishes  command, 
and  returns  to  England,  1778, 
81 ;  not  employed  again,  un- 
til change  of  Ministry,  1782, 
81,  227;  appointed  to  com- 
mand Channel  Fleet,  1782, 
and  primary  operations  there, 
227-229 ;  successful  evasion 
of  very  superior  Franco-Span- 
ish Fleet,  229  ;  skilful  conduct 
of  relief  of  Gibraltar  by,  1782, 
229-231 ;      engagement     with 


Allied  Fleet,  232;  special 
qualities  of,  again  illustrated, 
232;  French  eulogy  of,  232, 
and  of  force  under  his  com- 
mand, 233. 
Howe,  Sir  William  (brother  of  Earl), 
British  General,  failure  of  to 
support  Burgoyne,  1777,  28, 
51,     52 ;      evacuates    Boston, 

1776,  and  retires  to  Halifax, 
29,  30  ;  extent  of  regions  under 
his  command-in-chief,  30  ;  ap- 
pointed peace  commissioner, 
jointly  with  Lord  Howe,  39 ; 
goes  from  Halifax  to  New 
York,  39 ;  fruitless  peace 
negotiations,  39 ;  reduction 
of  New  York  by,  42-45; 
subsequent  operations  of,  to 
Battle  of  Trenton,  45-49; 
constitutional  sluggishness  of, 
45,  47  ;  occupies  Narragansett 
Bay,  48 ;  injudicious  exten- 
sion of  front  of  operations,  48  ; 
small  results  after  New  York, 
49  ;  rewarded  with  the  Order 
of  the  Bath,  49 ;  takes  the 
greater  part  of  his  force  to 
Chesapeake  Bay,  52 ;  effect 
of  this  upon  Burgoyne's  oper- 
ations, 52,  53,  55 ;  occupies 
Philadelphia,  53 ;  this  suc- 
cess worse  than  fruitless,  56 ; 
relieved  in  command  by  Clin- 
ton, and  returns  to  England, 
56,  63. 

Hudson  River,  a  link  in  the  chain 
of  water  communications  from 
Canada  to  New  York,  7,  30, 
45;  mentioned,  28,  41,  44, 
45,  46,  49,  50,  51,  53;  al- 
ternative name.  North  River, 
41 ;  Washington  retreats 
across,  into  New  Jersey,  45 ; 
British  advance  up  valley  of, 

1777,  55. 

Hughes,  Sir  Edward,  British  Ad- 
miral, commander-in-chief  in 
East  Indies,  1779,  235  ;  enter- 
prise of,  235 ;  engagements 
with  French  Fleet  under  Suf- 
fren,  240,  242,  244,  247,  253; 
loses  Trincomalee,  247,  and 
compelled  thereby  to  leave 
Coromandel  coast  for  Bombay 


INDEX 


275 


251 ;  reinforced  by  Bicker- 
ton,  251 ;  contrasted  with 
Suffren,  as  a  general  officer, 
254. 

Hughes,  Sir  Richard,  succeeds  to 
West  India  command  at  peace 
of  1783,  226;  subsequent 
controversy  with  Nelson,  226. 

Hyder,  Ali,  Sultan  of  Mysore,  at 
war  with  British,  1779,  235; 
French  Admiral  d'Orves  re- 
fuses cooperation  with,  235 ; 
Suffren  acts  with,  240,  242; 
captures  Cuddalore,  1782, 
244;  death  of,  1782,  252; 
succeeded  by  Tippoo  Saib, 
252. 

Inflexible,  British  cruiser  built  by 
Sir  Charles  Douglas  on  Lake 
Champlain,  1776,  16;  in 
herself  sufficient  to  control 
the  lake,  17. 

Jamaica,  British  West  India  Island, 
38,  110,  149,  153,  159,  176, 
177,  185,  224,  226;  conquest 
of,  intended  by  France  and 
Spain,  1782,  206;  attempt 
leads  to  defeat  of  de  Grasse 
by  Rodney,  208,  209;  Rod- 
ney repairs  to,  after  his  vic- 
tory, 225. 

Japan,  significance  of  contrast  of 
population  of,  to  square  mile, 
with  that  of  the  United  States, 
5. 

Johnstone,  George,  British  Com- 
modore, commands  squadron 
despatched  to  take  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  from  Dutch,  236 ; 
attacked  by  Suffren  in  Porto 
Praya  Bay,  237;  arrives  at 
Cape  too  late,  Suffren  having 
strengthened  it,  238;  returns 
to  England,  238;  profes- 
sional capacity  of,  239 ;  at- 
tacks made  by,  upon  profes- 
sional conduct  of  Howe  and 
Keppel,  239.    (See  also  p.  80.) 

Jones,  John  Paul,  American  naval 
captain,  serves  as  a  volunteer 
in  French  Fleet,  1782,  212. 

Kempenfelt,    Richard,    British    Ad- 


miral, captures  in  Bay  of 
Biscay  great  part  of  French 
convoy  going  to  West  Indies, 
1781,  195,  196;  commands 
a  division  in  Channel  Fleet 
under  Howe,  1782,  227,  228; 
lost  in  sinking  of  the  Royal 
George,  229. 
Keppel,  Augustus,  British  Admiral, 
refuses  to  serve  against  Ameri- 
cans, 81 ;  commander-in-chief 
of  Channel  Fleet,  1778,  61, 
82 ;  encounter  with  French 
Brest  Fleet,  83-91;  com- 
ments on  the  conduct  of, 
92,  97 ;  controversy  with 
Palliser,  third  in  command 
under,  95 ;  returns  to  port 
with  fleet,  96 ;  court  martial 
upon,  93;  and  cited  from, 
87,  88,  95 ;  resigns  command, 
97 ;  becomes  first  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  97,  225;  quoted, 
107  (note). 

La  Motte  Picquet,  French  Com- 
modore, 1 15  ;  action  with  a 
British  division  off  Marti- 
nique, 1779,  128;  encounter 
with  squadron  under  Corn- 
wallis,  1780,  153-155;  cap- 
tures great  part  of  a  British 
convoy  returning  from  West 
Indies,  1781,  188;  quoted, 
229  (note). 

Leeward  Islands  Station,  extent  of, 
99 ;  under  command  of  Bar- 
rington  when  war  begins,  1778, 
99 ;  Byron  succeeds  to  com- 
mand, 1779,  105;  held  tem- 
porarily by  Hyde  Parker, 
1779,  113;  Rodney  takes 
command,  1780,  121,  128; 
Hood  in  temporary  charge 
of,  1782,  177,  185,  196- 
205 ;  Rodney  relieved  by 
Pigot,  225. 

Les  Saintes,  small  West  India  Islands, 
between  Dominica  and  Guade- 
loupe, scene  of  Rodney's 
battle  with  de  Grasse,  209, 
211,  213. 

Manners,  Lord  Robert,  British  naval 
captain  (killed  in   the   battle 


276 


INDEX 


of  April  12,  1782),  encomiums 
of,  upon  Hood,  quoted,  202, 
205. 

Martinique,  French  West  India 
Island,  99,  104,  128,  130, 
140,  141,  142,  144,  147,  149, 
153,  167,  206,  207;  principal 
French  depot  in  West  Indies, 
100 ;  action  off,  between  de 
Grasse  and  Hood,  162-167. 

Mathews,  Thomas,  British  Admiral, 
Influence  in  British  Navy  of 
court  martial  upon,  in  1744, 
93,  139. 

Minorca,  Mediterranean  Island  in 
British  possession,  Byng's  ac- 
tion off,  1756,  93,  94 ;  recovery 
of,  a  primary  object  with 
Spain,  120 ;  supplied  by  Rod- 
ney, 1780,  125,  126;  by 
Darby,  1781,  187;  attack 
upon  by  France  and  Spain, 
1781,  188;  capitulates,  1782, 
189. 

Mobile,  Farragut's  attack  in  en- 
tering, cited  in  illustration, 
66  (note). 

Monroe  Doctrine,  in  last  analysis 
is  the  formulation,  in  terms, 
of  a  purpose  to  prevent  the 
propagation  to  the  American 
continents  of  wars  arising 
elsewhere,  4 ;  recognition  of 
same  danger  in  unchecked 
Asiatic  immigration,  4  ;  neces- 
sity of  adequate  force  in  order 
to  maintain,  29. 

Montgomery,  Richard,  American 
General,  sent  by  the  Congress 
to  conduct  invasion  of  Can- 
ada, 9 ;  killed  in  assault  on 
Quebec,  10. 

Moultrie,  Fort,  Description  of,  33. 

Moultrie,  William,  American  officer, 
commands  Fort  Moultrie 
when  attacked  by  British 
squadron,  32-36. 

Narragansett  Bay,  occupation  of  by 
British,  1777,  47;  value  of, 
47,  56 ;  Rodney's  opinion 
of,  48,  115;  description  of, 
69  ;  military  and  naval  situa- 
tion in,  1778,  72,  73;  aban- 
donment of,  by  British,  1779, 


because  of  improper  disper- 
sion of  their  army,  113,  114, 
115;  occupied  by  French 
squadron  and  troops,  1780, 
149,  150,  155-157;  Rodney 
neglects  to  attack,  150; 
French  division  in,  watched 
by  British  from  Gardiner's 
Bay,  151,  170;  but  starts, 
1781,  for  Chesapeake  Bay, 
170 ;  returns  to,  unsuccess- 
ful, 173 ;  sails  again  from, 
177,  and  joins  main  fleet  in 
the  Chesapeake,  184. 
Navy,  and  Navies,  Washington's 
remark  that  to  them  belonged 
"the  casting  vote"  in  the 
War  of  American  Independ- 
ence, 4,  147 ;  exercised  on 
two  decisive  occasions,  by 
Arnold    on   Lake    Champlain, 

1776,  and  by  de  Grasse  at 
Yorktown,  1781,  4,  7,  9,  168, 
176,  178,  179,  184;  decisive 
influence  also  in  American 
War  of  Secession,  4 ;  present 
and  future  dependence  upon, 
of  Monroe  Doctrine  and  of 
question  of  Asiatic  Immigra- 
tion, 4,  5 ;  military  explana- 
tion for  this  "casting  vote," 
5 ;  Pacific  question  essen- 
tially one  of,  5  ;  military  rea- 
sons for  general  dominant 
effect  of,  in  War  of  Independ- 
ence, 6,  114;  British,  saves 
Canada  for  Great  Britain,  12  ; 
specific  effect,  on  ultimate 
result  of  the  general  war, 
exerted  by  American,  on 
Lake  Champlain,  1776,  12, 
13,  14,  25 ;  inadequacy  of 
British,  to  demands  upon  it,  29, 
30,  59,  62,  79,  82,  99,  116,  117, 
120,  127,  148,  189,  193,  226; 
British,  in  operations  at 
New  York,  1776,  40,  44, 
47 ;    in   Burgoyne's   advance, 

1777,  51 ;  misuse  of  British, 
to  divide  the  land  forces,  51, 
62,  114,  115,  152;  subsidiary 
operations  of  British,  56 ,  in 
the  Carolinas,  151,  in  Vir- 
ginia, 170;  under  Howe, 
though      inadequate,       saves 


INDEX 


277 


Army  under  Clinton,  63,  64, 
and  also  New  York,  64-68, 
and  subsequently  Narragan- 
sett  Bay  with  army  division 
at  Newport,  72,  77;  tone  of 
French,  as  indicated  by  Gov- 
ernment instructions,  and 
action  of  officers,  83,  89,  91,  92, 
166,  235 ;  effect  of  seasonal 
conditions  upon  operations  of, 
in  Europe  and  in  America, 
98,  100,  113,  115,  147,  149, 
159;  in  East  Indies,  251; 
inefficiency  of  Spanish.  116, 
125,   147,   189,  231,  232. 

Nelson,  mentioned  or  quoted,  38, 
39,  109,  126,  132,  140,  155, 
160,  202,  225,  226,  243. 

New  Jersey,  Washington  crosses 
from  New  York  into,  45 ; 
operations  in,  1776,  46-49 ; 
impracticable  to  British,  in 
1777,  and  consequent  effect 
upon  Howe's  course,  51,  52, 
56 ;  retreat  of  British  from 
Philadelphia  through,  1778, 
63,  64. 

Newport,  Rhode  Island,  taken  pos- 
session of  by  British,  47 ; 
importance  of,  48 ;  siege  of, 
by  Americans  and  French, 
70,  73,  77;  abandoned  by 
British,  115;  occupied  by 
French,  150, 155, 170, 173,  174, 
179.     See  Narragansett  Bay. 

New  York,  water  communications 
between  St.  Lawrence  and, 
7,  8 ;  British  occupy  harbor 
of,  1776,  38 ;  operations 
around,  1776,  39-46;  har- 
bor, approaches,  and  forti- 
fications about,  40-42 ;  Wash- 
ington abandons,  45,  46 ; 
British  occupy,  45 ;  British 
forces  in,  unable  to  cooperate 
with  those  in  Philadelphia,  56, 
63 ;  Lord  Howe's  prepara- 
tions to  defend,  64-67;  d'Es- 
taing's  failure  to  attack,  67, 
68 ;  Rodney  goes  from  West 
Indies  to,  150,  152,  159. 

Order,  of  Battle,  93  (and  note),  137- 
140,  191 ;  comparison  be- 
tween  Keppel's,   off   Ushant, 


and  Byron's,  off  Grenada,  112  ; 
Graves',  off  Cape  Henry, 
179-183,  criticized  by  Hood, 
181,  182;  Hood's  at  anchor 
off  St.  Kitts,  202,  203. 

Palliser,  Sir  Hugh,  British  Admiral, 
third  in  command  at  Battle  of 
Ushant,  84,  87,  90,  91,  93-96; 
court  of  inquiry  upon,  95-97. 

Parker,  Sir  Hyde,  (1)  British  Ad- 
miral, left  in  temporary  com- 
mand at  New  York  by  Howe, 
1778,  80  (and  note)  ;  in  like 
position  in  Leeward  Islands 
by  Byron,  1779-1780,  113, 
128 ;  biographical  summary 
of,  113;  quoted,  129,  130; 
nickname  of,  130 ;  implied 
censure  of,  by  Rodney,  in 
battle  of  April  17,  1780,  136 ; 
returns  to  England,  136 ; 
commands  at  Battle  of  the 
Dogger  Bank,  189-193;  his 
reply  to  George  III,  193; 
ordered  to  East  Indian  com- 
mand, and  lost  at  sea,  194. 

Parker,  Hyde,  (2)  British  Naval 
captain  (afterwards  Admiral 
Sir  Hyde),  in  operations  about 
New  York,  1776,  39,  44,  46; 
in  expedition  against  Savan- 
nah, 1778,  113,  114;  bio- 
graphical summary  of,  113 
(note).  (In  1801,  commander- 
in-chief  over  Nelson,  at  Copen- 
hagen, 39,  80,  note). 

Parker,  Sir  Peter,  British  Admiral, 
commands  naval  force  in 
expedition  against  Charles- 
ton, 1776,  31 ;  attack  of, 
upon  Fort  Moultrie,  33-38; 
gives  promotion  to  Nelson, 
Collingwood,  and  Saumarez, 
38 ;  at  operations  around 
New  York,  38,  43,  45,  and  at 
Narragansett  Bay,  48 ;  com- 
mands Jamaica  Station,  149, 
153,  155,  159,  176,  177,  185; 
superseded  at  Jamaica  by 
Graves,  1781,  185. 

Pellew,  Edward,  (afterwards  Ad- 
miral Lord  Exmouth),  Brit- 
ish midshipman,  at  Lake 
Champlain,      1776,     22;      in 


278 


INDEX 


Burgoyne's  advance  to  Sara- 
toga, 1777,  51. 
Philadelphia,  occupation  of,  by  Brit- 
ish, 52-55 ;  brief  tenure  of, 
55 ;  inutility  of,  to  British, 
56 ;  evacuation  of,  by  British, 
and  hazardous  retreat  from, 
to  New  York,  63,  64. 

Quebec,  attack  upon  by  Americans, 
under  Montgomery,  1775,  9, 
10 ;  blockade  of,  by  Arnold, 
1776,  10,  11;  relieved  by 
British  navy,  10-12;  utility 
of,  to  British  preparations 
to  control  Lake  Champlain, 
15-17,  26. 

Raids,  by  British  navy,  56,  114. 

Rhode  Island,  47,  48,  69,  70,  72, 
77,  78,  79,  115,  150,  155. 
See    Narragansett    Bay. 

Riedesel,  Baron,  commander  of  Ger- 
man troops  in  Canada,  1776 ; 
testimony  of,  to  effects  of 
delay  by  Arnold's  flotilla  on 
Lake  Champlain,  13,  25 ; 
quoted,  21,  23. 

Rochambeau,  French  general,  com- 
manding forces  in  America, 
requests  cooperation  of  de 
Grasse  against  Cornwallis, 
168. 

Rodney,  Sir  George  (afterwards 
Lord),  British  Admiral,  ap- 
pointed to  command  Leeward 
Islands  Station,  1779,  115, 
121 ;  sails  to  relieve  Gibraltar, 
122 ;  on  the  way,  destroys 
two  Spanish  squadrons,  122- 
125 ;  relieves  the  place,  and 
sails  for  West  Indies,  125, 
126  ;  actions  with  de  Guichen, 
April  and  May,  1780,  130- 
135,  142-144 ;  censures  offi- 
cers of  the  fleet,  135-139,  145  ; 
further  proceedings  in  West 
Indies,  1780,  146-150;  takes 
fleet  to  New  York,  150,  and 
turns  to  West  Indies,  159 ; 
capture  of  Dutch  islands,  1781, 
160 ;  proceedings  of,  at  St. 
Eustatius,  161,  162 ;  sends 
Hood  off  Martinique  to  in- 
tercept de  Grasse,  162 ;    suc- 


cesses of  de  Grasse  against, 
167,  168;  sends  Hood  to 
New  York  with  fleet,  176, 
177,  and  returns  to  England 
on  leave,  177 ;  returns  to 
West  Indies,  1782,  and  re- 
joins Hood,  205;  pursuit  of 
French  armament  against  Ja- 
maica, 207-212 ;  victory  of, 
in  battle  of  April  12,  213-220  ; 
failure  of,  to  improve  his 
success,  220-225 ;  superseded 
by  Pigot,  and  returns  finally 
to  England,  225. 
Rowley,  Joshua,  British  Admiral, 
brilliant  conduct  of,  in  Byron's 
action,  106,  107,  109;  im- 
plicitly censured  by  Rodney, 
136. 

Sandy  Hook,  at  entrance  to  New 
York  Harbor,  52,  63,  64,  65, 
66,  76,  113,  150,  177,  184, 
185.  Lord  Howe's  prepara- 
tions at,  for  defence  of  New 
York,  1778,  65,  66. 

Santa  Lucia,  French  West  India 
Island,  capture  of,  by  Brit- 
ish, 1778,  100-102;  d'Es- 
taing's  ineffectual  attempt  to 
retake,  103,  104 ;  military 
value  of,  104,  207;  de 
Guichen  seeks  to  retake,  142 ; 
mentioned,  105,  106,  128,  141, 
144,   148,   165,   167,   168,  206. 

Saratoga,  surrender  of  Burgoyne 
at,  why  decisive,  3,  6 ;  capitu- 
lation there,  determined  by 
Arnold's  defence  of  Lake 
Champlain,  3,  7,  13,  14,  25; 
Burgoyne's  surrender  at,  28, 
50-53. 

Saumarez,  James  (afterwards  Lord 
de),  British  naval  officer,  mid- 
shipman at  attack  upon  Fort 
Moultrie,  1776,  35,  38;  lieu- 
tenant at  the  battle  of  the 
Dogger  Bank,  1781,  192 
(note)  ;  captain  in  West  Indies, 
1782,  196  ;  biographical  sum- 
mary of,  196  (note)  ;  in 
Rodney's  victory,  1782,  218, 
221. 

Savannah,  capture  of,  by  British, 
1778,    113;     disastrous    effect 


INDEX 


279 


of  operations  thus  initiated 
upon  the  British  position  in 
America,  114,  115,  151-153, 
175-178,  184 ;  failure  of  d'Es- 
taing's  attempt  to  retake, 
115,  151. 

Schuyler,  Philip,  American  General, 
commanding  Northern  De- 
partment,  1776 ;    quoted,    12. 

Seasons,  effect  of,  upon  naval  opera- 
tions, 98,  113,  115,  145,  149, 
159,   251. 

Spain,  induced  to  enter  the  war,  1779, 
3,  116;  cruise  of  fleet  of,  in 
conjunction  with  French, 
1779,  116-121;  divergence  of 
views  between  France  and, 
120,  121,  147,  158,  186;  two 
squadrons  of,  dispersed  or 
destroyed  by  Rodney,  122- 
126 ;  inefficiency  of  navy  of, 
125,  126,  147,  158,  187-189; 
fruitless  cruise  of  fleet  of,  in 
conjunction  with  French, 
1781,  188,  189;  projected 
conquest   of   Jamaica,    206. 

St.  Eustatius,  Dutch  West  India 
Island,  capture  of,  by  British, 
1781,  160-162;  a  great  trade 
centre  in  the  war,  prior  to 
capture,  160. 

St.  Kitts,  British  West  India  Island, 
attacked  by  French,  1782, 
196;  naval'  operations  of 
Hood  and  de  Grasse  about, 
196-205 ;  capitulates  to 
French,  owing  to  lack  of 
British  land  force,   205. 

St.  Lawrence,  River,  the  centre  of 
French  power  in  Canada,  7 ; 
strength  of,  as  a  military  line, 
7,  8 ;  as  a  naval  line  of  com- 
munications, closed  by  ice, 
10,  11,  but  at  other  seasons 
controlling,  11,  12;  relations, 
to  the  decisive  naval  cam- 
paign on  Lake  Champlain, 
1776,  15-17,  25-26. 

Ticonderoga,  strong  post  at  head 
of  Lake  Champlain,  8,  9,  13, 
18,  20,  27,  28,  46,  50;  saved 
from  capture  in  1775,  and 
1776,  by  Arnold's  naval  ac- 
tion on  Lake   Champlain,   9, 


13,  25;  taken  by  British,  1777, 
but  reoccupied  by  Americans 
after  Burgoyne's  surrender,  28. 

Tiller.     See  "  Helm." 

Tippoo  Saib,  Sultan  of  Mysore,  in 
India,  succeeds  his  father, 
Hyder  Ali,  1782,  and  continues 
his  policy,  252, 

Tobago,  British  West  India  Island, 
taken  by  French,  167,  168. 

Trenton,  battle  of,  48. 

Trincomalee,  harbor  in  Ceylon,  a 
Dutch  possession  in  1780,  cap- 
tured by  British,  1782,  240; 
importance,  and  imperfect  de- 
fences, of,  240,  242,  244,  251, 
252,  255;  taken  by  French, 
1782,  247;  naval  battle  off, 
between  Hughes  and  Suffren, 
247-251. 

Ushant,  battle  of,  83-93. 

Valcour,  Island  in  Lake  Champlain, 
15,  17,  18,  20,  21,  23,  24; 
selected  by  Arnold  as  the 
position  in  which  to  await 
British  advance,  1776,  15; 
description  of,  19,  20 ;  battle 
of,  20-23 ;  American  retreat 
from,  23-25. 

Washington,  George,  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  American  armies, 
expression  of,  that  the  navies 
had  "the  casting  vote"  in 
the  War  of  Independence,  4, 
151 ;  arrangements  of,  for 
defence  of  New  York  City, 
1776,  41-43;  withdraws  the 
exposed  division  on  Brooklyn 
Heights,  43,  44 ;  successive 
retirements  of,  to  Harlem 
River,  to  New  Jersey,  and 
across  Delaware  River,  44- 
46 ;  wins  battle  of  Trenton, 
1776,  and  recovers  great  part 
of  New  Jersey,  48,  49 ;  com- 
ment of,  on  Howe's  sailing 
from  New  York,  1777,  52; 
disputes,  unsuccessfully, 
Howe's  advance  on  Phila- 
delphia, 53,  55  ;  skilful  strate- 
gic position  of,  in  New  Jersey 
hills,  56 ;    comment  of,  upon 


280 


INDEX 


effects  of  d'Estaing's  long 
passage  out,  1778,  63 ;  hot 
pursuit  by,  of  Clinton  in 
retreat  from  Philadelphia  to 
New  York,  64 ;  disappoint- 
ment of,  at  failure  of  French 
naval  assistance,  1780,  150, 
152  ;  comment  of,  on  Arnold's 
treason,  152 ;  with  Rocham- 
beau,  asks  cooperation  of 
de  Grasse,  1781,  168;  move- 
ment of,  against  Cornwallis 
at  Yorktown,  178,  184;  sur- 
render of  Cornwallis  to,  185; 
mentioned  incidentally,  67, 72. 

Washington,  Fort,  commanding  Hud- 
son River,  1776,  44,  46; 
Washington  orders  evacua- 
tion of,  45  ;  stormed  by  Brit- 
ish, and  garrison  taken,  46. 

West  Indies,  dependence  of,  upon 
American  continent,  60 ;  sea- 
sonal conditions  in,  affecting 
naval  operations,  98,  115, 
149,     159 ;      commercial    im- 


portance of,  98 ;  naval  battles 
in,  103,  106-112,  129,  130- 
135,  142-144,  153,  163-167, 
198-205,  207-220. 
White,  Thomas,  British  naval  author 
serving  during  War  of  Ameri- 
can Independence,  quoted, 
108,  183  (note),  204. 

Yorktown,  series  of  events  which 
brought  Cornwallis  to,  152, 
153,  169,  170,  174,  175 ;  naval 
actions  affecting  control  of 
waters  around,  170-173,  179- 
184 ;  Cornwallis  shut  up  in, 
176 ;  French  navy  in  force 
before,  184 ;  French  and 
American  armies  arrive  be- 
fore, 184 ;  surrender  of  Corn- 
wallis at,  185. 

Zoutman,  Johan  A.,  Dutch  Admiral, 
commands  the  squadron  at 
the  battle  of  the  Dogger 
Bank,  189-193. 


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